This is part of the theme I have heard being called 'Truth vs Rhetoric'.
Rhetoric is not a bad thing as such, and can be a really good thing when it serves to complement truth. Rhetoric is bad only in the absence of truth, called 'mere rhetoric'.

We can prove truth is more important than rhetoric by imagining them in competition: If we can only choose between a person that is good a finding truth but bad at rhetoric, and a person that is bad at finding truth but good at rhetoric, I thing we would all choose the former over the latter. Therefore truth is more important than rhetoric.

Does the person who is deserving of punishment deserve this punishment? [...] — Moliere

I am not sure I understand your point. Your three options, death, life sentence, and rehabilitation, appear to aim at answering the two questions about stoping injustice and restoring justice; and they can be judged against these two questions to determine which one is most just, or mostly deserved. If not justice, how else would you judge which option is mostly deserved?

Note that if it works, rehabilitative justice is the best one, because being rehabilitated not only prevents further injustice, but can also restore justice a bit, by helping out the relatives of the victim.

how you determine whether such a statement is true or false. Agreement seems to be the metric on hand, so we'd have to ask how it is we determine that people agree. — Moliere

A moral system is a system that applies to everyone about what ought-to-be, or good behaviour. It is evident that everyone views justice onto them as good, and injustice onto them as bad. Therefore everyone ought to be just and not unjust. Justice is therefore a criteria to determine the morality of an act.

the Nazi system you propose contra moral systems is another example of people acting on moral impulses. — Moliere

Again, a moral system is about good behaviour for anyone. Part of the Nazi system was to subdue other ethnic groups like the Jews. Surely no one, not even the Nazis, would view this behaviour done onto them as good. It is therefore not a system of good behaviour, and therefore not a moral system.

No probs.

Gotcha. For most arguments, finding the validity of the logic is not too hard. A trick is to replace the complicated terms with simple concrete ones, and find sound premises with them.

Example: All A are B, some B are C, therefore some A are C.
Replacement: All triangles are shapes, some shapes are circles, therefore some triangles are circles.
This is not valid.

I'd like to know if learning logic will bring me any practical benefits, for example in verifying the validity of some arguments or stuff like that. — Rayan

Hello.

I never learned pure abstract logic so I am a bit biased; but experience has shown me that nowadays, inductive reasoning is more needed than deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is logic and math, and we have computers and calculators for this. Inductive reasoning is finding definitions and principles, and I find this is usually the weak point of people's arguments. After all, a perfectly logical conclusion is only as strong as its premises.

That is not to say that logic is not important; just that people, while focusing solely on deduction, forget about induction.

would I be exempt from making wrong/bad inferences? — Posty McPostface

Only deductive inferences, not the inductive ones.

Would I be any closer to the correct apprehension of reality/truth? — Posty McPostface

Yes, you would be closer than the person with the exact same rational skills but less skills in logic.

But it would be insufficient to find all truths, or even all truths that can be found by man, because this would only cover deductive reasoning, and you would lack perfection in inductive reasoning; that is, finding essences and principles.

A paradox is an apparent, but not real, contradiction. The barber can shave himself or not, and the group as defined can exist, but the barber cannot fit the group without contradiction. Now you claim it is a paradox and not a contradiction. Why is the contradiction not real?

Here is another simpler example for clarity:
A triangle exists in a world where all shapes have four sides. A triangle is possible, and a world where all shapes have four sides is possible, but the triangle cannot exist in the world without contradiction.

“The town barber, who is a man, shaves exactly every man in the town who does not shave himself.”
Either the barber shaves himself or not. If he does, then he does not only shave men who do not shave themselves. If he does not, then he does not shave all men who do not shave themselves. The statement is therefore impossible.

Contradictions are impossible.
The statement “the town barber ...” contains a contradiction either way we look at it.
Therefore the statement is impossible.

The town barber, who is a man, shaves exactly every man in the town who does not shave himself. Does the barber shave himself? — Jeremiah

Hello. I can see that the first statement is logically impossible, because whether the barber shaves himself or not, the statement contains a contradiction. But why call it a paradox, as opposed to a mere impossibility?

By your terms I agree that morality is objective. The notion that I'm proposing is that every moral statement is false. — Moliere

Great. To determine if morality is objective or not was the main goal of this discussion. Everything else is secondary. Now why do you claim that every moral statement is false?

I think there's one important question that you're missing there. Do they deserve it? And that is not a question of fact, but of values. — Moliere

Asking "Do they deserve it?" is another way of asking "Is the punishment just?". If we unpack the question, we get "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?". The objectively correct punishment is the one that answers "yes" to both questions (if possible). But I only see a matter of facts here. Why do you say this is a matter of values?

how would we determine [strong disagreement or not]? — Moliere

Given that we agree that morality is objective, this question becomes virtually irrelevant; because objective truth is found by reason and not opinions. But I'll try to answer your objection anyways.

You point to the differences in political and economical systems, but believing that morality was always an end goal is a questionable assumption. The end goal of some of these could have been power only. It is hard to believe that the Nazi regime had morality in mind, instead of power. Moral systems on the other hand are very similar in different places and times. The Golden Rule is called such because it is universal. It occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition (Source).

the notion 'objectivity' is an impossibility — Marcus de Brun

This statement is a self-contradiction, because if objectivity is not real, then nothing can be objectively true, including the above statement.

no two things can be the same — Marcus de Brun

I think you misinterpret Leibniz's law of indiscernibles. The law states that no two things can be the same in every way, that is, have all the same properties. But two things can have some properties that are the same. Two things can have the same genus or species, or accidental properties.

Are you a human being? So am I. Yet I am not you. Although we are separate beings, we participate in the same species: human. 1 human + 1 human = 2 humans. No more, no less.

Hello Mr Dude.
I admit I don't understand your post. Subjectivity means 'only a matter of opinion' and 'no right or wrong'. Objectivity means 'part of reality independent of a subject' and 'with a right or wrong'.

In accordance with Leibniz's law of indiscernibles it its accepted amongst scientists and philosophers alike that no 'one' thing in the universe can be exactly the same as another 'one' thing: if they are exactly the same, then they must be the same thing. Therefore if I begin my math with the assumption that 1=1, I am beginning with a subjectively accepted falsity. No things are alike, and no one thing in the entire universe is exactly equal to another 'one' thing IE: One is not equal to One . It is equal only to itself. Beyond subjective thinking we can have no two things that are actually equal. — Marcus de Brun

Your conclusion that "One is not equal to One" is wrong because it fails the Law of Identity: For all A: A = A. Now let A = 1. Therefore, 1 = 1. I fail to understand your demonstration using Leibniz's law of indiscernibles, because the first "1" is the same as the second "1" in the equation; so it does not fail the law of indiscernibles.

I understand your point, that strong disagreements on a topic suggests subjectivity. But two counter-points.

(1) Subjectivity is not necessarily entailed; inasmuch as people disagree on religions even though it is clearly an objective topic (E.g., if the Christian God exists, then He exists for everyone; and if not, then not).

(2) I dispute the claim that the disagreements are strong; even for the case of the death penalty. People do not argue on the death penalty when it comes to simple cases like children jaywalking; they do only when it comes to complex cases like dealing with terrorists. E.g., if only put in jail, will they escape? Will they do it again once released? Will their buddies continue to terrorize because jail time is not a strong enough incentive to stop? etc. If we know the answer to these questions with certainty, then there would be very few disagreements; and these are matters of facts, not values.

I am now confused as to where you stand. If you believe that "something can be ethically or morally wrong but legal or vice versa", then you believe in true ethics and morality, do you not? Those who don't believe in objective morality will use the man-made laws as the only criteria for what is considered wrong.

I disagree with this point, as it excludes the "crazy person" as being someone to which a code of justice or morals would not apply to. If there is someone who likes disrespect, diseases, and dishonesty it does not make them separate from morality, if morality is truly objective. If morals are objective, they would have to apply to everyone regardless of mental state. — Anguis Ex Caelo

Hello Mr Ex Caelo. Morality indeed should apply to everyone if objective. But the necessary ingredient to a moral act is intentions. I.e., if good intentions, then morally good; and if bad intentions, then morally bad. E.g., accidental killing is not immoral, but intentional killing is, despite both acts resulting in the same amount of harm to the victims.

Our crazy person, liking disrespect, may in turn give disrespect to others with complete sincere intentions of doing the good. As such, the act would not be immoral, albeit crazy and dangerous. Note that a crazy person can still be immoral if his intentions are still bad. It's just harder to tell from the outside.

Math, being a system of defining the world invented by humans, is not necessarily objective. It could be argued that the things that math defines are objective, but it does not make math itself objective. Similarly, the things that language defines may be objective, but language itself is not. — Anguis Ex Caelo

Agreed about language; disagreed about math. Numbers are man-made, but the concept they point to are not, and these are still part of math. We can change the numbers 2 and 4, but we cannot change II+II=IIII.

'Clearly objective' to whom? — Marcus de Brun

To all that understand the concept. Do you believe "2+2=4" is right, and "2+2=3" is wrong? If so, then you too believe math to be objective, because only things which are objective can be either right or wrong. On the other hand, subjective things are neither right nor wrong, but only a matter of opinion.

Say that my "legal justification" is that the law is corrupted. Would you not find this legal system wrong?

But you define justice in a manner which people clearly do disagree with -- there are people who believe the death penalty is just, for instance. — Moliere

There are people who disagree on the shape of the earth. It does not make the topic subjective. And if objective, then some people are necessarily in error on the topic.

There are people who also don't think that justice is the most fundamental value. — Moliere

One of the most anyways. I would like to meet such a person who don't think so, and see how they react when experiencing injustice from others.

When confronted with those counter-examples, you say they don't really disagree on values, but rather are making mistakes in reasoning. Why? Because justice is the equal treatment of people, and what they propose violates justice. It's a bit circular. — Moliere

Do you claim that not everyone values respect, honesty, and health? If that is not what you claim, then I don't see what else you dispute in my position.

But the same could be said for the man who believes in the death penalty -- in which case it is you who wish to spare a man's life who justly deserves death, to use your reasoning, that is falling to an error in fact or reasoning. — Moliere

If they are correct, then yes, I am the one in error in this case. But the very fact that there can be an error proves the objectivity of the topic. There cannot be any error on subjective topics, for it is by definition only a matter of opinion.

Why do you believe morality is subjective? Because to do otherwise, is to have a subjective belief about morality. — Marcus de Brun

Hi. Let's use the same logic for a different topic:
"Why do you believe math is subjective? Because to do otherwise, is to have a subjective belief about math".
Math is clearly objective; therefore there is a flaw in the logic.

Add that he assaults himself every time he catches himself looking at him crooked, and wants others to behave likewise. — Cabbage Farmer

People in their right mind do not want to be assaulted. This behaviour does not make him immoral but crazy. We do not send this type of person to jail but to a mental hospital.

See my initial reply to the OP: Rationality and fairness are not in general sufficient to resolve the issue. — Cabbage Farmer

Add human nature. All men want respect, health, and honesty, and dislike disrespect, diseases, and dishonesty (excluding the aforementioned crazy person). Combined with human nature, this justice-based morality is no longer an empty equation but a system with substance.

I've already provided a counterexample to disrupt your position. — Cabbage Farmer

Let's stick to the cake example. You write: "Another says the size of the cake should be proportionate to the weight of the consumers." You can claim that if it was true, but you must justify why it would be true. Is the end goal of sharing the cake survival or pleasure? If survival, then maybe it is true that one must eat an amount proportionate to one's weight, and therefore the just act is indeed relative to weight. But if pleasure, then I see no reason why the claim would be true.

And so to answer my question, if I am unjust to you, e.g. I am your employer and pay you less than the others for the same work, you would not say "it is wrong", but say "I disagree with your choices, inasmuch as I disagree that blue is the best colour". Is that correct?

