Ok, but how would you recognize usefulness? What does a metaphysical theory do, such that it is useful for that thing? — Mww

As I understand metaphysics, it consists of the underlying assumptions, what Collingwood calls "absolute presuppositions," that provide the foundation for our understanding of the world, reality. As a possible example - Science, at least as it is commonly understood, operates in a material universe. One of the absolute presuppositions of science and materialism is that the world is lawful and that those laws apply everywhere and at all times. That's impossible to verify, it has no truth value, but without it, science can't work.

Another - Taoism works on the assumption that the fundamental ground of reality is unnamable - it can't be conceptualized or understood. This formless entity is known as the "Tao." Lao Tzu fully recognizes the irony of giving a name to the unnamable.This from Stephen Mitchell's translation of Verse 1 of the Tao Te Ching.

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.

The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things. — Lao Tzu - Tao Te Ching

Particular things, which Lao Tzu sometimes calls the 10,000 things, represent the objects, ideas, things, that exist in our world, including horses, wavefunctions, love, 1040 forms, Immanuel Kant, i.e. all of reality. This is from Verse 40.

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao.

All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — Lao Tzu - Tao Te Ching

Being is the world of the 10,000 things. Non-being is the Tao. I am oversimplifying. In a sense, the world we know doesn't exist until it is named. This way of seeing things was revolutionary for me. It brings together ideas that I had been thinking about for a long time. What we learn empirically, what we can know and understand, includes factors that we, human beings, provide as we name, conceptualize, things in the world. That means that materialism's objective reality is not the only way of seeing things.

These two perspectives seem to contradict each other and to a certain extent they do. But they also can work together to temper each other. Materialism is useful for methodological purposes. Taoism is useful for showing us that we need to take human understanding in to account too.

none of them should be judged absurd, merely from disregard of that relative attribute, but from each one’s internal logical consistency and each one’s non-self-contradictory construction. — Mww

I would judge them based on usefulness.

This is impossible: society is based off of social constructs, which are ideas people have had—ideas through action (at a minimum). Human beings develop their living structures on ideas, even if they are not entirely able to explicate it to people through language what those ideas are, and so the idea which is embodied in the society must come first. — Bob Ross

Again, I don't agree. We can leave it at that. I don't think we'll get any further here. Maybe in a separate thread sometime.

According to your logic, rights came before the idea of rights; which makes no sense. — Bob Ross

Sure it does.
Feudal lords - "Hey, king!! Stop overtaxing us and throwing us in jail!!
Fighting takes place.
King - "Oh... ok then. We'll lay off on the tariffs and dungeons. We'll write that down if you insist."
Feudal lord #1 (whispering to the other lords) - "Hey, this is great. The king has promised us... what has he promised us? What do we call them?"
Feudal lord #2 - "We can call them "rights." All in favor..."
Feudal lords - "Aye"

Hmm. I wonder why you think this. I can state definitively that all positive metaphysical theories are logically indefensible,and can be reduced to absurdity. This is what Bradley means by saying metaphysics does not endorse a positive result. I can also state that a neutral theory, which is the only alternative, cannot be reduced to absurdity. I'm not sure why,. as a fan of Lao Tzu, you would think this doesn't work. After all, there's got to be one theory that works. — PeterJones

I don't say metaphysical positions are true or false, but they are unavoidable and can be useful at particular times in particular situations. I see them as tools in the philosopher's tool box. You need the right tool for the right job.

I neglected to respond to part of your post.

It is Kant, B422, and concerns expositions surrounding the self as a closed, private, all-encompassing concept represented by “I think”, what Kant calls the “unity of consciousness”, and how that concept is misused by treating it as an object, which is what I meant by reification of pure conceptions...

...Kant, Bxxxi, (translator-specific). Yeah, true, huh. Guy’s every-damn-where. Think of something having to do with theoretical human cognition, pre-quantum physics, morality/religion….plate techtonics, tidal friction, rotational inclination, relativity of space and time (sigh)……there’s a Kant quote relatable to it. — Mww

As I've said elsewhere, I need to reread the Critique.

I treat the concept of “mind” as something everybody knows what is meant by it even if there really isn’t any such thing, and from that, I prefer to say pure reason is a purely logical system, but the subject at the time this came up was mind, and the nonsense of getting beyond it, so…… — Mww

Maybe we can talk about this some other time.

Oh absolutely. I treat noumena as the proverbial red-headed stepchild….he’s here, by accident, can’t pretend he isn’t so obligated to set a place at the table for him, but no freakin’ way he’s gonna be included in a will. Noumena in the Kantian sense are born from the faculty of understanding over-extending itself into the forging of general conceptions for which neither the remaining components of this particular type of cognitive system, nor Nature Herself as comprehended by that same system, can obtain an object. — Mww

Well, I disagree with this - strongly. Kant's discussion of noumena is, for me, the most interesting part of "A Critique of Pure Reason." It parallels the thought of Lao Tzu, whom I think highly of.

All is well if one avoids extreme positions. Non-dualism is not directly opposed to theism or atheism. They are two extreme ideas that oppose each other. Thus folks on both sides of the God debate reject mysticism. — PeterJones

I wasn't thinking of any particular metaphysical position when I wrote that, I was thinking that believing any metaphysical position is truth apt, as they say, is dualistic. That was just off the top of my head.

Lao Tzu's remark 'True words seem paradoxical' is better translated (and sometime is) as 'Rigorous words seem paradoxical' - to avoid the idea that they are true as opposed to false in a dialectical sense. If they were true or false in the usual dialectical sense then hey wouldn't seem paradoxical. . . . — PeterJones

I'm a fan of R.G. Collingwood's "An Essay on Metaphysics," which gave me words to support my intuitions about metaphysics. Collingwood wrote that metaphysics is the study of absolute presuppositions. Absolute presuppositions are the unspoken, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that underpin how we understand reality. Collingwood thought that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false, they have no truth value.

So, we agree that metaphysical positions are neither true nor false, but I'm not sure I understand the logic behind your reasons. I think you and I may be kindred spirits when it comes to metaphysics.

The problem with pragmatism is that it does matter what you pick - awful things 'work'. At an extreme end, murdering people to get to the top can work. Abortion works as birth control. And what do we mean by work? A lot of people say things ‘work’ but on close examination you can see that they don't. — Tom Storm

You have chosen an uncharitable interpretation of what I wrote.

I haven't said anything is is - gods, idealism. Just that they haven't been adequately demonstrated. — Tom Storm

I guess skepticism says "I don't have enough information to know." Pragmatism says "It doesn't matter, just pick one that works.

this starts with an idea. — Bob Ross

Again, I think the idea comes second, after the fact.

Moral realism is usually a three-pronged thesis (at a minimum):

1. Moral judgments are truth-apt.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.

Prong 2 is the most important one: moral objectivism. I can’t tell if you hold there are moral facts or not. — Bob Ross

I vote no on all three. So, for me there are no moral facts.

Engaging in fun is arguably an essential aspect of becoming happy, but it is not an element of being virtuous. I am not acting, in any meaningful sense, virtuous by intending to merely do something I enjoy doing. — Bob Ross

Fun and play are not exactly the same thing, although play is often fun. Play is inseparably tied up with creativity and creativity is, if not inseparable from, at least strongly connected to doing good work. Here's the last stanza of Robert Frost's "Two Tramps in Mud Time" that says it just right:

But yield who will to their separation,
My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight.
Only where love and need are one,
And the work is play for mortal stakes,
Is the deed ever really done
For Heaven and the future's sakes. — Robert Frost - Two Tramps in Mud Time

which is the way human thinking involves splitting. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I think human thinking is naturally drawn to dichotomies.

Science and philosophy can become split, with so much validity being placed on the 'truth' of science when the abstraction of creating scientific theories and models involves the metaphysical and metaphorical imagination. — Jack Cummins

I agree with this.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system — Mww

Do you believe this is true?

