Yes, that is what I mean. I define subjective as of the subject, and objective as of the objective. Judgement is something that subjects do therefore all judgements are subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your terminology, is a judgement that same as a proposition, that is, a sentence that can be either true or false? If that is the case, then the proposition "all judgements are subjective" is also a judgement, and is also subjective, and so cannot be objectively true. As such, the proposition is a self-contradiction.

Consider an octagon. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I admit that in this example, it is hard to judge if it is closer to a square or a circle. But the challenge here is due to the challenging example and not due to judgements always being subjective. Here is another easier example. In this drawing, is E closer to D or G? The objectively right answer is "E is closer to G than D". This statement is clearly objective.

Let's recap the comparisons so far between the Stone hypothesis S and the Christian hypothesis C.

• S is found figuratively; C is found literally, as least some of it.
• S is found in most religious books; C is also found in most religious books, at least for one of its two main commandments.
• S is about eternal life and health; C is primarily about the meaning of life, and secondarily about eternal life and the beginning and end of the world.
• S can only be proven true empirically through scientific experiments, and this it has not yet been done publicly; C can be proven true, or at least reasonable, rationally through philosophical arguments, and this has been done many times, like in the OP argument.

Conclusion: C is more reasonable and more ambitious than S. Following the Principle of Parsimony, in order to defend S, C needs to be refuted.

what you write in your second paragraph has not been established at the stage of Aquinas' arguing for God's existence. — pico

Maybe not, but my aim is merely to reconcile the conclusion in the argument from degree that perfect moral goodness exists which is what christians call God, and Aquinas' claim that God is not a member of any genus, by showing that the two are not incompatible.

It begs the question to claim that God's essence is identical with His existence and then to use that claim as a premise in an argument for God's existence like the Fourth Way. — pico

The Fourth Way, or argument from degree, is not dependant on the claim that God's essence is identical with His existence. The argument only depends on the definition of 'goodness' as defined in the OP, and the acceptance that moral goodness is objective.

Aquinas proves that God's essence is identical with His existence in his Second Way, which is an argument separate and independent from the Fourth Way.

How the bible should be interpreted: With regards to interpretation, not truth, the literal interpretation is always the simplest. Now regarding creation specifically, granted, the 6-day period is not to be taken literally, because it has been disproved by science. But the statement that God created the world out of nothing is supported by metaphysical arguments.

The Stone is referenced in the Bible, the Quran, the Bhagavad Gita, in Taoism, Buddhism, and in fact just about every mainstream religion. — Pilgrim

Unfortunately, the same argument can be used to support the christian interpretation of the bible. In christianity, one of the two Great Commandments is the Golden Rule: Love you neighbour as yourself. And the Golden Rule is found in some form in almost every ethical tradition. Source

Hello Mr Amateur. I accept your additional points on the bible.

To claim purpose we must look at the action of the thing as a part, with a function, in a larger context. So in relation to the human being, the eyes have a function, a purpose, and that is to see. The eyes, as a part of the human being, see for the human being, and that's why we can say that they have a purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I accept that distinction, that the purpose of the human parts are relative to the human being. That said, that kind of purpose is nevertheless objective. It would be wrong to say that the purpose of the eyes relative to the human being is not to see. ... Now it makes me wonder if all beings with a purpose must be a purpose towards another being ...

How does choosing something change it from subjective to objective? [...] Take your example of a circle. We decide to judge a shape for circularity rather than squareness. What, in your mind makes this type of goodness objective? We have some principles by which we determine circularity, but these exist in, and were created by, the minds of subjects, therefore they are subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not change from subjective to objective. It was never subjective in the first place; only relative to the perfect nature. The fact that these perfect natures of circle and square are not real outside the mind does not entail that the predicates about the shape must be subjective. Again, objectivity implies the possibility for either right or wrong, where as subjectivity cannot be neither right nor wrong. And for a given shape, it is either right or wrong that it is closer to a circle or a square.

The "essence" of a thing is how it is described by human beings. If a paper cutter's purpose is by definition to cut paper, then this is how human beings define "paper cutter". Definitions are produced by subjects, they are subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only thing I can agree with you on, is that just because a paper-cutter is unable to cut paper, it does not follow that it is a bad being objectively; but it does follow that it is a bad paper-cutter objectively, by definition of paper-cutter. How's that?

The judgement of something as right or wrong is carried out by subjects, so such a judgement is necessarily subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot mean that, can you? Since only subjects can judge, all judgements are carried out by subjects, including the judgement that "2+2=3 is wrong". Are you saying that this judgement is therefore subjective?

Let's talk epistemology. We really have two questions here. (1) Should the bible be interpreted the way you claim? and (2) is the stone real?

To answer question (1): I invoke the principle of Parsimony, aka Occam's Razor. The christian hypothesis of interpreting the bible literally is a simpler one than your hypothesis of interpreting it figuratively. Sure christians interpret the OT figuratively too, but this is directly from the authority of Jesus in the same bible. It is therefore more reasonable to believe in the christian interpretation, until it has been debunked. The same would go for the other books that mention the stone in a figurative way.