To my mind the subjective-objective distinction is only applicable to practical situations in which there is a verifiable criterion of truth that is independent of one's feelings about the matter. For example, when betting on the outcome of a football match. Ethical judgements do not fall into this category, since one's feelings are the ultimate arbiter of truth here. — sime

Hello. I dispute the claim that what comes from our feelings is necessarily subjective inasmuch as what comes from our physical senses is necessarily objective (we could be dreaming). I agree that if we believe the criteria to be objective, then the thing the criteria is applied to is objective. But how do we judge the criteria itself to be objective? This seems to result in infinite regress.

First, let's group physical senses and feelings in the same category, because they both serve to convey information about the outside world to the subject. The information they convey may be either objective, that is, attributed to the object, or subjective, that is, merely coming from the subject. Since all info we perceive must necessarily come through our senses and feelings, how do we tell which is objective and which is subjective? By checking if many subjects perceive the same info. E.g., if I see a unicorn and nobody else does, then it is likely not real; but if all subjects present see the unicorn, then it is reasonable to judge it is real, that is, objective.

Same goes for moral senses. If I sense that Mother Teresa's deeds are morally better than Hitler's deeds, and a large majority agrees with this, and although some may be indecisive (due to possible moral blindness), nobody senses Hitler's deeds to be morally better than Mother Teresa's deeds, then it is reasonable to judge that morality is objective.

Our third interlocutor would simply say that a man who murders a million deserves a million deaths. That being impossible to do he deserves the most that we can give him -- one death. — Moliere

As previously mentioned, the Golden Rule is derived straight from justice. Thus anything that breaks the golden rule is necessarily unjust. Our third person observes the rule "Do unto others as they do unto you", which is different than the Golden Rule "Do unto others as you would want them to do unto you". Killing a man breaks the Golden Rule, unless it is done to prevent a yet greater harm, such as killing more people. Our third person breaks the Golden Rule, and is therefore not just.

Sometimes commitments are motivated by good will alone -- it isn't the results of actions, but what they intend to accomplish which compels persons to adopt a particular moral position. — Moliere

Agreed. But if you truly intend to accomplish a thing, then you would necessarily try to find the correct means to accomplish that thing, and discard the means that don't. Say I intend to help people, and find out the means to do so which is in my power to do. Then I will necessarily do it. If I don't do it, then it is either because I don't believe the means to be correct, or because my intentions were not true.

Same for the pacifists. If their intentions is to bring peace and justice, and pacifism does not provide the means to do so, then they will necessarily find another means, or else their intentions were not truly to bring peace and justice.

Unequal treatment among men for a given situation. And this is evaluated objectively.
— Samuel Lacrampe

So far "objective", though, has just been fleshed out as a test in the imagination -- what someone is able to conceive of as being possible or impossible, in the same manner that a triangle cannot have anything but three sides. — Moliere

I think you are mixing up two topics here. The test of imagination only served to determine if there is a case that is morally good yet unjust. But my above quote concerns justice only. 'Objective' means "Independent on the subject of thought, the observer". Two treatments are equal or not, independent on the observer; and therefore justice is objective.

All that happens after having determined what is good or evil. But there are those who disagree on those terms. — Moliere

It is simpler than you think. To summarize my position so far: Criteria for moral judgements are Justice and the Golden Rule (aside from religious authorities, but these only add and don't reduce the previous criteria). Then all humans, due to human nature, know what is good and evil. E.g. Respect, honesty, and health are good. Disrespect, dishonesty, and harm are bad. With that, we have all the ingredients we need to make moral judgements for a given situation. Then if there are disagreements, these can only come from errors of facts or reason.

We can test this with particular examples if desired.

I think you believe in both justice and mercy, and so you attempt to reconcile the two. — Moliere

Not the way we have defined 'mercy', meaning "never punish". I value mercy only when it is just, which simply translates to justice.