So it would seem, despite what meditators and contemplatives would have it, the origin of non-dualism must be beyond the mind, or beyond the mind as scholars and regular joes understand it, for no other reason than that form of mind used by other than meditators cannot justify the conception beyond the principle by which it is a valid thought. — Mww

I think this is right, although I think it's more than just "meditators and contemplatives" who see it that way. I am neither, and I do. I also consider myself a regular Joe. As I see it, Kant's noumena and Lao Tzu's Tao are "beyond the mind."

noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible — Mww

Does this mean you reject noumena as a useful metaphysical concept?

an intrinsically dualistic mind, such as a human mind — Mww

An interesting idea. I don't think it's accurate. Wait... maybe I do. I'll think about it more.

"…. From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance—which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness—the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe….” — Mww

Where is this quote from? I think it's wrong, or at least misleading.

…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error…. — PeterJones

Is this from Bradley? Do you have a reference?

Thus it is easy, with a few tweaks, to reconcile Kant's analysis in the Critique with the Middle Way doctrine. — PeterJones

I have a strong interest in Taoism and I was surprised, when I finally got around to reading the "Critique of Pure Reason," how much common ground there was.

Well, once we have calculated that only one world-theory works and identified it then all we need do is study it. We then have a sound understanding of metaphysics and only need develop it. — PeterJones

There is not only one world-theory that works he said definitively. They all work, more or less, for better or worse, sometimes, in certain situations.

Kant makes the situation clear in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he concludes that all selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. Here a 'selective conclusion' is an extreme position, and 'undecidable' means not what it means in mathematics, but that positive (yes/no) both answers are absurd, rendering all metaphysical questions undecidable. As F.H. Bradley puts it, 'Metaphysics does not endorse a positive result'. . — PeterJones

I agree with this. I'll have to go back to the "Critique of Pure Reason." I'll also take a look at Bradley.

We are all one and everything is oneness has been a New Age monistic mantra - coming out of the theosophy movement and 1970's counterculture. — Tom Storm

I forgot to respond to this in my last post. As you know, non-dualism goes back much further than the New Age movement. The Vedanta, Buddhism, and Taoism go back as far or further than the earliest Greek philosophers.

The problem with this idea is that there is no demonstration that idealism is true. — Tom Storm

Do you believe that one metaphysical position is true and all the others - materialism, realism, anti-realism, idealism, physicalism, existentialism, and so on and so on - are false? You have always struck me as a pragmatist and that idea, to me, is very unpragmatic.

An interesting OP and some interesting responses. I have been meaning to get involved in this discussion since it started, but it kept slipping my mind. I have gone through all the other responses - reading some, scanning others - so I don't think I am duplicating anything or asking questions that have been answered.

Those who have paid any attention to my posting history should know that I have found a philosophical home in Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching" and R.W. Collingwood's "An Essay on Metaphysics." My responses here will reflect that.

One way of seeing beyond theism and atheism is in Buddhism, which focuses on consciousness. — Jack Cummins

This is also true of Taoism as described by Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, and others.

However, there is the underlying idea of non-duality, which may be a perennial one within many traditions. I have had some difficulty thinking about the idea but have been reading recently which I am finding useful in making sense of the idea. — Jack Cummins

Lao Tzu and I see this as an issue that goes beyond spiritual issues of immanence and transcendence to more mundane issues. This from Stephen Mitchell's version of Verse 2 of the "Tao Te Ching."

When people see some things as beautiful,
other things become ugly.
When people see some things as good,
other things become bad.

Being and non-being create each other.
Difficult and easy support each other.
Long and short define each other.
High and low depend on each other.
Before and after follow each other. — Lao Tzu - Tao Te Ching

'Such a dualistic view of reality is a failure of vision and results in a narrow and self-alienating view of life. And yet it is this version of the nature of reality, that has influenced the culture of Western civilisation greatly for the last 2000 years...' — Jack Cummins

I'm more or less in agreement although Taoism takes a kinder, gentler, i.e. less judgmental view.

I wonder to what extent such a non-dualistic viewpoint offers a solution to the split between materialism and idealism, as well as between atheism and theism. — Jack Cummins

Here's where I roll out the metaphysics, which everything discussed in your OP is. As Collingwood and I know, we don't have to choose non-dualism, materialism, idealism, atheism, theism, or any other ism. None of them are true or false, right or wrong. They are intellectual tools we use for particular purposes in particular situations. Believing that some metaphysical positions are true and some are false strikes me as dualistic. Hmm...do I really believe that? I'll have to think more. I'm an engineer with a strong interest in science. When I do scientific stuff, I'm mostly a materialist, a realist, a dualist I guess. When I do philosophy, I'm always a pragmatist and mostly... what? I guess an idealist, anti-realist, or non-dualist.

I have begun to think that the division between theism and atheism is anything but a black or white issue, and this is not down to agnosticism or of proof of the existence of God. — Jack Cummins

Theism is a difficult issue for us metaphysicians. It's kind of a hybrid - half a matter of fact - God either exists or it doesn't - and half metaphysical. I can make what I think is a legitimate metaphysical argument for God. This is not the place to do that. Maybe I'll start a new thread.

Grumpy old men fight on both sides of that battle. — Paine

As a grumpy old man wise elder I agree.

Philosophical idealogies are the guiding forces behind societial norms — Bob Ross

I don't think this is true, but I don't think I have the ammunition to shoot it down.

This thread was not meant to provide an argument for why Aristotelian ethics is a form of moral realism: that’s common knowledge. — Bob Ross

If by common knowledge you mean something known by most people, I disagree. I think if you started a thread to discuss the meaning of any of these three terms you would get quite a few differing opinions, and that's just among us amateur philosophers. The answers would be even more diverse in the general public.

If, on the other hand, you mean it is common knowledge among those familiar with Aristotle's works, I don't have a response, since I don't know enough to have a meaningful opinion.

Ah, so you are a moral anti-realist? — Bob Ross

I think that human values are a reflection of human nature, whatever that means. I would have thought that means the answer to your question is "yes," but now I'm not so sure.

Aristotle is noting that the happy life consists in hard work, in being virtuous, and not chasing desires or passions; he is clarifying for those who conflate happiness in the richest sense with the superficial kind that kids have. — Bob Ross

I'm have never been an especially happy person, by whatever definition you use. That being said, I have never been happier than since my retirement. Now I have the freedom to follow where my intrinsic virtuosities lead me, although that's something easier said than done. I find many of the things I do are playful, participating in the forum is one of those.

Aristotle kind of does—it depends. What words do you need me to define for you? — Bob Ross

Happiness, virtue, and good as objective standards without making a circular argument by using each word to define the others. Actually, I think that will take us down a long and winding path, so we can leave it for now.

Following one’s moral intuitions is not necessarily incompatible with moral realism, and, as a virtue ethicist, Aristotle is going to agree that a moral compass is more important than moral principles; but he will warn against blindly following one’s heart: one has to cultivate a virtueous character or otherwise they have no reason to believe they are morally sensitive and wise enough to intuit properly in nuanced situations. A psychopathic narcissist probably isn’t going make the right decision following their heart, without first reshaping it. — Bob Ross

This feels like an escape clause. Yes, follow your heart, but let me decide if your heart is up to the task.

This is an interesting discussion. Thanks for that.

Good post.

That set the agenda for this thread, which at times has seemed less like a philosophy debate and more like old farts in a pub whinging about the state of the world. — Herg

Ha!! I like that. On the other hand, much of philosophy is exactly that.

Some thoughts.

An overall comment - a really thoughtful and well-written post.

Another overall comment - you make a lot of definitive statements about things that are matters of opinion. For instance...

Modern society is decaying; and this decay is a direct result of moral anti-realism. It is hard to say why moral anti-realism has caught wind like wild fire, but I would hypothesize it is substantially influenced by Nietzschien thought.

With this moral anti-realism, society slowly loses it’s ability to function rationally (since it has cut out The Good from its inquiry) and begins to cause people to damage themselves in the name of “you-do-you!”. — Bob Ross

To start, saying that whatever decay there is in our society is the result of moral anti-realism is unsupported, and I think, wrong. Philosophy follows society, not the other way around. Also - no society has ever functioned rationally and none ever will.

Here is a definition of moral realism from Wikipedia.

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion) — Wikipedia - Moral Realism

Let me know if that matches your understanding. Also, I assume that moral anti-realism is the position that moral statements have no objective reality. As for that, I don't see that you've provided any evidence or argument that Aristotle's moral formulations are in any way objective.

I suggest society by-at-large goes back to Aristotle’s ideas (for the most part) to live a better life. — Bob Ross

As I see it, impossible to implement, unlikely to solve the problem you've identified, unnecessary, and damaging to societies and individuals.

The chief good for a human being is to be a eudaimon (viz., to embody the chief good [for human beings] of eudamonia [i.e., of a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being]); and this is the most persistently satisfying and deeply rewarding pursuit a person can endeavor on. Everything else is, if it does not relate somehow thereto, a mere distraction...

...the virtue of a human being too would be that characteristic as a result of which a human being becomes good and as a result of which he causes his own work to be done well. — Bob Ross

Maybe this is the my biggest disagreement with you and Aristotle in this regard. The meanings of "good," "virtue" and "happiness" are in no way objective facts.

“The happy [eudemian] life also seems to be accord with virtue, and this is the life that seems to be accompanied by seriousness but not to consist in play...If happiness [eudaimonia] is an activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable that it would accord with the most excellent virtue, and this would be the virtue belonging to what is best” — Bob Ross

Happiness without play? That is not my experience or, I think, that of most people.

A key aspect of living well for a human being (and, arguably, any member of a rational kind) is living a (morally and intellectually) virtuous life; but it is important to note that, for Aristotle, “virtue” is not a morally-loaded term. For Aristotle, “virtue” is a sort of excellence which is relative to the subject, craft, etc. in question; whereas “moral virtue” is the subtype of virtue which is about moral excellence—i.e., doing well at being moral. It can be seen more clearly now that a person who wants to fulfill their nature must excel in every regard to that nature (i.e., must be virtuous); and a part of this is being moral, as morality pertains fundamentally to how to act best in accordance with what is good. — Bob Ross

Again, you haven't really defined the key words in this statement. Does Aristotle?

A broader statement - I recently started a thread - "My understanding of morals." In it I described a set of beliefs about behavior quoting Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu, the founders of Taoism, and Emerson. This is from Chapter 8 of Ziporyn's translation of the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi).

What I call good is not humankindness and responsible conduct, but just being good at what is done by your own intrinsic virtuosities. Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more. — Chuang Tzu

By "intrinsic virtuosity" Chuang Tzu means our true nature, to oversimplify - our hearts, conscience. My first take is that this is exactly what you meant when you said "moral anti-realism," but as I thought about it, it struck me that's not true at all. They really are very similar, at least as you've described Aristotle's ideas.

It's a long thread. Read back and you'll find hundreds of recommendations. More come just about every day.

Welcome to the forum.

I've said this in other threads.. I don't think personal ethics translates to political actions. I think there is such things as ethics in politics, but that is not political actions per se, but personal matters in how one acts in political situations. This goes down to meta-ethics. I think ethics is at the individual level, and "society" itself is not a target for ethics proper, but political actions. — schopenhauer1

This is an interesting way of putting it. I'll have to think about it.

What part of the golden rule is dissatisfying, do you think? — Moliere

Actually, I like it a lot. It seems perfect. Problem is, it doesn't really fit into what I have been describing. I said this to @Frank in an earlier post:

I'd like to think that behaving in accordance with the golden rule will arise automatically when we all live in accordance with our inner natures. I'm not sure that's true. I'm not even sure that behaving in accordance with the golden rule will arise automatically when I live in accordance with my inner nature. — T Clark

When is everything working correctly? — Moliere

What I describe is not easy for me. It takes self-awareness, which I'm pretty good at, but it also takes fortitude, which I often lack.

I'm not opposed, it's just sometimes these states seem a little mythical to myself: they're idealizations which sound pleasant, but I can say I like the articulations and deliberations because I'm not always acting without acting -- sometimes I'm wondering "Hrm, so what now?" — Moliere

I can't say I never ask "So what now," but often I don't need to. That's what I mean by "everything working correctly."

I suppose that, in the end, I'd still allow more principles than you do, though I think principles are the sorts of things one commits themselves to. I value moral autonomy. — Moliere

As I've tried to make clear, when I talk about "personal morality" I'm talking about how I, myself, come to what might be called "moral" decisions. I wasn't saying I expected, or even wanted, others to do the same. That being said, I've never come across a moral principle I found convincing or satisfying except, perhaps, the golden rule.

But I am very interested in the role of emotions in ethical thinking, and also clarifying differences between different ways of thinking ethically (or even further specifying when it is we are thinking ethically) — Moliere

When everything is working correctly, so-called "moral" decisions present themselves to me as emotions, intuitions, understandings, insights, or intentions, not usually as rational arguments. Sometimes they skip those steps completely and go directly to actions. As I mentioned, that's what Taoists call "wu wei," acting without acting. Perhaps that's a bit misleading. In the world Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu came from, that's where all action, whether or not we call it moral, arises.

Morality happens when two sentient creatures of roughly equal power encounter each other, and they have to come to terms. Morality is the terms that they come to, perhaps. It's is about controlling the behaviour of the other, so they are less of a threat, or so they work for you. Morality is always about others, what you want them to do and what they want you to do. — bert1

This is a bit more cynical than the way I see it. As I say over and over, humans are social animals. We like each other, want to be around each other, want to take care of those we are close to.

That's pretty much as I would have it as well. How people in general should behave is reducible to mere administrative codes of conduct, and THAT is reducible to a member-specific personal moral disposition.

The consequences related to codes of right action, is very different than the consequences related to one’s own code of proper action. — Mww

I agree with this. I've been surprised at how many respondents have been sympathetic to this way of seeing things, although many others have been strongly in disagreement.

No, I wasn't saying that, though your statement seems fair, I just meant that "morality" has contradictory characteristics due to the differing meanings of the word in various contexts. Though they aren't real contradictions, only appearing due to ambiguity as to which "morality" is being referred to. — Judaka

I agree with that too.

I'm not sure what you mean by "nothing more than social control". It reads as being very cynical, though you acknowledge the necessity for it, do you deny its potential beauty and desirability? I think those feelings you refer to as your "personal morality" are often parents to this morality as social control. To me, it's inevitable that this will happen, because of the inevitability of politics. For example, if one loves animals, how can they not act in their defence when others try to harm them? Only a specific set of morals can flourish without turning to social control, entirely inward-facing ones. Is there any separation between thoughts & feelings that guide our own behaviour and those that motivate us to influence others? — Judaka

I'm not a cynical person, although I am annoyed by philosophical muddy-headedness. I've tried to make it clear that I recognize the necessity for social controls in general and many specifically, including your example of protection of animals. I also recognize that different types of social control are less coercive and more benign than others. On the other hand, I think formal systems of moral philosophy generally give special status to social rules that don't deserve it. "Don't do that because it's wrong" generally just means "Don't do that."

Though I've yet to hear a description of "personal morality" that would allow me to identify it by myself, one possible "personal morality" is our biological morality. A psychologically in-built morality, made up of our able to perceive fairness, experience empathy and possessing aversions to incest etc. Different forms of this are observable in other pack mammals such as dogs and lions. — Judaka

What Chuang Tzu calls "intrinsic morality" has a lot in common with what you call "a psychologically in-built morality," i.e. conscience, although there's more to it than that. And I think that's the problem with what he, Emerson, and I have written. Most people don't recognize, as you note can't identify, this seemingly amorphous agent.

Though that doesn't mean they'll be persuasive. — Judaka

Clearly, from the responses in this thread, that's true.

Though coercive morality would surely exist without personal morality, it's inconceivable to me that personal morality could avoid resulting in the coercive kind. — Judaka

This I don't agree with, although I think it's just a difference of language.

Sorry. I missed your comment the first time around.

While I agree one ought to follow his own conscience, his conscience needs to be developed, and studying moral philosophy is helpful in that regard. Emerson, for instance, was once a preacher, and it is doubtful he would have come to his later conclusions had he not put in the study of those doctrines. One needs to know a doctrine before he can become unsatisfied by it. — NOS4A2

I'm not sure about this. Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu specifically identify the behavior of young babies as good examples of action in accordance with inborn nature.

In Emerson’s example we discover that no one can be controlled by a normative claim, moral, ethical, or otherwise. The only coercive rules are the legal ones, enforced as they are by the threat of force, violence, and kidnapping. — NOS4A2

I think you're right about what Emerson proposes, but I'm sure he recognized that human behavior can be controlled by "normative claims," e.g. guilt, shame, community disapproval.

I think you'd probably agree with TClark if you understood what he's saying. — frank

I think both Banno and I smirked in exactly the same way when we read this.

An interesting discussion. Although there is a lot of overlap and similarity, Buddhism and Taoism take different approaches to many issues, including this one. One of the things I like about the writing of Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu is the easygoing, down-home understanding of the world and people. This is me speaking as someone who has a very limited experience with Buddhism.

Right. That's what I said. — frank

Yes. I didn't read carefully enough.

Morality is a dysfunctional word with too many very similar, overlapping but separate meanings. — Judaka

I agree. That's one of the reasons I started this discussion.

I think it's truth that morality is both natural and artificial/manmade, however, I think the "morality" that is natural and the "morality" that is manmade are distinct and different things. One referring to our biology and one roughly referring to our culture. It's very difficult to delineate the "natural" from the "artificial", and I wouldn't even be willing to try. "Personal morality" and this coerce/social morality we've described could be distinct from each other, but overlap greatly and I've no way to unravel that mess. — Judaka

If you are saying that what I call personal morality vs social control and what you call natural vs. artificial morality are similar concepts, then I agree.

"Moral" sounds prescriptive or evaluative, I'd say this "social control" is part of morality, and that morality & social control are not mutually exclusive. Their mutual exclusivity seems to be the core of your argument, but what's the argument for it? — Judaka

No, I don't think they're mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I am saying I think what people call "morality" is nothing more than social control.

You can forfeit your position as a participant, but the rules of the democracy are enforced by law and coercive factors will bend you or break you until you comply. By refusing to participate you sacrifice the power to influence outcomes while still experiencing the full weight of said outcomes. — Judaka

If I didn't think democratic government is legitimate that doesn't mean I wouldn't still recognize I am subject to the consequences of not following the rules and I would behave based on that understanding.

it has been found lacking in the larger claim of morality. — Philosophim

Found lacking by you and some others. Some other others have been more sympathetic. Also, as I wrote in the OP:

As far as I can see, all formal moral philosophies, and certainly any philosophy that specifies how other people should behave, is not moral at all, or even really a philosophy. It’s a program of social control - coercive rules a society establishes to manage disruptive or inconvenient behavior — T Clark

You are unconcerned with contradictions when other people are involved, — Philosophim

By contradictions I assume you mean conflict or potential conflict. There is nothing in my description of my personal morality, so-called, that prevents me from taking the needs and interests of other people into account.

When you introduce your ideas on these boards, it is not a place to assert and not address the details of your argument. That's just proselytizing. I feel you can be better than that, and maybe you're unaware of what you're doing, so I'm bringing it to your attention. — Philosophim

Thank you for your smug condescension.

As for the direct question of, "Are our values based on rational considerations?" this is hardly a debate. — Philosophim

Based on the contents of this thread, it seems you are wrong.

You've started to be insulting. Perhaps we should end it here.

Personally, I'm especially interested in the concept of causality qua instrumentality, and the instantiation of knowledge in the physical form of tools. — Pantagruel

My interest is primarily ontological, i.e. by what metaphysical mechanisms does the world operate.

I'll get back to you when I've read more of both books.

This is my theory: considerations of good and evil are mostly post hoc assessments of spontaneous action. In other words, everybody is like you. We all just act without a huge amount of thought and then guilt invades later when we realize that we didn't channel our angst in the best way, or maybe things went awesomely and we take credit for an outcome that was 99% accidental. Through experiences like that, action remains mostly spontaneous, but that lingering guilt or pride makes us pause and assess the options. — frank

This makes sense to me, with this addition - considerations of good and evil may be post hoc, but they are likely to effect my judgment when another situation comes up in the future.