To answer question (2): The fact that your hypothesis is purely empirical is both a good and a bad thing. The good thing is, as previously stated, that it can be scientifically proven to be true, by showing the real stone. The bad thing is that it can only be proven to be true by showing the real stone, because empirical claims necessitate observations. And the burden of proof is on the one making the claim.

To be clear, my intention is not to be a downer, but merely to find the reasonable belief.

To see what, to smell what? There is no objectivity here, just a general principle produced by inductive reasoning. The eyes sees things therefore it's purpose is to see. The nose smells things therefore its purpose is to smell. But not everything can be seen, nor can everything be smelled, so these senses are selective and not objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand what you are saying here. Most of our principles are arrived at by inductive reasoning. Are you saying it is not right to say the purpose of the eye is to see, and not wrong to say that the purpose of the eye is to smell? Even if you believe only in evolution and not also God as part of the human design, evolution would not retain a body part which served no purpose.

I already explained this, the judgement of a worse or better circle is made relative to some principle or principles. [...] This is a relative good. it is subjective because the principle by which the thing is judged to be good or bad, "circleness", is chosen. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course good is relative to best. That is pretty much the point in the OP. But relative does not imply subjective. Yes, we pick a type of goodness in the judgement, but once picked, the type of goodness is objective. If we mean 'good' as is 'a good circle', then this type of goodness is objective.

It only appears to be superfluous if you do not recognize the possibility of not-being. If to be is good, then not-being is bad. How is this superfluous? It is, by definition, good to be a thing, and to be nothing is bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is getting technical :blush: . If good is always linked to being, and not-good is always linked to not-being, then good=being, and not-good=not-being. But we already have words for these: being and not-being. Thus good is superfluous.

Go ahead then, and explain to me how purpose is objective — Metaphysician Undercover

Take a man-made thing like a paper-cutter. It is by definition "a device whose purpose is to cut paper". Its purpose is inherent in its essence, for a paper-cutter that cannot cut paper is not really a paper-cutter. Since the essence of things is objective, then the purpose inherent in the essence is also objective. That is not to say that everything has a purpose inherent in their essence (although I happen to think that), but this is an example of objective function nonetheless.

"Objective", means of the object, adhering within the object. "Purpose" is to have a function. So if an object has a purpose, this means that it has a function relative to something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree that objective means a property of the object; however the objet need not be a single substance, and can also be a system of substances. Thus if I say "Person A is taller than person B", 'taller' is relative to A and B, but is objective to the system which is A and B. We know it is objective because objectivity implies a right and wrong; and the statement is either right or wrong, not a matter of opinion.

How does judging good or bad determine a thing's objective purpose? [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the opposite way around. A thing's objective purpose determines the judgement of good or bad. In the case of the tugboat or hammer, the purpose is inherent in the thing's essence. For a tugboat is by definition "a tool whose purpose is to tug boats", and the hammer is by definition "a tool whose purpose is to hit objects into other materials". In those cases, the thing's function is in its identity, which is objective. Thus a hammer that is capable of digging dirt is good at digging dirt, but that does not make it a good hammer. Similarly for persons. If a person is good at driving, we can say "this person is good at driving", but this does not make them "a good person", which has a specific meaning.

Hello.

I first want to point out that this objection seems to be against the inconsistency between Aquinas' argument from degree and his claim that God is not a member of any genus; not against the argument from degree by itself. That said, I can try to refute the objection anyways.

When it comes to moral goodness, us creatures have the potential for it to be fully actualized, thereby becoming maximally good. Still, this maximum degree of goodness would not equal that of God's. The reason is that God has it essentially, where as we have it accidentally, or by participation. I.e., even when fully actualized, we have moral goodness, where as God is Moral Goodness. Thus God does not belong to the genus of "moral goodness by participation" which applies to creatures, for he is Moral Goodness by essence. And the same can be said about other divine attributes like existence, power, wisdom, etc.

A fantastic hypothesis! Allow me to examine it. I have two points.

(1) From a christian standpoint, the primary purpose of the bible is to inform man's life of its meaning, purpose, its goal and how to achieve it; and secondarily to give the good news that there is eternal life after this one. Your hypothesis covers the second point but not the first (at least not in your last post). It is only secondary because the meaning of life is like quality where as the length is like quantity. Following the existentialists, a meaningless life leads to despair. What is the point of having an infinite supply of something if it has no value? Note that this point does not refute your hypothesis, but shows that it is in fact less ambitious than the christian hypothesis.

(2) The good news about your hypothesis is that it is by nature fully empirical, and thus it is scientifically provable. I may not fully comprehend your recipe to produce these stones or how you extracted it from the bible and other books, but all you need to do to demonstrate its truth is to produce some stones and use them on people. If this results in the removal of physical pains and long life, as your hypothesis predicts, then you have proven your case, and the world will be persuaded. Now, what is the status on this experiment?

If good is associated with purpose, how can there be an objective good? Good would be determined relative to one's intention, and intentions vary. — Metaphysician Undercover

That sounds ad hoc. Why is purpose subjective? The purpose of the eye is to see, and that of the nose is to smell. It would be objectively wrong to believe that the purpose of the eye is to smell, and that of the nose is to see.

