My reply to unenlightened showed that A needs to be defined prior to A = A + 1, or else the statement is false (it returns an error). You can't use a variable that wasn't previously defined to define a variable. Its like defining a word with using another word that hasn't been defined.

This errs in failing to notice that science is social. One individual making their own observations is not science. A group actively engaging in a conversation aimed at explaining what they see, and willing to adjust their view to account for what others claim, is at least a start. — Banno

So Galileo wasn't doing science when he devised the modern scientific method and performed his experiments in private, away from the watchful eyes of the theocracy?

If philosophy is social, then we have both made the same point - that philosophy IS a science.

Besides, other peoples claims are are not evidence. That is where you err. You still have to personally verify their claims. Other peoples' claims is just another personal observation anyway.

It assumes nothing can exist, or that something can come from nothing, but we know that to be wrong, therefore I don't see how asking such a question is useful. Something exists. There is no why.

Thats a different question that your formula doesn't address. It also seems like a useless non-sensical question. How useful do you expect the answer to be?

Falsification fails to demarcate science from non-science both because scientists make use of non-falsifiable theories (as Watkins shows) and because falsification fails to solve the problem of induction. — Banno

The key to understanding the relationship between philosophy (metaphysics) and science (physics) is to realize that philosophy is a science. And the conclusions of one branch of the investigation of reality must not contradict those of another. All knowledge must be integrated

At root, science identifies and integrates sensory evidence (which is the nature of reason). Science is essentially based, not on experiment, but on observation and logic; the act of looking under a rock or into a telescope is a scientific act. So is the act of observing and thinking about your own mental processes (proof of one's conclusions to others comes later, but that is argumentative, not inquisitive.) Science is willing to accept and integrate information from any observational source, without concern about persuading other people.

They are both the same in that they both gather knowledge through observation and then classify this knowledge, and through classification, elaborate general principles or ideas. Science is simply organized knowledge.

if that weren't the case, we would either have the answer to the question or would be claiming knowledge we don't possess. — TheMadFool

We do have the answer. Something exists. Therfore, this whole endeavor is unnecessary.

Yeah, I’m fine with that brief. Personally, I would then ask, if science solves the hard problem by relating the physical mechanisms of brain to the metaphysical mechanisms of subjectivism......what has really been accomplished? I rather think no one will care, except the scientists. — Mww

So you are no longer interested in the subject if it no longer resides in the domain of philisophy and becomes part of the domain of science. I can understand this. Unsolved mysteries are interesting to philosophers. Solved mysteries are no longer interesting to philosophers but are interesting to scientists. :cool:

However, we should be careful not to allow our interest in keeping it a mystery prevent us from solving the problem. The answers were never guaranteed to be interesting to everyone for every goal that they may have.

I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it? — fdrake

Start off with the basics. When you have a thought of red, is the thought a color or a word? But then words can be colored scribbles. So is red a color with no shape or a colored scribble?

Statements are sounds and colored scribbles. So to say that you don't know how to think of red apples without sounds and colored scribbles doesn't seem consistent, when you think of words as words, but not apples as apples?

Words are just different types of sensory impressions. You see apples on tables like you see words on screens. You don't need statements to distinguish between words and apples or to have the belief that words and apples are different things. The distinction is obvious in the mind. You only need statements to communicate beliefs, not to actually have beliefs.

There are 2 equiprobable possibilities: — TheMadFool

That's an unfounded assumption. How did you come to the certain conclusion that something existing and nothing existing are equiprobable outcomes?

They only appear as "unfalsifiable" because you have not defined your terms, "God", "exist". Once you provide clear definitions you'll see what I mean. That "unfalsifiable" could mean something other than true is only the case when terms are ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is akin to what I've been saying. The more specific we are with our definitions, the more falsifiable those definitions are. To assert the existence of some thing that contradicts the category you are defining the thing as (ie there are planets smaller than mercury that exist) either means that we adjust the definition of the category, or put the thing in a whole new category. The latter occurred when we categorized Pluto as a dwarf planet, instead of a planet.

