1) There is no such thing as the Laws of Nature. It is a made up please with no definition. It is precisely equivalent to God and has its roots in religion. — Rich

Then what are the scientists looking for if not laws that describe how our world works?

2) Science says that events are non-deterministic. If they were we could throw out Schrodinger's equation and replace it with Newton's. But, alas, science decided 100 years ago that Newton's Laws do not correspond to experimental evidence including Bell's Inequality which demonstrate non-locality. — Rich

This is the listing of all of the interpretations of QM (there are probably more but this is most of them). Realize that not all of them are indeterministic:



The Schrodinger Equation works, certainly. It's been experimentally verified time and time again by science. How we choose to interpret that is a whole other matter.

Determinism has zero evidence. There is absolutely nothing to support the notion that everything is determined or anything it's determined and the choices we make are either governed by some supernatural God or Laws of Nature which in turn are mystically creating the illusion of choice. — Rich

Yeah, determinism has zero evidence, apart from the fact that we find that pretty much everything in the physical universe is determined by the laws of nature. That's what science is all about.

In 1920's 'they' found out that the idea of determinism is not right due to the discovery of quantum physics. So how do quantum physics give the Universe 'free will'? Or is quantum physics just an other thing we have yet to fully understand and is determinism still right? — FMRovers

Not necessarily true. The Copenhagen interpretation of QM says that there is indeterminism, but there also exist other interpretations as well that say there are hidden variables which support a causal view of nature, such as the Bohm interpretation. In fact, there are plenty of interpretations, some of which are deterministic but some aren't, and there doesn't seem to be any consensus agreement that any one is true, so the question of determinism is up for grabs.

As for the implications of this quantum indeterminism on free will if such indeterminism does exist, whether or not this grants us "free will" depends on what you want to get out of the idea. If by "free" you are just looking for us to make decisions that are unhinged by any sort of deterministic influence (simply making choices that are uncaused), then we can technically have free will if we can draw a clear line linking the decision making processes in our minds and the quantum process of the subatomic world. In theory, this seems possible, as the former is reducible to the latter, but it seems like a very rare occurrence even if it does occur. Of course, if you're looking for anything more substantial than that (or somehow less "chaotic") than that, then I don't think you can get that from QM.

The fact is, QM isn't really the best theory we have, since it doesn't mesh well with GR, and vice versa for GR. We are still looking for a theory of Quantum Gravity so it's likely that one or both will be replaced in the future. How this all will mesh with determinism isn't really clear, but it seems like alot of different ideas are on the table with respect to a theory of QG (continuity, the multiverse and the existence of higher dimensions being some examples), so it's debatable which ones are right and which are wrong.

I doubt that most Quinians or Wittgensteinians would say that it is a benign regress and would reject it, given it's similarity to the Modus-Ponen's infinite regress paradox of Lewis Carroll, as used by critics of truth-by-convention to attack the idea that the notion of logical necessity is representable or derivable from a finite supply of community conventions. — sime

Okay, so what exactly in the infinite chain is objectionable?

Also, what is this "Modus-Ponen's infinite regress" you're referring to? Quick google search doesn't give me anything.

One variety of vicious infinite regress could be when trying to justify some proposition, p, and justifying p is done with (or requires) a different proposition, p1, which, in turn, depends on p2, ..., ad infinitum, where pn diverges. — jorndoe

I think this sounds similar to my own theory, just with different wording. Instead of saying that an infinite regress involves "solving a problem", you instead say that it would involve justification. I've also heard it said that a vicious regress is one that is meant to be explanatory as well, but again it all sounds the same to me.

On the other hand, if all propositions/claims can be shown to collapse into one (like pn+1 = pn), for example, then it's not a vicious infinite regress. — jorndoe

Interesting. So, would statements such as "Every event has a prior cause" and "Every region of space is composed of smaller regions" work here to describe an infinite past or a continuous interval of space? Though I am not sure if they qualify as regresses, I am inclined to think of continuity and causality as being benign if they are so that'd be nice.

First off, I would want to say that I do not believe in any sort of "objective" morality. Or to put it another way, I don't think that there any absolute fact as to what is right or wrong. However, that doesn't mean that I don't think that there doesn't exist any morality at all. Clearly we do have a deep-rooted sense as to what is right or wrong, and I believe that this is grounded in our own capacity as human beings to empathize and feel compassion for others. We are social beings after all, so it's not surprising that we have evolved with an inborn conscience. This, I think, is where laws such as the golden rule come from, and why they are so pervasive across different cultures.

Democracy's weakness and strength is the stability it gives. With totalitarianism you can actually have really good times if your leader is benevolent and knows what he is doing. (Example: See Singapore/Lee Kuan Yew, or Korea/Sejong the Great). But unfortunately most of history has been the exact opposite. Democracy avoids this but makes actually fixing issues a slow and sometimes impossible task. — yatagarasu

I think it's the opposite really. Democratic systems tend to change their ruling party from time to time (for instance just look at the U.S. where they went from Obama to Trump). In contrast, totalitarian countries usually have the same ruling party (and in a lot of cases the same person) as the head of government for decades. Democracy, if anything, is good at avoiding corruption, which is unfortunately something that most totalitarian governments fall victim to.

