What is the difference between the quality of the experience and the experience? — Isaac

See my latest response to @Janus.

What is 'the way' doing here?. The taste of an apple is the taste of an apple — Isaac

If an apple has a taste, then there is a way it tastes. Am I Englishing wrong?

there's no other thing it becomes inside my mind. — Isaac

If apples have a taste then you can taste them (or not), which means they taste some way to you. I’m not suggesting it becomes some other thing in your mind, but it becomes something in your mind: a sensation of taste. That sensation of taste probably has properties, such as sweet, bitter, juicy, sharp, etc.

You think that the word “qualia” has an intentionally nonsensical meaning?

I guess we don't even need to speak about quality of experience, but just about the experience itself. — Janus

What’s the difference? I guess it depends on whether you take an “experience” to be something inner or something outer. Qualia is what eliminative materialists want to eliminate.

There seems no purpose for this wierd intermediary 'qualia', neither in perception, nor in experience. — Isaac

Why does it need to be considered as an “intermediary” instead of just the (quality of the) experience that a person has? The way things taste, look, sound or feel to a particular person. We know that these things are not the same for everyone, otherwise there would be no colour-blindness or synaesthesia or deafness, etc. And it’s likely that there could be even more slight, less noticeable differences for more “normal” people.

Nonsense verse is not complete nonsense, but the nonsensical aspects are due to the use of words which intentionally lack meaning/sense. Maybe a word like “Preffling”. But “qualia” isn’t one of those words.

I’d really prefer to return to my argument that we can talk about qualia even though qualia are not the basis for the meanings of sensation terms. Banno’s minimalist responses to the first lines of my posts have brought us here. But okay why aren’t all language games sensical?

Ok, you got me. You win. There is indeed a language game about qualia. — Banno

Good. Then you should accept that it’s not senseless to talk about qualia or inverted spectra.

Seems you have entirely missed what was said. — Banno

If you’re only going to respond to the first line of each of my posts then why should I bother?

It is you who has missed what was said. Being the topic of a discussion is “having a role in the language game”. However, your claim is that qualia “cannot have a role in the language game”. Contradiction.

Let's make a game about Prefflings; were the game is to answer the question "what is a Preffling?" The game spins by itself, never making contact. — Banno

Try again. There are no language games about “Prefflings”, but there are plenty about qualia, Moreover, if Prefflings and qualia “cannot have a role in the language game”, then we would be unable to talk about them, yet here we are. Surely being the subject of discussion is “having a role in the language game”. Otherwise, please explain why it isn’t.

Indeed; and in much the same way that the subject of Antigonish is the little man who wasn't there, or the Jabberwock the subject of Jabberwocky. — Banno

You said that qualia "cannot have a role in the language game", so how can it be that there are language games about qualia? You are not merely saying that qualia don't exist; you are saying that we can't talk about qualia. Yet, qualia is the subject of this discussion, the subject of Dennett's paper, and here we are talking about qualia.

"Qualia"" is the name of all that? — creativesoul

"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. — Dennett, Quining Qualia (opening line)

There is no sense in which the notion that "the quali could be different" could be meaningful. It cannot have a role in a language game. — Banno

What cannot have a role in the language game? Qualia? I thought it was the subject of this discussion.

With regards to intuition pump #3, you know what is being indicated by "we experience entirely different subjective colors", don't you? I assume you must, since you asserted in your previous post that we can't "ever determine that".

I take it that you know how pain feels and how the colour red looks to you, even though it is not from your own case that the words "pain" or "red" get their meaning. What is "how pain feels to you" or "how red looks to you" - an illusion? Meaningless gibberish? Can't we talk about how red looks to a colour-blind person or to someone with cerebral achromatopsia? Surely the private language argument excludes something (whatever it may be) from providing the basis for linguistic meaning.

But don't complain that there is a problem of consciousness here. — Banno

If qualia are not definitive aspects of the mind, then I don't know what is. Are you an eliminative materialist?

