Saying is a form of doing. Language is a game. I don't see how you can say that this is bull shit, at this point in the book when it's the premise of the book — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say this was bullshit. I said that your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" was bullshit. Yes, saying is a form of doing, but that doesn't imply that "there is no such thing as 'what I am saying'." You have apparently retreated to this absurd position only because you cannot answer my questions or respond to my specific examples. Repeating "meaning is use" does not address my criticisms or questions.

For example, you didn't answer: 'How can the same thing be both good and bad?' and 'What same thing?'

Meaning is use, therefore you cannot understand the meaning of the dishonest speaker. Simple isn't it? Often we do not know when the speaker is lying, and we think we understand how the speaker is using the words, when we really do not. This is not a case of the hearer not being able to "comprehend English", it is a case of misuse of English by the speaker. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are creating confusion via your attempted collapse of the distinction between "saying" and "doing". It is not about understanding the speaker; it is about understanding the language. Yes, speakers can use language differently and give different meanings to the same words across various occasions. But we all learn the same language for the most part and we learn that words can have different meanings in various contexts along with it. Wittgenstein is merely reminding philosophers of this fact.

You never answered my question of whether you understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means. But I'm certain that you do, whether it's told as a lie or not.

I said we need to create consistency in what is determined as "good", so that the same thing would not be both good and bad.. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can the same thing be both good and bad? What same thing?

Your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" is bullshit, designed only to try and maintain your theoretical house of cards. You have claimed that "There's no such thing as 'what I am saying'." Honestly? Nobody really says anything - is that what you're saying? Also, this is hardly the main insight of "meaning is use".

No you do not understand. Because you do not understand what the speaker is doing with the words, you do not understand the use of the words in that instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. If the speaker is being honest then you can understand the sentence, but if they are lying then you can't understand the (same) sentence. But how do you know when they're lying? Do you suddenly become unable to comprehend English?

I gave you the example, misunderstanding. In deception the purpose, or goal is misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're saying that there are only two "purposes" of language use: for understanding and for misunderstanding; for good and for evil? Yeah, okay.

If meaning is use, there is no such thing as "what I am saying", there is only "what I am doing". — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we need to create consistency between what is "good" morally, and what is "good" linguistically. — Metaphysician Undercover

First you say that there is no saying and only doing, but then you say that we need to create consistency between saying and doing. How do we create consistency between saying and doing if they are the same thing?

If I lie and tell you that "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" (when I am not ill) do you not understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means?

Again, you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose (i.e. to lead you to "misunderstand what I am doing" - or however you describe it).

Your examples here are called "kinds of use". They are not purposes of use. So for example, an order is a kind of use, but an order is done for a purpose, it is not the purpose itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean?

When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each other"? If it is not always the purpose of language use, then what other purposes are you talking about? Provide an example.

According to you, a lie is a kind of use, it is not the purpose itself.

The purpose of the lie is to make the other person misunderstand what you are doing. — Metaphysician Undercover

But not to make them misunderstand what I am saying. Otherwise, the lie would not fulfil its purpose. All that is relevant here (to §98) is understanding what is said.

Not necessarily everyone is trying to win, but there are varying goals which people have behind their use of language. This is why it's a moral issue, because language serves as a means to achieving various goals. If it were an organized game, we'd all have the same goal, trying to win. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the context of a language game. Just a reminder, too, that not all games have the goal of winning (§66).

So for instance, if we say that the purpose of language is for us to understand each other, then we can judge the vague or ambiguous sentence as a bad sentence because it is not conducive to understanding, and therefore not consistent with the designated purpose of language. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, understanding each other (without any doubts?) counts as winning?

But if we allow that language is sometimes for this purpose, sometimes for that purpose, and sometimes for another purpose, then we have no ideal by which to judge language use, and the goodness or badness of each instance of language use must be judged in relation to that particular purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

What purposes other than understanding do you mean? A lie is still understandable, isn't it? Likewise, jokes, stories, orders, reports, and all of the other language-games (or purposes of language-use) that Wittgenstein lists at §23 may be understood. To include understanding as a similar "purpose" of language appears to be a category error.

Is it the purpose of telling a story that the storyteller is understood or that the story is enjoyed (or both/neither)? What if I understood the story but I didn't enjoy it? Did the storyteller win?

The problem is that the particular purpose may itself be morally wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is irrelevant. We are here to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy, not yours. Wittgenstein is talking about the sense of a sentence at §98, and that's all. There is no need to drag morality into it just because the word 'ideal' has been used.

You might think that we can either play the language-game for fun or play for keeps, and it would be better if we would all just play for fun and forget about playing for keeps. It doesn't matter who wins or loses, we're playing for fun. The problem though, is that in reality we all play for keeps, and that's why we continually strive to better ourselves (strive for the ideal). — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand what you mean by "playing for keeps" in the context of language games.

Ever see a chess player who says it doesn't matter which move I make, because any move is going to create a perfect order? The chess player strives for the ideal move. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone is somehow trying to win the language game?

As I explained, it doesn't matter how many possible meanings of "perfect" there are — Metaphysician Undercover

It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal".

it is the only one that serves Wittgenstein's purpose, of dismissing 'striving for the ideal'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I'll leave it to you to explain why you apparently believe that our ordinary vague sentences have not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still has to be constructed by us.

The terms you have proposed allow for the possibility of something better, or more complete, which "perfect" does not allow for. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"?

If Wittgenstein was using "perfect" in the way you suggest, it would not serve his purpose. His purpose is to demonstrate that we are not striving after an ideal language, perfection is already there, within our common, ordinary language. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right: the kind of perfection under discussion is already there within our ordinary language, but it is "perfect" in the sense of 'suitable', 'apt', or 'appropriate', rather than the ideal sense that you are attempting to stipulate.

So if "perfect" here is anything less than the ideal, it does not serve the purpose because then we could still be striving after the ideal. It is crucial that "perfect" is equivalent (in value) to "ideal", in order to dismiss as unjustified, 'striving after the ideal'. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is true only if you stipulate that "perfect" must have the one (ideal) meaning. Whereas Wittgenstein is counselling the reader to abandon such a philosophical pursuit of sublime chimeras (§94).

You left out the word "perfect", he says that it has "perfect order". — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, it was a direct quote; the first line of §98.

So "perfect" plays a very important role here. It is only by saying that language is already "perfect", as it is, even in the vaguest sentences, that he gets away from the notion that we are striving after some ideal perfection in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. You get it now?

"Perfect" implies without deficiency, faultless, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has the sense of 'suitable', 'apt' or 'appropriate', rather than 'faultless', 'flawless' or 'ideal'. The same distinction that you made above.

If you believe that we use language for the purpose of understanding each other, i.e. language is used to help us to understand one another, then you ought to reject the principle stated at 98 as false, and unsupportive of this premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which "principle"?

You have a perverse way of reading the text. It is pointless to take the words "ideal" and "perfect" as being used in a contradictory manner while giving scant consideration to the context. At §98, Wittgenstein is talking about the sense of sentences being in perfect order, yet you continually disregard the "order" part and focus only on the "perfect" or "perfection" part.

Perhaps Wittgenstein's use of "On the one hand" and "On the other hand" at §98 confuses you, since he really only continues one line of thought rather than comparing two.

To paraphrase §98, he says "it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’." That is, we do not require the construction of a perfect language with an exceptional sense that our ordinary language is lacking; i.e. we are not striving after this ideal. Moreover, "it seems clear that where there is sense, there must be perfect order. —– So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."

He continues this thought at §99, where he says that a sentence must have a determinate sense, because an indeterminate sense "would really not be a sense at all". In other words, no matter how vague the sentence, it must have a determinate sense or else it wouldn't have a sense. As such, it is in perfect order.

If you disagree, then explain in context, rather than speaking in abstract terms about "ideal" and "perfect".

But if we accept the principle at 98, then we ought to accept what is implied by it, and that is that language may be used for any goals whatsoever, including cheating and deceit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Still unsure of the "principle" here, but it is uncontroversial that language may be used for cheating and deceit.

The issue is whether or not language use is an activity which may be governed by principles of good and bad, morality. If it is, then there is a moral basis for the judgement of better (more perfect) or worse (less perfect) language use. If it is not, then any way of using language is just as good (perfect) as any other way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein makes no mention of morality in the text. Why are you?

There is meaning in meaningful relations, that's why they're meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein speaks of "meaning" and "use", whereas you speak of "meaningful" and "useful". Apples and oranges.

Right, but using words is not the same as "meaning" because meaningful relations exist where words are not used. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are conflating "meaning" and "meaningful". Words have meaning, they do not have meaningful. And although words can be meaningful, they do not have "meaningful relations" which "exist where words are not used".

I do not behave in a kind and considerate way because it is of some sort of use to me. To the contrary, if I took time to think about what was more useful to me, and behaved in that way, I'd be more deceitful and cheating. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your use of "use" here has a meaning of personal benefit, such as that it is useful to you. This is a different meaning to Wittgenstein's use of "use" which has a meaning of employment, such as that it has a shared use by the speakers of a community.

