So you do have some metaphysics then. It's not a salad bar. — Olivier5

If it were a salad bar, it would still be metaphysics. We all get metaphysics whether we like it or not.

I'm not sure what you mean by saying that absolute propositions are not true or false. Can you give an example? — Janus

My thoughts about metaphysics began to take shape in a thread I started about four years ago - "An attempt to clarify my thoughts about metaphysics." It grew out of the attraction I felt towards the Tao Te Ching. The metaphysics in that text is very different from one I had always been aware of as an engineer. That one was from science.

The difference between the two is the difference between the different grounds of being in each. The ground of being in the Tao Te Ching is the Tao, the undifferentiated unity which is the natural state of existence before humans get involved. For science, it is objective reality, which represents the multiplicity of concrete phenomena that would make up the universe even if there was no consciousness.

Although they seem contradictory, I didn't feel any conflict in using both ways of understanding. I could hold them both in my mind at the same time. That's when I started to think about the fact that they weren't true or false. Sometimes it made sense for me to think in one way and at other times the other. That's what made it clear that neither was true or false.

At about the same time, after I had started developing these ideas, someone recommended Collingwood's essay to me. I felt right at home.

Like eusociality, health, fitness, integrity, peace of mind ... are ends-in-themselves, — 180 Proof

I don't think you're saying that these factors are goals. Are you? If not, I think you and I are in agreement.

It seems we have a different meaning of the term end-in-themselves. What do you mean by it ? — Hello Human

To me, the important thing is the idea of using people as a means to an end. That means making decisions about their lives for our own benefit without regard to their preferences or the effects of our decisions on them.

You don't support it, but you still have to respect it if it doesn't do more harm than good. — Hello Human

I guess I'd respect their goals or not based on my own values, not necessarily on their potential effects. Again, I don't see that as particularly relevant to the question. People should be treated with respect. I think that's another way to formulate the categorical imperative.

That's you, but it is a luxury that a historian like Collingwood could not afford. Faith exists as a historical force and needs to be reconned with. Besides, he was evidently a Christian himself and cared about it a great deal. — Olivier5

If my memory is correct, Collingwood does deal with God by using him as one of the absolute presuppositions for science. I'm not sure about that. I'm rereading it now and I'll check. My comment wasn't about Collingwood or any other metaphysician. I was speaking for myself. As I've noted previously, the existence of God is a matter of true or false. As such, it is not a metaphysical question. I don't know how Collingwood would respond if it were put to him in those terms.

Your historian is responsible for his own metaphysics.
— T Clark

He will simply not be able to publish in a scientific journal as his peers will 'cancel' him due to his heterodox metaphysics. So it's not just his problem. Other historians will make it their business. — Olivier5

The point I was making is that it is not my job to tell the historian what metaphysics he should use. If he chooses one that puts him outside what is considered the mainstream, he may have trouble being taken seriously.

As far as I can tell, my metaphysics is somewhat out of the ordinary. I don't think I've convinced anyone that I'm on the right track. I'm ok with that. When time comes when I have to fit into a conversation with people who don't share my particular views, I generally don't have any trouble. As I've noted and Collingwood wrote, a particular metaphysical approach is used to address specific questions at specific times in specific situations. One of the absolute minimum requirements for a metaphysical system is that it should allow people with similar interests to talk to each other. I can generally work with that.

Let me take another example: a Chinese physicist demonstrates that over there in China, E=MC3. Or a Zimbabwean mathematician proves that, over there in Zimbabwe, Pi equal 12. — Olivier5

That's not metaphysics - it's science and mathematics. They are positions with truth values. Metaphysics does not have truth value.

Oh, yes, welcome to the forum.

Boy, this is a good post. Some of it stretches beyond my grasp, but it's still interesting. I don't have an overall response, but I have some thoughts.

Whereas we can analyze the existence of a particular thing, existence, in its generality, cannot be analyzed. It can only be acknowledged. This is so because general existence precedes everything, save itself. In other words, perception presupposes general existence. — ucarr

I've just been reading Collingwood's "Essay on Metaphysics." He goes through parts of Aristotle's metaphysics and then bends it to his purposes. One thing he talks about that I had to work at was the idea that there is no science of pure being. At the top of the pyramid of what he calls "science," which is broader than what I use that name for, is being. There are no presuppositions that underlie. That seems similar to what you are talking about.