The point is that our qualia may be different despite using the same colour words, so I'm questioning what you claim we "agree on".
— Luke

How could you possibly ever determine that? You can't — Banno

It is still a possibility that our qualia may be different. Besides, if you can’t “ever determine that” our qualia may be different despite us using the same colour words, then it must be because our qualia are private. Unless there is another reason that you can’t “ever determine that”?

and hence it is an irrelevance.

When my wife tells me it is violet, the conclusion is not that she is seeing a different colour to me, but that I have mis-used the word "blue". — Banno

Irrelevant to what? Qualia may be irrelevant to language use - as Wittgenstein notes with his private language argument - but I don’t consider qualia irrelevant to philosophy of mind.

A perspective (or a point-of-view) is a logical precondition for making natural distinctions and observing things. — Andrew M

I don't see why making natural distinctions and observing things could not be a logical precondition for having a perspective (or a point-of-view). But I see neither as a pre-condition of the other; merely that the two go hand-in-hand.

Alice points the camera, presses the button and the camera takes the picture. That's a physical process. At the end of that process, Alice has a snapshot of the landscape from a particular perspective. — Andrew M

None of that makes any sense unless there are conscious people to look at snapshots of landscapes.

She can't be standing everywhere, and she can't be standing nowhere. — Andrew M

I understand that you want to argue against the "view from nowhere". I'm not trying to argue for it, but I don't think that you can just stipulate having a perspective as a pre-condition. But perhaps I'm not understanding your point.

Intersubjective comparison is available via public language. — Andrew M

I can't directly show you my perceptions or sensations, and neither can anyone else.

We can both agree that the stick appears bent (when partly submerged in water) because we can point to actual bent sticks and recognize the superficial similarity. — Andrew M

We can do that, but it's not directly comparing our perceptions or sensations. Consider Locke's spectrum inversion: Since we both learned colour words by being shown public coloured objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colours. It seems to me more likely that what "straight" and "bent" looks like to you will be the same as what they look like to me, but the same issue could apply if only as a matter of degree (or perhaps if I had some sort of condition or brain malfunction that made me see differently than most people).

Similarly, normally-sighted people can distinguish red, green and yellow apples, so there's nothing ineffable in saying that red and green apples appear dim yellow for dichromatics. And the dichromatic will agree they all appear dim yellow. That the dichromatic lacks the ability to distinguish these three colors is a kind of privacy in practice, but not in principle, since their lack of color discrimination has a physical basis. — Andrew M

I don't disagree that our minds have a physical basis, but I don't see why the same "privacy in practice" doesn't equally apply to everyone, including statistically "normal" people. This could be another case of spectrum inversion, in principle.

What I'm arguing for is that our experiences are not radically private or ineffable (which our public language attests to) — Andrew M

How does our public language attest to the fact that you see the same colour as I do when we both refer to "red"? How can our public language help to show me your sensations?

and also that we represent the world from a particular perspective (since our public language reflects the natural distinctions we make when we observe and interact in the world). — Andrew M

I don't believe that it is a "particular perspective", unless you mean some ideal, statistically normal "average person" - which is not a view from nowhere, but not a view from somewhere, either.

Sorry for not responding sooner. I had intended to, but life intervened.

So take "I enjoy spicy food", I believe Dennett would see that as quite unproblematic. I can taste things, I can have taste preferences. I have a taste preference for spicy food. But what he would see as problematic is an unrestricted commitment to the existence of tastes, spiciness feelings and so on. As if spiciness, enjoyment as we typically conceive of them are somehow instantiated in my mind and body. — fdrake

It seems that Dennett finds our talk about tasting food and experiencing spiciness to be on a par with our talk about Santa Claus. I would concede that what might be problematic here are words like "existence" or "instantiation" in the body, but does anyone seriously doubt that they actually taste food or experience spiciness feelings (besides, maybe, @Isaac)?

Dennett's intentional stance seems like an extension of this idea: to treat our external behaviour as if we had internal states, but ultimately denying we have them.

