I am assuming that when he says "this here" while pointing to the object in front of him he means the object in front of him is here. — Fooloso4

I am not assuming a specific meaning. — Fooloso4

That is not a criticism, it is a statement of fact. You were not making a claim about the object, that is, the map. You were not saying that the map is here. If you were pointing to the map in front of you and saying "this is here" then your example would be the same as Wittgenstein's, and would be just as senseless. — Fooloso4

I have no assumed meaning of the sentence. — Fooloso4

Again, following Wittgenstein, in the circumstances described it makes not sense to say "this is here". That is not because I assume the sentence has a particular meaning, but because in this situation it makes no sense. — Fooloso4

It is the same in that you are both pointing, but you are pointing to a location on a map and he is pointing to an object, say, the map. In your example 'this' means the location, in Wittgenstein's this means the object in from of him. — Fooloso4

I am not going to try to convince you otherwise, but consider this: if I were to ask in what circumstances he said "this is here" the answer would be, while pointing to an object in front of him. — Fooloso4

What distinction are you making between doesn't make sense and lacks sense? — Fooloso4

If someone points to an object and says "this is here" I assume he means the object he is pointing to is here, but he might be pointing to something else. He might mean a scratch on the object, for example. That does not mean I have a specific meaning in mind. — Fooloso4

it means that I assume he is pointing to the object and not something about the object. — Fooloso4

I did not criticize your example. What I said is: — Fooloso4

The reason it does not mean the map is here is because you are pointing to a location on the map not the map. — Fooloso4

If you mean as per what Wittgenstein says should be considered - circumstances where this sentence is actually used then I agree. But his example was of circumstances where it does not make sense - pointing to something in front of him and saying "this is here". — Fooloso4

Perhaps. Do these determine your name? — Banno

Your own example replaces the one Wittgenstein rejects. Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here. — Fooloso4

In your example "this is here" does not mean the map is here. — Fooloso4

I did not think this was in dispute since you said "this" refers to a location on the map. — Fooloso4

The circumstance is him pointing to the object in front of him and saying this is here. — Fooloso4

You are assuming that "this is here" has a specific meaning
— Luke

I don't know why you would assume that I have assumed any such thing. Everything I have said runs counter to the idea that it has a specific meaning. — Fooloso4

Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here. — Fooloso4

The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. — Fooloso4

What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. — Fooloso4

Right. And that is why I said:

In your example you are pointing at a map but you are pointing to a location on the map — Fooloso4

The statement fails to have meaning unless it's in the proper context. The logic behind the correct use of this phrase will not work in just any situation or context. — Sam26

Yes, that is what Wittgenstein says. Whatever those circumstances are in which it makes sense to say "this is here" might be, his example is not one of those cases. — Fooloso4

When he points to the object and says "This is here" I see no reason to conclude he is not talking about the object he is pointing to. — Fooloso4

You are doing what Wittgenstein suggests we do, consider circumstances where it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

In Wittgenstein's example "this" would refer to the object, the map. — Fooloso4

The person pointing might think it makes sense to say that the object he is pointing to is here, but Wittgenstein does not. He is asking us to compare this case with others in which one actually says this, cases in which it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

Although someone is still pointing, he is not making a claim about the object, the map, being here. — Fooloso4

It does not make sense to point to something in front of you and say "This is here". — Fooloso4

He then asks us to consider circumstances where it would make sense to say "This is here". He is not asking us to consider circumstances in which one points while saying it. — Fooloso4

If, for example, someone says that the sentence “This is here” (saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, — PI 117

I don't think so. It is not a matter of adding circumstances to the example but of replacing the example with some situation in which it does make sense to say "This is here". — Fooloso4

If we are to think of circumstances in which the sentence "This is here" makes sense we do not have to include the act of pointing at an object that is in front of you. — Fooloso4

In other words, we do not have to start with the circumstances described in the example and add something in order to have it make sense. — Fooloso4

"That particular person" is Luke. No particular, and no set of, attributes determine that the person is Luke. — Banno