But suppose you're in a conversation with three people. And now the third and so far silent conversation partner pipes up and says, "In order for justice to be served, for there to be a balance for what he has done. Having killed millions he also must die -- only by forfeiting his life, after having orchestrated the death of so many innocents, will there be any kind of equality; he would deserve worse if there was something worse to give him" — Moliere

If the third person is sincere, then his error is not a moral but rational one. We appeal to the principle of a just punishment: A punishment is just if (1) it restores justice when possible, and (2) prevents further injustice. Also, if numerous punishments accomplish these ends, then we ought to choose the one that is the least harmful.

Killing a criminal does not restore justice to the victims. It does prevent further injustice from the criminal, but then jail time accomplishes this too and is less harmful.

If everyone were committed to pacifism, then the horrors of war -- including the systematic slaughter of innocent people -- would not exist on our world. — Moliere

And if there were no sinners, then we would all be saints. Can't disagree with that logic, but it says nothing about how to deal with current warriors and sinners. I am not sure how extreme pacifism or 'mercy' as we have defined it, can stop current wars or injustice. As such, I claim rational error again, because the means does not meet the end.

What counts as unjust? — Moliere

Unequal treatment among men for a given situation. And this is evaluated objectively.

And if it is the motivation and the act which are good or evil, and the circumstances are the same (kill or not kill the ex-fascist leader) -- then there must be some reason for our different acts. — Moliere

Indeed there are. I will exclude rational errors here. We all know what is morally good and bad, but free will entails we have the choice to be morally good or bad. Why decline the moral good if we know it to be good? To prioritize other kinds of good such as physical good (e.g. unfaithful sex) or emotional good (e.g. merciless revenge). Now why should we prioritize the moral good over the other kinds of good? By definition of the moral good which is "what we ought to do". In other words, to say "we can do something else than we what ought to do" is a contradiction.

Hello.
So right only means what you choose, and wrong only means what you don't choose, is that correct? So if I chose to be unjust to you, you likely would not choose this, and so the event would be wrong for you, but right for me. Would there be any reason why I should stop being unjust to you?

However, if someone did believe this to be so then they would say that punishing Hitler is immoral. (though could agree to stopping him). Said hypothetical person would say there wouldn't be a point after having stopped him from doing evil, that evil is prevented and that bringing more evil to the world, by way of not observing the value of mercy, only brings more evil and does not bring balance. — Moliere

We are not really in disagreement here, because the end of putting Hitler in jail is to prevent further harm. If the end can be accomplished by another less extreme means, then that is acceptable too. In addition, if the harm done could be repaid, to restore justice, then that should be done too; but this may not be possible when it comes to killing people.

What is the difference, in your set up, between justice and goodness? Aren't they basically the same thing? — Moliere

In this case, I think justice is a necessary and sufficient criteria to determine goodness.

what prevents someone else from holding to another value as having priority to the claim of goodness? — Moliere

P1: If one truly believes an act to be morally good, then they may willingly accept it, despite the harm it may cause them, because moral goodness is believed to be the ultimate end for a lot of people. E.g., one may willingly accept to tell a truth that is damaging to them, if they believe it to be the morally right thing to do.
P2: Nobody willingly accepts injustice to happen to them (unless it is to prevent an even greater injustice); not the saints, not Hitler, nor anyone else in between. This is a posteriori knowledge, but we all know this to be true.
C: Therefore nobody believes a unjust act to be morally good.

The pacifists you speak of may have thought that Hitler could be stopped in a more peaceful way than violence, but I don't believe they sincerely thought it was morally good to not stop him.


You brought up other objections, but if that's okay, let's put them aside to focus on the main ones above.

merciless is to punish offenders within your power — Moliere

So by extension, mercy simply means "not to punish offenders within your power". Let's roll with it.

I claim we cannot imagine an act to be morally good without the will of mercy. Therefore "willing mercy" is a necessary property of moral goodness; therefore "willing mercy" is a necessary criteria to determine if an act is morally good — Moliere

This claim can be refuted if we find a case where the act is not merciful, and yet we judge it to be morally good: Hitler starts killing Jews, and we have the power to stop this. We therefore capture him and put him in jail, which effectively prevents further victims.