P.S. I have not technically returned; just not suffering the anticipated effects of treatment yet.

How is it possible that there is a perfection which is not ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps he is not using these terms synonymously despite your preconception that he must.

So "ideal' has a meaning here other than as a perfection which we strive after. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have it backwards. It is the ideal which we are not striving after at 98.

The result is that "ideal" means something other than a perfection which we strive after — Metaphysician Undercover

You again have it backwards. Stick to what's written instead of speaking in abstract terms.

He is distinctly saying that the work of philosophy is to describe the use of language, not to criticize it. To criticize it is to pass judgement, and this implies that one ought, or ought not use language in a particular way. Where does Wittgenstein show any principles to give this criticism any repute? Such hypocritical criticism is nothing more than a potential for ridicule. — Metaphysician Undercover

This makes no sense. You state that W distinctly says that the work of philosophy is not to criticise the use of language, but you then appear to imply that W criticises language use. Where does he do so? Your abstract bombast is tiring.

On a personal note, I will be undergoing extensive medical treatment for a few months so I possibly might not be around for a while. However, on the plus side, I had Daniele Moyal-Sharrock follow me on academia.edu today for some unknown reason.

If he talks about ideal this, or ideal that, ideal exactness, ideal languages, or ideal logic, "ideal" is the adjective. These are not different types of ideals. They are different types of things described by the same adjective, "ideal", and therefore we ought not assume that "ideal" refers to a different type of ideal in each case. — Metaphysician Undercover

You were previously only willing to acknowledge that the "ideal" adjective applies to exactness, whereas I repeatedly noted that Wittgenstein also applies it to many other things. You have otherwise treated "the ideal" as a catch-all noun, and have largely disregarded Wittgenstein's particular uses.

Read 100 -110 and tell me how many times he mentions "the ideal". — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein references "the ideal" in regard to the ideal language, the ideal sentence, the ideal exactness, the ideal (purity of) logic, the ideal game, the ideal application of the word "game", and the ideal order between sentences, words and signs.

Can you offer an explanation for why he drives a wedge between "ideal" and "perfect"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that W makes a distinction between "ideal" and "perfect" at §98 or §81. To be charitable, he appears to use two different senses of "perfect" in those sections: an ideal perfection of which he is critical, and a non-ideal perfection of which he is not critical.

The non-ideal perfection of which he is not critical is found where he says that "there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence" (§98). Here, the "order" of the vague sentence is already "perfect" as it is. This is contrasted (in the same section) with the ideal meaning of "perfect" where he says: "we are not striving after an ideal, as if...a perfect language still had to be constructed by us."

This does not help to support your claim, however, since he uses "ideal" only in a critical sense. This is consistent with W's other critical references to "the ideal" which are made to denounce common preconceptions regarding the once lofty aims of traditional philosophy, such as that it should seek to make new discoveries, to invent new languages, to provide a final analysis, to reveal hidden essences, etc.

How is ideal exactness any different from any other ideal, qua 'ideal"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue is that Wittgenstein is discussing other particular types of ideal that you are failing to acknowledge.

This is actually very simple and straight forward, so I can't understand why you don't see it. In philosophy, if we diagnose a particular form of thought as "wayward", we are rejecting the way that the philosopher is using language. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is very simple. Wittgenstein is attempting to dispel misconceptions; he is not attempting to dictate any changes to the use of the word "ideal".

The problem, in this particular instance, as I described in my last post, is that the role of "ideal" is the very opposite of the dead end. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is that you make sweeping abstract generalisations about the word "ideal", without regard for how Wittgenstein is using this term or to what he is referring.

Accepting that there is an ideal, which has not yet been obtained, is what leaves us open to continually bettering ourselves. If, instead of "ideal" we accept "fulfils its purpose", as our goal, then we have no inspiration to find a better or more efficient way to do what we are doing. Therefore, rejecting "the ideal", in favour of "fulfils its purpose" is really what is the dead end, because the end, or goal, is already reached when the purpose is fulfilled, and there is nothing further, no ideal, to strive for. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein offers no positive determination or definition of "the ideal" (especially outside of any particular language game), yet you are hellbent on trying to find one.

Whether you call it "ideal exactness", or "the ideal exactness" is not relevant, we are talking about the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I made a distinction between "ideal exactness" and "the ideal", and referenced other types of ideal than ideal exactness.

But if we look back and apply the term in retrospect, at 87, the final explanation, the one which requires no further explanation to avoid misunderstanding would be the ideal explanation. At 85, the sign-post which leaves no room for doubt would be the ideal sign-post. — Metaphysician Undercover

This has already been addressed: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine." You have in your mind some ideal explanation that accounts for every imaginable doubt, but this is not Wittgenstein's idea. Then you accuse him of being inconsistent based on your own ideal.