The identification ins in the specification of the possible world. Consider a possible world in which Luke is female. Consider a possible world in which Luke is Jewish. What guarantees that we are talking about Luke? The very specification that swts up the possible world. — Banno

Naming is not yet a move in a language-game — any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. One may say: with the mere naming of a thing, nothing has yet been done. Nor has it a name except in a game. — PI 49

The particular circumstances in which the sentence is actually used is meant to compare with the example. It is in those circumstances that the sentence makes sense. The example illustrates the point that the meaning is not something that carries "in every kind of use". 'There', as in "There it does make sense." does not mean here, that is, in the example, but those circumstances in which the sentence is actually used. — Fooloso4

The circumstances in which the sentence is used and makes sense is not one in which one points to an object in front of him while saying it. It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it. It is rather, that there may be circumstances in which one says "this is here" and it makes sense but saying it while pointing to something in front of him is not one of those circumstances. — Fooloso4

What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. — Fooloso4

And yet words do have a aura that is the ghost of all the uses in all the games of the ancestors. — unenlightened

But he says the sentence does make sense in the circumstances in which it is actually used. — Fooloso4

If those circumstances are "special" in the sense of extraordinary — Fooloso4

The sentence: "This is here" does have an everyday use. "This is here (pointing to the table) and this is here (pointing to the chair) but where are the dishes?" — Fooloso4

It seems a fucking weird thing to say, to me. — unenlightened

I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here: — Fooloso4

In what circumstances does it make sense? If we are looking for the object and find it: "This (the car key) is here. Or if mapping the location of objects in the room. Or giving an inventory of the things in the room. There is nothing "special" about these circumstances. They are all quite ordinary, but they are not the same circumstances in which one claims "This is here" and means something metaphysical. — Fooloso4

Exactly, it could be used in absolutely any circumstances — Metaphysician Undercover

..."this is here", creates something specific (special) — Metaphysician Undercover

The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly laid out in advance for us; we know, are in no doubt, what we have to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are —– if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency —– our normal language-games would thereby lose their point. — The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that such lumps suddenly grew or shrank with no obvious cause. — PI 142

The sense in which philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words is no different from that in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say, for example, “What is written here is a Chinese sentence”, or “No, that only looks like writing; it’s actually just ornamental”, and so on.
We’re talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity. [Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules for their moves, not describing their physical properties.
The question “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a piece in chess?” — PI 108 (boxed section)

After all, Witty consistently and repeatedly stresses that what he has to say has nothing to do with discovering new facts, nothing to do with the empirical, and bears entirely on the understanding. — StreetlightX

To say that everyday use has nothing to do with empirical use is not to exclude it. — StreetlightX

So - If not this [i.e. empirical use], then what? What is an 'everyday use' if not an empirical use of language in an anthropological setting? — StreetlightX

All of which is to say, once again, that the 'everyday use' of language has nothing to do with an empirical use of language. — StreetlightX

The 'metaphysical use of language' imagines that there is an essence/ideal of language which the actual use of language must/ought/should conform to. By contrast, the everyday use of language is any use of language which does not have this requirement. That's it. — StreetlightX

Use comes first. Rules are established by use. — Fooloso4

The rules maintain that use, that is, they determine the common use, how you or I will use that word according to its established use. — Fooloso4

The rule is the standard, but it is the use not the subsequent rules of use that determine meaning. — Fooloso4

Your inference is not correct. — Fooloso4

What is at issue is your claim:

Therefore, rules or grammar determine proper and improper meaning. — Fooloso4

The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use. — Fooloso4

My example of following was intended to get at the distinction between following along and following a rule. There may have been no practice of following along and it is not clear whether what they are doing is part of a practice. It may have simply been what they all did on that one occasion. — Fooloso4

The practice of playing chess means playing chess. This is not the same thing as the rules of chess. — Fooloso4

36. And we do here what we do in a host of similar cases: because we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call pointing at the shape (as opposed to the colour, for example), we say that a mental, spiritual activity corresponds to these words.
Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit.