141. At 139 Wittgenstein demonstrated that a mental picture evoked by the hearing/saying of a word does not force a particular use/meaning of that word, because different methods of projection (i.e. different applications of the mental picture) can produce different uses/meanings of the word.

Wittgenstein now considers whether hearing a word might be able to produce not only a mental picture but also its own application/method of projection. How would this work? Wittgenstein suggests a schema showing lines of projection from one cube to another. However, this schema encounters the same problems as the mental picture, viz. it is just another picture. As Wittgenstein notes: "does this really get me any further? Can’t I now imagine different applications of this schema too?"

Nonetheless, is it possible for an application to come before one's mind when they hear a word? Wittgenstein says we need to get clear about this expression:

Suppose I explain various methods of projection to someone, so that he may go on to apply them; let’s ask ourselves in what case we’d say that the method I mean comes before his mind.

The only case in which we'd say that one of several particular methods of projection had come before his mind would be where the student goes on to apply it; by an actual application.

On the one hand there is the picture, and on the other hand there is the application of that picture. Wittgenstein notes that it doesn't matter whether the picture is mental or material.

Returning to the question of 'fit', Wittgenstein now asks whether there can be a 'clash' between picture and application. Only in so far as the picture makes us expect a different use, he says. A picture might suggest a particular use because that is how it is normally applied.

Once again though, Witty looks to 'test' his account to check if there is, in fact, a two-stage process at work, which he ultimately wants to deny. As he puts it, it looks as though there were first the picture, then its application — StreetlightX

I question whether this is something that he ultimately wants to deny. Given that a picture can have more than one application, it seems important that a picture and its application are separable.

To conjure up a 'picture of a cube' is to already have an application of it in mind. It may not be the only application there is ("it was also possible for me to use it differently"), but this doesn't imply that there are two stages from meaning to application. Rather, the application is always-already inherent to the meaning. — StreetlightX

I agree that there aren't two stages from meaning to application, but Wittgenstein is instead talking about the distinction between a picture and its application. A picture (either mental or material) is essentially "lifeless" and does not force or contain its own application or meaning.

If you do not understand what I am doing, then to you what I am doing is unintelligible. Using words is a case of doing something. It is very common that people do not understand meaning (the meaning is unintelligible to them). — Metaphysician Undercover

You claimed that "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word". But is it actually meaningful if nobody understands? In order for people to "not understand meaning", there must be meaning there to be misunderstood. I used the words "elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance" how I pleased and you don't appear to have understood. But how do you know whether there was any meaning there?

What we understand is the meaning of the word(s), right?
— Luke

I would prefer to say that what we understand is the use of the words. Do you agree with this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, meaning is use.

To understand the meaning of a heard word is to understand its use, i.e. how it was used by the speaker. What Wittgenstein demonstrates is that there are no such constraints on the user of the word (speaker). — Metaphysician Undercover

A speaker doesn't require any understanding in their use of words? Where does Wittgenstein demonstrate this?

Meaning is use, and use is not a mental picture, it is an activity. So the fact that meaning is not a mental picture is self-evident from the premise that meaning is use. However, Wittgenstein has provided nothing as of yet, to demonstrate that understanding the meaning of a spoken word (understanding its use), is not a matter of associating the word with a mental picture. He proceeds to demonstrate at 141, how the application of words (use) may be carried out simply as a process, without any mental picture associated with the words, but I think it's questionable whether such use would be intelligible. It may be something like this: "elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance". — Metaphysician Undercover

How is it unintelligible given your claim that "you can use a word however you please, and this use provides meaning for that word"? I used those words however I pleased, therefore I must have provided meaning for those words. So what makes it unintelligible?

"The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."

If it is always possible to use the word differently from what is suggested, then what could restrict the number of different uses which a word could have, and why could you not use a word however you wanted, thereby forcing the pertinent meaning on the word by virtue of that use? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is possible for the meaning/use of the word to be different from what is suggested by the mental picture which is evoked when you hear or say the word. Thus, meaning is not a mental picture. This does not mean that anything goes; there are other constraints. Otherwise, elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance. Understand?