He is criticising this notion of "ideal", as if it is misguided, and we ought not use it... — Metaphysician Undercover

Where do you get the idea that Wittgenstein is trying to reject any form of language use? As I stressed earlier, it is about particular assumptions, presumptions, preconceptions, misconceptions, or misguided ways of thinking. Wittgenstein diagnoses particular forms of wayward thought in philosophy, including those listed by Baker and Hacker:

- the strict rules of the logical structure of propositions;
- that the sense of every sentence must be absolutely determinate;
- that every proposition must have the form ‘Such-and-such is thus-and-so’;
- that the real name must be simple;
- that the sentences and words of ordinary language are merely crude surface manifestations of the real propositions and names hidden in the medium of the understanding.

These misconceptions are "like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off." (§103) These misconceptions can be cured by simply looking at how language actually works (§93). Nowhere does Wittgenstein advocate that we ought not to use the word "ideal", or any other word. Wittgenstein is trying to dispel particular philosophical dead ends of thinking.

Serving the purpose is the real ideal, as expressed at 88. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is not referring to "the ideal" at §88; he is referring to ideal exactness. Furthermore, he is criticising, not defining, the unspecified notion of ideal exactness. He says "we don't know what we are to make of this idea". He goes on to talk about other kinds of ideals (other than ideal exactness) from section §89 onwards.

Baker and Hacker, in their exegesis of §103, detail various misconstruals of 'the ideal':

The ‘ideal’, misconstrued, is evident in the preconception of the strict rules of the logical structure of propositions, in the idea that the sense of every sentence must be absolutely determinate, in the thought that every proposition must have the form ‘Such-and-such is thus-and-so’, in the supposition that the real name must be simple, in the conception of the sentences and words of ordinary language as merely crude surface manifestations of the real propositions and names hidden in the medium of the understanding. Caught thus in the web of illusion, the conception seems irresistible. — Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations : Part II: Exegesis §§1–184, Volume 1

These are not all about 'serving a purpose' or 'achieving a goal'.

However, he does not reject "ideal" as a totally useless word which people are going around using when it really has no use. He calls it a misunderstanding of "the ideal". He still allows that "ideal" has a role in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know where you got the idea that W was possibly attempting to"reject "ideal" as a totally useless word".

The question would be whether all language use is goal oriented, and whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have an uncanny knack for misreading. It's not about "whether all language use is goal oriented", or about "whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal". Wittgenstein never mentions this. I grant you that he talks about exactness and inexactness and goals at §88, but not in the way you present it, and §88 is mostly irrelevant to the sections we are now discussing. The ideal we are now discussing is an assumption which can result from the sublime nature of logic.

"In what way is logic something sublime?
For logic seemed to have a peculiar depth — a universal significance.
Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all the sciences. — For logical investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way. —– It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal connections, but from an urge to understand the foundations, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand." [§89]

Our inquiry is a grammatical one, which sometimes involves analysing our forms of expression as a method of removing misunderstandings. This procedure resembles taking things apart [§90].

However, this might lead some people (including the young Wittgenstein) to incorrectly assume that there is "something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed form of every expression". In other words, some philosophers might assume that they should be aiming at a state of complete exactness, "as if this were the real goal of our investigation" [§91]. (Hint: it isn't.)

This misguided view finds its expression "in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought". This view presupposes that the essence is something hidden beneath the surface (as opposed to "something which already lies open to view"), and that a philosophical analysis will unearth this essence. [§92]

Those who make these assumptions are "unable simply to look and see how propositions work". [§93]

"[O]ur forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved". [§94]

Logic presents the "a priori order of the world; that is, the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common". This order "is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty may attach to it."
"We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth."
"Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”."[§97]

"§101. We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. At the same time, one doesn’t as yet see how it occurs there, and doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there."

None of this is about "whether all language use is goal oriented, and whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal." The 'ideal' Wittgenstein is talking about here is a presupposition or attitude that some philosophers adopt in relation to logic, language and related philosophical problems (such as in response to Augustine's question: 'What is time?').

If we have these two fundamentally different ways of using language, the one assumes an ideal, and proceeds in that way, in logic and explanation, and the other, common usage, assumes no such ideal, and does not proceed according to theoretical rules of essentialism, but by practise, then doesn't an accurate description of language require considering both of these branches of language use? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really, because the (non-common) "usage" which assumes an ideal is only found in philosophy. Wittgenstein is attempting to illustrate that this way of thinking leads to misunderstanding and is the wrong way to do philosophy, or to solve philosophical problems. Wittgenstein refers to himself making this ideal assumption with his Tractatus at PI §114. Keep in mind that it is the assumption (of an ideal) - the thinking - that is misguided.