As to the special problem, ontology suffers the slings and arrows of an innate problem of design with respect to PERSPECTIVE which, as quantum mechanics tells us, holds foundational significance vis-à-vis existence. — ucarr

I am always skeptical of mixing quantum mechanics, science, with metaphysics. To me it looks like the similarities are metaphorical rather than literal. That's why I disliked "The Tao of Physics." Being would be unapproachable even if reality were classical.

When confronted with the question of the true nature of general existence, we are compelled by existential logic to first ask, What point of view? — ucarr

This seems really important to me. In a sense, this is the purpose of metaphysics - to provide us a place to stand while we observe.

The philosopher, when commissioned with the task of analyzing the general nature of existence, cannot wholly detach the self from the thing examined because it predicates the examiner. This, dear reader, leads us to an apparently insoluble paradox. — ucarr

I don't think it's insoluble. It may not even be a paradox. The answer - there is no general nature of existence. All there is is our choice of a place to stand. This makes me think strongly of the Tao Te Ching. I can see the unspeakable Tao as the perspectiveless point of the pyramid. It's where you have to surrender to the recognition there is no place to stand.

The human example, par excellence, of instantaneous-paradoxical shape-shifting that is multi-directional is the Trinitarianism of Holy-Father-Holy Ghost-Jesus. — ucarr

I have no idea how religion fits into any of this.

It appears that Christianity has foreshadowed QM by centuries. — ucarr

Yes, well...ahem.

Why is there not nothing? — ucarr

I have never found this a particularly intriguing question. Something exists because it does. It couldn't not. There can't be nothing. Reason - because.

OK, I didn't remember that, but it's years since I read it. If I can find the reading time I'll take another look. — Janus

I don't think this answers the question anyway. I don't know enough to tell if he did a good job or not. It doesn't really matter, to me at least. As I've noted throughout this thread, I like the way Collingwood takes on the question of what underlies our understanding of reality, no matter what you call it. If it's not metaphysics, although I'm comfortable it is, it's still what I want to talk about.

So we can leave it there for now. You say you may reread him. I'm aiming to also. The kind of language he uses and claims Aristotle uses does not come naturally to me. We can talk about it in a future thread.

My interpretation of it is that we are autonomous beings with our own goals, so we must consider the goals of other people when interacting with them. — Hello Human

I don't get the connection. I can treat someone as an end in themselves without considering their idea of their own purpose.

My interpretation of the categorical imperative can be reformulated as a respect for the goals of others, and the accomplishment of those goals is flourishing. — Hello Human

What if the other person's goal is one that I don't respect. I don't have to support it, but I still need to respect the person.

It seems that we do have a purpose, though it is choosen by the person themselves. You choose your own purpose. We choose our actions. — Hello Human

I don't feel as if I have a purpose. I don't see that as a bad thing. I am responsible for my own actions and I guess I could choose a purpose, but it would seem degrading. Wouldn't having a purpose be the same as being a means to an end rather than and end in myself?

Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's not doing anything that would conventionally be considered, according to either the ancient or modern conceptions, metaphysics. — Janus

In the Essay, Collingwood summarizes Aristotle's metaphysics and then derives his directly from it. I've read it several times and I don't understand it all, but I can see he didn't just wave his arms and say "abracadabra presto chango" and pull his metaphysics out of a hat. That's about as far as I can take it. I don't have what it takes to evaluate his results.

And so Collingwood doesn't really count as a metaphysician, — Janus

Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's wrong.
T Clark: Why is he wrong?
Janus: Because he's not a metaphysician.

Collingwood is not generally considered to be a central figure in the historical evolution of metaphysical thought. — Janus

And so...

There seem to be, broadly, two conventional definitions of metaphysics: the "traditional" and the "modern". — Janus

I don't think I get your point.

Anyone can use the term "metaphysics" however they wish, but it is unusual. — Manuel

As I've said many times, "metaphysics" means different things to different people. You can say it means anything you want it to. So can I.