This is the weakness of his argument. He starts with a proposition about understanding a word, either hearing or speaking it. This is the proposition of associating the word with a picture-like thing. He criticizes that proposition through reference to the process of speaking words, application. But he provides no evidence that such a criticism would be relevant to understanding in the sense of hearing a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

What we understand is the meaning of the word(s), right? If meaning is not a mental picture, then this applies equally to words spoken and words heard. Do you agree that Wittgenstein demonstrates that meaning is not a mental picture? Or do you still fail to comprehend even the most basic insights of the text?

What is essential now is to see that the same thing may be in our minds when we hear the word and yet the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we would deny that. — PI 140

Suppose you hear a spoken word, and understanding that word consists of associating it with a picture like thing (I will call it an "idea", perhaps). Now, speaking is using words, what Wittgenstein calls "application". If we simply reverse the process above, and say that choosing the appropriate word for use is simply a matter of applying that idea, to determine the appropriate word, we have the problem brought up at 139. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "problem brought up at 139" is problematic for both the hearing and the speaking of a word, due to the erroneous assumption that meaning is a picture in the mind. This is the upshot of the current sections.

As much as the idea associated with "cube" tends to force a certain use on me, I can still use the word to refer to a prism if I want. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point here is that your mental picture of a cube can be made to fit with a prism; or, that the mental picture can have the application of a prism via a particular method of projection. On the other hand, if the mental picture stood for the meaning of the word, then the cube could not be made to fit with the prism, or it could not have that application. Again, this is to reveal the problems with the assumption that meaning is a picture in the mind. However, it should not be inferred from this that you can use a word to mean whatever you want.

Therefore, as Wittgenstein concludes at 140, there must be another process, or other processes involved in choosing which words to use, distinct from the process of associating the word with ideas, which we often assume accounts for the "understanding" of the spoken word. That is why I referred to this other process whereby we choose words to be spoken as a distinct form of "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, understanding a spoken word does not necessarily consist of "associating it with a picture like thing" either, so I dispute your distinction between two types of understanding.

...by Wittgenstein' description, speaking words, and choosing words are one and the same thing... — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for clearing that up. Could you now explain your earlier distinction between ""understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking"? If speaking and choosing words are one and the same according to Wittgenstein, then why should there be two different types of understanding here?

:up:

In the midst of summarising the current sections and while trying to find more information about Wittgenstein's use of "method of projection", I came across this very good reading of the current sections, which some should find useful. I think it explains the matter better than my attempted summary possibly could.

Also, here is the information I gathered regarding Wittgenstein's "method of projection":

We may say: a blueprint serves as a picture of the object which the workman is to make from it.
And here we might call the way in which the workman turns such a drawing into an artefact "the method of projection". We might now express ourselves thus: the method of projection mediates between the drawing and the object, it reaches from the drawing to the artefact. Here we are comparing the method of projection with projection lines which go from one figure to another. — But if the method of projection is a bridge, it is a bridge which isn't built until the application is made. — This comparison conceals the fact that the picture plus the projection lines leaves open various methods of application...

...what we may call 'picture' is the blueprint plus the method of its application. — Philosophical Grammar (p.213)

With regards to Wittgenstein's cube, it can look like a triangular prism (or vice versa) when viewed from certain angles. Therefore, if we project or apply the picture in a particular way, then the picture of the cube can be made to fit with (or to look like) an actual triangular prism.

Since you asked so nicely, here is part of Baker and Hacker's exegesis of 140:

The illusion that a picture forces an application on us merely reflects the fact that by habit and training only one application is naturally suggested to us. If, however, the same mental image occurs to us in relation to different applications, we will not claim that the word has the same meaning despite its different applications. Consequently, the meaning of a word is not a picture in the mind, nor any other entity, and grasping the meaning of a word at a stroke does not consist in having such a picture come before one’s mind.

I think you could be conflating the use (or speaking) of words with choosing words. At least, that's the only reason I can imagine for why you might think Wittgenstein is discussing choice at 140. The use of words that Wittgenstein is talking about in these (and possibly all) sections of the book is a physical expression, not some mental decision making process. If I'm mistaken, then you are still welcome to explain where Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words (or understanding choosing) at 140.

Well, he introduces the topic of what it is to "understand a word" at 138, and proceeds to discuss the meaning of words, the use of words, and the choosing of words. Where's the problem? Why do you insist on excluding the bulk of 139 and 140 where he discusses the choosing of words, claiming it's only my presumption? — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein does not mention anything about "choosing words" at 138 or at 140. He makes only a passing mention of choosing words at boxed section (a) of 139, and he makes it only to aid the rejection of meaning as a Something (or a mental picture) in the mind:

Suppose I were choosing between the words “stately”, “dignified”, “proud”, “imposing”; isn’t it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? — No; the fact that one speaks of the apt word does not show the existence of a Something that... ["a Something that we have in our mind and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here"]

One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like Something because one can find a word apt; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words, and so on. — PI 139 - Boxed section (a)

What Wittgenstein is saying here is that we are inclined to speak of mental pictures because one can find a word apt, because one often chooses between words as between pictures, etc. However, the inclination to speak in this way does not show the existence of any mental pictures, or that the meaning of a word is a mental picture (i.e. meaning is not "a Something that we have in our mind").

Note however that none of this has anything to do with understanding choosing, and Wittgenstein makes no reference to it. Also, your suggestion that choosing words forms the "bulk" of the discussion at 138-140 is patently false.

Or do you think that he is putting the choosing of words into some category other than meaning and use? How could you think this when he explicitly talks about the picture-like thing in the mind, "forcing" upon us a particular use, when we might actually choose the word to mean something else? — Metaphysician Undercover

His rejection of a mental picture "forcing" a particular meaning/use has nothing to do with choosing words. He makes no mention of choosing words at 140.

We have the three elements right here, clear as day in 140, choice, which leads to use, and therefore meaning — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he mention choice at 140?

If meaning is use, and use is described as choosing words, then understanding meaning requires understanding choosing. That's very simple isn't it? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's convoluted. Where is use described as choosing words? I know it's your presumption, but it's not part of the text.

But if you think that understanding the meaning of a spoken word upon hearing it, is something different from the understanding required to choose words to speak, then you'll recognize the distinction which I said Wittgenstein is blurring. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't specifying this difference; I was noting the distinction you made.

What about the fact that you can understand spoken words in a flash, but it takes time to choose the words required to properly express what you want to say? — Metaphysician Undercover

WIttgenstein doesn't talk about use in mentalistic terms of choosing words. He says only that use is extended in time.

ETA: Wittgenstein talks about mental pictures only to dismiss the idea that meaning is a something in the mind.

Meaning is use, and we use words by speaking and writing, and this implies choosing which words will be used. Wittgenstein, is talking about choosing words here. How could you possibly read through 139 and 140 without noticing this? . — Metaphysician Undercover

You complained earlier that Wittgenstein was vague about this, but now you seem to find that he is very clear about it, so which is it?

Wittgenstein does indeed talk about choosing between words in his discussion of mental pictures and meaning, where he is discussing understanding the meaning of a word. What you have provided zero evidence for is that he is discussing understanding choosing. You might recall your original complaint:

...he doesn't properly differentiate between "understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking. These two are distinct mental processes, and though he speaks of these activities, he seems to conflate them into one sense of "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

In your latest post, you demonstrate that Wittgenstein discusses choosing between pictures at §139. That may be, but he does not discuss understanding choosing, which is something that only you have attempted to interject into the discussion.

If I were to follow you down this rabbit hole of confusion: understanding the meaning of a word is (arguably) a requirement of choosing to use that word. Wittgenstein doesn't need to "properly differentiate" between your two senses of understanding because he is not at all talking about understanding choosing.

Don't be silly, there's no such distinction. Meaning is use. Using a word is speaking. Understanding the meaning of a word is understanding speaking. Either we choose our words when we speak, we do not, or sometimes we do and sometimes we don't. — Metaphysician Undercover

The distinction is the one you have needlessly introduced. Wittgenstein is talking about understanding meaning. You are talking about understanding choosing (?).

He's talking about understanding meaning. He's not talking about 'understanding choosing a word when speaking' - whatever that is supposed to mean. The only confusion is yours. Stick to what's in the text.

See 197. Better yet, wait until we get there.

...what he is discussing is in the mind, but as I said earlier, his distinctions are confused so it's very difficult to say what he actually believes. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's much more likely that you are confused.

And as I said, he doesn't properly differentiate between "understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking. These two are distinct mental processes, and though he speaks of these activities, he seems to conflate them into one sense of "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe that's not the purpose of this section. You complain that he doesn't answer a question that's on your mind, whereas he never purports to answer that question here. It would be more worthwhile to focus on what he does say than what he doesn't. He doesn't say anything about understanding "in the sense required to choose a word in speaking", so I don't see how he possily conflates the two senses of understanding you are complaining about.

The principle issue which I see is his use of the expression "understand in a flash" — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no great mystery to it; that's how fluent speakers often do understand the meanings of words as they are being heard/read. It could be a part of the reason for the mistaken assumption that meaning is "a something" in the mind.

...it does not give proper credit to the role of memory in memorizing the application of the principle, assuming that a grasp of the principle come to the person in a flash. — Metaphysician Undercover

This memorising/teaching can be unproblematically assumed.

The point of your emphasized line is that there is not an "exact picture", there is something "picture-like", but not an exact picture. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point is that the meaning of a word is not "a Something" in the mind. I suggest you reread.

He's saying that if a picture of a cube occurs to my mind when I hear the word "cube", but I use the word "cube" while pointing to a triangular prism, then I use the word in a way other than what is indicated by the picture in my mind. But we still cannot really say that the use does not fit because we might find some reason to say that it does fit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your only account of "method of projection" here is that it is "some reason". :roll:

In other words, a picture-like cube might come to my mind every time I hear the word "cube", but I might still use the word "cube", in application, to refer to something different (the triangular prism) from what comes to my mind when I hear "cube". — Metaphysician Undercover

This implies that meaning/use is something other than a picture in your mind, which supports Wittgenstein's point.

Now check the footnote, he goes back the other way "I believe the right word in this case is . . . ." — Metaphysician Undercover

What he says in boxed section (a) is that meaning is not a picture in the mind, which is the point (my emphasis):

I believe the right word in this case is. . . .” Doesn’t this show that the meaning of a word is a Something that we have in our mind and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here? Suppose I were choosing between the words “stately”, “dignified”, “proud”, “imposing”; isn’t it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? - No; the fact that one speaks of the apt word does not show the existence of a Something that . . .

The issue is that there is an activity involved in judging appropriateness (fitness) in the relationship between the word and what the word is associated with (picture, in Wittgenstein's example). This is a mental process, what he calls a "projection" — Metaphysician Undercover

The method of projection Wittgenstein is talking about is a way that a picture of a triangular prism could be transformed into a picture of a cube; or a way of viewing one as the other. It is not the mental process of judging appropriateness between a word and a picture.

No, he asks whether when you hear a word (outside of any context) it evokes a picture in your mind and whether this picture (or pictorial understanding) comprises all uses of the word. The answer: it can, but not always. (The word 'cube' might evoke the picture of a cube shape in your mind, when someone is instead talking about the cube root of a number, or the 1997 movie "Cube".) He then asks whether and how the picture evoked by the word can fit or fail to fit a use of the word. You seem to think that the picture evoked by the word must always fit all uses of the word: "I never question whether the picture fits the word". Regardless, the fit Wittgenstein is referring to is one of resemblance or agreement between the picture the word evokes when you hear it and a particular use of the word. The fit is not, as you assert, one of appropriateness or suitability about "whether a word is "fit" to be used for a particular situation (ought to be spoken)". Wittgenstein is not blurring any distinction between hearing and saying, because he's not talking about saying at 139.

That's not the type of 'fit' Wittgenstein is talking about at 139.

139. I may know what a word (e.g. 'cube') means when I hear it, but the same word can also be used in other ways, thus giving the word conflicting meanings on different occasions of use. Therefore, how is it that I can grasp the meaning of a word at a stroke? Does understanding the word involve a mental picture coming before one's mind, and how can this picture fit or fail to fit the use of the word? Wittgenstein submits that a triangular prism might not fit the word 'cube', however a particular method of projection can make the picture fit after all. Therefore, although a picture may suggest a certain use, it does not compel that use.