All I am saying is that a thing's perfect nature cannot be other than what the thing is, or else that is not that thing's perfect nature it is something else's perfect nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you reconcile this idea with the idea that there is a worse, better, and best circle?

That's an objective good, good is in the object, by virtue of being the object which it is, it is good. — Metaphysician Undercover

This definition of 'good' effectively makes the term superfluous: any thing is by definition a good thing, and a bad thing would be a contradiction.

Now we might relate one object to another, and say that one is better according to some principle like a "purpose", and come up with a relative, or subjective good. — Metaphysician Undercover

This almost sounds like what I am saying in the OP, with the exception that you make all purposes subjective, and I make them objective. We should therefore clarify this.

Conscience apprehends "good" which comes to us from the source of "other". It doesn't apprehend the purpose because the purpose inheres within the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

No sir. If the "other" can judge a person as being good or bad, it follows that the purpose known is the human purpose; not the other's purpose. Here is an analogy: The purpose of a tugboat is to tow larger boats. Say the tugboat does not know its purpose, but we do. We can judge the tugboat by its action, relative to its purpose. Note that it is its purpose and not ours, even though we know it and it does not. The same goes for the conscience and the "other" when judging humans.

Hmmm... This post is quite large, and you are correct that this is not really related to the main topic of this discussion any more. We can pursue, but how about we focus on one specific passage for now? Your choice. Better to have quality than quantity. I respond below to the three passages that I can interpret. What hidden truth do you see, and why?

Genesis 2:4-7: This passage seems to me to be not fully literal but partially literal, where the human body comes from evolution (dust of the ground) and the human soul comes from God (the breath of life).

Proverbs 3:13-20: Why not interpret this passage literally? Wisdom, the ability to judge things rightly, is surely a good thing to obtain and grow.

John 12:23-24: Jesus tends to speak in parables but then also tends to explain them right away. In this case, he explains it in John 12:25 "Those who love their life in this world will lose it. Those who care nothing for their life in this world will keep it for eternity." In other words, one ought to treat things according to their proper value, and so to value eternal things more than temporary things. And letting go of worldly obsessions requires a sacrifice, a small death.

Doesn't it seem more logical that it is actually impossible that there is a being with the best of that property, because this would mean that the being would have to have a number of different degrees of that property at the very same time, to satisfy what every different person considers as "the best" of that property? — Metaphysician Undercover

When we talk about the good, I mean specifically the objective good. I agree with you when it comes to subjective goods like best song or best flavour of ice cream. But when it comes to objective goods, like best circle, hammer, math homework or health, that best is objective, and hence not a matter of opinion. Surely you must agree that the best circle is something like this, and not this.

What is a being's perfect nature? Any being is the being which it is. If it were something other than the being which it is, it would not be the being which it is. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

This type of belief forces you to forfeit terms like change, good, and potentiality; which is absurd.

Change: For you, a being could not change because the changed being is no longer that original being. Yes, in actuality, a being is the being which it is. But all (or most?) beings belong to species which make them in potential to change.

Good: You would need to forfeit terms like good, bad, better, worse, etc; because for you, all beings are perfect beings as you said. This means there is no such thing as a bad health state, but only "the health state which currently is".

Potentiality: Surely you understand the metaphysical difference between the terms actual, potential, and non-potential. When I close my eyes, I actually cannot see, but I potentially can see. In contrast, a tree actually and potentially cannot see. Furthermore, a human that is blind or deaf is a bad thing because it is part of human nature to have the ability to see and hear. In contrast, a tree that cannot see or hear is not a bad thing because it is not part of its nature to see or hear.

So we must dismiss the premise of good according to purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with everything you have said up to that point. The distinction is between metaphysics and epistemology. As per the definition of good, if there is a real degree of good, then there is a real purpose, regardless if we know it or not. Indeed, if we don't know the purpose, then we cannot know or judge what is good; unless the judgement comes to us by another which knows the purpose.

So, at first we don't know our purpose so we cannot judge of what is good. But we are told what is good by another which we call conscience. Assuming that our conscience speaks the truth, then what is judged to be good is a real good. This therefore implies a real purpose, which the conscience must know. We then can find our purpose through inductive reasoning based on data from conscience. Once we know our purpose, then we can judge of what is good, which should coincide with the judgement from conscience because it all comes from there in the first place.

Having learned some astonishing secrets hidden cryptically, allegorically and in code in the OT, that part of your statement holds true, however I have never seen the NT confirm or explain the secrets hidden in the OT. Thus for me, we still have the situation where the masses (Sheeple) are being hoodwinked about what the Bible is saying and they are not being given the truth. It's a sorry state. — Pilgrim

Did somebody read Dan Brown :wink: ? Jokes aside, do you have an example of passage in the OT that is not clarified in the NT? I myself am not all that familiar with the OT so I could learn something too.