As far as I can tell, Collingwood's description of metaphysics is respected and still referenced 80 years later. Yet, you call it "unusual." Can you support your contention?

To understand the universe as it is, both with us and without us. — Paine

The universe as is isn't anything. You have to have a point of view to see from, a center to stand on. That's metaphysics.

To my mind that does not read as a metaphysical statement at all, but as a methodological or historiographical statement. — Janus

Seems metaphysical to Collingwood and me. No reason we have to agree.

I see those basic assumptions or axioms as being methodological, not metaphysical. — Janus

As I said, it looks like "metaphysics" means something different to you than it does to me. That's no surprise. No one ever agrees as to what the word actually means. It comes down to this - Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics is what I'm interested in. It's an important part of my understanding of how the world works and how we understand it.

Again, no reason we have to agree.

Man is the measure of all things. — Paine

Wherever our ideas and technology go, we ourselves live at human scale. All human value resides at human scale. For us, the world is inseparable from human value.

The only tools we have to conceptualize reality are human language and mathematics. Humans cannot understand or use anything that hasn't been translated into humanese.

That view captures a certain kind of immediacy in our experience but exemplifies the lack of desire I was referring to. — Paine

Lack of desire for what?

According to Protagoras, any further efforts to understand beyond those parameters is make-work or wankery. — Paine

I never said I agreed with Protagoras, you did.

So, what is its central tenet? — Janus

In his own words:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

I propose the goal is to understand the world and ourselves in it. — Paine

The world and ourselves in it are functions of the metaphysical system we choose. First pick the system, then you get to see the world.

Understanding is finding out what is 'real' and wanting to understand more because of that experience. — Paine

Again, "real" is a function of the metaphysical system you choose.

It is to say there is no ultimate coherence in this 'real' world and it is foolish to seek it out. — Paine

No, it is to say that the ultimate coherence of the world is dependent on me and the choices I make and the values I hold.

Is that not making the struggle to understand risk free? — Paine

Good question, although I think it comes from the wrong direction. The goal is not be be correct, it's to provide answers that will work in the real world. Collingwood's metaphysics makes us, or at least gives us the ability to be, responsible for our own assumptions. It's then our job to pick assumptions that make sense in the world in which we live.

The Collingwood method of not framing assumptions as true or false is helpful toward a taxonomic orientation of various concepts and points of view but it doesn't give itself problems it cannot solve. — Paine

First of all, it's not all assumptions, presuppositions, but only absolute presuppositions that Collingwood's view applies to. As I said, the goal is not to just solve problems, but to solve them in a way that works.

Is that not an 'absolute' assumption of some kind? — Paine

If you're asking whether Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics is a metaphysical position, the answer is "yes."

The idea of Collingwood is that certain metaphysical constraints are fruitful, — Olivier5

Yes, but to me, the more interesting thing is that they are unavoidable and we need to try to be aware of what we are using and the influence it has on our thinking.

For instance, a modern historian cannot decently believe or write that Zeus literally helped Heracles, or that Moses parted the Red Sea. Such mythological explanations or descriptions of events are ruled out by the naturalistic presupposition that gods do not intervene in history directly via miracles. — Olivier5

As I noted, for me, theistic religion's place in metaphysics is ambiguous. My solution? Don't worry about it.

Now, a mystical historian could say: "I find that believing in an interventionist God is sometimes liberating."

Would he be right? — Olivier5

I see it from the other side. To be constrained limits your ability to understand. That's why, in an ideal world, we would pick, take responsibility for, our own constraints. That's not how it usually works, even for such profoundly insightful intellects as you and me. Your historian is responsible for his own metaphysics. It is in our best interests to be aware of them when we are reading his works.

I still feel unsatisfied with a lack of conceptual coherence between frameworks. — Olivier5

The willingness to accept the "lack of conceptual coherence between frameworks" is exactly "the ability to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas in our minds at once and yet keep on thinking" I was talking about. Rejecting the need for a "meta-framework" is intellectually liberating. I guess some would call it intellectually lazy, but it's not.

My only disagreement is with your characterisation of my position in your first sentence. I didn't use the term 'fundamental'; instead I said that God (or gods) is a classic question in metaphysics, — Olivier5

Yes, I pulled the old switcheroo. I started out with "classical" as you did. Then I switched it to "fundamental" because that supported my rhetorical position better. I'm a bad boy.

Was the Buddha sourgraping?
Did he dismiss too easily life as it is usually lived? — baker

[irony]Yes, one of humanity's great philosophical systems, which has been studied by millions and profoundly influential for 2,500 years, is based on resentment about the unfairness of the world.[/irony]

Thoughts? — Wheatley

This is something I've thought a lot about, but haven't really done my homework on, so I'm stepping out a bit on thin ice based on 1) What little I have read and 2) My own experience of intuition.

Most human learning is not learning facts. Babies don't learn facts, they build themselves a world, at the start without language. That world view includes all the important information they need to live in the world. It's based on their observations of and interactions with the outside, but also on innate, instinctual capacities that all humans have. We, as fully grown humans, still carry that world around inside us, although it has grown and evolved as we've grown. The baby's, and our, worlds are not made up of facts. Most of the things we know have never been proven to us. In my understanding, and experience, that factless world is the basis of intuition.

People look down on intuition, but it is much more powerful and effective than what we call knowledge. Our intuition is the fundamental basis of our intellect. To not recognize its importance is mind-bogglingly arrogant.

I will start by attempting to answer a question that I consider to be the basis for morality: What is the purpose of a human being, or a sentient being? I consider that question to be important because morality is about what we must do, and what we must do is our purpose, so we must ask what is that purpose. — Hello Human

I don't believe we have a purpose and I don't see how having a purpose would necessarily be relevant to how we treat others.

we must streat others not as mere means but as ends-in-themselves — Hello Human

This basically a restatement of the Golden Rule, which is a good thing.

That means that we must respect the goals others have set for themselves while striving to achieve our own goals, because it would be preferable to maximize the amount of persons accomplishing their goals. — Hello Human

Why does "we must treat others not as mere means but as ends-in-themselves" mean that we must respect the goals of others. How does that lead to "it would be preferable to maximize the amount of persons accomplishing their goals."?

In order to flourish while respecting or promoting the flourishing of others, some qualities are useful. — Hello Human

Respecting the flourishing of others, which may be part of the categorical imperative (I'm not sure), is not the same as promoting the flourishing of others, which it seems to me is not.

It's a classic metaphysical question, though. Collingwood goes as far as advising to use religious language to frame absolute presuppositions, as an indicator of whether we are truly at the right foundational level. E.g. "God is a mathematician" is his way of phrasing the absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences. He sees this presupposition as being at the heart of the scientific revolution. — Olivier5

You say it's a fundamental metaphysical question, then go on to show how it's not. What you describe is the use of God as a metaphor for "he absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences." Albert Einstein, an atheist, said that God does not play dice. Although I am not a theist, one of the texts that means the most to me this the American Declaration of Independence "All men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator...

But we are talking here of methodological choices, of people saying "for the sake of the argument, let us pretend that X is true even though I don't actually believe it true." — Olivier5

The basic methodological choices are metaphysics.

Using different metaphysics for different applications is not "pretending for the sake of argument." It is making a choice, whether or not one is aware of it. Back to Collingwood's definition:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

It says "on this or that occasion in the course of this or that piece of thinking." Metaphysics is time and use dependent. There's no reason someone can't use one metaphysical approach in the morning and another in the afternoon, depending on usefulness for a particular application. I have quite a few floating around in my mind right now. Now, I'm following (more or less) the rules of reason. Later I might want to follow the rules of intuition or poetry. One of the greatest strengths of human intelligence is the ability to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas in our minds at once and yet keep on thinking. Light is both a particle and a wave - far out man.

Not so simple. People can't really believe in, say, one unique god in the morning and believe in no god or many gods in the afternoon. — Olivier5

First - I have trouble including existence of a personal God in metaphysics. The statement "God exists" is, assumedly, a true or false question. Metaphysical statements are not true or false. I wonder what Collingwood would say.

Second - I didn't say someone would reject a metaphysical position often. Different metaphysical systems are useful for different purposes. A Taoist scientist might experience the Tao during meditative practice, but then have no problem dealing with the world as an objective reality at work.

Mining a bitcoin is done on a computer.
The process that the computer needs to do to mine a bitcoin keeps getting longer.
The process can be done quicker the more computers you have.
The process can be done quicker the harder you run each computer.
Running lots of computers very hard is the quickest way to get bitcoins.
Running lots of computers very hard uses a lot of electricity. — fdrake

Is bitcoin mining payment for services, by which I mean, is the mining part of the work required to make the system run which is paid for by the system? It just seems pretty screwy. It is my understanding that mining costs per bitcoin will continue to increase. Who keeps the system running when mining is no longer profitable?

I don't want to hijack Clark's thread. Suffice to say the observation about the subjective nature of reality is grounded in long-term study and meditation. I'll leave it at that for now. — Wayfarer

This has been a really interesting and helpful discussion for me. I've gotten what I need out of it and I'm happy to see it go wherever anyone wants to take it going forward. I appreciate your restraint, but I'm all set.

Attempting to find out "what absolute presuppositions have been made..." just is the study of the history of metaphysics. Making absolute presuppositions yourself is doing metaphysics (making metaphysical claims or adopting a metaphysical standpoint); so you have a distinction between studying the history of (other people doing) metaphysics and actually doing metaphysics.. — Janus

Ok, although I'm not sure the distinction is an important one. To be clear, those are Collingwood's words. I do agree with them.

is not studying the history of metaphysics, but rather making a particular metaphysical claim, selected from among many other possible metaphysical views on account of personal preference. — Janus

Again, the distinction doesn't seem all that significant to me.

Reality itself has a fundamentally subjective aspect, which is intrinsic, but is never knowable by objective means. — Wayfarer

I think you know this is a position I am attracted to. It's something I use all the time. In this particular situation, I was using it as an example.

True. But different human thoughts can refer to different objective realities, a concept that's hard to grasp for western thought somehow. — Verdi

As I told Wayfarer, I gave this as an example of a metaphysical statement, not necessarily as one I endorse.

Obviously. — Verdi

Again, this was an example I provided, not a position I necessarily support.

Not true. — Verdi

Again, it's an example. I don't think you're paying attention. I was responding to a specific request to provide examples.

There is no absolute point of view or scale.
— T Clark

There is. Dependent on which theory one prefers. — Verdi

An example.

That's highly questionable and not really a metaphysical rule, — Verdi

Again, it's intended as an example. I disagree that it isn't a metaphysical statement.

I feel very at home with Collingwood.
— T Clark

Who goes by a rather precise (but perhaps restrictive) definition of metaphysics as the study of absolute presuppositions of knowledge. — Olivier5

As I've noted several times in this thread, the problem with the word "metaphysics" is that it is not restrictive enough. It means different things to just about everyone to the point that it has become almost meaningless. As I've also noted, I don't really want to talk about metaphysics, I want to talk about metaphysics as envisioned by Collingwood. Using his understanding doesn't limit me, it gives me exactly the words I need to talk about my understanding of how human understanding of reality works.

Metaphysical statements are not themselves provable. — Olivier5

Collingwood is explicit about this. Metaphysical statements have no truth value.

2. We all go with certain basic presuppositions, ergo we all sport some metaphysics or another, consciously or not, even those of us professing otherwise, whom Collingwood humorously calls the "anti-metaphysicians". — Olivier5

Yes. Keeping in mind that the difference between relative presuppositions and absolute presuppositions is central to Collingwood's way of seeing things. Anti-metaphysics is just another kind of metaphysics.

3. There is metaphysics at the heart (or rather seed) of physics and any other other science, since all sciences are built on certain absolute presuppositions. — Olivier5

That's the reason we care about metaphysics at all.

The directions taken by our truth-seeking efforts (our observations of the world around us, in particular) are framed by and interpreted within our metaphysics. Therefore one rarely changes one's metaphysics, not based on empirical observation anyway. — Olivier5

I think people change their metaphysics all the time. You can be running two metaphysics programs at the same time if you're dealing with two situations simultaneously e.g. talking philosophy at the dinner table. I'm not sure Collingwood would agree with this.