It may also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were aiming at a particular state, a state of complete exactness, and as if this were the real goal of our investigation. [§91]

For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand the nature of language — its function, its structure — yet this is not what that question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis is supposed to unearth.
‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any future experience. [§92]

94. ‘Remarkable things, propositions!’ Here we already have the sublimation of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional sign and the facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublimate, the sign itself. — For our forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved.

These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing.) [§96]

97. Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus. — Its essence, logic, presents an order: namely, the a priori order of the world; that is, the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty may attach to it. —– It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction, but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language.

101. We want to say that there can’t be any vagueness in logic. The idea now absorbs us that the ideal ‘must’ occur in reality. At the same time, one doesn’t as yet see how it occurs there, and doesn’t understand the nature of this “must”. We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there.

102. The strict and clear rules for the logical construction of a proposition appear to us as something in the background — hidden in the medium of understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium), for I do understand the sign, I mean something by it.

103. The ideal, as we conceive of it, is unshakable. You can’t step outside it. You must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. — How come? The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.

107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming vacuous. — We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! — PI

The point though, is that Wittgenstein is making no such distinction between types of explanation at 87. Luke is making this distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you account for the 'Whereas' at §87?

We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth. This order is a super-order between — so to speak — super-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”. [§97]

...we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still had to be constructed by us. [§98]

When we believe that we have to find that order, the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called “sentences”, “words”, “signs”. [§105]

When philosophers use a word a “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition/sentence”, “name” — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? —
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. [§116]

When I talk about language (word, sentence, etc.), I must speak the language of every day. So is this language too coarse, too material, for what we want to say? Well then, how is another one to be constructed? — And how extraordinary that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!
In giving explanations, I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); this is enough to show that I can come up only with externalities about language.
Yes, but then how can these observations satisfy us? - Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask! [§120] — PI

The remarks at §121 regarding orthography I consider to be an extension of this line of thinking: that philosophy should treat all language as being on the same playing field, and not treat some terms (e.g. "super-concepts") as being more important or meta- than others. Philosophers have tended to ask questions such as 'What is beauty?' or 'What is truth?', but not questions such as 'What is a door?' Philosophers have misguidedly placed concepts such as these above other more mundane concepts, have sought the essence of these things, and have tended to think that a more perfect language is required (or that our everyday language is inadequate) to capture that essence. Wittgenstein proposes instead that ("we") philosophers "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."

There are a variety of different language-games, as Wittgenstein notes at §23 of PI, but one thing that may be shared between language users across at least some of those language-games is behaviours or actions. The obvious example is giving and acting upon orders or requests, where the speaker uses (or behaves with) language to elicit the desired behaviours of the hearer(s). In this case, knowing the meaning of the speaker's words is knowing how to behave/act in response.

I doubt that this "answer" fits all uses of language, as there is probably more than one answer depending on the use.

Sorry Luke, I can't even begin to understand what you're saying about "explanation". — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider it this way: The type of explanation that Wittgenstein says must disappear at §109 is the same sort of "complete" and "final" (i.e. philosophical) explanation that he mentions at §87.

He clearly states at 31: "One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones." It is incorrect for you to say that this is "not by observation". — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that "he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation". To learn the game without ever learning the rules, as W states, is not to "learn the rules simply through observation" as you claim. Read the bloody text.

This is an incorrect interpretation of what I said. It isn't even close. — Metaphysician Undercover

You suggested that we could learn rules (I assume this includes language?) through observation and/or inductive reasoning. Therefore, you are suggesting that a child can learn language through inductive reasoning, and that, therefore, a child can reason before it can think (i.e. talk to itself - see §32). That's precisely what you are saying.

It is incorrect to say that the foundation of a thing and the essence of a thing are the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then explain what you mean.

If you prefer to disagree rather than to understand, then my efforts are pointless. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't have Fooloso4, Banno, unenlightened, Sam26, and others telling me that I have misunderstood the text. It is you who does not understand and refuses to listen.

I think that explanation in general, as the means by which we remove doubt, is being rejected, for the reason that explanation cannot remove doubt unless it is the final explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is inconsistent with his statement at §87: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding". He is not rejecting explanation here. Also, he states that an explanation removes misunderstanding, not doubt.