[...] I don't believe he has proven or deduced that the maximum property is this being, he has only proved that the maximum property exists. — Pilgrim

You are correct that the argument only proves merely a slice of the christian God. In fact, christians believe that a complete picture of the true God is only possible through Jesus, not through reason alone. That said, we can associate this source of moral goodness with the christian God based on the Bible:

• 1 Peter 1:16 "Be holy, because I [God] am holy."
• Mark 10:18 "Why do you call me good? - Jesus answered - No one is good except God alone"

[...] See, judging goodness requires knowing the purpose of something, and I have admitted that conscience serves "a purpose", so now we need to know "the purpose" of conscience in order to know that what conscience determines as good, is really good. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are still not quite on the same page. First, I think we can both agree that this conscience, this moral compass, is real (not necessarily truthful but we do perceive something). Next, the assumption is that it is also truthful; its info is correct. As such, its purpose is clear: to inform us on which behaviour is morally good and morally bad. Next, based on particular data from conscience, we induce general moral laws like the Golden Rule or Kant's Categorical Imperative. Finally, based on the common language that what we call a "good person" is a morally good person, we deduce that the human purpose is to abide to the general moral rules.

As the definition dictates, the degree of goodness is judged according to the designated purpose. This requires knowing the purpose. Conscience tells us that there is "a purpose", and free will allows us to choose "the purpose", so we have a number of possible purposes to choose from. The degree of goodness is therefore dependent on the choice of purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a being is able to choose its own purpose, then that purpose is merely subjective, which means it has no objective purpose; and by extension, the degree of goodness, relative to that subjective purpose, would also be subjective. Furthermore, if conscience judges our behaviour, then we do not get to choose our purpose over what our conscience tells us.

Instead, with the assumption that our conscience is truthful, we are able to determine if a person is truly morally good. It is also able to tell us if a person is a good person, for to be a good person is to be morally good. From this, we can deduce the human purpose which is to be morally perfect. Yes, free will gives us the freedom to choose, not our purpose because it is objective, but rather choose to accept or decline our purpose of moral perfection; which itself is not changeable.

I will respond to the rest of the post at a later time.

The "ought to" part simply implies that the benchmark maximum exists albeit notionally (as the 'ought to' could just be an ideal or concept). It doesn't for me imply that the benchmark can be reached. [...] — Pilgrim

'Ought' is different than 'should'. 'Ought' means 'should' specifically in the moral sense, in the sense of duty, obligation; in the sense that we are labelled as good if we do, and bad if we don't. Your superman example is an example of should, but not an example of ought, because as you said, it is not currently possible to ignore the effects of gravity, despite the benefits it could bring.

Example: The rich ought to donate to the poor, because it would be in accordance with the Golden Rule, and they can. On the other hand, the poor ought not to donate to the poor or the rich, because they cannot. See the story of Rich man and Lazarus for support from the Bible on this.

I pause here to ask whether the actual source property itself, love, goodness, life-energy, whatever, must in any sense be an actual being rather than just being that simple thing/property itself. [...] — Pilgrim

Another clarification on definitions. In Aristotelian language, a 'being' is not necessarily a living organism (which would be a living being) or person, but simply a thing in the sense that that which is not a being is nothing. So the being with the maximum property as its essence can be just that, the maximum property.

If God is deemed the actual personification and true source of love or goodness then by definition God can not be evil or produce evil. If the source is true and pure there can be no evil within it. — Pilgrim

Yes, that follows.

That being the case the entire set of books in the OT would seem to be in gross error for they describe a God who is, at least to our minds and set of values, inherently evil. — Pilgrim

The conventional interpretation of the Bible in Christianity is that the New Testament should be interpreted literally, and the Old Testament should be interpreted figuratively, in the sense that agrees with the NT. Thus the OT is like the section with riddles, and the NT is like the section with the answers. It sounds like a cop out, but Jesus says himself in the NT: "Don't suppose I came to do away with the Law and the Prophets. I did not come to do away with them, but to give them their full meaning." Pascal gives a good explanation for this in his book The Pensées.

It comes from "outside" of the person, but that "outside" is really through the "inside". — Metaphysician Undercover

I accept the clarification.

[...] So as much as "conscience" may lead us in specific directions, we cannot validate that it is leading us in the right direction [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

While your argument is valid, its conclusion unreasonable, as it fails the Law of Parsimony. It is like saying that although we all perceive the same boat at the horizon, we should not conclude that it is real because there is always the possibility of collective hallucination. Yes, it is possible, but the former hypothesis is simpler than the latter.

More importantly however, let's recall why conscience was brought up. The argument from degree is based on the hypothesis definition that good is the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or function. You attempted to falsify it by pointing out that we perceive persons as being more or less good despite not knowing the human purpose. Thus conscience was brought up to explain how we are able to perceive goodness in persons without the need to know human purpose. Whether or not conscience is a reliable source of data, its existence is sufficient to counter the objection.


Regarding the terms ideal, quantity, quality: I don't mind trying to adjust the terms to apply to your meanings. As for me, I can find other terms to fit my meanings as intended in the OP. Thus what I meant by 'ideal' or 'maximum degree' can become 'perfection' or 'best'.

Hello Mr White.

To clarify the position in the OP, opposing Aquinas, I do not believe that there must exist a being with maximum property for all beings with degrees of a property. I only claim that it must be the case for some properties, like colours and objective goodness.