I wasn’t asking a question. I was making a statement. If you think Wittgenstein wasn’t referring to animal communication then you’re asking me why I think such, shouldn’t you perhaps ask why you think so? — I like sushi

I was trying to determine whether that's what you were getting at, like I said.

I believe if you look at sections 243-315? Or somewhere in that area? Index should help; “private language”.

[...] the broader definition of ‘language’ extends to animal communication (note: we’re animals, ergo we have means of communication that fall outside of W’s stricter definition of ‘language’). — I like sushi

I asked you several posts ago whether this was about private language but you didn't answer. Nevertheless, what does private language have to do with non-linguistic communication? Animals do not communicate with each other in a private language, and non-linguistic human communication is not a private language.

He defines (denotes if you wish) language to be of character X and then says it cannot be of character Y. — I like sushi

As I asked you before, where does he give this definition of language?

If Wittgenstein is talking about communicating, as distinct from language, he doesn't anywhere say so. — I like sushi

I still don't understand what you're getting at. Are you asking whether Wittgenstein includes non-linguistic communication as part of language? His concerns are philosophical and he considers philosophical problems to arise from linguistic confusions. I don't think Wittgenstein would include animal communication as part of (our) language, but unless animals are engaging in philosophy I think it's largely irrelevant.

Where?

the term ‘language’ has multiple applications; you know that so only you know why you’re asking for clarification there — I like sushi

I'm asking because I disagree that Wittgenstein uses a narrow or strict definition of language, as you claim.

The illusion of an “ideal” (in and of itself) serves the purpose of distinction rather than the merging of all concepts into one ubiquitous soup of meaningless drivel. — I like sushi

What is the illusion? What is the ideal? I still don't understand.

I often get the impression when I see people talking about Wittgenstein that a number of them assume any given word to be a concept. I’d also add that many conflate his use of the term ‘language’ - I know I used to until I read his stuff and saw he attaching a specific meaning to ‘language’ that others choose to use more broadly (those others being linguists).

[...]

If the meaning is the use then what does ‘use’ mean? Clearly we’re talking within W’s strict definition of language so it is true. The point here being he sets out the limits of the map and then has a hard time being satisfied with this limited reach - and also seems to forget HE set it up as the limit of his investigation (he equates “language” to “philosophy” so a more precise title would’ve been “Philosophical Musings about Language”). — I like sushi

What is this "strict definition of language"? Do you mean lacking a private language?

For the individual person every experience is unique, yet the subtle differences are glossed over. Most words used don’t have any apparent “unique” meaning to the individual, yet they only have a unique meaning at large - or they wouldn’t have meaning at all (there would be no differentiation). When a word is considered as an experienced item - a memory attachment - then it is uniquely meaningful to the individual (as is the word “mountain” for me due to my personal connection with the word in regards to ... well ... something personal and in relation to Wittgenstein’s proclamation of there being no ‘private language’). — I like sushi

You are conflating private meaningfulness with the denotative function of meaning. Your talk of "meaning to the individual" refers to something memorable or important (to the individual), whereas Wittgenstein's talk of meaning refers to a definition or denotation.

I don't understand what you mean by "the play between" or "the purposeful illusion of ideal meaning". Purposeful?

138. Wittgenstein criticises the notion that each word has a unique meaning attached to it, and that these unique meanings can be fit together with the meanings of other words. Wittgenstein reminds us that "the meaning is the use we make of the word", implying that there is not a fixed, unique meaning attached to each word, and it therefore "makes no sense to speak of such fitting".

Wittgenstein then anticipates a possible rebuttal against his dictum that 'meaning is use'; one most likely made by those captured by the view that a word's meaning is something mental:

But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear it or say it; we grasp the meaning at a stroke, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!

If the use (and meaning) of a word is extended in time, as Wittgenstein contends, then how is it that we can grasp the meaning of a word at a stroke? Wittgenstein does not provide an answer, but it lies in our training, practise and acquired ability with the use of words.

The boxed section offers a counter to the rebuttal with the simple observation that we do not always understand the meaning of a word (e.g. "at a stroke"), even if we think we might.

137. We determine the subject of a sentence by asking "Who or what...?" and there is a sense of the subject 'fitting' this question. A similar type of 'fitting' relates to our determination of what letter follows 'K' in the alphabet. Wittgenstein asks:

In what sense does 'L' fit this series of letters? — In that sense “true” and “false” could be said to fit propositions; and a child might be taught to distinguish propositions from other expressions by being told “Ask yourself if you can say ‘is true’ after it. If these words fit, it’s a proposition”.

Having just told us that "true" and "false" do not fit propositions at §136, Wittgenstein now tells us at §137 that "true" and "false" do fit propositions. Why is this?

At §136, "Being true and false are not criteria for being a proposition" (Baker and Hacker). That is, "true" and "false" do not help us to discover propositions in some scientific or metaphysical sense (i.e. outside our language games), so "true" and "false" do not fit, or are not appropriate to determine, a proposition in this sense.

At §137, however, Wittgenstein is speaking in pedagogical terms within our language games. In this sense we can speak of 'fitting' in our determination of (e.g.) the subject of a sentence, the letter that follows 'K' in the alphabet, or which expression is a proposition. "In that sense, "true" and "false" could be said to fit propositions."

136. Fitting vs Belonging

We do not discover whether something is a proposition by asking whether we can apply a truth value to it; by whether we can say that it is true or false. That is, 'true' and 'false' do not exist as independent criteria by which we determine whether something is a proposition. In other words (to use Wittgenstein's terminology), 'true' and 'false' do not fit the concept of a proposition. Rather, the concepts of 'true', 'false' and 'proposition' all constitute or belong to the same game.

Similarly, we do not discover which chess piece is the king by asking which piece can be put in check. Only the king can be put in check, as per the rules of the game. In other words, the concept of 'check' does not fit the king. Rather, 'check' and 'king' both belong to the same game.

Why is anybody here talking about 'mind' independence (or dependence) in relation to Witty? — StreetlightX

To dismiss the notion.

I am not asking for justification or certainty, but to look at the idea that there are facts that we derived from experience, that we can perceive of the world, but also indicates something characteristic about the world and not the mind's interpretation of it perhaps. In other words, ontology. — schopenhauer1

How would you ever know? What comparison can you make in order to determine this? You can't compare our mind-dependent concepts to the mind-independent world-in-itself and say "we got pretty close that time". Hence the Wittgenstein quote I posted:

"But does it [an hypothesis] certainly agree with reality, with the facts? — With this question you are already going round in a circle."

The best that we can do or know, from within our all too human language-games, is "if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it". At least, that's my reading of it.

It is our agreed upon, that is, shared or common, form of life that is the scaffolding. Our agreed upon definitions and judgments are part of our form of life. It is not simply that we share the same opinions, but that both our agreement and disagreement regarding opinions rests on our form of life. And this means, in part, not only that we agree on the definition of a meter but that there is a certain constancy of results when we measure. When the woodworker measures the length of a board it is not first one meter then two or three. It is not human agreement that determines that the length of the board does not change, but we agree when we say that it is true that it does not change. — Fooloso4

Right. Or, as Wittgenstein expresses it:

...if things were quite different from what they actually are —– if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency —– our normal language-games would thereby lose their point. — The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that such lumps suddenly grew or shrank with no obvious cause. — PI 142

Do you think PI 242 also speaks to this?

Why do scientific facts obtain so well? — schopenhauer1

I don't understand the meaning of your question.

191. Well, if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. — But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? — With this question you are already going round in a circle. — On Certainty

I apologise if I said something to upset you. That was not my intention.

Well, you got me on that one, I did say "all." — Sam26

I'm not trying to "get" you, Sam, except to get you to acknowledge that propositions need not be beliefs, which you appear to have done.

You said on the previous page that "All propositions are beliefs" which implies that propositions are necessarily beliefs.

I don't think I ever said that propositions are necessarily beliefs. — Sam26

If propositions need not be beliefs, then you shouldn't say that propositions are beliefs.