P2: Time and space emerged at the moment of the big-bang.
P3: Before the big-bang, there was neither time nor space.
P4: It is probable that there was a reason, or a cause, for the big-bang (for, the universe is magnificent and even contains conscious human beings with remarkable minds). — Brian A

Seems like you decided to go with the idea that the big bang was the origin of time and space. That seems to create a problem with your P4. though like I said earlier, because if there is no such thing as a "time before the big bang" then how can anything stand in a relation of causality to it? Causality conceptually requires time to exist.

Also, you say that the big bang, which caused the universe must have a cause because the universe is magnificent, but wouldn't the same reasoning apply to God, which I imagine you would also say is magnificent?

I'm having trouble reading your argument, since I don't see how your premises are all related to one
another (in the sense that they all should point to a single conclusion). Most of them seem to make unjustified assumptions about the world, and others seem to outright contradict each other if not the whole conclusion of the argument (with one of them being just a statement about the conclusion itself).

Premise-1: Everything in the world has a cause. — Brian A

Wait, wasn't your argument that an infinite chain of causation was impossible? That seems to be your conclusion, but apparently one of your premises assumes that the conclusion is false. If you're trying to prove that it is false by way of a reductio, then I do not see where that comes into play.

On top of that it may not necessarily be the case that the premise is true anyways. This premise assumes determinism but it is not clear that determinism is true.

Premise-2: If we trace the causes back, we arrive at the big bang, and the cause of the big bang. — Brian A

Willing to grant that current cosmological theories suggest that there was a big bang in the earliest moments of the universe that we know of, but the idea that there was a cause to the big bang is debatable. Some physicists have suggested that there is no meaning to a "time before the big bang" and therefore no meaning to a cause of the big bang.

Premise-3: Even if God was not the cause of the big-bang, and something natural was, still, it is very improbable that there is an infinite chain of causes going back forever. — Brian A

This is a bald assertion that basically states the conclusion you want to prove. Why is it improbable that there cannot be an infinite chain of causes? That is what your argument is trying to make the case for.

So on the one hand you have a premise that assumes that everything has a cause, and in another you have a premise that basically states that an infinite chain of causes is improbable, and your conclusion is that an infinite chain of causes is impossible.

Conclusion: Therefore, it is very probable that a non-contingent first cause exists; and this must be God, since there is nothing greater than the non-contingent first cause. — Brian A

Your conclusion makes other statements that might as well be additional premises: that there must exist a first cause, that it must be a non-contingent first cause, and that that cause must be God. Like the other premises, I think you need to offer some more supporting reasons for these statements as well.

I am on record for saying that the distance between any two events (points in spacetime) can be expressed by pure spatial separation or by pure temporal separation, or if right on the edge between the two, then undefined singularity. That assertion contradicts my denial of existence of things not in our reference frame. — noAxioms

So which one are you rejecting here? Seems like the former, but if that is the case, then I still don't understand where the assertion that some things don't exist in some reference frames if they are moving away faster than light. Your response still amounts to this assumption that they do, but I am afraid I don't see how or why.

Also, since we are on the topic of absolute frames, I don't think that GR allows for the notion of a reference frame, due to the curvature of space-time. Instead the idea of an absolute frame is replaced with a preferred global foliation, which though technically not a frame of reference, defines a global time like the correct inertial frame should under SR. I am not sure if your statements above apply there, but I think I should throw that out since GR is the theory we are currently using.

Any designation of one would render over 99% of the universe nonexistent since only a tiny percentage of matter exists in any particular frame. Most of it is increasing its distance from that frame at a pace considerably faster than light and thus can never ever interact with the matter reasonably stationary in the frame.The bulk of all matter is nonexistent in any given frame. — noAxioms

Not sure I am getting the connection between things that expand from us at a speed faster than light and them not existing. Sure they won't ever interact with us given the light speed limit and all, but that does not imply that they would cease to exist for us.

If the definition of Atheism is merely lack of belief, both of these diagrams make no sense whatsoever. — WiseMoron

I'm not sure about that, since any time I see a chart like the ones you brought up, they seem to always take atheism as being merely a lack of belief or "whatever isn't theism". Really, this is why people take the whole black and white approach with regards to atheism/theism, which is what your charts seem to indicate.

I also have a counter-argument against the definition of Atheism being merely lack of belief as well. Given that someone has the opinion that God doesn't exist and yet says s/he is an atheist, in the sense that s/he merely lacks belief, isn't that a contradiction in a way? What I am saying is, "having an opinion requires believing." If you merely lack belief in God, then you ought to be under the title of agnosticism than atheism because logically that makes more sense and is less misleading. I know that atheism isn't a religion, but how can you have an opinion on the same subject that you have no belief nor disbelief in? That makes no sense to me. Also, beliefs aren't only in the systems called religions, anyways. It makes more sense to me that atheism is disbelief and not merely lack of belief. — WiseMoron

The response here, I imagine, for someone defending the definition in question is that if your stance on God does not include a belief that he exists, regardless of whatever opinion you hold on the matter, you are an atheist by definition. Your objection amounts to using a definition they already reject and the whole disagreement lies in the differing ways you both define the terms "agnostic" and "atheist".

That is not to say I don't sympathize with your definition. Indeed, the thing that irks me about the definitions that atheists have been insisting upon has always been the way in which it obscures the difference between simply not having an opinion, and disbelief (believing that God does not exist). For instance, I believe that the Earth revolves around the Sun is true, and I believe also that Santa Claus existing is false, but I am on the fence on whether Donald Trump colluded with the Russians and I am not willing to say whether that is true or false. All three are clearly different stances on a particular issue, and to me it'd be better if they were distinguished with the proper terms, but by redefining atheism as being merely "not theism", we lose that distinction.

Like, imagine if we decided to flip the scenario and had atheism traditionally defined as disbelief and theism as "whatever isn't atheism". We'd have the same problem of course, but I imagine the atheists wouldn't be the ones pushing this definition for reasons I'll leave you to figure out.

Based on what? — Coldlight

Give me any belief that you have apart from those about your experiences and your existence. Do you know that any of these beliefs are true with absolute certainty?

I never said that a fact stated as absolute with certainly is to be believed without thinking. — Coldlight

I never said you did. I was saying that a fact can be believed without being absolutely certain with regard to its truth. In fact I'd say most of our beliefs, apart from introspective beliefs (such as the cogito and our own direct experience), are like this. I don't know with certainty if there is an external world, that I'm not a brain in a vat, but my money is definitely on that being true, that I know for certain. For what little we do absolutely know, that can work as an argument against the metaphysical agnosticism you're talking about, but again I should note that it doesn't apply to agnosticism as normally defined in religious discussion.

We can go further by claiming that no absolute truth can be known, and that nothing metaphysical can be proven. I think that this view is wrong because it puts agnosticism itself as an absolute truth, as something we can know with certainty. — Coldlight

First off, this doesn't show that agnosticism as defined by Rowe is self-defeating, it shows that your expansion upon agnosticism, as the belief that no absolute truth can be known with certainty is self-defeating.

But despite that fact, your argument still doesn't work out. You can believe that the above is true without thinking that fact is absolutely certain.

Another problem is why would some things be brute when most things are not? What makes God, or Quantum Mechanics, or Daisen brute? What distinguishes the brutally existing things from the non-brutal ones? Is it just being brute? Is there a brute property? How does brute existence result in contingent existences? — Marchesk

I find this sort of comment strange. Bruteness to me seems synonymous with fundamentality. When materialists say that matter is "brute", some physicists say that QM is "brute", and some dualists say that consciousness is "brute", they seem to me to mean that it is fundamental. They aren't reducible to anything deeper (as far as we are concerned), but rather everything that exists reduces to them, so of course it should come as no surprise if the non-fundamental things in the world vastly outnumber the fundamental ones.

So if you're asking why some there are even fundamental (or brute) entities at all, then you seem to be suggesting that it can be otherwise. But unless we are willing to argue for turtles all the way down in all cases, then it seems like it's necessary that there be a fundamental level of some kind and that there exist fundamental entities that make up the universe.

Of some kind, yes. But the spatial relation that exists between the Earth and the Moon is not it, nor is it the temporal relation between an ice cube and that cube melted an hour later. — noAxioms

Is it? We are talking about something related to physics which means we are dealing with something physical here. So it seems closer to say that these worlds, if they should exist, exist within a physical space rather than say the space of abstract ideas (not a Platonist myself or anything but I'm just saying). These parallel worlds could be said to exist in another dimension of space for instance, and not necessarily the dimensions that we are normally accustomed to either.

Worlds have positions?? Can I say which is left of the other? Can these four identical worlds be put in some kind of order? — noAxioms

If the worlds are supposed to exist in the same reality, and they are numerically distinct (despite having the same qualitative properties) from one another then I cannot see how that makes sense without saying that they occupy different regions of some kind. How they are distributed may be a problem to explain in detail, but it seems to necessarily be one that it has to deal with.

It seems like you are saying that we should do away with the concept of causation altogether, but I thought your point was that there was no distinction between cause and correlation? If you're saying that causation is correlation then that's one thing, but if you were just saying that causality is a mistaken concept to begin with then that's something else entirely.

Also, the kind of correlation that I gave in my earlier example (of two symptoms of an illness) isn't exactly spurious as it certainly implies a deeper relation that isn't coincidental and is thus in that sense useful. However, my point was that relation wasn't one of causality, where one causes the other to happen. Instead, we would say that they both are related in sharing a common cause. They can be related, but not in the same way that, say, a brick thrown at a window is related to its being broken.

I am not sure how you plan to distinguish between both cases, or if you even intend on doing so, but it doesn't seem like persistency is a good enough way of doing so. The symptoms of an illness are usually found to be tightly correlated in many cases, as is healing when a chemical is ingested. But that doesn't mean we should treat both cases the same way.

The correlation vs causation dichotomy is one that has occupied my mind a fair bit over the last couple of years. I used to think there was a clear distinction between the two, but now I am not so sure. — andrewk

Consider me part of the camp that finds this line of thought confusing. The distinction between correlation and causation seems pretty clear to me. For instance, the symptoms of a particular illness can be said to be statistically correlated with one another, but that does not mean that they are in a relationship of causality. In actually, they are both said to be shared by a common cause, the illness itself. Although causation necessarily implies correlation, correlation does not imply causation. The former is merely the subset of the latter.

You've probably responded to this line of thought already, but I just want to get something to chew on.

When consciously experiencing the world, we seem to always be aware that we are doing so. — JulianMau

I don't think so. I may be aware of my experiences when I have them, but I am not also
aware of the fact that I am having experiences. That sort of awareness requires an extra act of introspection which IMO we don't always exercise at every moment in our lives. So, for example, I may be having a red visual experience, but that does not necessarily mean that I have the thought that I am having a red visual experience.

We are indeed talking past each other, because you were, like I said, inappropriately applying A-theorist ideas in a context that was explicitly eternalist. More specifically, your sense of "having multiple experiences" required these different experiences to pass according to the flow of time was different from what I meant. I am not sure what you mean when we say that our use of "experience" differ, unless you mean the idea of "having multiple experiences" above.

So, do you understand now why you should drop this idea of having multiple experiences in the dynamic sense here? When I say that we have multiple experiences over time, it is in the context of the static worm theory.

Yes, of course. Do you know of any other way to experience something? — Luke

Well, given that we are talking about having multiple experiences in the sense of the eternalist worm theory, then of course that is irrelevant. According to the eternalist, time does not pass. You apparently think that this means that they cannot have conscious experiences, but I am willing to grant that they do, and then work towards what that would mean.

The idea of having multiple experiences together as a combined experience that I am referring to is pretty much like the idea of having multiple experiences at the same time combined into a larger experience. The way I see things, the eternalist is just like the presentist in that it regards everything as, in the A-theoretic sense, "present". It is just what they consider "now" includes alot more than a single moment. It includes all times, the Big Bang, the death of the Universe, and whatnot. This is why the eternalist would say they all exist on a par. The time in which these events exist in, can be treated pretty much like an extra dimension of space, in which the different events are located. It is for this reason why I think the analogies I made with space are convincing.

The block universe would functionally be no different, say, from a world with no flow of time and 4 dimensions of space, 3 of which are the usual xyz coordinates the the 4th including the contents of all the different time slices. If there were a being who is spatially extended across the 4 dimensions, then she would be exposed to whatever experiences that her parts have. It seems reasonable to believe that, given that she has each of these experiences, that she would necessarily have an experience of them all together, does it not?

You address my concerns by complaining that I have not addressed your concerns? — Luke

That is how I think you've been addressing my concerns. But if you look more carefully at the text you quoted, you would see there are two large paragraphs above the third one where I specifically try to show the error in your reasoning. I have given you my reasons, but you haven't really addressed them.

Time is considered to be a space-like dimension under eternalism, not "another dimension of space". Time is not considered to be a dimension of space. — Luke

Indeed, but I did say that it was claimed by some to be just like space. The fact that they are very similar under eternalism than presentism should make the analogy more convincing, no?

I have experiences (or an experience) at a particular time. I don't agree that this must necessarily be a part of some larger experience, which I can only take you to mean something like the rest of my life. Please correct me if you are referring to some other "larger experience" than this. To be clear, I consider an experience to be a part of my entire life, I just take issue with calling my entire life "an experience". — Luke

Yes, I am not referring to the sense of having multiple experiences that you describe, one that involves the passage of time. Remember the context in which I am referring to having a larger experience over time is within the context of the eternalist worm theory, in which the passage of time isn't real. Given that you seem to have a strong stance against the eternalist view, then I am not sure if you would even think the latter makes sense, but understand that I am certainly not saying that we have multiple experiences as through the passage of time.

I think that a worm is a representation of a person/object's lifetime/existence. I don't think that a representation or a lifetime can have its own experiences. I believe that a person can have experiences over their lifetime, however. — Luke

According to the worm theory, the temporally extended worm isn't just a representation. The block universe isn't neither. There literally is a real sense in which the Big Bang exists and 2018 exists, because the block universe isn't just a map, but the real territory. The worm is actually a real entity that is composed of multiple times.

Again, I think the situation with you is similar to TGW. You think that the very ideas of the worm theory itself are nonsensical, which is why when I try to frame my argument in a way that tries to accommodate the theory and remain neutral among all the theories of time, you either find it unnecessary or equally nonsensical. Of course, I don't really share that same feeling and am willing to grant that the view makes sense. At this point my job isn't just to clarify what my argument says, but to actually convince you that a metaphysical position that you reject is worth considering, which is a bigger order.

Suppose that Jones made a decision that he would wake up early in the morning. However, some seconds later, his decision does not exist. This scenario is based on presentism. — quine

True, but he would say that it did exist.

Presentism will delete your every experience occurred in the past. — quine

It will also delete dinosaurs and historical figures as well. Is that a problem? I don't think it would make sense to say that they are still around, that they still have a real existence like you and me.

And presentism also doesn't subscribe to the reality of future events either unlike eternalism. The death of our sun isn't just waiting there in the horizon, it doesn't exist at all. That doesn't sound problematic either.

Tell me, when you talk about having two experiences together, are you bringing in some notion of the flow of time into the mix? That is, when a person has two experiences, one of skydiving and one of smelling burnt toast, then do you see the person as having them in sequence with the passage of time, according to an A-theory of time?

I've explained it several times and you continually fail to address it: I find it peculiar to consider two distinct, temporally-distant experiences (e.g. decades apart) to be referred to as a singular experience. How do you justify this unusual use of the term? — Luke

I have given reasons, if you have been reading. We have no problems considering having multiple experiences in space for a single subject that would necessarily combine together. Experiences may be "separated by space" but that doesn't mean anything to saying they are had together. Space is not time, but they are very similar to one another (even more so under eternalism, where it is often claimed that time is another dimension of space), so it seems there is no reason for us not to say the same applies for a being who is temporally extended through time.

The only reason why I think you would disagree is if you just simply assume that having a larger experience means that all the experiences are had "at the same time". But I see no reason for this understanding. Furthermore, your sense of "together" as "together at a time" is too restrictive. The worm theory says that a temporally extended being has their temporal parts "together". Do they mean "together at a time" where "time" means one of the moments of the worm's life? Certainly not, any more than we would say that have all of our body parts at a single point in space. But does this mean that the worm theory is obviously false? Maybe it is to you, but it seems like a lot of people are fine with saying that a person has their temporal parts together without trouble, so either they're wrong or you are.

Whether you have read these reasons or not, you certainly haven't addressed them, instead repeating the same unjustified assumption that just because two experiences that a subject experiences are temporally separated, there is no larger experience which contains both.

I've already granted that a person can have more than one experience at a time, and I provided the example of having a conversation and hearing background noise simultaneously. — Luke

I was asking if it is possible for you to not have a larger experience featuring them both. And again I should note that we are talking about both experiences being had at the same time.

The relevant difference being that we don't experience our lives all at once, or have every experience of our lives available to us "in full" at a single glance. For example, two distinct experiences might be had decades apart, where they do not form a combined, singular experience. — Luke

And I imagine that this "single glance" implicitly means "at a time", "simultaneously", and "at the same moment" right?

I don't know, should it? Why should it? You are attributing the experiences that you actually have (in the real world) to the eternalist model, and then subsequently make the assumption that the eternalist model has implications on what we should experience. Sounds backwards to me. — Luke

Okay, let's just consider the spatial case. I am a body extended through space. My eyes register visual experiences, my ear audio, etc. Does this have any implication for what I experience, as the body who has all of these different body parts as a part of myself? If not, then what does?

No, I think that your talk of worms having experiences is nonsensical. Also, how you seem to think that it is unproblematic for a worm to have a combined experience of two distinct experiences which may be years or decades apart. Worms don't have experiences of a person's entire lifetime; people have experiences throughout their lifetime, and in a particular sequence. — Luke

I am not sure if you are just instinctively saying "no" whenever I ask you for clarification, because I've found more than once that your responses to my questions have no connection to what I have asked about, I mean at all.

Do you think the temporally extended worms of human lives are not "human beings"?
Do you think that temporally extended worms cannot possibly have experiences?

I believe that it is a general feature of a single conscious subject to be continually ageing and moving forward in time. — Luke

How do objects "change" their position over time without a flow of time? You need to implicitly assume a flow of time for the concept of change to make any sense. Changing where I focus my attention on the static timeline does not constitute any real change, it's just an attempt to smuggle in change via my attention (which really does change!). And I'm pretty sure that if (e.g.) blood doesn't flow through our veins, if our brain impulses don't fire, and if we don't continue to breathe in and out, then we will soon lose consciousness. — Luke

The situation with you is starting to sound like the one I have with TGW. Even though you reject my argument, you don't reject my conclusion. In fact, you would go one step further and deny eternalism altogether. To you the very concept of the block universe doesn't make sense, and so much as we have been disagreeing, as far as I can tell, we have been disagreeing about whether or not the notion of temporally extended worms and their experiences even make sense.

I thought that was the point in contention? — Luke

I'm not sure I understand you. Earlier I said that the disagreement laid with me saying that having an experience x and an experience y means having an experience of "x and y". You said I misrepresented you and said that the real disagreement laid with the fact having both experiences entails having a combined experience. This suggests that you see a difference between the two. Explain what that difference is.

An experience of x and an experience of y need not be a combined experience, as they can be two distinct, separate, temporally-distant experiences. Although you could refer to them as a singular experience, I take you to mean that the experience of red on my left and blue on my right are not temporally-distant experiences. If they were, then it would be peculiar to refer to them as a single experience, instead of two individual experiences. — Luke

Let's say that both experiences are had at the same time. Is it possible to have an experience of x and an experience of y without having a combined experience? If so, can you imagine what that would even be like? For instance, is it possible to have an experience of seeing red and seeing blue without seeing an image of red and blue?

Besides, if any two (x and y) experiences must be combined into a single experience, then all experiences must be combined into a single experience. — Luke

Indeed. I believe that is a general feature of a single conscious subject having two experiences.

How, then, can you distinguish, or even speak about, one experience as distinct from the rest? It then all becomes just one big experience. This seems to create some problems for your OP, where you speak of having more than one experience.. — Luke

We can distinguish individual parts of our experiences easy. If I am looking at a picture of the Mona Lisa, then I can identify the visual experience of her hair, and the visual experience of her eyes. In fact I can even identify and compare the different parts that visual experience I have. Nothing wrong or problematic with that. But that doesn't mean that I have those experiences separately or that I do not have the visual experience of the Mona Lisa in full.

How does it have implications on what we should experience? — Luke

If I am a being who is extended through space and time, and the parts that I have at every spatio-temporal contain experiences, then shouldn't be relevant to what I, as a being who is composed of those parts, experience?

I don't know what beings you are talking about, but I'm talking about normal human beings and the way that we actually have experiences. You are talking about some abstract nonsense which has little to do with human beings. — Luke

So you think the notion of temporal worms itself is nonsensical? I am not sure what else you think I am talking about here.

Charitable or not, I find it impossible for us to have consciousness or experiences, or for there to even be the illusion of a flow of time, in a static, motionless universe. I don't think that beings in an eternalist world would be zombies, because even that suggests some sort of motion. If the eternalist theory proposes that the universe is truly motionless, then why be charitable about it? Advocates of the theory are welcome to explain it. — Luke

The problem is that most such arguments as far as I have heard them, seem to be unjustified. I have heard people say that if time doesn't flow then experience cannot happen, but they usually misinterpret eternalism or assume requirements about conscious experience that aren't plausible. The eternalist, for instance, wouldn't say the world is motionless because motion does not require the flow of time, it only requires that objects change position over time. In addition, I do not see how consciousness would require the flow of time either.

If someone were to say physicalism on the grounds that it says we are all zombies, then I believe they would also be acting unfair because I see no reason to believe physicalism in general to reject conscious experience (unless of course you are an eliminativist about it). Maybe you think it is satisfactory to reject eternalism in that manner, but for me, I find it insufficient.

You misrepresent the point in contention. The point in contention is whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have a combined experience of x and y. My going to Disneyland when I was five years old and my going to Disneyland last week do not constitute some "combined experience" - they are separate and distinct experiences. I suppose I could talk about the singular "experience" of my entire life, but this strikes me as a virtual misuse of the word, and it is not the same meaning of "experience" as you have used when describing our 'point in contention' above. Also, you are not referring to the experience of a person, but of a person's worm. — Luke

An experience of x and y is a combined experience. I am not sure what the distinction is to you. Similarly an experience of a red patch on my left side of my vision and a blue patch on my right is a combined experience of red and blue. It is an experience of red and blue.

Eternalism (and the worm conception of time) is an ontological theory of existence, not experience. You are importing your own bizarre assumptions about experience. — Luke

The worm conception of time is an ontological theory of time that has implications on what we should experience. I am making no such assumptions about the experience of temporally extended beings apart from those we usually make to spatially extended beings.

Presentism is a theory of time which is consistent with the way we have experiences and apparently move forward in time. It is up to eternalism to try and account for why it seems this way to us. You can presume that a temporal worm has experiences, and has all of the experiences that an individual will have across their lifetime, but this still won't account for (temporally-speaking) the main issue: why does time appear to flow and why do we appear to have these experiences in a presentist way, moving forward in time from one moment to the next? It's not being uncharitable to eternalism that it cannot account for this; that's just the problem with eternalism. — Luke

There is a difference between saying that eternalism says that we shouldn't be consciousness whatsoever (that the phenomenon of conscious experience necessarily requires a flow of time) and that eternalism cannot account for our experiences of feeling like time flows. The former is not charitable because it assumes that beings in an eternalist world are zombies which we evidently are not. However this seems like too strong a stance to take.

I agree that it is reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings, like us, can have experiences. However, I disagree that some aggregate of our entire existence, unlike us, can have its own consciousness or experience, including any meta-experience (or "larger experience") of two distinct, temporally-distant experiences at once. — Luke

I am sorry, but what is the difference between being temporally extended and being an aggregate of more than one time?

Personally, I have never had a "combined experience" of two distinct, temporally distant experiences, and I'm pretty sure that nobody else ever has, either. — Luke

Does that matter? The point in contention is merely whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y together means that they have an experience of x and y. I argue that that is just a general fact about having multiple experiences together, just as much as having the property of being bald and the property of being a man means having the property of being a bald man.

Why you are so intent on attributing experience to a hypothetical aggregate of your temporal existence (i.e. your temporal worm) is beyond me. — Luke

Um, because according to the worm theory I am actually supposed to be a temporally extended being that should, presumably, have multiple experiences together?

If you want to say that such a temporally extended entity cannot possibly have any sort of experiences then it would seems the worm conception of time is obviously false because evidently, you and I do have experiences. Of course that would also work to rejecting the view (which is my goal anyways) as will TGW's overall rejection of eternalism in general, but I find it either to be question begging or uncharitable to the view. I think it reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings can have experiences just as much as spatially extended beings do, and my argument is simply to show how the implications of those facts lead to conclusions that we just don't find in our own experiences.

It is a fact about English that things stated in the present tense are anchored to the speech time (for the most part – it's more complicated than that). A theory that denies this cannot be correct. I don't have any views on whether eternalism is committed to such a thing. My guess is they would plead that they are using 'exists,' if they're inclined to do so, in some technical sense that differs from how it's used in ordinary English. I would also be skeptical, however, that they have a coherent notion of the sense in which they are using it. — The Great Whatever

I am not an eternalist but I am not sure if the eternalist view in itself is nonsensical. As far as I can tell, the sense in which they use the word "exists" is pretty much how a presentist would say the present "exists". I don't see much of a problem with that, but apparently you do.

