Yes, I've written about it on this thread. I think there are numerous reasons to do with wanting to get others to believe us, wanting to show faith in others, wanting to give an indication of confidence... — Isaac

That begs the question. You're assuming anything does. — Isaac

No, all statements are true, including this one. — Luke

I currently take it as the honest theory...one that would rather not spout nonsense, bewitched by old metaphors... — Pie

There's probably lots of wiggle room on the issue of pragmatics, which I'm admittedly ignoring to focus on what I take to be the essence of the issue. I claim that it's better to not think of truth as a property. — Pie

I suggest that it's true that snow is white and snow is white do the same thing when used, have the same meaning. — Pie

To say it's true there are plums in the icebox is (basically) to say there are plums in the ice box. — Pie

How's this ? The meaning of the assertion, the sentence in use, seems to simply be the world(-as-understood). If we jettison apparent nonsense like the world-in-itself...the world is just that which is the case. To me this is not correspondence. There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie

You and I had a discussion about a year ago concerning the relation for Witt between a rule and the use of a rule.
I suggested that you stand on one side of a rift between Wittgenstein interpreters who support Hacker’s understanding of this issue and those , like the later Baker , Cavell, Conant, Hutchinson and Rouse, who reject it. I think this rift colors your debate with Antony concerning the ethical in Wittgenstein’s thinking. — Joshs

What Rouse had to say concerning
“Wittgenstein's well-known remark that requests for justification of a practice must eventually en-counter a stopping point at which one can only say, "This is what we do" (1953, par. 217), supports Antony’s contention concerning the creative, enactive, and, yes, ethical reaponsivity of language use. — Joshs

Remember that we cannot appeal to social regularities or collectively presupposed norms within a practice: there are no such things, I have argued, but more important, if there were they would not thereby legitimately bind us. — Joshs

Any regularities in what practitioners have previously done does not thereby have any authority to bind subsequent performances to the same regularities. — Joshs

The familiar Wittgensteinian paradoxes about rule following similarly block any institution of norms merely by invocation of a rule, since no rule can specify its correct application to future instances (Wittgenstein 1953). — Joshs

Practices should instead be understood as comprising performances that are mutually interactive in partially shared circumstances.”(Rouse) — Joshs

Witt is looking at how our practices work and break down, including why we abandon our ordinary criteria. The approach above is caught in the trap Witt is diagnosing: thinking we can have a defendable system of how to pre-judge behavior. — Antony Nickles

As opposed to matters of fact, or logic. Welcome to the Tractatus. Once again, Wikipedia fails. I would think with your adamant denial you would have your own thoughts on this issue. — Antony Nickles

Most times our actions don't require philosophy. — Antony Nickles

When they do, our conceptual investigation shows us what our interests are in others pain, following rules, justification, etc. Just as Plato would think we knew what virtue was, but then tear it apart to learn more about it. — Antony Nickles

What it demonstrates is that the relationship between the student and teacher is more important than justifying the explaination. We can simply judge the student as wrong and stop the conversation, or start again, ask more questions, move to other examples, etc. — Antony Nickles

You seem hell-bent on maintaining your position, with little interest in understanding what I am saying about the matter at hand (explanation vs description, the hidden). I don't believe I have anything I could say that would satisfy your vague objection that grammar is literally about how to use words, rather than showing us something about the world, and thus, ourselves. — Antony Nickles

I am not assuming it, I am making a claim that Witt is thinking of the moral realm as something particular, yet different. You just denied he is, without any explanation of what it's supposed to look like or include. — Antony Nickles

Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that "involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior". The field of ethics, along with aesthetics, concerns matters of value; these fields comprise the branch of philosophy called axiology.

Ethics seeks to resolve questions of human morality by defining concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. As a field of intellectual inquiry, moral philosophy is related to the fields of moral psychology, descriptive ethics, and value theory. — Wikipedia

And what Witt would call "morality" is when we enter an unknown situation-..." Nickles

Do you have any textual support for this?
— Joshs

Justifications coming to an end, rule-following and its limits, continuing a series (able to go on) or being inclined to give up on the other (student), aspect-blindness, whether we can know the other (pain, thoughts). He discusses how our ordinary criteria work, but also how they break. Instead of a moral theory or rules I can tell you, Witt is showing us that it is a moment, a crisis. — Antony Nickles

He discusses how our ordinary criteria work, but also how they break. Instead of a moral theory or rules I can tell you, Witt is showing us that it is a moment, a crisis. — Antony Nickles

Most of the time there is no space between our words and our lives (as with knowledge and pain)--we have not come to a point of loss. Here, the desire for certainty forces the skeptic to remove words from their ordinary contexts and expressions, which creates the problem that they then project onto the world, as intellectual (there is something mysterious, hidden, unknowable). For example, they might say: "because agreement on ethics is not ensured, it is irrational". — Antony Nickles

From the beginning of this post I have been arguing this. He is trying to figure out how he got into the mindset he did in the Tractatus, the motivation of the interlocutor's questions, his discussion of temptation, obsession, need, etc. Why do we want to have something private, hidden? The question is everywhere. There is not an answer "...if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it." — Antony Nickles

Sorry, I am not arguing against you. I was trying to work through the claim, which we both stated, that they are consistent. — Fooloso4

:up:
I also don't see it, not in the text. I don't object to texts being wove in to new projects, but it's more agreeable when this is done boldly. Claim it. — Pie

I have not looked into the question of ethics in the PI, but suggest, in a tentative way, that although ethics is not explicitly discussed in the PI, this does not represent a break from his earlier concerns with ethics and aesthetics. It is, rather, consistent with it.
— Fooloso4

As I also mentioned earlier, the word "ethics" appears only once in the text (at 77), in a manner that is consistent with the views on ethics he expounded in the Tractatus. Does he show it instead of say it in the PI?
— Luke — Fooloso4

The "saying/showing" distinction is not limited to what can be shown as opposed to what can be said, but, rather, includes what can seen or experienced as opposed to being said. — Fooloso4

...consistent with the Tractatus, this is because the ethical/aesthetic is not something that philosophy deals with. — Fooloso4

You're assuming what ethics and moral philosophy looks like. — Antony Nickles

Aren't the subjects of thoughtfulness, understanding, teaching, treating people as more than objects of knowledge, etc. what ethics is about? — Antony Nickles

And what Witt would call "morality" is when we enter an unknown situation--not the everyday stuff like changing a tire, but when we come to the end of our justifications, we're at a loss as to what to say to each other (say, a student), our regular courses of action amount to contradiction (stunning us he and Plato say), etc. — Antony Nickles

Th subject is language because it is the means by which we struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding--it is the "resource", not the cause. — Antony Nickles

The interlocutor is given to say things, but they are things which we could agree could be said in such a situation. They are our expressions. — Antony Nickles

Examining those expressions ("our 'ordinary' language") shows us the grammar (criteria) of the practices like chess, rule-following, thinking to ourselves, being in pain, see a thing as a thing (or in another way), etc. — Antony Nickles

And these examples of practices show that we have a multitude of criteria rather than just crystalline purity, — Antony Nickles

107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.)

97. Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus. — Its essence, logic, presents an order: namely, the a priori order of the world; that is, the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty may attach to it. —– It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction, but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth. This order is a super-order between — so to speak — super-concepts. Whereas, in fact, if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”.

108. We see that what we call “proposition”, “language”, has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is a family of structures more or less akin to one another. —– But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here. — But in that case doesn’t logic altogether disappear? — For how can logic lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. — The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need. — Philosophical Investigations

but also that this is not an alternative or rejection, but the opportunity to ask: why do we do that? Is it right, good? — Antony Nickles

Witt comes in second after Nietschze for cryptic, half-finished thoughts and just flat-out question marks. If it were easy to change, he could just tell you how. — Antony Nickles

The non-solipsist says "it is possible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist".
The solipsist replies with "it is impossible to know that other minds and mind-independent objects exist".
The non-solipsist then says "but what does it mean to exist"? — Michael

You can share an understanding and not know that you share an understanding. And at least on the non-solipsist's end he must admit to a known shared understanding. So it would be hypocritical of the non-solipsist to demand of the solipsist what he won't demand of himself. — Michael

If the non-solipsist claims that other minds and mind-independent objects can be known to exist and the solipsist claims that they can’t be known to exist, and if they accept that their positions are incompatible, then they accept that there is some shared understanding of what it means to exist, whatever that is.

So as I said, if you think that the meaning of “exists” first needs to be explained then you must be quiet on the debate between solipsism and non-solipsism. — Michael

But the Pi does not only morally implore us to take certain actions, but to do so in the name of our betterment, not only in thinking, understanding, teaching; in being rigorous, clear, deliberate, honest, fair; but in learning about our responses to our human condition (our separateness), our fears, our desires, our blindness. But the Pi also uncovers our ethical obligation in the groundlessness of our world and the limitations of knowledge. — Antony Nickles

The thoughts that I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition and sentence, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. — PI, preface

PI begins with a quote from Augustine’s Confessions which “give us a particular picture of the essence of human language,” based on the idea that “the words in language name objects,” and that “sentences are combinations of such names” (PI 1). This picture of language cannot be relied on as a basis for metaphysical, epistemic or linguistic speculation. Despite its plausibility, this reduction of language to representation cannot do justice to the whole of human language; and even if it is to be considered a picture of only the representative function of human language, it is, as such, a poor picture. Furthermore, this picture of language is at the base of the whole of traditional philosophy, but, for Wittgenstein, it is to be shunned in favor of a new way of looking at both language and philosophy. The Philosophical Investigations proceeds to offer the new way of looking at language, which will yield the view of philosophy as therapy. — SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein

To treat someone as if they have a soul; that it is not our knowledge of another’s pain, but our response to it that matters. — Antony Nickles

Philosophical Investigations...published posthumously in 1953...comprised two parts. Part I, consisting of 693 numbered paragraphs, was ready for printing in 1946, but rescinded from the publisher by Wittgenstein. Part II was added on by the editors, trustees of his Nachlass. In 2009 a new edited translation, by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, was published; Part II of the earlier translation, now recognized as an essentially separate entity, was here labeled “Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment” (PPF). — SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein

109. It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ — whatever that may mean — could be of no interest to us. (The pneumatic conception of thinking.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light — that is to say, its purpose — from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized — despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. — Philosophical Investigations

This is not a traditional moral philosophical theory or just a set of ethical principles because it subsumes the is and ought, the in and out, etc. What I would think is relevant here is that the discussion of explanation vs description and hidden vs plain-view shows our part in ontology, or desires for epistemology, and thus our moral part in philosophy, to be better people, do better. — Antony Nickles

And, yes, I would categorize seeing the ordinary as extraordinary as a course of action, an ethic Luke. — Antony Nickles

A ‘non-bourgeois’ thinker whose profound influence on Wittgenstein’s development dates from this first year back at Cambridge was Piero Sraffa. Sraffa was a brilliant Italian economist (of a broadly Marxist persuasion), and a close friend of Antonio Gramsci, the imprisoned Italian Communist leader. After jeopardizing his career in his home country by publishing an attack on Mussolini’s policies, Sraffa was invited by Keynes to come to King’s to pursue his work, and a lectureship in economics at Cambridge was created specially for him. Upon being introduced by Keynes, he and Wittgenstein became close friends, and Wittgenstein would arrange to meet him at least once a week for discussions. These meetings he came to value even more than those with Ramsey. In the preface to the Investigations he says of Sraffa’s criticism: ‘I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book.’
This is a large claim, and – considering their widely differing intellectual preoccupations – a puzzling one. But it is precisely because Sraffa’s criticisms did not concern details (because, one might say, he was not a philosopher or a mathematician) that they could be so consequential. Unlike Ramsey, Sraffa had the power to force Wittgenstein to revise, not this or that point, but his whole perspective. One anecdote that illustrates this was told by Wittgenstein to both Malcolm and von Wright, and has since been retold many times. It concerns a conversation in which Wittgenstein insisted that a proposition and that which it describes must have the same ‘logical form’ (or ‘grammar’, depending on the version of the story). To this idea. Sraffa made a Neapolitan gesture of brushing his chin with his fingertips, asking: ‘What is the logical form of that?’ This, according to the story, broke the hold on Wittgenstein of the Tractarian idea that a proposition must be a ‘picture’ of the reality it describes.
The importance of this anecdote is not that it explains why Wittgenstein abandoned the Picture Theory of meaning (for it does not), but that it is a good example of the way in which Sraffa could make Wittgenstein see things anew, from a fresh perpective. Wittgenstein told many of his friends that his discussions with Sraffa made him feel like a tree from which all branches had been cut. The metaphor is carefully chosen: cutting dead branches away allows new, more vigorous ones to grow (whereas Ramsey’s objections left the dead wood in place, forcing the tree to distort itself around it).
Wittgenstein once remarked to Rush Rhees that the most important thing he gained from talking to Sraffa was an ‘anthropological’ way of looking at philosophical problems. This remark goes some way to explain why Sraffa is credited as having had such an important influence. One of the most striking ways in which Wittgenstein’s later work differs from the Tractatus is in its ‘anthropological’ approach. That is, whereas the Tractatus deals with language in isolation from the circumstances in which it is used, the Investigations repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the ‘stream of life’ which gives linguistic utterances their meaning: a ‘language-game’ cannot be described without mentioning their activities and the way of life of the ‘tribe’ that plays it. If this change of perspective derives from Sraffa, then his influence on the later work is indeed of the most fundamental importance. But in this case, it must have taken a few years for that influence to bear fruit, for this ‘anthropological’ feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method does not begin to emerge until about 1932. — Ray Monk, The Duty of Genius

Compare what he says in the preface to the Tractatus:

I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.


with PI 133:

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.


His desire for complete clarity is not something Wittgenstein rejected after the Tractatus.

He continues:

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question. — Fooloso4

131. I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Where there were previously branches, now there is a human figure. My visual impression has changed, and now I recognize that it has not only shape and colour, but also a quite particular ‘organization’. —– My visual impression has changed — what was it like before; what is it like now? —– If I represent it by means of an exact copy a and isn’t that a good representation of it? — no change shows up.

132. And above all do not say “Surely, my visual impression isn’t the drawing; it is this —– which I can’t show to anyone.” Of course it is not the drawing; but neither is it something of the same category, which I carry within myself.

133. The concept of an ‘inner picture’ is misleading, since the model for this concept is the ‘outer picture’; and yet the uses of these concept-words are no more like one another than the uses of “numeral” and “number”. (Indeed, someone who was inclined to call numbers ‘ideal numerals’ could generate a similar confusion by doing so.) — Philosophical Investigations, Part II

129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. - And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. — Philosophical Investigations

Q1: If relations exist in a mind-independent world, how can the mere fact of a relation between a rock on Earth and a rock on Alpha Centauri cause changes to either ?
— RussellA

What is the relation between them?
— Luke

Exactly, what is it ? — RussellA

Q2: If relations don't cause changes in the world, then why do we think that relations exist in the world ?
— RussellA

Why must the existence of relations cause changes in the world?
— Luke

Exactly, if relations don't cause changes in the world then how do we know about them ? — RussellA

Q1: If relations exist in a mind-independent world, how can the mere fact of a relation between a rock on Earth and a rock on Alpha Centauri cause changes to either ? — RussellA

Q2: If relations don't cause changes in the world, then why do we think that relations exist in the world ? — RussellA

We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. Again we have the situation of a relation relating, which as Bradley pointed out, leads to an infinite regress — RussellA

aRb does not require a relation, it is a proposition that points to a relation between a and b. aRb is a fact that is pictured in the proposition. — Fooloso4

The apple (a) is on (R) the table (b). The relation between the apple and the table is that one is on they other. You can say it. You can show it. — Fooloso4

RussellA's picture is perhaps a form of Platonism — Banno

You're assuming that there is something called C — RussellA

Either way, C cannot ontologically exist, and if doesn't, cannot be "what relates A to B". — RussellA

In modern usage, an internal relation is not an ontological addition — RussellA

An external relation is a relation between two items that can be conceived independently of one another; an external relation is in its nature a matter of discovery or hypothesis. Thus, the idea that the relation of depicting that holds between language and the world depends upon a linguistic sign's standing in an external relation to something that can be conceived as independent of language, or to something that is not essentially linked with language, must, Wittgenstein claims, be recognized as an illusion. The relation between language and the world that it depicts is not a hypothetical relation between items that we grasp independently of one another. Rather, the relation between language and the world, between a propositional sign and the state of affairs that it represents, is essential or internal; it is a relation that is constituted by the rules of projection in virtue of which we use language - i.e. a propositional sign - to say how things are in reality. Thus, although we see the items as separate - the propositional sign, 'p', is distinct from the fact that p - we also recognize them as internally linked, insofar as we use the propositional sign, 'p', to represent the fact that p is the case. Thus, a propositional sign can be used to represent a fact, and any fact can be represented by means of a propositional sign. The relation between the propositional sign and the fact that it can be used to represent does not depend upon a correlation between two items, but upon a rule that enables us to construct one from the other. We come to see the relation between language and the world it represents more clearly, not by discovering something, but by clarifying the rules of projection in virtue of which we use propositional signs to say how things are in reality.

Thus, Wittgenstein's claim is that the relation of depicting that holds between language and the world does not depend upon a hypothetical link between linguistic signs and something outside language, which is in its nature a matter of discovery. Rather, it depends upon the existence of a rule of projection whereby we can derive one thing (a representation of a possible state of affairs) from another (a propositional sign). The internal relation of depicting which holds between language and the world, consists in the fact that to understand a proposition is to know how things stand in reality if the proposition is true. The rule of projection that constitutes the internal relation between language and the world it depicts is the rule whereby we determine, on the basis of the constituents of a propositional sign and how they are put together, the situation that it represents, that is to say, the circumstances in which the proposition it expresses is true and the circumstances in which it is false. It is in virtue of this rule of projection that a propositional sign expresses a proposition that represents a possible state of affairs; it is in virtue of this rule of projection that we can derive knowledge of what is the case from knowledge that a given proposition is true. The logical investigation of how a proposition expresses its sense is the investigation of the internal relation between a proposition and the situation that it represents, that is, of the rules of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign can be compared with reality for truth or falsity. There must, Wittgenstein believes, be no attempt to explain how language's ability to represent the world came about; the internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world is the starting point for our investigation. The aim of the investigation is to make the internal relation - i.e. the rules of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign represents a possible state of affairs - perspicuous. — Marie McGinn. Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Language and Logic

It is these external relations that Bradley argues cannot exist, as their existence would lead to an infinite regress, in that this external relation would need another relation to relate it to its relata. — RussellA

The problem being that as relation C is independent of its relata A and B, a further relation D needs to be shown relating relation C with relata A and B, leading to the conclusion that relations independent of their relata are not possible. — RussellA

I originally included these when writing my post but decided to eliminate them before posting because I wanted to stress the fact that these relations exist between things and not just the picture.

2.031 and 2.15 both refer to "determinate relations". — Fooloso4

2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way that it does, is its pictorial form. — Tractatus

2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture. — Tractatus

What exactly are relations ? Can they be individuals ? — RussellA

When he says pain in not "a Something" ,I take this to mean it is not a thing or object existing in the world that is represented in thought or propositions. — Fooloso4

PI 1 These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands ...

If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.


But the remaining kinds of words do not take care of themselves when this picture holds us captive. — Fooloso4

The purpose of the statement: "I am in pain" is not to convey the thought that I am in pain. — Fooloso4

But if no one felt pain what we might consider pain behavior would not be considered pain behavior. The experience of pain itself enters the picture. — Fooloso4

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever. — Philosophical Investigations

My guess is that you would agree with this. — Sam26

So, as we get into the different shadings of red, and make detailed comparisons with other color samples, the idea that you're seeing yellow instead of red would seem to break down at some point. We would begin to recognize in our various uses that we're not seeing the same color or colors. If, on the other hand, there is no way to tell if you're seeing yellow instead of red, then the whole point is moot. Whatever's happening in the mind would fall away as as so much chaff, but I suspect this is incorrect. — Sam26

It seems to me that if you remove what's going on in the mind, then your left with nothing. I don't think Wittgenstein goes this far, even though his beetle in the box seems to remove the thing as having any great import. — Sam26

305. “But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering,
an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we
want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does
take place here” — one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it
is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering”. —
The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting
our face against the picture of an ‘inner process’. What we deny
is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the
use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with
its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word
as it is. — Philosophical Investigations

If there is a limit, I suspect that it's not as limiting as he thinks it is. The fact that we can talk about some of these subjective experiences, as we're doing, seems to point at something problematic with Wittgenstein's limit. — Sam26

It doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning, which isn't to deny that there is some relationship between the inner and the outer public manifestation. There is a correlation or relationship between our inner experiences and how we use the words, and this, it seems to me, would be severed, or would break down publicly. The disconnect would eventually show up in our uses of the concept. — Sam26

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. — Philosophical Investigations

307. “Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you nevertheless basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” — If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. — Philosophical Investigations