People are 'ticklish' about their metaphysics. They can get angry if you challenge their absolute presuppositions (even so-called anti-metaphysicians). It is a natural reaction, as these absolute presuppositions underwrite their (our) whole world view. Hence perhaps the irksome tone of some metaphysical discussions. — Olivier5

That's true, but it's about psychology, not philosophy.

From my experience here on the forum, I think the irksome tone in metaphysics discussions comes from two places 1) The confusion and frustration related to different meanings attached to the ideas and 2) The fundamentally irksome natures of many of us here.

Metaphysics as defined by Collingwood is a historical science in that absolute presuppositions are both a product and an engine of history: they are born at a certain time in a certain place, their popularity ebbs and flows, they are a bit like mental viruses. And since they can shape discourse, they can shape politics. Metaphysical ideas can have a political impact. — Olivier5

I agree with this.

There is an objective reality independent of human thought.
— T Clark

Objectivity is over-rated. What is seen as objective is highly dependent on many contingent factors, and whatever is ascertained to be real is obviously a matter of judgement, which is a rational process. Being able to criticize this attitude is where metaphysics begins. — Wayfarer

I was using the statement as an example of a metaphysical statement, not necessarily one I endorse.

Will you give me some examples of those Metaphysical rules? — Gnomon

Here are some:

• There is an objective reality independent of human thought.
• Alternatively, existence is inseparable from human interaction.
• Physical laws that apply now have always applied and will always apply everywhere.
• There is no absolute point of view or scale.
• The universe has a living essence, a personality, which some people call God.

Here are some that I think may be metaphysical, but I'm not sure:

• We will use English as the language of this forum.
• We will use base 10 mathematics
• We will behave in a civil manner during discussions.
• We will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

This is fun, although I'm not really satisfied that my examples capture the flavor I'm looking for.

Is your claim that it is metaphysics all the way down itself a metaphysical or ontological, or a merely epistemological one? — Janus

Metaphysical.

I'm not sure if you're being serious, — Janus

Although I think it's funny, I am completely serious.

my retort would be that there is no fact of the matter regarding what we should call the study of the history of metaphysics, which is what Collingwood refers to as just 'metaphysics'. — Janus

Generally I agree, although I don't understand the distinction you are making by calling it the history of metaphysics.

There is, distinct from this historical study of metaphysics, the possibility of practicing metaphysical thinking which has no truck with any traditional metaphysics. — Janus

I'm not sure what you are suggesting. Please expand.

Major companies are starting to accept cryptocurrency like TESLA and Microsoft and PayPal

If these big Companies weren’t accepting cryptocurrency I would be skeptical but these businesses are validating my optimism. — TheQuestion

I am not sophisticated with how banking, finance, and currencies work, but here's how it seems to me. The value of the US dollar can fluctuate based on what other people are willing to exchange it for in other currencies. I guess Bitcoin is something similar, the difference being that the dollar at bottom is supported by the treasury of the US government. Bitcoin is supported by.... nothing as far as I can see. It's like Tinkerbell. If we just believe, everything will be ok.

Even if Bitcoin is somehow ok, given it's the oldest and best established, what about all the other cryptocurrencies? How many are needed. What does one provide that the others don't. It's like putting all my money in Betamax. What happens to my money when VHS wins the race for supremacy? That's an old guy reference, so I don't know if you'll get it.

One event I heard about really made me more skeptical about the whole thing - a guy put 200 million dollars into Bitcoin and then forgot his password. His money just disappeared. No recourse. No "did you forget your password."

It does seem, though, that cause is most easily seen, understood, appreciated as an observer's account, serving the needs of the observer, rather than something itself. — tim wood

I was going to say "But then all of what we call 'reality' is just an 'observer's account.' But then you wrote:

And I wonder if that distinction has been made, or even seen, because accounts themselves are just convenient fictions. — tim wood

Not quite, imo. Cause is simply a presupposition of a theory. That means at best it is never true - except as a cogwheel in the theory - but only efficacious. Apparently for parts of modern physics it's no longer adequate even as that. Perfectly good for billiards players though, still. — tim wood

I guess it's no surprise we agree n this.

The point is, I suppose, that if you wish to account for your world with stories, you can. But they'll break down at the borders of your world. And just see to what lengths some - many - will go to extend their story beyond its border, where it does not belong. — tim wood

I like this too.