Our act is merciless, as defined above, and I judge it to be morally good. Do you? If so, then mercy is not a necessary criteria for moral goodness.

I'd say that the problem with this test is that those with a lack of imagination will come to different conclusions than those with an expansive imagination. — Moliere

Yes but this is a non-issue. As a parallel, think of math. For problems solvable with math, math is an infallible method in theory, even though some people may make errors. To prevent human error, the math reasoning can be checked by different people, as it is unlikely for everyone to repeat the same error; and once discovered and shared, the error is easily seen by everyone. As is the case with math, so it is with the test of imagination. Some people may erroneously believe that "blue" is a necessary criteria for triangles, because they lack the imagination to imagine a triangle that is another colour. But another person can easily show them the error.

Were a triangle given another side then, by definition, it would be a quadrilateral. It just follows from how we set things up at the beginning. — Moliere

You are mixing the word 'triangle' with the concept of a triangle. The word may change but the concept may not. We can arbitrarily change the word 'three' to 'two', but we cannot modify the concept III to II. Similarly, we cannot modify the concept Δ to have four sides.

But if our test for truth by way of necessity is in our imagination then I would claim I can't think of one moral statement which is true in all possible worlds. — Moliere

"An act cannot be morally good if unjust". We have yet to find an example where this is false. I know the examples with mercy were an attempt at this, but I think we can both come to the conclusion that they are incorrect if we agree on the definition of mercy.

Loving yourself means willing the good to yourself. But to will mercilessness towards yourself (out of justice) means you will less good to yourself. You should be merciful to yourself just as you are merciful to others, and forgive them out of compassion regardless of what may or may not be just. This is what it means to love. — Moliere

To recap, we have defined mercy as "Don't over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way (and also sometimes not fully restore justice)". By extension, mercilessness means "Over-respond so as to produce injustice the other way". Do you agree with these definitions?

As such, mercilessness can never be willed out of justice, by definition of mercilessness. Additionally, being as merciful to yourself as you are to others can never be unjust, by definition of justice.

[...] Might that be possible, in your view? — Moliere

One way to determine a necessary truth is to use "The Test of the Imagination", as Chesterton calls it. If we cannot imagine a subject x without the predicate y, then y is a necessary property of x, and by extension, y is a necessary criteria to determine if the object of enquiry is x. E.g., we cannot imagine a triangle without 3 sides, therefore "having 3 sides" is a necessary property of triangles; therefore "having 3 sides" is a necessary criteria to determine if the object of enquiry is a triangle.

I claim we cannot imagine an act to be morally good without the will of justice. Therefore "willing justice" is a necessary property of moral goodness; therefore "willing justice" is a necessary criteria to determine if an act is morally good.

I love myself, and I care about mercy -- so I act on my conception of mercy regardless of what others may think of me, foolish or not foolish. — Moliere

Let's define the term 'love'. The Christian love, agape, means "willing the good to the object loved".
Thus loving love yourself means willing the good to yourself. But to will injustice towards yourself (out of mercy) means you will less good to yourself than to others, which means you love yourself less than you love others. As such, the statement "I love myself, and I care about mercy, even when unjust to me" leads to a contradiction.

On the other hand, if you love others as much as yourself, it follows that your acts of mercy will always remain just.

While a joke, I did want to note that people can believe their moral grounds are objective. Religion is often given as the sort of thing which gives an objective ground to moral commitments, and different religions emphasize different values. — Moliere

If morality is objective, and different religions teach contradicting moral systems, then it follows that some moral systems taught by religions are wrong, as truth does not contradict truth.

Note however that nearly every religion uses the golden rule in their morality. Source

Yes he did it through his own will and no he didn’t harm anyone. And to answer your last question, yes he intends to do it again if no punishment is inflicted. Do you think jail time is deserved in this case? — SonJnana

I will also assume that anything lower than jail time would not be sufficient to deter him. Then yes, jail time is deserved (plus rehab afterwards). Laws and their enforcements are installed for the end of not only justice but also safety for the citizens. Yes, the addict did not commit injustice, but he nevertheless acted unsafely for himself and potentially others (e.g. he could be driving under the influence). Note that such punishment, while not for the end of justice, is also not unjust, for it can be applied to everyone.