Consider statements of the form "there exists an x such that p(x)", those are verifiable but not falsifiable. Why? To verify it, all you need to do is find an example, to falsify it, you need to go out and look at everything ever and evaluate whether there's an x in it such that p(x). "There exists a non-white swan" - go out and find it. You think there isn't one? Have you looked everywhere? — fdrake

I wouldnt need to look everywhere, only where swans live, or in its genetic code where there would be the potential for non- white feathers to be expressed, just as one might have the code for brown eyes in their genes even though they have blue eyes.

Then there is the possibility of defining swans as all being white, and non-white "swans" aren't actually swans at all.

A statement is verifiable if it can be shown to be true.
A statement is falsifiable if it can be shown to be false. — fdrake

And if it's neither, then the statement is verifiable and falsifiably shown to be nothing other than an unjustified belief, which is to say that it is neither true or false, which is to say that the statement is useless.

The whole point of the claimant omitting "I believe..." at the beginning of the statement is to get the reader to believe, and possibly to fool themselves into thinking that it is more than a just an unjustified belief. But if there is no evidence either way then the lack of evidence is verifiable evidence that the statement is nothing more than an unjustified belief.

Did anyone actually read the article? — Banno

Did anyone understand the article? I'm responding to your examples. If you're examples aren't good representations of what was said in the article, it makes me wonder if you understand what you read, or if you have critically examined what you read in the article.

Any claim made without empirical evidence, which is the same as saying without justification, is a claim about the ontological status of a belief, not the ontological status of real UFOs in real secret military garages.

Any claim made without evidence can be safely understood to actually be saying, "I believe...[the claim]". The claim is about a metaphysical belief, not a metaphysical state of affairs independent of your belief.

The difference between Level 1 and Level 3 is in the degree of verifiability. The car is in my garage today - take a look; but the metal that doesn't expand when heated - I don't have a sample as yet, but it's out there, somewhere... prove me wrong!

Uncircumscribed existential statements are the stuff of conspiracy theories. There's a flying saucer in a US military base. I know we've looked in all the military bases we know of, but this base is secret...

Anyhow, the key point here is that Level 2 statements are unfalsifiable, Level 3 statements are unverifiable, and their conjugate, Level 4 statements, are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. — Banno

We could just say that one of the characteristics of metal is that it expands when heated. Anything else would be, at best, semi-metal. We can simply redefine words or make up new words to resolve the first example. It's a language issue.

Religious claims are just as conspiratorial as many political claims. Some claims are more useful than others, depending on your goals and more fundamental beliefs. Those that already assume there are aliens, gods, or Republicans/Democrats out to oppress you, will see these types of claims as more proof of their assumptions. Not very useful to those without those assumptions, and require the same empirical evidence as you provided for your car being in the garage to believe in UFOs being secret military garages.

Determinism: Every event has a cause. This has the form given for Level 4 statements, an existential statement nestled in a universal. Hence, if Watkins is correct, it can not be proved - doing so would require the impossibility that we examine every possible event and determine its cause; nor can it be falsified; that we have not so far found the cause of some given event does not imply that there is no such cause. — Banno

Again, here we could just define effects as having causes. Any event without a cause would be classified as being a non-effect. It seems that many metaphysical problems can be resolved by changing the way we use words.

Depending on the context, they can be interchangeable. Alice (the subject) is kicking the ball (the object). Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). In the first, it is Alice that is being described. In the second, it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form). — Andrew M

It seems to me that both sentences are describing both things, because both sentences say the same thing, just from different views.

As far as I understand, your point is that our mental states are ultimately independent of the corresponding verbal expressions. This position fails to take account of the complex social and collective character of our beliefs. They are developed, shaped, and exercised within the networks of our interpersonal interactions. Can we reduce them to simple rituals and behavioural patterns, deprived of the signifying symbolic mechanisms? — Number2018

Correspondence is a mental activity. When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver?

Social environments are just a type of natural environment. Sure, being raised by wolves as opposed to apes can have a drastic impact on how you interpret your environment, but we are actually talking about the various environmental niches that certain species fill in the environment. Different rules are required to accomplish different goals. Apes and wolves have different goals, but also similar goals. They both require food and mates, but different food and different mates. A wolf does not interpret an ape of the opposite sex as a thing to mate with. It interprets it as food, or a trespasser in its territory.

Right, that's why I said what "information" refers to in information theory is something completely different from what "information" refers to in much common usage. So for example, if we distinguish between symbols and what the symbols represent (meaning), in information theory the symbols are called information, but in common usage information usually refers to what is represented by the symbols, the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can you call them symbols if they don't already represent something? Meaning is inherent in symbols. Effects are symbolic of their causes.

Harry Hindu is speaking of this as a matter of following rules, but I don't see any evidence of any such rules. And the idea of "rules" does not deliver us from the ambiguity. We generally understand "rules" to exist as an expression of symbols. But these rules would need to be interpreted for meaning. So we'd be stuck in a vicious circle here, of requiring rules to interpret rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe "rule" isn't the most appropriate term. Does natural selection "select rules" by which some organism interprets the information it receives via its senses? Is "selecting rules" an adequate phrase to refer to how certain characteristics are favored by natural selection for the organism to be more in tune with their environment? What is selected is better interpretations of sensory information. These ways of interpreting sensory information are what become instincts, or habits.

I really do not believe that there are any such rules, just habits, so I think we're on a different page here Harry. — Metaphysician Undercover

Habits are memorized rules, or rules that have been engrained in the genetic code thanks to natural selection.

Re: Noise

Noise is information that isn't being attended to, or not applicable to the present goal in working memory.

When listening to someone across a crowded and noisy room, you are focusing your attention on one particular voice. All the other voices are noise because your attention isn't focused on that information. But switch your attention to another voice and that voice becomes information. Its not that the noise wasn't information. It is. The difference arises from attending to bits of information vs. not attending to the bits of information. So, the distinction between noise and information is epistemological.

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with. — Andrew M

So subjects are nouns? Looks like objects and subjects are synonyms, unless you're saying that objects can't be discussed, described, or dealt with. :chin:

It describes how what is foundational, or basic to communication is uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This can be said about any experience - visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or tactile. We use past experience, knowledge, and rules, to eliminate the uncertainty of what we experience.

Interpretting words and behaviors entails discovering the rules (beliefs) that the sender used to encode the message. Only by discovering the rule (belief) can you then decode the message.

Yet, would my mental state be identifiable and recognizable if I could not understand and articulate it in a sentence “It is raining”? — Number2018

Again, communicating beliefs is a seperate issue than having beliefs. Making sounds with your mouth is a behaviour that expresses your belief just as covering your head and running inside does.

As an observer of others, your only have access to their beliefs via their actions. Do you need to observe your own actions to know you have beliefs? Do you need to say, "it is raining." to have a belief that it is raining, or do you simply need to experience water falling from the sky to have the belief that it is raining? If simply stating it is raining means you have a belief that it is raining, then who needs water falling from the sky to believe that it is raining?

“If I were to say that belief is always about states of affairs, would you agree? Then it only remains to point out that a state of affairs can always be put in propositional form for us to see that beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form” — Number2018

Beliefs are not about what can be put in propositional form. How beliefs are communicated is a seperate problem than what beliefs are. Seems like you have to solve the latter problem first before solving the prior problem.

Putting beliefs in propositional form is just another state of affairs that is not the state of affairs that the proposition is about. We can talk about talking, just as we can talk about anything.

What on Earth are all of these scribbles in this thread is about? Is it about a debate? What is the debate about? Is it about something being the case - the ontological nature of propositions and beliefs? Does a debate not assume that one side is closer to the truth than the other side, and that each side tries to show how their scribbles are more of an accurate representation of the ontological relationship between propositions and beliefs? Are you not trying to show something with your use of scribbles? I'm inclined to believe that many people here are more interested in hearing themselves talk than in actually solving problems.

Depends I guess. — frank

On what? What if the speaker was referring to a dream or a fictional story? There are many instances where the present king of France is bald would be true. So it would appear that it depends on what is being talked about. Propositions are always ontological in the sense that they are about how things are or are not. They are epistemological in the sense that the symbols and rules we agree to use to refer how things are or are not, are arbitrary. We could just as well use barks and tail wags to represent some state of affairs as we could use scribbles and utterances.

What if the proposition was, "The present king of France is imaginary." Does that not change what we are talking about, even though we are still talking about the present king of France?

Does this not show that some propositions have terms that are not clearly defined, or have multiple definitions, and which one is being used isnt clear? Thats why I demand definitions for these nebulous terms.

Just like a computer program, variables need to be defined before you can perform functions with them. Scribbles need to be defined before they can be used.

Plus the sentence could become truth apt (if we grant that sentences can be) if you named your dog 'The present king of France' — frank

What if the statement was made by a person that is hallucinating or delusional, or a habitual liar?

I'm making a comment about failure of reference. If that example doesn't work for you, then see the earlier "the present king of France is bald" example. — Andrew M

Like I said, its a matter of some string of scribbles being useful or useless. Scribbles that fail to refer are useless scribbles, just as a dog's bark or the wagging of its tail must refer to something that isn't another bark or tail wag, or else the bark or wag of the tail wouldn't be very useful behaviors. Drawing scribbles that don't refer to anything isn't a useful behaviour. What else could Banno mean by saying that meaning is use? Words are used to refer. If you didn't use scribbles to refer, then you didn't use words. It is what distinguishes scribbles from words.

Never heard of yellow snow? You can certainly have polluted snow which is brown or black. You could also pour food coloring on it. Snow cones are a thing.

It's like saying, "Water is H2O", which is only true in the pure sense. Water often has other things mixed in. It's something to keep in mind in these philosophical discussions. The real world is messy — Marchesk

LOL. Its not the snow that is yellow. Notice how you said there are other things mixed in. Those other things mixed in isnt snow. "Yellow snow" is simply lazy use of language. The snow wasn't yellow before you mixed something that isn't snow in.

Notice how yellow snow has more information than white snow because the former isn't redundant and the latter is.

Must we insist that explaining consciousness at a mechanistic level any easier than explaining the subjective first-person experience aspects of consciousness? My hunch is that the so-called easy problem of consciousness at a mechanistic level is equally as difficult as the so-called hard problem at the subjective level. They might even be the same problem. — Wheatley

The hard problem for dualism is to explain how these two opposing substances (material vs. immaterial) interact. Essentially dualism creates the problem by asserting that there are two opposing substances.

It arises as a result of thinking that you see both the world as it truly is and that you see your mind as it truly is. How they both appear is irreconcilable if you actually believe that how you see to world and mind is actually how they actually are.

Do be careful with computational logic. It doesn't work the same as propositional logic, because instructions are not statements. "A= A+1" Contradiction as statement, simple commonplace instruction — unenlightened

Yet A=A+1 still has meaning to both a computer and human being. Such statements produce real outcomes in both computers and human beings. Programmers often define instructions in a computer program as functions. Basically computational logic and propositional logic are just different sets of rules for using symbols. We can translate one set of rules to another. We do it all the time with different languages.

In this case, we have a statement/function that changes the definition of A, which is just a scribble that can mean anything at any moment we define it.

A=A+1 actually doesn't work in a computer program. You have to have A defined prior to this line in order for it to work. The A between the = and + actually means something else, so it's not a contradiction if you write the function correctly. So A=A+1 is actually only part of a statement/function, therefore is meaningless without A=1 before A=A+1.

Snow. If I assert that the snow outside is white, then I am (purportedly) referring to snow outside and saying something about it. If there is no snow outside then that is a failure of reference. Hence, on Strawson's view, my assertion is neither true nor false (i.e., it's not truth apt). — Andrew M

Asserting that the snow outside is white isnt useful, as it is basically redundant information -as if snow could be another color. I don't know anyone that says such things, except in a philosophy forum.

But if you had said, "There is white snow on the ground outside", would that be any different? If there were no snow, then your sentence would be false, regardless of the color. Statements are either true (useful) or false (useless), not somewhere in between.

it may not be interesting to you, but I find it interesting that there isn't agreement on the issue. — Coben

But if the source of disagreement is that we are just talking past each other, then that isn't really a disagreement is it?

I tend to agree, but some things are much harder to put into words than others. Like 'the meaning of a dream'. — Coben

What do you mean, "meaning of a dream"? How are you using "meaning"? How is the meaning of a dream different than the meaning of a drunken stupor?

If your sense of the proposition is like: so long as there exists a string of words which states the belief content at some point in time *** then the belief content is propositional because it can be stated, then yes of course it's propositional.

But if your sense of the proposition has the modality associated with that italicised "can" be temporal - IE there are some beliefs in some organism, or some beliefs at some points in time which cannot be stated at that* time, then no of course belief contents aren't always propositional.

I do not expect creativesoul and @Banno to ever argue this crucial point regarding the modality of expression of belief statements in their debate, so I expect it to be a clash of worldviews without any interfacing - an exchange characterised by attempting to shift frames of interpretation for belief than regarding any thematisation of belief ** — fdrake

But words are just scribbles and sounds. Does a dog's bark or a dog's wagging tail qualify as a proposition?

Why "process"? Do you deny the possibility of a static relationship? Are not the relationships between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc., static? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, I would just say that static relationships are less complex than dynamic relationships, therefore static relationships have less information than dynamic ones. I do prefer to use "information" for the prior reasons I've stated. As I said, Process Philosophy is similar, not exactly the same as my "Information philosophy".

How is Joe's weight, or Ron's weight causal? That's what I don't understand. If a thing's weight is the product of a measurement, then this information is caused. But how would you account for the information within the thing itself? Clearly there must be some sort of information within the thing itself which is called "Joe", to validate the measurement as true. Isn't it the case that this information is there within Joe whether or not it acts as a cause in the case of Joe being measured? — Metaphysician Undercover

Measurement are just comparisons, just like Joe being heavier than Ron. What is measured is the relationship between their body's mass and the Earth's gravity.

The thing itself is information in that it is caused. The thing being the effect, and it's reasons for existing here and now in the way that it does being the cause. So an organism carries information about it's parentage, it's eating habits, it's understanding of a native language, it's life and ancestral history essentially.

When we acquire information to compare, like two people's weight, then that is the cause of the inference that Joe is heavier than Ron. In other words, reasoning is causal. You point to reasons (causes) for your beliefs (effects), and point to your beliefs as causes for your actions (effects). Your actions carry information about your beliefs, which is how many of us can interpret what one believes based on their actions.

By their behavior, just as I do with animals. And yes, through non-verbal communication also, which is a subset of behavior. Of course with animals we are dealing with a serious cross-'cultural' divide, so I might make errors. But with mammals say, I share a lot in common with them. So, I do think I can work out many of their beliefs and put those in statements.

And since I was responding to someone who it seemed was saying 'they have beliefs that cannot be put into statements' they seem to recognize beliefs in animals, but have deciding that these beliefs they recognize, some of them, cannot be put into statements. Well, I don't think that makes any sense. If they recognized a belief in an animal, then it can be put into words. The animal may not, but they are, without seeming to acknowledge it, now capable of it. — Coben

Having a belief and being able to symbolize it with scribbles and sounds are two separate things. We can symbolize anything, not just beliefs, so asking whether or not we can symbolize beliefs isn't a very interesting question. Non-language users have beliefs that they cannot put into statement form, but language users can put beliefs, as well as facts (like the fact that others have beliefs), into statement form. This just means that those that have established a symbol system can use that system to symbolize other events and processes. A symbol system can be expanded to represent new events and processes. So languages can be adapted to represent virtually anything - beliefs or otherwise.

Well, not for me. I think anything I consider as something an animal believes can be put into a statement. They don't do that, but that's another story. I don't believe all of my beliefs, for example, have been put into statements. But a belief is an idea about how things are/work/cause/will be/have been. Those can all be put into words.

When drinking water at the watering hole it is good to be ready to run. Other places and positions are safer.

To me anything I would attribute as a belief to an animal could be formulated in language. Otherwise I would not call it a belief. Like the way the skin might pulsate if you poked a baboons skin. I wouldn't call that a belief, I'd call that a response.

Something leads him to believe 'those phenomena indicate a belief'. He can tell me the phenomena. I would likely then show how it could be put into a statement. Not a statement describing the phenomena, but a statement of the underlying belief. — Coben

I'm not quite sure that I'm getting you here.

Words and statements are just visual scribbles and audible sounds. Writing or speaking are actions. So why would it be so difficult to acknowledge that animals and babies have beliefs if they can make noises with their mouths, or perform actions?

Being that words are just visuals and audibles, then any visual or audible could be made into a word. The symbols that are used to communicate can be arbitrary, and even unintentional. A dog barking or wagging it's tail communicates something. What that may be - only other dogs may know, and maybe some humans if they have been around dogs long enough. I find it difficult to believe that only particular human made visuals and sounds are indicators of possessing beliefs.

If you hear a person speaking a different language that you don't know, how do you know that they are using words or just making noises? How would you know that they have beliefs?