If there exists a maximum value for a quality or attribute and if the beings in the universe are moving in the direction of that maximum, i.e. actively trying to attain that maximum position (in Christian terms, to be more like Jesus/God) then it stands to reason that eventually over time, that maximum position will become flooded. — Pilgrim

Yep, I now agree with you. The Law of Parsimony made me lean towards the hypothesis of a single being, until a better reason is provided, and you provided a good one. Furthermore, I forgot about the principle that "ought implies can", and as such, if we ought to be morally perfect, then it implies that the moral good to the maximum degree can be reached.


Regarding being with essential quality vs being with accidental quality: I confess I got ahead of myself on that last post, where I made assertions without much explanations. I should backtrack and explain my reasoning.

• As per the argument in the OP, there must exist a being with moral perfection. This being must have that quality essentially, as part of its essence, for if it was not essential, then the being could have it removed and there would not be a being with moral perfection at all times; which there is.
• Other beings may possess the quality of moral perfection, but that quality is only accidental (not essential) because these beings existed prior to the quality reaching maximum degree. E.g., a bad person remains a person despite being bad, but the being with moral perfection cannot remove its moral goodness without ceasing to be.
• The being that possesses moral perfection essentially must be the source of moral goodness in other beings that possess it accidentally, for two reasons: (1) because without some knowledge of moral perfection, we could not know how to progress towards it. (2) An act is considered moral only insofar that it was done with the intention of moral goodness. Unintentional acts cannot be considered either morally good or bad. And intention of x implies the knowledge of x. Therefore the essential being acts as the source that informs us of its existence.

If this were the case then what motive or value is there in other beings striving to reach the "maximum quality" if in truth it is impossible to achieve on the basis that they don't have the quality inherently or "essentially"? — Pilgrim

Why be morally good? As morality is about "what we ought to do", the question is self-explanatory. Because we ought to do what we ought to do. To return the question, why not be satisfied in becoming like God as opposed to becoming God? If it not part of our nature to have the ability to become God, then this desire is literally unnatural.

But how to arrive at any kind of consensus about what is good, absent something like a Platonic view or its equivalent? — Wayfarer

We need first to establish what good is in general. My definition of good refers to any type of good that is objective, not merely moral good. Thus it applies to circles, hammers, homework, health, morality, or really anything that has a nature, an identity. People may not all agree about the moral system, but all can agree that this circle is a better circle than this circle. Thus I believe that the definition of good is fitting. Once established, then we can move on to the next objections.

This is just a vicious circle, using goodness in human beings to determine the human purpose, in order to use the human purpose to identify goodness. To say that so and so is a good person would require already that one has an idea of the human purpose, if goodness is determined relative to the human purpose. So we can't look for good human beings to determine what the human purpose is because we wouldn't know how to identify a good human being without already knowing what the human purpose is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see your point; but we need here to introduce another notion to show that the reasoning is not circular: Conscience or Moral Compass. When we observe a person as being morally good or bad, this is information that comes to us, not from us. This makes sense because if the moral judgement of men came strictly from men, then the whole exercise would be circular and pointless, like a prisoner being its own judge.

The reasoning thus goes like this: Through conscience, we acquire information that some persons are better than others; and from this, we induce the human purpose; which coincides with the moral ideal.


Regarding the quantity-quality-ideal topic: I now see there was indeed a misunderstanding, mainly in these terms. It is odd to define 'ideal' as the scale rather than as the maximum degree of a property. In common language, the ideal grade for a homework is clearly 100%, not the percentage scale. You define 'quantity' as "that which can be measured", and thus cannot be infinite; but a length can be measured, and the length property can go to infinity. In common language, 'quantity' simply means that we can put numbers to it, and numbers go to infinity. You define 'quality' as "that which cannot be measured as a definite quantity", and therefore can go to infinity; but 'red' is a quality, not a quantity, and we know that there is a pure red, and red to the maximum degree.

Let's take your example of heat. It has a relative scale, K, a minimum, 0 K, and is measurable and quantifiable. Yet, we know that there is no such thing as a maximum heat in K, for we can always add one more K to the previous measurement. On the other hand, nothing can be more red than the pure red.

If the units are arbitrary, then there is no real quantity. The quantity is relative to the arbitrary scale, there is a possible infinity, and no maximum. If the units are real, then there are real limits, no infinity, and a maximum, there is a quantity in an absolute sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give examples of what you call real units vs arbitrary units? As I understand it, it doesn't make sense: Say I am counting spoons. A spoon is a real unit. Yet there is no possible maximum number of spoons.

Hello.
You bring up valid points.

Regarding the possibility of many beings with the maximum degree of a property, rather than just one: It is indeed possible for many beings to fully actualize a property, thereby reaching the maximum degree. But two counterpoints:
(1) If we don't know this, then it is more reasonable to infer a single being rather than many, due to the Law of Parsimony or Occam's Razor, stating that the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data is the most reasonable one.
(2) If the ideal is essentially made of that one property only, (e.g. the ideal red), then there can only be one ideal being with that property, as per the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Other beings with that property may also reach the maximum degree, but they have it only 'in participation', where as the ideal being would have it 'essentially', and would be the source of that property in others. (This is admittedly getting quite technical).

