There is a sense to be made of the difference between the abstract content of an idea and the concrete having of an idea by a person. [...] I’m only taking about the content of the ideas, — Pfhorrest

What I say "idea" here I'm talking about roughly a picture of some way that things might be; a possible state of affairs. All of those possible states of affairs, those ideas that could be had, are already possible; when we "come up with" an idea, we may feel as though we're inventing something, but as the thing we're "coming up with" is just a possibility, and all the possibilities were already possible, then really we've just discovered something. — Pfhorrest

What you're talking about is trivially true and I'm not contesting it at all. — Pfhorrest

This thus blurs the lines between "making" and "finding" something, between "invention" and "discovery". I'm not saying there's only one and not the other; I'm saying there really isn't any difference between them when you get down to it. — Pfhorrest

Surely every possibility is already possible, right? There is some (infinite) set of things that are possible, and by discovering that something is possible, we don't thereby become the cause of its possibility; it was already a possibility, we just found it among that infinite set of possibilities.

What I say "idea" here I'm talking about roughly a picture of some way that things might be; a possible state of affairs. All of those possible states of affairs, those ideas that could be had, are already possible; when we "come up with" an idea, we may feel as though we're inventing something, but as the thing we're "coming up with" is just a possibility, and all the possibilities were already possible, then really we've just discovered something. — Pfhorrest

If, however, we simply accept that for certain classes of belief, in certain contexts of use, "I believe it's raining" is simply the same as "It's raining" and the same as "It's true that it's raining", then the paradox is solved Macintosh is saying "I believe it's raining, I believe it isn't raining" which is a contradiction, McGillicuddy is saying "Macintosh believes it's raining, I don't believe it's raining" which is not a contradiction". Wittgenstein's objection to this solution I've covered above with Luke, is only a problem if one mixes one of the many other senses in which "I believe" could be used, many of which would also make sense in the present tense — Isaac

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190) — Isaac

It's not about idealism. recognising that the access we have to the real world is indirect does not entail idealism. — Isaac

All I'm saying here is that if you're trying to make sense of Moore's paradox, it limits your options to simply assume that the proper object of an utterance is the real world and the truth judgement of that utterance is the state of the world. You may well have ideological commitments by which you'd like to assume that from the outset, and that's fine. I'm only saying that my understanding of the paradox doesn't assume those things and so we're not going to get any further if yours does. — Isaac

That seems the same to me. "I believe it's raining" can be a description of one's state of mind (as I gave the example of someone reading off a super-advanced fMRI scan of their own brain), it just rarely is, but nothing is preventing it from being so. As such, it is this meaning which is implied when the sentence is in the past tense. The other meaning ("It's raining") is expressed in the past tense as "I believe it was raining". I don't really see what insight Wittgenstein is pointing at here. — Isaac

That just seems to beg the question. If we're going to assume the object of propositions from the outset, then we're only going to get limited range of possible solutions to the paradox. — Isaac

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)
— Isaac

Believe has a different past tense use to it's present tense use. I don't understand what might be so problematic about this, lots of words have different uses in different contexts. — Isaac

If assertions are 'about' the world, then how does the world become the subject? When I form the words constituting the assertion, how does the world tell me which words to choose without first being inferred by my beliefs about it? — Isaac

I think this is just a lack of clarity about what 'psychological' refers to here. — Isaac

The photograph thing is clever. I had matter-of-factly observed that we can't deduce p from someone's asserting p -- never occurred to me to imagine deducing p from my believing that p.

But this is another point of divergence between the first- and not-first-person cases: we regularly infer p from the fact, which we (let's say) infer from what they say, that someone trustworthy, either in general or just in the matter at hand, believes that p. It is plausibly our principal way of gathering knowledge. This sort of inference is clearly reasonable even if we grant the point at the top, that there's no logical but only probable implication to be had here. — Srap Tasmaner

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief.
— Luke

I've never claimed otherwise — creativesoul

"I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state. — creativesoul

One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof. — creativesoul

"I believe, but I'm not certain" is about one's own mental state nevertheless, in these situations, to be clear. — creativesoul

Do you see it differently? — creativesoul

"I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state.

"I believe that some philosophical positions are better than others" is of the latter variety. "I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is of the former. — creativesoul

someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it.
— Marie McGinn

Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. It seems on the face of it rather an odd thing to say. If the thing that someone asserts (the matter the sentence is about) can be about something which is outside of their mind, then why does saying it imply they believe it? — Isaac

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)

If 'P' and 'I believe that P' "amount to" the same assertion, then their meanings should not change with tense.
— Luke

I don't think this is the case because beliefs change, — Isaac

"It did then rain" is a current belief (about the historical fact). — Isaac

But this 'psychological' issue is present as an assumption in all solutions so I don't see it as a blocking point to Ramsey's. This is pretty much what Wittgenstein says later, as you quote.

Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.
— Luke

...ie, we can't have a belief about our mental states. — Isaac

Consider, in this light though "I believed..." which is used exactly that way - a description of one's mental state. So either way we have the meaning changing with the tense. We don't seem to be able to escape that. — Isaac

If the words ‘I believe’ describe my internal, representational state, then, Wittgenstein suggests, it ought to make sense for me to ask whether my belief is a reliable guide to what the facts are. If I read off facts about the world from a photograph, I must also be in a position to say that the photograph is a good one, that it is a trustworthy representation of what is the case. And similarly, it ought to make sense to say: ‘ “I believe it’s raining and my belief is reliable, so I have confidence in it” ’ (PI, p. 190). ‘In that case,’ he remarks, ‘my belief would be a kind of sense impression’ (PI, p. 190). But this is not how the words ‘I believe’ are actually used, for ‘[o]ne can mistrust one’s own senses, but not one’s own belief ’ (PI, p. 190). Saying ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to asserting that p is the case, and is not a means of telling that p is the case, which I might trust or mistrust. This is shown, Wittgenstein suggests, in the fact that if ‘there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person present indicative’ (PI, p. 190). — Marie McGinn

Unfortunately we can only gather very little of Moore's meaning from that one letter which is why I quoted from PI. — Isaac

The paradox concerns the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’. Moore observes that although it may, for example, be true that it is raining and I do not believe that it is raining, it is absurd for me to say ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is’. For Moore, the paradox arises insofar as there may be truths about me which I cannot, without absurdity, assert. How is this to be explained? Moore’s own suggestion for how to resolve the paradox is to recognize that we need to distinguish between what someone asserts and what he implies in asserting it. Thus, someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it. It is, according to Moore, because someone who asserts that it is raining implies that he believes that it is, that it is absurd for him to go on and assert that he does not believe it. — Marie McGinn

Ramsey's solution is simple, it's because 'I believe that P', 'P is true' and 'P' all amount to the same thing in ordinary use, just asserting P. — Isaac

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)

Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.

if we are inclined to hold that ‘I believe’ ascribes a mental state—the same state whether it is used in the first-person present indicative, in the past tense, or in the context ‘Suppose …’, or in the third-person—then we want to see ‘a different development of the verb’, one on which ‘I believe …’ is never equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’. [...]

On the ‘different development of the verb’, I am to be understood as ascribing a certain disposition to myself, the disposition which the state of belief is held to consist in. On this view, ‘I believe …’ is not equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’, although conclusions about my state of mind may be drawn on the basis of both. The expression ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to the assertion that I am in a certain dispositional state. But now the question arises: ‘how do I myself recognize my own disposition?’ Surely, ‘it will have been necessary for me to take notice of myself as others do, to listen to myself talking, to be able to draw conclusions from what I say!’ (PI, p. 192). The absurdity of this suggestion—expressed through the presence of an exclamation mark—shows, Wittgenstein believes, that the words ‘I believe’ are not used to ascribe a disposition to myself. [...]

The idea that in using the words ‘I believe …’ I ascribe a disposition to myself misrepresents the way we are taught to operate with these words. It misrepresents what is an act of making or expressing a judgement about the world as a description of the state of a particular person. Wittgenstein acknowledges that there are circumstances in which it does make sense to say “Judging from what I say, this is what I believe”. These are circumstances in which I stand back from my normal state of engagement and try to take an objective view of myself: I try to see myself as others see me. In these circumstances, saying ‘I believe …’ is no longer equivalent to asserting ‘It is the case that …’ and, Wittgenstein observes, it would be possible for me to say “It seems to me that my ego believes this, but it isn’t true” (PI, p. 192). In these circumstances, it is as if two people—the one on whom I reflect and the one doing the reflecting—speak through my mouth. However, this is not the normal use of ‘I believe …’, and it is a use, Wittgenstein wants to insists, which presupposes the normal use.

Moore himself is reported to have said the sentence is "an absurdity for psychological reasons" - According to Wittgenstein's report of the lecture.

Despite the herculean efforts of most posters here to avoid any psychological talk and focus on the 'say-ability' of the sentence, this was never the object of the paradox. The object of the paradox was entirely psychological - according to Moore. — Isaac

Wittgenstein expresses his dissatisfaction with Moore’s resolution of the paradox
in the letter he wrote immediately after the meeting of the Moral Sciences Club:
‘To call this, as I think you did, “an absurdity for psychological reasons” seems to me
wrong, or highly misleading. (If I ask someone “Is there a fire in the next room?”
and he answers “I believe there is” I can’t say: “Don’t be irrelevant. I asked you
about the fire, not about your state of mind!”)’ (Wittgenstein, 1995: 315–16)

I can easily say "I say P but I don't believe P"; I'm just telling you I'm lying when I say P. — Pfhorrest

In this discussion, all we've done is digressed, from the meaning of "number" to the meaning of "value", to the meaning of "meaning". — Metaphysician Undercover

When I talk about this animal here, my cat, "animal" has a completely different meaning from when I talk about that animal over there, my dog. The fact that all the things called "animal" can be classed together in on group, as animals, does not mean that whenever someone refers to one of those animals, "animal" has the same meaning. I am talking about this animal here now, my cat, do you see how the meaning of "animal" is completely different from when I am talking about that animal over there, my dog. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suggested, that a "value" is related to a scale, But this does not mean that when I talk about the value of a dollar, or the value of zero degrees Celsius, "value" has the same meaning. That would be ridiculous. The meaning is determined by the scale being referred to, just like the meaning of "animal" in my example, is determined by the creature being referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said there are all different types of values. — Metaphysician Undercover

What basis is there for claiming that there is a meaning for "value" which refers to something completely independent from all other types of value — Metaphysician Undercover

1.
the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something.
"your support is of great value"

the material or monetary worth of something.
"prints seldom rise in value"

face value
the worth of something compared to the price paid or asked for it.
"at £12.50 the book is good value"

2.
principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.
"they internalize their parents' rules and values"

3.
the numerical amount denoted by an algebraic term; a magnitude, quantity, or number.
"the mean value of x"

4.
Music
the relative duration of the sound signified by a note.

5.
Linguistics
the meaning of a word or other linguistic unit.

the quality or tone of a spoken sound; the sound represented by a letter.

6.
the relative degree of lightness or darkness of a particular colour.

Therefore any value is a type of value and the type is determined by the scale. There is no such thing as a value which is independent from a scale of evaluation, and the scale determines the type of value. — Metaphysician Undercover

So unless you are talking about "value" in the most general sense, — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly our disagreement is not in the meaning of "objects", but in the meaning of "value". You want to disassociate quantitative value from all other sorts of value, claiming that mathematical values are something completely distinct and unrelated to any other type of value. But values do not exist in that way, They exist in hierarchical structures, one type of value receiving its worth from another, like a family tree, until the whole structure is grounded in a material desire or want. Aristotle explained this in his Nichomachean Ethics, one end is for the sake of another end, which is for the sake of another, until there is a grounding. Unless you recognize that values are tied together in this way and it is unrealistic, and a misunderstanding, to separate one type of value (quantitative value) from all others, we will always disagree. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what I object to. In no way can a value be an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

That was four days ago. And, it's what I've been arguing for weeks. Did it take you this long to figure out that I really. mean what I say? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a specific type of value, a quantitative value, which people have assigned the word "number" to. You have been working hard to disassociate "quantitative value" from all other forms of value — Metaphysician Undercover

...there is no need to posit "a number" as existing between the symbol "1", and what the symbol refers to...

The value we give to the group "4", is an abstract feature, but it's a value — Metaphysician Undercover

Hold on here, you're jumping ahead of yourself. An object is one, so you cannot predicate any number other than one of an object. If you have a group or set of objects you can count them, assign a quantity or number to that group or set, but take notice that number, or quantity is actually predicated of the group or set, not of the objects themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly a numeral is an object, as a symbol. But I do not see how a number can be an object. Number, or quantity is something predicated of a group or set of objects, so how can a number itself be an object? — Metaphysician Undercover

The expression isn't what has the value, it's what the expression refers to that has the value. — Metaphysician Undercover

The numeral "4" does not have the value, of 4, Whatever it is that we refer to with "4", in application, is what is judged to have that value. So "4" is used to refer to that group of objects which is judged to have the value of 4. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no problem with saying that a numeral represents a value. That is how we establish equality, by giving different things the same value. — Metaphysician Undercover

"2+2" and "3+1" are just symbols which cannot be said to have any particular value, or refer to any particular value. — Metaphysician Undercover

No such "number" is indicated. "2+2=3+1" is just an expression of symbols — Metaphysician Undercover

To imagine that there is an object called "a number" referred to by "2", or "3", or another type of mathematical object referred to by "2+2", or "3+1" is just an imaginary fiction — Metaphysician Undercover

The point is that there is no need to posit "a number" as existing between the symbol "1", and what the symbol refers to in a particular application of mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

...counting numbers is nonsense... — Metaphysician Undercover

No. My belief is that it is not raining. It isn't raining. Therefore my belief is true. — Michael

Does “1” refer to an object called “a number”?
— Luke

No, of course not. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's true regarding your belief. It's false regarding the weather. As a conjunction it's false. — Michael