Take "fdrake enjoys spicy food", when I write that I've got a few memories associated with it, and I'm attributing an a pattern of behaviour and sensation to myself. I've made a whole type out of "spicy food", but in particular I had some memories of flavours from a vindaloo I'd had a few years ago and the burrito I'd described previously. The particulars of the flavour memories didn't really matter (I can give both more and different "supporting evidence" for the statement), as I'm summarising my engagement with an aggregate of foods, feelings and eating behaviours with discriminable characteristics (sensations, flavour profiles, event memories) etc. — fdrake

Yes, but what you seem to be granting here, which Dennett seems to deny, is that you have memories, tastes and sensations. Further quotes from Wittgenstein on private language are relevant here:

306. Why ever should I deny that there is a mental process? It is only that “There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering . . .” means nothing more than “I have just remembered . . .” To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything.

If remembering were nothing more than the external behaviours that we typically associate with remembering, as Dennett seems to indicate, then this "would mean to deny the remembering, to deny that anyone ever remembers anything." Of course, it is evident from people's external behaviours that people can and do remember things, e.g. a person recalls where they left their car keys and then looks in that place, or just plain old learning of any sort, is evidence of remembering. In fact, it is this external third-person perspective of our shared language that gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "remember", according to Wittgenstein. We would be grammatically mistaken to assume that the word is used to refer to an inner process, but without that inner process there would be no such thing as remembering:

305. “But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does take place here” — one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering”. — The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our face against the picture of an ‘inner process’. What we deny is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is.

Ineffability of experience as a feature of the descriptive strategies we adopt regarding experience, rather than of the abstract entities we are committed to when using those strategies. Analogously, the computer's exact reaction to my call command for "2+2" is also practically ineffable; there are thousands of transistors coming on and off, there are allocation patterns for memory etc; and not because it's trying to express the natural number 2 added to the natural number 2 producing the natural number 4 through the flawed media of binary representations and changes in voltage states of transistors. — fdrake

I'm not sure that's comparable. You want to compare our own experiences - of which we are aware - with the mechanical workings of a computer, of which we are (in this example) unaware. This analogy might work when dealing with other people, but I don't see how it works on ourselves. We might infer or attribute beliefs and desires to a calculator just as we might do to another person, but I think we tend to have better and more direct knowledge about these things when it comes to ourselves. Of course, there are cases where this will not be true, as some psychologists might attest. But I think you would agree that you know better than most people whether or not you like spicy food.

You selectively quoted Wittgenstein and when challenged used another misplaced quote to defend your misreading. — Banno

What challenge? A random quote from the Tractatus which you have failed to demonstrate was a view Wittgenstein still held in his later years? I met your random quote with my own. Try an argument instead.

Edit: As for your accusation of selective quoting, I believe that the private language argument and the sections of it I have quoted from the PI are much more pertinent to Dennett's paper and this discussion than your one unsupported quote from the Tractatus.

Can you show that he rejected that aphorism? — Banno

Can you show that he didn't? Wittgenstein himself - not one of his interpreters - states the Tractatus contained "grave mistakes". I've provided relevant quotes from the PI and my reading of them in relation to qualia. You now appear to want to change the subject rather than to address these directly.

"For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book."

I'm happy for you to provide an argument. All I see in those sections is W repeatedly stating that he does not want to deny that any "inner process" or mental process takes place.

As I have previously quoted:

307. “Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” — If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. — Wittgenstein

He is saying only that qualia do not enter into the language. He does not deny their existence:

"The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something [i.e. qualia] about which nothing could be said."

We can talk about pain, just as we can talk about colour. But we can't say much about the nature of our pains or the way we see colours - the sensation itself - because we can't observe another person's sensations or intersubjectively compare them. That was my point about the inverted spectrum, and I take it that was Wittgenstein's point in the quote.

Because the pain is the qualia; what it feels like. Acknowledging that there is pain (qualia) associated with pain-behaviour is not putting it "out of business".

that is the sort of Wittgenstein that puts qualia out of business. — Banno

If that were the case then Wittgenstein would admit that there is no difference between between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain. Instead, he says: "What greater difference could there be?"