Like I said earlier, eternalism can be interpreted as a version of presentism, albeit a strange version of it. It's just that, apart from rejecting the flow of time, the present moment that they consider "now" includes events from the Big Bang to the end of the universe. What they would call the "speech time" when they say that the "Big Bang exists" would be much bigger than the instantaneous moment that presentists would normally call "now" and include all the moments in the universe's history. Of course, this may sound incoherent at first, because how can the speech time refer to multiple times in the universe's history? How can the present moment consist of multiple moments in time? It doesn't make sense. However I suspect that the eternalist here would distinguish between two different senses of time in order to get around that. The speech time is the time that we are usually familiar with and operates like it usually does, but the "time" in which we take events like the BIg Bang to exist in, the time of the block universe, is introduced as an extra dimension (let's call it "sime" to differentiate it from time) within which all the different moments in the universe's history, all the years of our history, can be laid out. Events are laid out in order like they are in time, where the Big Bang exists at an earlier sime than that of the creation of the Earth, and 2018 is at a later sime than 2017. Put this way, there doesn't seem to be a problem anymore. The eternalist can talk about the past, the present, and the future existing at different simes while still being able to say that they all exist at the time of this utterance (and please note that here this time of utterance that our present tense claims are anchored to does not refer to a particular sime, which was a fact that I have been trying to emphasize throughout our discussion). Technically, they are still making use of the present tense, and framing their claims in a temporal manner, but now they are able to make sense of events such as the Big Bang and 2018 existing. I am not sure if this way of describing eternalism is satisfactory to you, but that is just how I see it.

It may be a potentially convincing premise infelicitously worded. But I think any felicitous wording of it would make it mean something like 'Right now, I only find that I have the experiences I have right now.' — The Great Whatever

Like, I said before, depending on your views on time, the premise could be read differently, some of which may probably be acceptable to you. For instance, the non-eternalist presentist could read P3. as "At the time of this utterance, I only experience the contents of a single time", and that is because nothing exists but the present moment, which would necessarily have to be the moment in which you make the utterance. Of course such a premise would sound trivial when expressed this way, and I agree that it doesn't sound remotely interesting, but this speaks more to the fact that you aren't an eternalist than any triviality of P3. itself. I imagine that this reading of the premise shouldn't be difficult to accept for you, at least I think.

If they are using the English language, that's all that sentence can mean. It's not up to them to decide what it means.
...
That is what "now" means. It is not a question of what I mean by it. — The Great Whatever

So the eternalist view in your opinion, is completely incoherent? You did say that you considered the view to be stupid, so is that the reason why?

My argument, despite its goals, was meant to be expressed in a manner that is neutral to the different views of time. My main target here would be the eternalists (who would believe eternalism to not only be coherent, but true) who are also worm theorists. I suspect your disagreement lies in the fact that you don't think that it is possible to do so, because you find one of those views to be internally inconsistent.

Good. Then let's drop references to eternalism altogether and just talk about P3. So no more saying "but on an eternalist view..." etc. That is simply irrelevant. — The Great Whatever

References to eternalism would help me understand what you are saying better. I will drop it once I feel like we are on the same page and understand what we both mean by the things we say. That said...

Apparently you mean only the experiences that exist. Okay, but the word 'exist' is inflected for the present tense, such that for an experience to exist is for it to be happening (or being undergone) now. But you've said this is not what you intend. — The Great Whatever

When an eternalist says that the Big Bang exists, do they mean that in the present tense? That it is happening now?

If so, then it certainly doesn't mean it is happening "now" as in "at the moment of this utterance" because the Big Bang doesn't exist "now". Unless, by now, you do not mean "at the time of this utterance" but something more general than that? If so, then I will agree with saying that I am experiencing only sitting in my room now.

They did exist. — The Great Whatever

They don't exist anymore.

If you mean in the ordinary sense, of course I believe in the passage of time, because time passes. — The Great Whatever

Then why didn't you say that earlier? There is only one sense of the passage of time I know of.

But if you require this to be an argument contingent on eternalism, as it seems to be in your OP, it seems you can just as easily convert any such notion into there just being distinct times at which things happen. I mean, I think eternalism is stupid, but that isn't my point, I'm just focusing on your argument, which has an unconvincing premise. — The Great Whatever

It's not contingent upon eternalism. The argument is meant to refute a view of eternalism, but the premise in question does not require one to adopt eternalism like I keep saying.

Every theory of time says that something exists. The presentist says the present moment exists, the eternalist says that all times exist, and the growing block theorist says that the past and present exist. As well, the worm theorist says that the me that exists is a temporally extended worm, while the stage theorist and presentist say that me only refers to a single time. So much as my P3. talks about me only experiencing a single time, I am talking about the me that exists, not what will exist and has existed (which strictly speaking, no longer exist).

I can't parse this clause. — The Great Whatever

Just corrected that phrase (Just take out the "am"). Sorry about that.

If I think about my total experiences, I find that I have had some, have some now and will have others later. So clearly they aren't limited to a single time. Why would I believe P3, then? — The Great Whatever

If your "total experiences" include experiences that don't exist (such as experiences that existed or will exist), then that is not the total experience I am talking about. I only mean the experiences that exist.