Regarding the possibility of everything constantly changing: This is impossible, for the statement "nothing is eternal" cannot be eternally true, and is therefore a self-contradiction. As such, some things must be eternal, that is, do not change. But can maximum goodness change? No, by definition of the term 'maximum'; that is to say, a "changing maximum" is a contradiction.

Hello all.
I think you are all roughly bringing up the same topic, namely, that we may need to presuppose a platonic view of reality in order to buy into the argument from degree. I could be wrong but I suspect this is not as critical as you make it out to be. Rather, all we need to agree on is the definition of the term 'good' as used in the common language.

My hypothesis definition of good is: "the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal".
Admittedly, the terms 'being' and 'nature' need to be defined too:
Being: literally a thing; such that whatever is not a being is nothing. E.g. a rock, a dog, jumping, red.
Nature: Identity; the kind of thing that it is. E.g. A hand-drawn circle, insofar that we intended to draw a circle, has the nature of a circle, although it is not a perfect one. A cat with three legs still has the nature of a cat, although a perfect cat has four legs.

Once the definition of the term 'good' has been accepted or rejected, the rest of the argument becomes straightforward. With that, can you falsify the hypothesis definition of 'good'? To do so, we just need to find a example of the term 'good' used in the common language where we know no ideal exists. A Socratic Dialogue around the term good, if you will.

A "quantity" is always a number of units. If the units are not real, then neither is the quantity. If you have a quantity which consists of unreal, or false units, then this is not a real quantity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. Real quantities imply real units. Although real, some can be man-made or arbitrary, such as 1 m in length, 1 kg in weight, etc. Anyways, I suggest dropping this side topic to focus on the main one.

You are defining "goodness" in a way so as to support your position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it supports my position, but it is not done arbitrarily for that aim; rather, the definition comes from the Socratic Method using the examples in the OP. To refute it, we would have to find an example that does not fit the definition. And you have attempted to do that with the example on human purpose. See below for the response on this.

But if you define it in a utilitarian way, you judge goodness by a quantity — Metaphysician Undercover

And what unit of measure would the utilitarian use? Note that the definition is for goodness in general, and not merely for moral goodness.

So if we follow your definition, we would have to assume that there is a purpose for human beings, in order that a human being could be judged as good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that follows.

In order to judge the goodness of any human being, or any human act, we'd need to know this purpose of human existence, and position the person, or act, relative to it. But clearly we do not know this purpose, and we do not judge goodness in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

A valid point. And now let me blow your mind :cheer: .
Through inductive reasoning, we can find the human purpose based on what we observe to be a good human being: A large majority considers Mother Teresa to be a better human being than Hitler. This is based on their moral behaviour and nothing else. So the human purpose would coincide with the moral ideal, which is God as per the argument from degree. As such, the christian argument from degree and the above corollary agree perfectly with the christian view on the human purpose, which is based on the Great Commandments in the bible: (1) Love God with all your mind, heart and soul; and (2) Love your neighbours as yourself. In other words, aim all your acts for the end of the moral good, which is done in practice by following the Golden Rule.

"Maximum" is a term which applies to things which are measurable, as is "quantity". To say that there is a "maximum" is to say that there is a "quantity", and this is to say that the thing is measurable. But you define "goodness" as a quality. So by talking about a maximum goodness you talk about goodness as a quantity, when you have defined it as a quality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suspect a misunderstanding either from me or from you; because as I understand your comments, I have already addressed these objections in my previous post. I'll try again, and maybe you can clarify. A maximum cannot imply an absolute quantity because absolute quantities are theoretically infinite, and so no maximum is theoretically possible. It can only imply a relative quantity, a percentage, where the maximum is 100%. I suppose you could also call it a quality insofar that relative quantities don't have any units. But as a relative quantity, I see not contradiction.

Hello.

If I understand your post correctly, you are saying all the examples in the OP include degrees of goodness and a defined maximum, where as the moral good only includes degrees of goodness and no defined maximum, is that right?

That is correct that the maximum moral goodness is not defined, and the OP merely attempts to prove its existence. This is done by using inductive reasoning from the examples to the definition of good in general, and then using deductive reasoning from the definition of good to the existence of maximum moral goodness. Thus it is possible to prove the existence of a being without fully knowing its essence.

Understood. But I don't think the Argument from Degree presupposes the theory of universals (although they are not incompatible). All we need to agree on is the definition of goodness, which is: the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal.

Unless you are saying that this ideal is the same as the universal? Regardless, do you disagree with the definition? It is backed up by the examples given in the OP.

Judgement for quantity requires the assumption of a fundamental unit, or unity, as a particular, an individual. So the soundness of this judgement, the judgement of quantity, is based in the reality of the assumed unit. The assumed unit allows for a first, the one, then the other numbers of the quantity may follow. [...] That the ideal must be real can only be known intuitively and cannot be proven with logic, but that the unit, the individual or particular must be real, in order that there is a quantity, can be proven with logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. I am not familiar with this notion of "fundamental unit". Can you give examples to illustrate that the unit must be real in order to have a quantity?

it is based in the assumption that to judge for goodness requires the existence of the ideal (maximum) for goodness. I don't think that this assumption is sound because we can judge for quantity without the ideal (maximum) for quantity. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we know it is the case for goodness, straight from the definition of goodness: the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal. Under such a definition, an ideal must exist for the judgement of goodness to apply. This definition is backed up by the examples given in the OP. Do you disagree with it?

