That is different from saying that 'metaphysical positions have no truth value'. That is very much the line of the 'vienna circle positivists' for whom metaphysics are nonsense. Collingwood's concern is more with interpretation: how are we to interpret metaphysical statements, so as to better understand those who made them? It's not dismissive of metaphysics in the way the positivists were. — Wayfarer

You're right. Collingwood was not dismissive of metaphysics and neither am I. Recognition that metaphysical statements, i.e. absolute presuppositions, are not true or false is fundamental to an understanding of how reality and our knowledge about it work.

I don't think Collingwood's concern was with interpretation, I think it was with identification and recognition. Absolute presuppositions are often, usually, unacknowledged, unrecognized by those who make them. The purpose of metaphysics is to bring those unacknowledged, unrecognized assumptions out in the open.

As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value.
— Clarky
:up: — 180 Proof

A bit simplistic. That belongs more to Carnap than Collingwood, of whom SEP says: — Wayfarer

Seems you are commenting on my comment about Collingwood. This is from "An Essay on Metaphysics."

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Prop. 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

This is because they are never answers to questions; whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions...

...Hence any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the questions ‘Is it true?’ ‘What evidence is there for it?’ ‘How can it be demonstrated?’ ‘What right have we to presuppose it if it can’t?’, is a nonsense question.

I don't think we are in a survival prison. There is more to life than eating and shitting. — Jackson

I'll say it again - I'm not saying that our concept of reality shouldn't include an understanding of quantum mechanics and other phenomena that can't be seen directly. I am saying that it should also include our everyday understanding of reality as more than an afterthought.

I think I largely agree with you but I suspect this is because I am not a philosopher or an academic. — Tom Storm

You are as much a philosopher as 95% of us here. You certainly are more well-read than I am, in spite of your aw shucks, I'm just a jumbuck playing my didgeridoo next to the billabong in the outback way of talking about yourself.

So, in the end who (except the hobbyist and academic) really gives a rat's arse about 'noumena' or 'being' or the 'really real'? — Tom Storm

There are aspects of philosophy that impact very strongly on my life. Most centrally - epistemology. I've spent most of my working life caring about what I know and how I know it in a very pragmatic sense. That initial interest attracted me to Taoism, which in turn gave me a strong interest in metaphysics in general.

As I've said before, for me, philosophy is about self-awareness and self-awareness is my purpose in life.

I think that the primitive hunter who masters the art of hurling a stone over a long distance "understands" gravity extremely well. — Pantagruel

Agreed.

but we aren't on the same page either.... — Pantagruel

Do you mean we're not on the same page because you and I understand that Newton and Einstein have changed the way we think about gravity? If so, I'll say ok, but... But the great majority of the time when we have to deal with gravity, we deal with it more like how the hunter did than how a physicist at work would. Even the physicist would deal with it more like the hunter most of the time.

I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. Quantum phenomena are utilized for a variety of technical purposes. — Pantagruel

I don't want to overstate my case. I think what we call reality should incorporate the things we learn from science about the world we can't directly experience, but not to the exclusion of aspects of the world that we do experience. For hundreds of thousands of years, people have lived more or less full lives without ever knowing about quantum mechanics. Even today most people don't know much about it. I don't need to know about QM even as I use technologies that depend on quantum behavior to work.

We note only that the concept of normal perceptions have no bearing on reality. — Hanover

Sez you.

My comment about you referenced how I suspected you had a notion of normal, which was in reference to your internal standard. — Hanover

I am a reasonably normal person and I think my understanding of reality is consistent with how most people in my culture see it.

What is the the normal response to hot peppers? Are they really hot or mild? — Hanover

What I like and what I see as real are not the same thing.

It seems to me that phenomenological and postmodern approaches recognize the metaphysical and the real, the formal and the empirical, the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real , the valuative and the factual as two inseparable poles of each moment of experiencing. — Joshs

It's not clear to me what "two inseparable poles" means in this context. Metaphysics is the context of seeing, knowing, experiencing; not what is seen, known, or experienced.

He talks about presuppositions in terms of the space of reasons, and makes use of Sellars’ distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image. — Joshs

I looked up Sellars in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The discussion of manifest vs. scientific images looks interesting. I'll read it. Maybe then I'll have more to say in response.

If you define reality as how you see it (and I mean you as in Clarky in particular), then that's that. — Hanover

That isn't what I wrote.

I'm not even sure that is philosophy at all. — Hanover

Even your caricature of my philosophy is still philosophy, whether or not you consider it useful.

Everything you say is true, but that doesn't change the fact that if we exclude how normal people see and understand the normal world on a normal day from what we call "reality," it's goofy. It's philosophy at it's most useless.

But in what way can we disentangle the metaphysical from the factual? — Joshs

I don't think it's always easy. Let's take a look:

[1] Observation of the behavior of particles at CERN - science
[2] Interpretation of observation in terms of current theory - science
[3] Standard Model of particle physics - science
[4] Quantum mechanics - science
[5] Scientific method - metaphysics
[6] Physicalism or materialism - metaphysics

Which of these are facts? Item one certainly. What about Items 2, 3, and 4? I'm not sure. Items 5 and 6 are definitely not factual.

A fact is what it is by virtue of its role within a value system. But the fact doesnt just reside within this system, it also alters this system. There is a reciprocal dependence between the metaphysical and the factual which allows each to change the other. — Joshs

You say "value system," I say "metaphysical system." Facts don't necessarily change metaphysics, but metaphysics may have to change in order for us to see reality in new ways. I'm not sure how that works. It's at the top of my list of things to figure out.

I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. — Pantagruel

It's not clear to me whether or not you and I are disagreeing with each other.

So would you extend this observation to the ‘facts’ of an empirical science as well? That is, is it a problem that people believe factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality? — Joshs

The claim that "factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality," is not a scientific fact, it is a metaphysical assertion.

10 Examples of Quantum Physics in Everyday Life — Pantagruel

Speaking scientifically, everything in the universe is a result of quantum behavior, but we experience reality as classical. To say that reality as people experience it is not really reality is goofy.

Welcome to the phenomenological school of thought! — Tobias

Much of what I think and believe is based on introspection, i.e. observation of my personal experience. Since phenomenology is "...the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness," it would seem to be right up my alley. But intentionality, aboutness, embodiment, what-is-it-like, qualia; is completely different than the language I use when I talk about my own or other people's experience gained through introspection or empathy.

We do not interact with the ground structure of reality of a day to day basis. — Tobias

I'm trying to decide whether or not I agree with this.

At least even us do not consider being, nothngness, essences and properties as our daily fare. — Tobias

As I said before, for me, reality is puppies and chocolate chip cookies, not essences and properties. That isn't to say I don't believe what physicists say about what happens at subatomic scale, just that it isn't sensible to think that's all there is to reality.

I tend to look at this sort of questions historically and I think we are in an epoch in which our metaphysics is indeed changing. — Tobias

I think you're right. I've done some thinking, and I need to do more, about what those changes are and should be.

I am an anti-metaphysical metaphysician though. Ultimately all such truth claims are speculative and the only thing we can do is trace the historical, social and political processes of their emergence. — Tobias

I'm with Collingwood - metaphysics has no and makes no truth claims.

We deduce from seeing a baseball that it is comprised by particles. We do not see the particles. — Jackson

I agree.

The term purports to do exactly what you intuit, postulate that what occurs on a different scale than that of humans, is what is actual. — Tobias

This is what I find troublesome. To me, reality can only sensibly be what normal humans interact with on a day to day basis. What a few scientists and philosophers know or believe doesn't change the essence of reality. It would be absurd to say that reality is somehow inaccessible to most people.

That is exactly my critique, the mistakes the metaphorical for the real and jump from the level of presuppositions to the ontological nature of reality. We are not in disagreement. — Tobias

I think maybe we do disagree. For me, the ontological nature of reality is a presupposition.

We see baseballs, not physical particles. The difference is important. — Jackson

I don't think I understand.

I see your point. But I think we act on our metaphysics not because we take it to be true, but because it is all we have. — Jackson

Agreed.

Maybe not. But we don't see the objects of science no matter what the model is. We see things, not physical particles. — Jackson

On the other hand, we see baseballs and ham sandwiches. They behave consistent with classical mechanics. I think it's fair to say, at least metaphorically, they represent reality as we define it on a day to day basis.

Perhaps. But I think all people have a metaphysic whether they articulate to themselves or not. — Jackson

Perhaps. But I think all people have a metaphysic whether they articulate to themselves or not. — Jackson

Agreed, but the question at hand is whether or not most people think "...there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities." In my experience, most people think their metaphysic is factually correct, if they think about it at all.

I am not sure to what extent people think there is one way of seeing reality. — Jack Cummins

I base my opinion, at least partly, on what I see here on the forum. There are a lot of big arguments about which ontological way of seeing things is correct - realism, materialism, idealism, pragmatism.... As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value.

We do not see the entanglement of existence. It is a judgment about what the real looks like; a conceptualization about the whole of existence is metaphysical. Those concepts might be derived from empirical sciences, but if employed to describe what 'existence' itself is, they are put to metaphysical use. — Tobias

That's fine, as long as we recognize that use of "entanglement" in any context beyond quantum mechanics is metaphorical and not literal. Quantum mechanics does not manifest at human-scale.

Good to know, thank you. — Jackson

:up:

I see it as valid. — Jackson

You’re wrong.

For physicists, the most important lesson is that their deeply held commonsense intuitions about how the world works are wrong. — Quantum Computation and Quantum Information - Nielsen and Chuang

Then again, physicists and the rest of us can count on both realism and locality in the world where we live our lives. I'm not saying the results of quantum mechanics aren't important, but they are scale-dependent. Here at human scale, we can live our lives as we always have.

But there comes a time, always, when these Gods fall like meteors from the sky, to crash in a crater of mundanity. These Gods are human, all too human, utterly fallible, utterly nondivine. The child's worldview crashes into tatters, because it was merely the child's delusion, the tapestry becomes stretched and torn until it must crumble into dust. — hypericin

I think it's just the opposite. A childhood with good parents - not exceptional, just good enough - teaches children that the world is understandable and that they belong here. It gets built into them and provides the foundation for their lives. Of course, all sorts of things can go wrong - bad parents, parents death, war. That foundation can be damaged or may never form. I don't think my children ever thought my wife and I were like gods. They did think we could protect them, were interested in them, and cared for them. Turns out my family was lucky - we could, we were, and we did.

God and Gods fill such a vast, and largely unexamined, need, that they will never go away. Their services will always be required, by some. — hypericin

This seems like an attempt to undermine belief in God by explaining it away as a psychological foible. I don't see that as a valid argument.

Thanks again. I downloaded the paper, although it may be a bit over my head.

Indeed. And ironically (or not) even those committed to perspectivism and the notion of there being no correct viewpoint - no totalizing metanarrative - seem to elevate this evaluative framework as somehow true, in itself a kind of totalizing metanarrative. — Tom Storm

As I've said eleventy-seven times here on the forum, the best, most useful, way of seeing things is different depending on the situation. And that is absolutely true.

It is however, fiendishly hard to pin-point what it actually is, outside of saying that it's about the nature of the world. — Manuel

I don't think it's hard to pin-point, it's just hard for people to agree on.

I am actually wondering if we are not seeing a new metaphysical turn. One indeed based around 'Quantum entanglement'. — Tobias

Entanglement itself is a physical, not a metaphysical, phenomenon. Metaphysics is how we look at things, not what we see. I have thought about what changes in metaphysics are required in order to deal with quantum mechanical phenomena. I don't know the answer.

Those who see metaphysics as being nonsensical may just be making metaphysical assumptions invisible. — Jack Cummins

Yes. I think this is correct.

If anything, the idea that metaphysics can be eliminated may be a form of concrete thinking, as if there is one way of seeing reality rather than the plurality of possibilities. — Jack Cummins

I think most people think there is only one correct way of seeing reality. It certainly seems that way here on the forum.

Epistemology deals with general rules, structures and categories of meaning. — Joshs

Epistemology is about knowledge, not meaning. Are you saying they're the same thing? I don't understand how that's true.

You don’t ‘ get rid of’ or ‘get away from’ such concepts, you deconstruct them by showi f how the general always manifests itself as a unique and particular contextual sense. — Joshs

Here's the definition of "deconstruction" I got from the web:

A philosophical movement and theory of literary criticism that questions traditional assumptions about certainty, identity, and truth; asserts that words can only refer to other words; and attempts to demonstrate how statements about any text subvert their own meanings.

Discussing traditional assumptions about certainty, identity, and truth is metaphysics. If you dump the old assumptions and come up with new ones, you haven't gotten rid of metaphysics. I'm a fan of R.G. Collingwood. In "An Essay on Metaphysics" he writes that our assumptions, what he calls "absolute presuppositions," are the essence of, the subject of, metaphysics.

It certainly can’t be done if you hold onto concepts like epistemology and reason as the ground of philosophy. It is precisely such traditional notion a that have been put into question by contemporary philosophers. — Joshs

Tell me how to get rid of epistemology. You say "Z." I say "How do you know Z." Or I say "Prove Z." Those are epistemological statements. If you say "Here's how I know Z," you are speaking epistemology. You can't get away from it.

Show me a philosophical argument that doesn't include reason. I have a strong interest in Taoism, a philosophy that focuses on personal experience. There's no way for us to talk about it without rules of discourse, i.e. reason. Rules of discourse are metaphysics. If you question whether reason has value, that's metaphysics.

I do read the thinkers which I referred to. Recently, I have been reading Schopenhauer and do find his ideas on the way in which Kant's idea of the thing in itself can be about human will, or consciousness. It is a form of demystification — Jack Cummins

I didn't mean that as a criticism of those thinkers. I just wanted to emphasize that metaphysics isn't old fashioned and hasn't been superceded.