Consider the section we've moved up to now, at 109 he says "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein uses the word in two different contexts at §87 and at §109. At §87, he is talking about explanation in general, and distinguishes everyday (non-philosophical) explanations from "complete" and "final" (philosophical) explanations. Whereas at §109 he is talking about explanation as the traditional solution to philosophical problems. His use of "explanation" at §109 is made in the context of the surrounding sentences. Just prior to your quote, he states: "And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations." And later: "The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with." He is not talking about just any explanation here, but specifically hypothetical, theoretical explanations involving "new discoveries".

Wittgenstein eschewed the traditional view of philosophy as queen of the sciences, and rejected the accepted wisdom that the philosopher's role was to advance theories and hypotheses in a manner akin to the scientist. Hence: "It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones." This follows from his remarks at §89 onwards, in which he is working to dispel widely-held philosophical assumptions, such as that "The essence [of language] is hidden from us" (§92). See also §126.

A description of how our language actually works is not necessarily an explanation of this type (i.e. an hypothesis or theory). However, it is another way of removing misunderstanding, which can therefore be considered as a more general type of explanation.

There's two different approaches to how one might learn a rule, which Wittgenstein has been stressing almost from the beginning of the text. One is that the rule is told to us (explanation), and the other is that we might learn simply by observation. I think that this is first mentioned at 31, where he says one might learn the rules of a game just by watching. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you have misread. He says at §31 that we can imagine someone who has learnt the rules without ever having been shown a chess piece (therefore, not by observation); or we can imagine someone having learnt the game "without ever learning or formulating the rules". The purpose of this example is to support what he says at §30, that an ostensive definition can only explain the meaning of a word "if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear".

So he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation, without any explanation required, as his effort to avoid this problem. I think that this would be like a basic form of inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

This sounds a lot like the Augustinian assumption at §1, of which Wittgenstein is critical. At §32, Wittgenstein clearly describes his criticism:

Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if he already had a language, only not this one. Or again, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean something like “talk to himself”. [my emphasis] — PI 32

You appear to assume, along with Augustine, that a child can reason before it has been taught language; that it can already think, only not yet speak. Your attribution of this "possibility" to Wittgenstein is antithetical to the text.

I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is trying to get to the bottom of language, the foundations. We can't simply assume that we learn rules through explanation because explanation requires language, and so the language by which we learn the fundamental rules, could have no rules at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is not trying to do any such thing, assuming that by "bottom" or "foundations" you mean something like the "essence" of language; something beneath the surface or hidden from view. As Wittgenstein states at §97: "We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language."

He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). — Metaphysician Undercover

He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation.

He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs?

Doubt is clearly not an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your doubts appear to be ideal and endless. You appear to have an axiomatic rule that doubts can be restricted but not removed. You also appear reluctant to address any specific examples which may challenge this rule. You did not address Fooloso4's bathroom signs example, nor respond to my latest example offering a reason for Wittgenstein's direction to "stand roughly there" (to take a photograph), and my questioning of what would remove your doubts in that particular case.

Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, your ideal. This is not quite Wittgenstein's account of certainty.

That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty... — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself.

However, we should refrain from turning this into a discussion about On Certainty.

There is definitely a method which is being described here. That's what learning is, a method for restricting doubt, and this is what Wittgenstein is focused on, that method. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, Wittgenstein's "method" for "restricting doubt" is...learning? And that's Wittgenstein's method? Hmm.

He started off the book with simple descriptions of ostensive definition, and showed how these description were deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

Deficient in what respect?

Now he has progressed to the point of addressing doubt in the same context, the context of learning. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not obvious to me that his remarks to this point, on (e.g.) language games, family resemblance, meaning is use, simples/complexes, sharp/blurred boundaries, all share "the context of learning". Does W state somewhere that the purpose of the book (thus far) is learning?

If we learn rules, the rules are like sign-posts, and we must learn how to restrict the doubt we have in relation to what the sign-post is telling us, to have confidence in understanding, in order to proceed. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections.

That's what I'm talking about, removing the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. Would you be satisfied if Wittgenstein told you the reason for his direction "stand roughly there" (e.g. so that he can take your photograph)? Would that be enough to remove your doubts in this case? If not, what would remove your doubts?

Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

What method?

His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

You introduced an absurd "doubt" into Wittgenstein's example of "stand roughly there", which is that you don't know why he would give this direction to someone. Maybe that's relevant to your philosophy or to some point that you're trying to make, but it has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's philosophy or to the text. It is not Wittgenstein's point that there is some doubt about the phrase "stand roughly there".

No, that's your phrase, not mine... — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why, if you had read the next sentence, I said "You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms."

Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please.

Why the obsession with certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously? You were the one who introduced the line of questioning and discussion about certainty a few pages ago.