No. It means nothing. — Banno

Dennett seems to think it means something:

The original version of intuition pump #3: the inverted spectrum (Locke, 1690: II, xxxii, 15) is a speculation about two people: how do I know that you and I see the same subjective color when we look at something? Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors. — Dennett

Make a point. — Banno

You said that "Colours ain't coming from in here, either, since we overwhelmingly agree on them". The point is that our qualia may be different despite using the same colour words, so I'm questioning what you claim we "agree on". That your wife says its violet while you say its blue is beside the point.

It's senseless to talk of inverted spectra. — Banno

You don't understand what it means?

And don't come along claiming that I disavow qualia and then use them; my beef with qualia is no more than that they are not needed, and that using them leads the discussion astray — Banno

Isn't that a bit like saying you believe we have qualia, but we just can't discuss them; which is to say that they are ineffable?

Rather than "hedg[ing] his bets", as Dennett posits, perhaps this is what Wittgenstein means when he says:

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said." — Wittgenstein

What do you think the assumptions are that lead to the hard problem? — Janus

If everything is physical (physicalism), then how do we account for (i.e. categorise) the mental/experiential?

Is not the primary idea that experience could not emerge from "brute matter"? — Janus

Experience could emerge from brute matter, but then it is not identical with brute matter, and is therefore not itself physical (matter).

Why would that be any more of a problem than the idea that self-organizing life could not emerge from brute matter? — Janus

I take it you are using "emerge from" here to mean "evolve from", whereas the putative emergence of experience from matter occurs as a process of a (current) functioning body. Experience itself may have emerged/evolved as life evolved, but that's not the same use of the term associated with the "emergence" of experience/consciousness from the matter of a functioning body, which occurs concurrently.

Perhaps it is our conceptions of what experience, life and brute matter are that is the problem. The fact that we cannot exhaustively explain how it happens should not be surprising; we cannot really exhaustively explain much of anything. — Janus

Should we just give up on these philosophical questions? Perhaps they are conceptual problems - if so, why not try and resolve them?

Colours ain't coming from in here, either, since we overwhelmingly agree on them - — Banno

How do you account for Intuition Pump #3?

Wouldn't you say that having a perspective (or being conscious) is a bodily process or function like any other?
— Luke

No. As I'm using the term, it's a logical condition. — Andrew M

A logical condition of what? Or, what do you mean by a "logical condition"?

In this case, like the "winning the race" example, it would be a logical condition that denotes the end of a process - something that is achieved by looking, thinking, interacting in the world, etc. Which is just what it means to be conscious. — Andrew M

I wouldn't say that being conscious is the end of a process. I consider it to be an ongoing process, or simply put: a process.

However I don't accept the "first-person" qualification if it's meant to imply a contrast with a "third-person" perspective. — Andrew M

It is meant to imply such a contrast, since that's the nexus of the mind-body problem.

Observation is an activity or process. Perspective is the prior condition (my usage) or the end result (your usage) of that activity. — Andrew M

I don't consider perspective to be the end result of observation. If anything, it might be the other way around. Either way, I would consider observation to be a part/constituent of having a perspective or of being conscious.

In effect, it posits ill-defined ghostly entities that are outside the scope of scientific investigation. — Andrew M

I take it there is a particular way things seem to you at particular times, including the way things look, sound, smell, taste and touch. Simply because science cannot directly observe this particular way things seem to you, and/or simply because no direct intersubjective comparison is available, does not make these into "ghostly entities".

I'd just add that the 'objective' qualifiers are misleading, since they imply that the apple has those characteristics independently of a perspective. It's both sides of the subject/object duality that need to be rejected and replaced with a perspective of the world conception. — Andrew M

It is only a subject who has a perspective of the world (object), so how can this be a rejection or replacement of the subject/object duality? It seems more like a bolstering of it.

Oh right - didn't notice that qualification. But I stand by my argument that only rational beings are capable of entertaining perspectives. — Wayfarer

Fair enough, although you did ask about reference frames, not perspectives.

Can ‘we’ be categorised with ‘other objects’? Do objects have a reference frame? Or do reference frames only pertain to observers? — Wayfarer

I was following Andrew's lead here, since he said:

a perspective is applicable to human beings and, potentially, other sentient creatures for whom it makes sense. But not trees or rocks (which nonetheless qualify as reference frames). — Andrew M

The difference is that aspiration, etc., are bodily processes or functions. Whereas a perspective is a logical condition for being able to make distinctions. — Andrew M

Wouldn't you say that having a perspective (or being conscious) is a bodily process or function like any other?

Compare running a race to winning a race. Both are predicated of people (i.e., are not separable from people). But they are different kinds of predicates. Running is a physical process, whereas winning is the logical condition of having passed the finish line first and is not itself a process. — Andrew M

I think you and I might have different conceptions of a human perspective. Yours is apparently stripped of all phenomena leaving only an abstract point-of-view singularity. Whereas I see little difference between having a perspective and being conscious (in the first-person), with all that that entails.

We don't, but it is implied in a person's activity which we do observe. — Andrew M

Do you consider observation to be a part of a perspective?

Linguistically, we wouldn't normally say that breathing exists — Andrew M

I think that human aspiration or human digestion could be said to have physical existence?

As I see it, the first-person/third-person division excludes the possibility of a physical explanation — Andrew M

Why does it?

So, from my perspective, the apple is spherical and red (i.e., they are properties of the apple). Not that the apple is objectively spherical and subjectively red (which is subject/object dualism). — Andrew M

If these are properties of the apple, rather than properties of your perception (or rather than some relation of the two), then it would seem to imply that the apple is objectively spherical and objectively red. Which is fine, but how do you deal with things like seeing illusions where there is a discrepancy between the properties of the object and the perception of the object?

Does separability from human activity help to decide whether these "things" are physical or real?
— Luke

I'm not sure I understand your question. — Andrew M

Apologies, I was quite unclear. I was trying to connect it back to your earlier post, where you said:

A human being has a perspective of the world... But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M

More recently, you stated that a human perspective is not a "thing" which can be separated from human activity, and that having a perspective was like having a reference frame.

You have now agreed that aspiration, perspiration and digestion are also "things" which cannot be separated from human activity. The point of these more obviously physical examples is that they do (or that they might be considered to) have substantial existence. This is something which you have stated a human perspective does not have. Furthermore, these other "things" are also considered to have properties, which you have also stated a human perspective does not have.

If a perspective is no different to aspiration, perspiration and digestion in terms of their inseparability from human activity, then why does a perspective differ in terms of having substantial existence and properties?

In an everyday sense, we regard the things we can observe as real. — Andrew M

But we don't observe a perspective.

The main point of comparison with relativity is that distinctions/measurements are relative to some reference point, not absolute. That is, the perceiver is implied in any statement about the world. — Andrew M

I see. What I'm questioning about the analogy is your statement that we have a perspective just like we (or other objects) have a reference frame, and yet neither of these has substantial existence. I think I'm still not sold on what you seem to be implying: that we can have them without them existing. More to the point, I doubt that the analogy holds.

I should probably make clear that I have no interest in preserving 'res cogitans' or the human perspective as a non-physical substance. I am looking for a purely physical explanation, but one which retains the first-person perspective and the reality of its properties/qualities.

Thanks, Andrew. Allow me to try and press the analogy to see whether it holds.

Their perspective is not a "thing" that has any existence separate from that human activity. But we can consider it separately (i.e., in an abstract sense). — Andrew M

In the same way that e.g. breathing, perspiration and digestion are not "things" that have any existence separate from human activity? Or, in the same way that the game of chess and economic markets are not "things" that have any existence separate from human activity?

Does separability from human activity help to decide whether these "things" are physical or real?

So what is a reference frame? It's simply an abstract coordinate system that measurements are made relative to. — Andrew M

Are perspectives identical to reference frames, then? Is a perspective also "an abstract coordinate system that measurements are made relative to"? If it's not the same, then in what way is it comparable?

And generally speaking, we regard that ‘substance’ as being material substance, something which exists whether we conceive of it or not, something independent of my saying so or believing so. That sense of ‘what is real’ as being ‘something which exists independently of my thinking about it’ is practically the definition of realism.

That is the sense in which I think you’re using the word ‘substantial’. — Wayfarer

Thanks, @Wayfarer. I was responding to Andrew's use of 'substantial', and was thinking in terms of Descartes' res extensa: extended thing(s), given Andrew's reference to res cogitans. So, yes, I was thinking of substantial existence as physical existence or mind-independent existence.

Wittgenstein said, did he not, that 'in order to set a limit to thinking, you would have to think on both sides of the limit'? But sensing, being aware of, the limit, is not the same as saying you know what it is. If you say 'I know what it is', then you've already fallen back into the subject-object mode of analysis. — Wayfarer

It's an interesting take that the Tractatus may be viewed as an attack on Cartesian dualism or subject/object dualism - not that I think you meant to imply it was, nor that I think that it is - but still, it's interesting to consider.

However, I'm not really interested in the limit, nor in thinking both sides of it (at least, I'm not seeing it that way). My immediate interest, resulting from @Andrew M's post, is the nature of existence of our perspectives. I don't claim to know, or to be able to say, what that is. If we follow Andrew in acknlowledging that "a human being has a perspective of the world", then it is hard not to fall into the subject-object mode of analysis. And I don't see that/why we should necessarily be avoiding it, anyway.

“having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists.
— Luke

What is the terminus of explanation in respect of such a question? — Wayfarer

What sort of explanation would satisfy me? Possibly one that explains the nature of existence of our perspectives, or one that would help to dissolve the apparent dualism without denying the existence/reality of either side of the issue. In short, something that helps to explain why our perspectives are different in nature from everything else in existence. I suspect it may be something to do with the definition of "existence".

What is the 'it' which is the subject of the question 'does it exist?' — Wayfarer

The perspective that each human being has, as I said in the statement you quoted.

'It' is that which every question presupposes, as without 'it' there is nobody to ask the question. — Wayfarer

That doesn't really help (me) to explain the nature of existence of our perspectives, or to dissolve the apparent dualism without denying the reality of either side of the issue.

nothing can be said to exist without the perspective provided by the observing mind. — Wayfarer

Does that include the existence of the observing mind itself?

You can't turn around and look at it. That's the main issue here: that the observing mind is never the object — Wayfarer

Yes, it’s a conundrum.

the act of knowing is grounded in the observing mind, which itself is never an object. — Wayfarer

Focusing on “knowing” misses the point, I feel. I agree it’s not “out there”, but “having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists.

You appear to suggest that we define physical existence in terms of what “the observing mind” observes , or in terms of objects, and simply ignoring any problems posed by having minds or being subjects.

A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M

To echo @Marchesk’s post, if we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have?

I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"...
— Luke

And something tells me you never will... — creativesoul

Perhaps, but not for lack of trying. I have asked for clarification.

Understanding and/or immediately apprehending redness requires considerable previous usage of "red" to pick out red things, and then rather extensive subsequent careful consideration about that previous use of "red"(that's metacognition). — creativesoul

Apart from your repeated assertions, I still don't see much justification for "metacognition" or much distinction of it from linguistic competence. What does "rather extensive subsequent careful consideration about that previous use of "red"" add that linguistic competence can't already do? What makes it necessary for "immediately apprehending redness"?

And it matters because qualia are supposed to be basic, fundamental, private, ineffable, immediately apprehensible, etc. but redness is none of those things. — creativesoul

Not sure where you get "basic" and "fundamental" from. Not from Dennett's paper. And "immediately apprehensible" is something you appear to acknowledge as being characteristic of qualia, given your claim that it requires metacognition.

Identifying the color as "red" does not require metacognition. — creativesoul

Why not? I'm trying to understand the distinction between "talk of redness" requires metacognition and "talk of redness" requires language. Why does "talk of redness" require metacognition, or what do you mean by that?

The point is that immediately understanding and/or apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience requires metacognition — creativesoul

How is that different to saying that it requires language to identify the colour as "red"?