I am aware that you have your own thread on the Tao de Ching, which is a text which I have not read still. However, I do see the value of Eastern metaphysics generally. In particular, I find some Eastern ideas on the body and mind useful. — Jack Cummins

I see my interest in Taoism as a reflection of my interest in metaphysics, epistemology in particular. Knowing, knowing how I know, and knowing how certain I am are right at the center of my intellectual world.

Will you give a definition of metaphysics? — Jackson

The branch of philosophy that attempts to construct a general, speculative worldview; a complete, systemic account of all reality and experience, usually involving an epistemology, an ontology, an ethics and an aesthetics. — Jack Cummins

The branch of philosophy that attempts to construct a general, speculative worldview; a complete, systemic account of all reality and experience, usually involving an epistemology, an ontology, an ethics and an aesthetics. — Jack Cummins

In the twentieth first century, I am wondering how much further is philosophy going in the elimination of metaphysics. This is in relation to the emphasis on the importance of understanding of language as being essential to philosophical analysis. However, there is more and more focus upon science as a source of 'truth'. It could be that philosophy is becoming more a matter of critical thinking in terms of understanding concepts and the empirical understanding through science, with reflection on personal values. — Jack Cummins

Good set up for the thread, as long as we can stay away from going down the swirling drain of arguing about the meaning of "metaphysics" and so avoiding any substantive discussion. I like that you gave us a reasonable definition to work with.

This has nothing to do with Plato, Aristotle, Kant or any of the others. I'm about as far from those guys as you can get in philosophy but even I know it is impossible to get rid of metaphysics. You might pretend that you have, even believe it yourself, but it can't be done. Metaphysics, especially including epistemology, is the foundation of reason. It's the rules that describe how it works. Science is science, but the scientific method, how science is done, what makes science scientific, is epistemology. The idea of objective reality is ontology. So is the idea of the Tao. So is truth.

Define truth, knowledge, logic. Those definitions are metaphysics.

Certainty about the ambiguity, how will this fit into the practicalities of life, which often require firm action or unambiguous behavior? What practical value can we assign to the ambiguity? — Frankly

It's a bit hard to talk about this without understanding the context. Have you read the Tao Te Ching or any of the earlier posts in this thread. Do you have any experience with...

Well, it seems @Frankly has already been banned.

Some philosophers question the very concept of subjectivity as deeply flawed. — Jackson

Subjectivity is that which, generally speaking, pertains to the 1st person experience of an individual. — Bob Ross

I am confused by the terminology that is used when discussing the human experience of reality. When I talk about it, I usually call it "introspection." A lot of what I understand about reality, reason, perception, emotion, and other mental processes comes from observing and trying to understand my own experience of my own mental processes. That can be reinforced by other peoples reporting of the results of their own introspection and also the results of more objective scientific observations.

How does that differ from "subjectivity" which is the subject of this thread? According to Wikipedia:

[Subjectivity] is most commonly used as an explanation for that which influences, informs, and biases people's judgments about truth or reality; it is the collection of the perceptions, experiences, expectations, and personal or cultural understanding of, and beliefs about, an external phenomenon, that are specific to a subject.

And that brings us to "phenomenology." From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions.

The language used in discussions of phenomenology; e.g. intentionality, aboutness, embodiment, what-is-it-like, qualia; is completely different than the language I use when I talk about my own or other people's experience gained through introspection or empathy. I can't see how the ideas included in the study of phenomenology help me understand my personal experience or other's.

Why did Aristotle and the ancient Greeks never talk about self-consciousness? Was there some huge leap in evolution where the brain developed self-consciousness? I think not.
— Jackson

The stuff we call "inner" they called divine. They thought the universe was alive with lust and arrogance.

We say those things only reside between our ears.

Who knows how our descendants will describe it. — Tate

Example? And please don't cite Homer. We are talking philosophy. — Jackson

For what it's worth, in the 1970s, Julien Jaynes wrote "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" in which he claimed that people were not self-conscious in the same manner that modern people are until about 3,000 years ago in Greece and later in other parts of the world. Before that, voices in the head we attribute to consciousness were attributed to gods. I have oversimplified his thesis. It's not one I buy, but it wasn't laughed out of the house either. The evidence he uses includes passages from Homer.

Spot on. As it happens, most physicists choose locality over realism [*]. This rejection of realism (precisely, counterfactual definiteness) is well summed up by physicist Asher Peres, one of the original developers of quantum teleportation, as "unperformed experiments have no results". — Andrew M

Both of those links are really helpful. Thanks.