Are you saying that all relations are causal? What about something like Joe is heavier than Ron? Isn't that information which is not a matter of causality? — Metaphysician Undercover

Excellent question. Thanks.

No. I'm not saying that all relations are causal. Causality is a kind of relationship. So, if you are saying that there is information in the comparison of Joe's weight with Ron's, then information is actually in all relationships. That is fine with me. I sometimes use "relationships" and "process" instead of "information" to define the fundamental layer of reality. My "Information Philosophy" is very similar to Process Philosophy.

On the other hand, it seems to me that both Joe and Ron's weight is information, and Joe being heavier than Ron is a comparison of those two bits of information that then creates more information by inference - that Joe is heavier than Ron. So could you get the information that Joe is heavier than Ron without first having the information of Joe and Ron's weight, or Joe and Ron's physical appearance? In a sense, Jon being heavier than Ron is an inference, or an effect, of comparing the information of Joe and Ron's weight or physical appearance.

It doesn't matter if you didn't understand the question. — TheMadFool

Now, not only do I not understand the question, but I don't understand your reason for asking it if you're just going to say that it doesn't matter if I understood the question or not.

I get synonyms but information, last I checked, isn't synonymous with causality. They're treated as distinct concepts. To add, you said

all effects carry information about all prior cause
— Harry Hindu

and that threw me off. In what sense would effects "carry information" if not in ways distinct and separate from causation itself? For instance, running with my detective example, if Sherlock Holmes sees the tables and chairs overturned in a room, he concludes that there had been a scuffle in the room. The information that there was a scuffle in the room is distinct from the scuffle itself right? is the inference of a scuffle identical to the scuffle itself? if it is then every time I gather causal information, whatever it is that I inferred should actualize in reality too, no? — TheMadFool

That's weird to say that information isn't synonymous with causality when you were the one that provided the example of a detective at a crime scene observing the aftermath of a crime and garnering information about the crime from the crime scene. I agreed with you. Would you agree that others would agree that that is a good example of how effects carry information about their causes? You're the one throwing me off.

The scuffle is the cause, the overturned chairs is the effect. The relationship between them is information. You basically have three separate things, but really those three things can't exist on their own ontologically, except in our minds.

See the ambiguity in your usage? You start out by saying information is in the complex thing. Then you end up saying that this is really "data", and it only appears to be information when apprehended by a mind. So which is it, is information in the thing as what we call "data", or is it how the data appears to the mind when apprehended? You do understand that there is a difference between these two don't you? And to switch back and forth is to equivocate. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I said that the more complex something is, the more information there is. There is information in simple systems, just not as much as in complex systems. The system being the causal process that leads to the effect that we are talking about.

Information is the relationship between causes and their effects. Apprehending that relationship is the act of syncing our knowledge with the way things are. Many people use the term information interchangeably with knowledge. If you have knowledge, you have information. We have terms that have more than one definition, so I don't understand this sudden aversion to different words meaning the same thing, or words that have more than one definition. It would only matter if the definitions contradicted each other, and they don't.

I wasn't talking about "causality", I was talking about "information". Why change the subject? — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't. They are the same thing.

Nothing to add/subtract although the most pressing concern regarding information being sought, given the teleological slant of many of our predecessors, seems to be WHO...is...behind...all...this? [the questioner takes his last breath, his eyes glaze over, and then his body goes limp] — TheMadFool

I don't understand the question. "WHO" is behind what?

Too, what exactly do you mean by "relationship" between cause and effect. The only relationship that exists between these two is causality. Are you suggesting information = causality? If you are then that brings us back to the question I asked, what's the point of the whole exercise of inventing the word "information"? — TheMadFool

Yes, causality = information = meaning. However, I don't understand your aversion to synonyms. Do you not use some words interchangeably? Also, I think "information" provides that sense of aboutness that "causality" does not seem to imply.

Can you give us an example? — Coben

If creative could give an example then it wouldn't be an example of a belief that can't be put into statement form, rather it would be an example of a belief put in statement form.

The first question should be, "What is a belief?" If you can show that animals and pre-language babies (or adults as in the case of Idelfonso - The Man Without Words) have beliefs, then is that not enough to show that there are beliefs that cannot be put into statements? What if there are words to refer to the belief, but the person doesn't know the words - does that mean that they don't have the belief until they know the words to refer to it?