I asked you to use a new word because you were abusing the English word 'now' by using it incorrectly. — The Great Whatever

So? Doesn't change the fact that you asked me to do something but then asked me why I was doing it later.

When did they happen? If they both happen in the past, I would say they both existed. — The Great Whatever

See, it's statements like these that make me think you are bringing in a flow of time.

(BTW, what is your stance on time? I've asked you this question before with no response but I am genuinely curious, even if it is not going to be relevant.)

I think a more sensible thing to say about past events is that they happened. Asking whether they exist seems infelicitous to begin with, but to the extent I can make sense of it, it seems to be a matter of asking whether they're happening, which of course they aren't, but they did happen. — The Great Whatever

In the block universe, those events both exist though. If you are saying that the experience of sitting in your room and the experience of the train do not exist (you reject the above statement), then I cannot see how you can say we experience both, other than by saying that they are experienced with the passage of time.

Of course, my P3. has nothing to do with this notion. It says for the experiences that exist that I have, they are only limited to a single time, because the contents that I find in my total experience are only of a single time.

So why use the word NOW? Can you just reword your claim using the word 'exists' instead? — The Great Whatever

Because you asked me to create a new word to describe what it means to you. If just using the word exists suffices for you then whatever. So according to eternalism, past present and future events all exist. According to presentism only the present moment exists. Does that make sense to you?

Are you asking if I have both experiences while I exist. Of course – I have to exist to have an experience. — The Great Whatever

Do you object to this statement: "Both the experience of sitting in my room and the experience of being on a train exist"?

More specifically, do both the experience of sitting in my room and the experience of being on the train exist like we would say that both the events of the big bang and the event of the creation of Earth are said to exist under the Block universe (again, I'm not requiring to you to accept the latter)?

What does it mean to generally exist? Is that different form existing? — The Great Whatever

It just means what it says. If something exists, then it is a part of what is NOW.

I think that there's a time t1 at which I have an experience and then later another time t2 at which I have another. Is that the passage of time? — The Great Whatever

So far as I can tell, nope. But then again, you also mention that you "will" have experiences at those times and have "had" other experiences, which seem indicative of you talking about the passage of time. Though really, how can I tell?

No. — The Great Whatever

Okay, we could've just continued from there then. What is NOW includes what generally exists. According to the Block Universe all times are NOW, while presentism states that only a single present moment is NOW. Assuming that you understand these theories (and aren't pulling my leg), what do you find difficult to understand here?

What do you mean by the passage of time? It requires that there be different times, with each of the experiences had at different ones. — The Great Whatever

If you don't really understand what the passage of time is, then I don't know if I can really tell you, since to me it's a basic concept. It's that thing that everyone in the philosophy of time talks about.

Also, I don't know what to make of that other statement of yours. At least not in terms of a specific interpretation.

Do you know what NOW means? Does your conception of having multiple experiences require the passage of time (yes/no)?

I keep asking you questions like these, but you either choose not to answer them or not answer them directly. I cannot understand what you mean when you say something like "clearly I experience more than just this one time" unless you help clear up my specific concerns. Maybe it sounds obvious to you, but so far, it seems like you are operating on a misunderstanding, though it is one I still have yet to determine exactly.

If I have an experience of getting up and going to work, that experience might both involve sitting in my room, and then letter being on the train, yes. — The Great Whatever

Do both of these experiences exist together NOW? (Not saying if they exist at the same time, mind you). Or does this experience of getting up and going to work require events passing in time?

You also want to say that there is some sort of eternalist way to have experiences. I reject this claim, and your example of simultaneously seeing a red and a blue patch (at the same time!) does not help to address how one can possibly have some "larger experience" of two different experiences that are temporally distant from each other. — Luke

I was giving you an example of what I mean when I talk about what a larger experience is. Nowhere does this definition refer to anything like having to experience red and blue "simultaneously". You were the one who imposed that restriction earlier and here you continue to insist upon it now. But I see no reason for this restriction.

You might as well say that by having red and blue experiences together, we must always refer to having them all in the same place (the same spatial point!). But of course that is just false. Some parts of my eye can register red experiences while other parts can register blue experiences, both being spatially separated. So being an extended body that has those eyes as parts of me, I am exposed to a set of experiences that consists of me having red experiences at some spatial locations of my body and blue experiences at others. But that doesn't stop me from having a combined experience which includes both. I can have a combined experience which is described as "red at the left side of my vision and blue on the right". In fact, I always find I do have to have such an experience if I were to have them both.

Similarly, I see no reason why a temporal worm extended in time, who would be exposed to, say, experiencing skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2 would not have a combined experience of "skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2" in a manner similar to how we can experience "red on the left side of my vision and blue on the right". Despite the differences between the two, time is a dimension just like space (which is even more true when we consider the block universe!), and here, being extended over time and having multiple experiences over time is no different than being extended over space and having multiple experiences over space. In the latter case you seem to want to allow such beings to have a combined experience, but in the former you don't.

Not at the same instant no. By parts of an experience I mean just that. For instance, I have a visual experience of a forest, but it can contain a bunch of smaller visual experiences of trees located in differents parts of my vision as parts.

When you say you experience both sitting in a room and being on a train, are you saying that you find yourself having an experience where sitting in your room and being on the train are parts of that experience?