And I claim that the judges wont necessarily agree on what punishment should be deserved via Golden rule becuase they can differ on what they think is a deserved punishment via Golden rule. — SonJnana

It seems that the golden rule is not the only criteria for determining a deserved punishment, because safety seems to be another criteria, as described above. Once again however, the deserved punishment cannot be unjust, and therefore the golden rule remains a necessary criteria, even if insufficient.

In the hypothetical scenario that all religion is proven to be made up[...] — SonJnana

"If God does not exist everything is permitted" - Dostoevsky :wink: The reason being that a true objective law is necessarily above the law abiding subjects; and this being would be what we call God. But this is entering metaphysics and goes beyond the scope of this discussion, so let's just ignore that.

One person does think premarital sex is okay via Golden rule. Another person is conditioned by parents and culture to believe premarital sex is wrong and unjust via Golden rule. [...] A collectivist thinks that if the father tells the son to become something, the son should do that. They think it is immoral to go against parents' word, and that the son has an obligation to his family that raised him. A more independent culture on the other hand thinks parents shouldn't impose on their kids to tell them what to become. They think that would be immoral. So which culture do you think is immoral and what criteria are you using to determine that? — SonJnana

For both cases, the criteria to determine morality is justice, and by extension, the golden rule. The person that breaks the golden rule is immoral, and the person that does not, is not. Even though the act and outcome are the same for both persons, the intention is not, because the first person is insincere where as the second person is not. This is the same rationale as the difference between intentional and accidental homicide. The act and outcome are the same, but the intent is not. This makes justice relative, but not subjective.

If some sect Christianity were to be true, all of its claims of morality would be right. This wouldn't make its moral claims an extra criteria for determining morality, this would make it the only criteria. Justice via Golden rule would be completely irrelevant. It wouldn't matter if everything thought that killing homosexuals is too cruel. [...] — SonJnana

In theory yes. But in reality, Christianity does not command to kill homosexuals; and in fact, makes the golden rule one of the two Greatest Commandments: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

Do you think someone else might disagree with you on this? — Moliere

The disagreement is of no value if it is not backed up by an objective reason. :wink:

Do I not love myself because I forgo pressing for my friend to pay me back? — Moliere

Let's expand your example to the extreme for the sake of clarity. You forgo pressing your friends to pay you back for money they stole; all your friends, all the time. Would you agree that your act is not judged to be virtuous, but instead, either foolish or lacking self-respect?

That said, if this act of mercy is a means to the end of inciting your friend to penitence (e.g. see Les Miserables), then it may be morally good. But then it is also just, because in penitence, the friend would be willing to restore justice and avoid further acts of injustice.

Humans are basically sheep, and we like the comfort of conformity (conscience). — bloodninja

Conscience is not the inclination towards comfort nor conformity. It gives info on what we ought to do, even if it goes against comfort or conformity. During the Nazi regime, conscience may tell you to protect Jews, despite the risks it entails and the fact that it does not conform to the political regime of the time.

If you think ethics is grounded in our "nature" then you need to show how slavery was or was not grounded by or in our nature. I think you have the burden of proof here. — bloodninja

Conscience informs us on what we ought to do, which is not necessarily what we can do or what is easiest to do. People may choose against their conscience like choosing to own slaves, because they can (through power) and it makes their lives easier. But conscience tells us we ought to seek justice and avoid injustice; and no one can say that slavery is just, as justice is defined in the OP. Neither the slaves, nor even the masters.

Hello everyone,
I am going out of town and will be unresponsive for a couple of days. Back mid-next week.
Stay ethical!

I think that addiction doesn't work so cleanly as all that, or akrasia in general for that matter. Suppose both conditions are met the first time. What if he does it again? And so on? Or perhaps this is the first time he has done it to you, but he's done this elsewhere before.
We are prone to repeat mistakes. We can be sincerely penitent and yet fail. — Moliere

I don't know much about this akrasia condition, but if he relapses, it is either out of his own free will or it is not. If the former, then he was not sincere in the first place and is not to be trusted. If the latter, then his act is not immoral, but harmful nonetheless, and at which point the "punishment" would not be out of retribution but to "save him from himself" so to speak, like an intervention.

Mercy is to forgo punishment. You have a right to punish (a concept associated with justice), but you do not exercise said right. It may be morally correct to enact justice in some scenarios, and morally correct to enact mercy in others. Mercy is a value which flows from love -- the kind of general love for humankind. While you may have the right to punish, to enact just consequences, you forgo them out of compassion. — Moliere

I think that the case where mercy fails to meet justice and is yet morally good does not add up. Recall that justice is defined as equality in treatment among all men. As such, we can define injustice as mistreatment for some men. If justice is not met, even out of mercy, then it follows that somebody gets mistreated.

E.g. You are a judge. Person A is unjust to person B. You could give a just punishment to A but decide not to, out of mercy, which comes from love for A. The logical consequence is that justice is not restored for B. This unjust decision from love for A entails a lack of love for B.

Person A thinks the drug addict does not deserve to go to prison via Golden rule. Person B thinks the drug addict does deserve to go to prison via Golden rule. This is not a disagreement about facts about the event, or about the purpose of a punishment. It is a disagreement about what is just via Golden rule. — SonJnana

If there is no disagreement about facts, then there cannot be a disagreement via the golden rule either. What are the specific facts in your example? Did the drug addict become addicted through his own will? Did he harm anyone? Does he intend to do it again if no punishment is inflicted? If yes to all, then jail sounds just, and nobody could say it is undeserved; not even him with regards to justice. If no to all, then jail sounds unjust, and in which case, nobody would want that punishment.

That said, remember that the source of the golden rule is justice. As such, if we can judge straight from justice, then we don't need to rely on the golden rule; although they would not contradict. And a just punishment is one that restores justice and prevents injustice from occurring again. So if the judges agree about the facts, then they will necessarily agree on the just punishment.

I still don't understand how you can determine something to be not unjust yet immoral. If you are saying it is not unjust, what criteria are you using to determine that it is immoral? — SonJnana

Religious claims. E.g., if Christianity is true, then its claim that fornication is immoral is true, even if not unjust. But don't misunderstand; I am not here claiming that Christianity is true (that would far exceed the scope of this discussion); I am merely giving you a candidate criteria that goes beyond justice.

Hello.
My position is that morality is more than a mere social construct. It is discoverable through our moral sense called conscience, universal because all humans have the same human nature, and unchangeable because our nature does not change. Even though slavery was more socially accepted 2000 years ago, it was just as morally wrong then as it is today, because it always fails the golden rule of ethics.

I don't fully understand what you are saying, and so my response may not be adequate. Here it is anyways. We are physical beings (though maybe not only physical). As such, our bodies obey the laws of physics, and so we are not free from these. Our intentions can be influenced but not compelled by our surroundings. Even locked in jail, a saint can have saintly intentions.

how do you define the "our" in our morals? — Pollywalls

Not sure. How do you define it? Your answer might help me understand your question.

it would not violate justice to demand your friend leave and pay you back — Moliere

A just punishment is one that serves two goals. (1) restore justice, and (2) prevent injustice from occurring again. If the friend truly intends to pay you back when he can, then goal (1) is met. If in addition he is sincerely penitent, then goal (2) is met without further punishment; and in which case any additional punishment like kicking him out would be overboard and result in injustice the other way.

The problem in real life is that intentions of others are never fully known, and so the disagreement in punishment can come from disagreement in the perception of the defendant's intentions.

Mercy is much more in line with the Christian response, since mercy flows from love (which I would say is the central organizing value of Christian values, if we had to choose one). — Moliere

We would need to define the term 'mercy' to obtain a full understanding of it. If it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but enough to restore justice", then mercy is always in line with justice by definition. But if it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but also sometimes not fully restore justice", then mercy is not always just; and at which point, I would say that this kind of mercy is immoral.