But notice that the reality of the ideal is not necessarily based in a maximum, as Aquinas describes. The reality of the ideal is the grounding principles for the system of gradation. When Aquinas talks about a "maximum" for goodness, this implies the character of a quantity, and this gives the argument an unsound premise to begin with. — Metaphysician Undercover

What he means about maximum is not a maximum absolute quantity but a maximum in actuality from potentiality; or to say the same thing in a different way, a grade of 100%, which can be seen as a relative quantity, relative to the perfect nature or ideal.

He can only mean it this way, since we have already established that absolute quantities do not have a maximum.

How do we do this? Could it be that perfect moral goodness cannot exist? — darthbarracuda

If perfect moral goodness could not or did not exist, then it would not be possible to rightly judge a being to be morally good; because, as described in the OP, a being is called good insofar as it gets close to its perfect nature.

Or did I misunderstand your last post?

Hello.

I admit I have trouble reading your post. Are you saying that a real proof requires a physical observation of the thing inferred?

Hello MU.

I don't think the argument from gradation is properly represented here, P1 seems a little simplistic. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your representation of the argument. This is essentially what I was attempting to describe too, though it may not have come out that way.

The argument may not be sound though because in the case of quantities, the ideal is "infinite". So with quantities the ideal escapes the maximum. What is required to make the argument sound, is to establish an acceptable distinction, a categorical division, between quality and quantity, such that a quality cannot be reduced to a quantity. If qualities are really quantities, then the ideal is infinite, there is no maximum, and the argument is unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are on to something when making the distinction between qualities and quantities, and I also agree that when it comes to quantities, there cannot be an ideal because there is no maximum. However, it is not necessary to prove that qualities cannot be reduced to quantities. What is necessary is to prove the existence of the ideal for goodness. Your way is indeed a means to that end, but not the only one. I use a different approach in the OP by showing that the judgement of goodness is possible only if an ideal exists.

My objection to P1 can be illustrated by objecting to this part of your argument. There are no perfect circles in the world. Every circle is slightly elliptical, they never have a perfectly uniform radius. The point being is that the existence of imperfection does not entail that perfection must exist. — darthbarracuda

That's a valid point. Slight correction: The existence of imperfection does entail the existence of perfection, though sometimes only from our minds rather than from reality outside the mind. I accept the possibility that perfect circles are man-made (I am not certain about this but this would be off-topic). Now a man-made being entails that we know its essence. E.g., we must conceive the essence of a hammer before we build one.

In the case of moral goodness, we have not fully apprehended the essence of perfect morality, and therefore this being cannot be man-made. Instead, we deduce its existence from the existence of imperfect moral goodness.

The only problem with this line of reasoning is [...] with the fact that the "technical" metaphysical concepts involved [...] are quite alien to thinkers raised on "modern" and "Postmodern" philosophy and require extensive explication — gurugeorge

You are correct, when it comes to the aim of persuasion rather than to seek truth. This is why I used the terms nature and function rather than formal and final causes (only added in one line for the fans of Aristotle); but there is always room for more clarity.

The added wrinkle is that objective morality, in the Aristotelian/Thomist system, is itself related to degrees of perfection (the moral person seeks to actualize their potential, the form of them, as best they can). — gurugeorge

Maybe I misunderstand your point here; because as I understand it, that is also my point in the argument; that the potential of moral goodness in persons is the potential to achieve moral perfection.

Hello.

This argument is reminiscent of the Ontological Argument isn't it? — gurugeorge

This argument reminds me of the ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes. — darthbarracuda

It is different in that the Ontological Argument aims to prove the existence of Perfection (a being perfect in every way) based on the essence of Perfection (which fails because we have not apprehended the essence of Perfection). It starts with the essence of Perfection and ends with its existence.

In contrast, the Argument from Degree starts with the existence of imperfection and ends with the existence of perfection, and specifically for morality.

That's right. Correct in the sense of grammar or syntax; not in the sense of knowledge, understanding, or truth. Have we reached an agreement on that point?

But the fact that we use the word "red" to talk about a range of different colours might be sufficient to convince a reasonable person that there is no one thing to which the word "red" points. — Banno

Not so. That range of colours must have that form of red to a more or lesser degree, in order to truly call that range red. "This has red" is true. "This has red" is false. Therefore the former range must have a thing which the latter range does not have; and this thing must be defined, that is, must have limits, because it does not appear in the latter range.

This is your theory in a nut shell? An essence of red, a Platonic Form of red, something like these examples, but not actually these examples; and while these examples exist in the world, the true form exists... where? in your mind? In my mind? Somehow, shared between minds? Think of the ontological and epistemic complexity here. — Banno

"In the mind" insofar that the subject has apprehended the object. Otherwise, only in reality. Where? In no physical location because forms are not physical, but that is a great discussion for another time. :wink:

And you offer this as somehow simpler that the claim that we just use the word to talk about different colours. — Banno

As per Occam's Razor or Law of Parsimony, we should side on the theory that is the simplest AND can explain all the data. My theory is not simpler than yours, but explains all the data, which, correct me if I am wrong, is not the case with yours. How does your theory explain the fact that some statements are true and some are false?

A statement is said to be true if its meaning or message is reflective of reality. In order to do that, the meaning of the words, which the statement is made of, must point to things in reality too. E.g. the statement "This apple is red" is true only if the thing I am referring to is truly an apple and is truly red.


Side note: how do you upload images and videos directly to the post?

Do you really take Mr Edison's use to be nothing but syntactic? — Banno

Yes. Not only is it possible, it is asserted by Mr Edison himself: "In this video, I have no idea what I am talking about." He says purple is his favourite colour by association with Prince, which he likes. Whatever purple is, it must be good because Prince is good.

To what does the word "purple" point, for Tommy? — Banno

Nothing. The word is to him meaningless. That is the point. As he stated in the previous video, he knows a colour is a physical property of objects which we perceive with our eyes (and later our memory), but cannot go any further than that. Thus the blind can know the material cause but not the formal cause of colours.

Again, these videos prove my point, and appear to disprove yours, namely that words need not to point to beings we experience, in order to be meaningful. If you are correct, then how do you explain Mr Edison's statement: "There is this whole part of vocabulary [colours], of language, that doesn't mean anything to me"?

It can't point to a archetypal purple swatch, as you suggest with red and blue. — Banno

As purple is not a basic colour, it has more than one essential property: red and blue. But purple still has an archetype or form. We know this because, again, we observe some colours to be more purple than others. And for a thing which degree does not go to infinity, a more and less implies a most. Like an arrow aimed closer to the target until it hits the bullseye.

I understood you to be claiming that any and every word points to something - which you call a "being"; and further that this "being" is in some way individual, giving the meaning of the word. It would follow that if there were someone who could not understand what some given word pointed to, then that person could not understand the meaning of the word; and that therefore, they would not be able to use the word. — Banno

You are correct about my position.

They would not be able to use the word meaningfully. They can say the word (from hearing other people use it), but not understand it; which is precisely what Mr Edison says. The key distinction is between saying vs understanding. Before I learned to speak english, for it is not my first language, I could sing along to a few english songs, though I would not understand what I was saying at the time.

You now have the choice of finessing your theory using ad hoc material; or you can accept the falsification. — Banno

I continue to choose finesse. :wink:

So one move open to you is to suggest that Edison can only use colour words syntactically, but without the semantics that can only come from knowing what the words point to. — Banno

If this means roughly the same as being able to use words in a sentence that is grammatically correct but not understanding it, then yes, that is what I am saying. But don't take offence. Mr Edison said it himself:
"There is this whole part of vocabulary, of language, that doesn't mean anything to me. Over the years people have tried and tried to explain color to me and I just don't understand it. [...] Stuff I picked up from hearing about it." You seem to be bluntly ignoring the testimony from Mr Edison himself, and I don't understand why.

You misunderstood; the notion of innate ideas was yours, I was just pointing out that Edison obviously learned to use colour words, and was not born with an understanding of them. — Banno

You are misquoting me. Here is the full quote:

I believe that fact is wrong, but for the sake of argument, let's say it is right. Would this not suggest that we have Innate Ideas, as per Plato and against Aristotle and Hume? — Samuel Lacrampe

From the full quote, you should be able to pick up that this is not my position, and that I am deducing it from a fact that you brought up. Moreover, I already clarified this in my last post. Shall we move on?

So "red" points to a web page? You don't mean that. Nor do you mean that "red" points only to that shade of red, which will be different on your computer than on my laptop, and even on my laptop varies as I move from room to room. There is no being to which the word "red" points, and in virtue of which it gains a mythical thing called a meaning... All there is, is the different and changing ways in which the word is used. — Banno

No, I don't mean that. And thanks for giving me the benefit of the doubt. Gotta celebrate those small steps towards progress.

There is a being which is pure red, close to this, and then there are different shades of red which are composed of pure red and other colours. Pink=red+white. Brown=red+black. Orange=red+yellow. Purple=red+blue. Finally, green has no red in it. The fact that some things are red (to a more or lesser degree) and some things are not red is sufficient to demonstrate that 'red' points to a being with essential properties.

Hello.

If I understand you correctly, then I think we are saying the same thing in different ways. For when I say "everything that is real is logical", it is a way of saying, for my lack of better words, "logic is a truth-preserving guide to reasoning (about reality)". Logic/illogic indeed technically only applies to minds that can reason, and reasoning logically is the method to predict how reality behaves prior to observation.

And this post should be read in a tone of voice that is somewhat contemptuous of the able bodied telling the disabled what they can and cannot do. — Banno

If this is about my statements about blinds, these should be taken as statements of facts, not statements of judgement. Anyways, if I have offended you, then I apologize for that, for my intent is not to offend.