Forget about certainty, there is no such thing... — Metaphysician Undercover

There definitely is such a thing.

What we need to discuss is doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't need to discuss anything. However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something.

We settle on the degree of precision required for our goals. To talk about exact understanding does not make sense. Your conclusion does not follow from your argument, because it requires the premise that certainty, or exactness is essential to "understanding", that a person cannot be said to have understood unless there is exactitude, and certainty to one's understanding. But that's not reality, as Wittgenstein is trying to say. If he says "stand roughly here", I understand that he's telling me that he wants me to stand somewhere in this general area, but I don't understand why he's just telling me to stand in this general area, rather than telling me to stand at this point or at that point. So despite the fact that there is understanding, there is also much which is also not understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

You start out by saying that certainty is inessential to understanding, but end up saying that without certainty we only have a partial understanding. Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. You may not have used that phrase, but you are speaking in those terms.

Furthermore, the issue is not why he's telling you to "stand roughly there". The reason for his direction is irrelevant. The point Wittgenstein is making is that "stand roughly there" makes perfect sense as a direction despite being imprecise. More importantly, the more precise we try to make this direction, the less sense it makes. You are critical that Wittgenstein does not direct you to stand at "this point or that", but if it were a very precise point, how would you stand at it? On one foot? On which part of the foot? With how much surface area of that part of the foot? Or, maybe you are thinking of outline drawings for both of your feet:

Only let’s understand what “inexact” means! For it does not mean “unusable”. And let’s consider what we call an “exact” explanation in contrast to this one. Perhaps like drawing a boundary-line around a region with chalk? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a colour edge would be more exact. But has this exactness still got a function here: isn’t it running idle? Moreover, we haven’t yet laid down what is to count as overstepping this sharp boundary; how, with what instruments, it is to be ascertained. And so on. — PI 88

It is explicitly stated, at 81 and 98 for example, and implied all over the place, such as right here at 88, that seeking the ideal is the wrong approach. So if in this book, In which seeking the ideal is portrayed as the wrong approach, Wittgenstein is actually seeking the ideal, wouldn't his efforts to portray seeking the ideal as the wrong approach, defeat his purpose, of seeking the ideal? — Metaphysician Undercover

As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought".

Therefore, Wittgenstein is not seeking some ideal certainty. Whereas you are seeking some ideal understanding where all doubt has been eliminated.

I'd say it's very clearly a matter of degree, as Wittgenstein describes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Wittgenstein describe understanding as a matter of degree?

We should limit the possibility of misunderstanding (this is doubt, recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding), to the degree required for our purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "logical result", of "misunderstanding is possible" is not "understanding is impossible", and I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding". The point is that we ought to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a degree acceptable, relative to the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an acceptable degree, implying that the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed. If the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed (without any doubt), then we can never be certain to have understanding. Therefore, understanding is impossible.

Otherwise, you are saying that understanding is possible despite the fact that some degree of doubt or some possibility of misunderstanding remains. But in that case, what is the threshold level of doubt at which understanding turns to misunderstanding? How many percentage points below 100% certainty before I am no longer sure whether I understand, or at which I misunderstand?

But striving for certainty, in the sense of leaving no room for doubt, is nonsense in the context of PI. To strive for the ideal would actually defeat the purpose of the book. — Metaphysician Undercover

How?

This is judgement after the fact, it's irrelevant. What we are talking about is avoiding misunderstanding, preventing misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not irrelevant. If we are not able to judge whether a misunderstanding has been avoided in the past, then how can we know how to prevent one in the future?

I only asked whether you have ever avoided a misunderstanding before. Have you ever understood something, or is it a matter of degree?

...there is always a possibility of misunderstanding. Therefore an explanation would always be required to avoid the doubt incurred by the possibility of misunderstanding. So, Wittgenstein's attempt to avoid the infinite regress fails. — Metaphysician Undercover

You complain that doubt can always remain; that we can always fall short of an exact understanding, but these are merely imagined possibilities. The logical result of this claim is that understanding (or exact understanding) is impossible.

Can you honestly state that there has never been an occasion on which you have understood a signpost or what someone tells you? Understanding signposts and what people say is both possible and actual - it happens every day.

So, what do you mean by exact understanding?

No single ideal of exactness has been envisaged; we do not know what we are to make of this idea - unless you yourself stipulate what is to be so called. But you’ll find it difficult to make such a stipulation - one that satisfies you. — PI 88

You simply repeat the interlocutor's concern at §87: "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”

Yet you fail to acknowledge or be satisfied by Wittgenstein's response.

I have no further interest in attempting to explain it.

To remove doubt, we seek an explanation. But then the explanation requires an explanation, and unless it's the final one, it's as if the explanation is hung in the air. Wittgenstein prevents this possibility of infinite regress of doubt and explanation, by asserting that an explanation is only needed, "if required to prevent a misunderstanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

The Wikipedia article defines Foundationalism thus: "Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to the regress problem of justification in epistemology. According to this argument, every proposition requires justification to support it, but any justification also needs to be justified itself. If this goes on ad infinitum, it is not clear how anything in the chain could be justified. Foundationalism holds that there are 'basic beliefs' which serve as foundations to anchor the rest of our beliefs."

The basic beliefs of foundationalism are the "final" explanations to which Wittgenstein refers here:

But similar doubts to those about the name “Moses” are possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling “Egypt”, whom the “Israelites”, and so forth?). These questions would not even come to an end when we got down to words like “red”, “dark”, “sweet”. - “But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!” - As though an explanation, as it were, hung in the air unless supported by another one. — PI 87

Wittgenstein's solution is to provide a circuit breaker to the regress. We don't need to justify every word or statement, as the regress problem would have it; we only need to provide an explanation in order to avoid a misunderstanding. Wittgenstein cuts off the regress near the surface level of language use, rather than at the foundation.

Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine. — PI 87

It is hard to see why you think that this is a foundationalist philosophy. There is no chain of justification ending at basic beliefs here: "none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding".

You provided a quote from the end of §87:

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed a gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is possible only if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts. — PI 87

Yes, it may easily look like that, HOWEVER....

The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose. — PI 87

That is, the signpost is in order if, under normal circumstances, no further explanation is required to avoid a misunderstanding. Conversely, we avoid a misunderstanding if, under normal circumstances, the signpost (or words used) fulfils its purpose.

In relation to what is said at 87, this statement is questionable. — Metaphysician Undercover

How so?

It is all philosophical thinking, regardless of whether Wittgenstein says otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say it wasn't philosophical thinking; I said it wasn't foundational philosophical thinking. See Foundationalism.

I'm not going to argue with you about whether to accept Platonic idealism, or whether to follow Wittgenstein in his rejection of this sort of foundationalism. But, of course, you should follow Wittgenstein. :grin:

The appropriate way for Wittgenstein to deal with the infinite regress of explanation which is required to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, is to accept the fact that doubt cannot be excluded. This simply means that we proceed in our activities without certainty. And, this thing which he attempts to do, establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed, and there is certainty, is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein in no way attempts to "establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed". This type of foundational philosophical thinking is rejected by Wittgenstein, and is a way of thought he is attempting to subvert via his therapeutic writing. The next 40-50 passages in the text seek to disabuse the reader of thinking in these ideal terms. Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation.

Wittgenstein repeats his "view" at §87:

...an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine. — PI 87

You could claim that Wittgenstein's therapeutic method has not worked for you and that you still crave the removal of every imaginable doubt. That's fine, but don't misread Wittgenstein to be providing a foundational philosophy which will help you with this.

Good, this supports my claim that "leaves no room for doubt", is inconsistent with what Wittgenstein was trying to say. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really, because in the very next sentence of §85 - which is unchanged in both the third and fourth editions - W says: "Or rather, it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not." You've willfully ignored this sentence for the last few pages of this discussion, and built your 'incoherent epistemology' thesis around the claim that W says "leaves no room for doubt" (only).

Since you agree with me that he is saying that the rules, as sign-posts, leave room for doubt, then for what reasons do you not agree that his position is consistent with what I've described, what you've called "radical doubt"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, he says at §85 that "it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not". At §84, he states:

But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. — PI 84

This is Wittgenstein's view, which is what everyone here has been trying to tell you.

§85 is a prelude to the later passages on rule following, including §201 ("there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation").

The issue was whether or not Wittgenstein's appeal to "ordinary circumstances" (87), is sufficient to "leave no room for doubt" (85). — Metaphysician Undercover

The third edition has it as "leave no room for doubt", but the fourth edition has it as "leave room for doubt" (at §85).

In TS 227(a), one of the two surviving typescripts, Wittgenstein crossed out the ‘k’ in ‘keinen’ in §85(b), thus changing the sentence from ‘der Wegweiser lässt doch keinen Zweifel offen’ (‘the signpost does after all leave no room for doubt’) to ‘der Wegweiser lässt doch einen Zweifel offen’ (‘the signpost does after all leave room for doubt’). This, in the context, makes much better sense. — Editorial Preface to the Fourth Edition

But what would I know, since I didn't participate in a part of the discussion. :roll: