I'm not sure if the concept of existence can even be defined. To me, it sounds more like a fundamental term, one that cannot be reduced to anything else. Thus any attempt at explaining it is meaningless.

Agreed. One deals with physics, while the other deals with metaphysics. The scientific models by themselves don't necessitate any particular worldview; that would require an additional argument.

I can understand where you're coming from, but it seems like if we ask a soldier why he saved his comrades, he wouldn't disagree that he did so because he couldn't live with himself if he didn't. In other words, the guilt that he would face if he let his friends die is something that makes dying in their place more preferable. And it could be argued that this sort of thinking applies to every person who wishes to help others. The idea that they provided assistance to avoid guilt sounds just as appropriate as saying that they did so because they wished to help. — Alec

Even if the soldier would feel guilty if they didn't perform their action, was that what was on their mind when they saved their comrades? Were they thinking "Oh dear, my friends are going to die and it would be such a pain if I have to deal with the resulting guilt" (which is the sort of thinking they'd have if they were really being self centred) or were they more concerned with the fact that their friends are actually in danger? In addition, wouldn't the fact that they felt guilty be a signal that there is more to their decision to save their friends other than the pain that comes from this guilt?

Now, let's say we have an ecosystem. Mr. Reductionist claims that said ecosystem can be explained in purely physical terms. Mr. Irreductionist claims that it can't. Mr. Reduction anything in that ecosystem can be explained by the motions of its constituent particles, since it's all made of matter anyway. Mr. Irreductionist claims that it can't, because explaining the actions of any particular particle fully will require an account of its interactions with other particles, so the whole thing telescopes out. Mr. Reductionist says that, even after "telescoping out," the whole business will still just be a bunch of particles. Mr. Irreductionist then asks what, exactly, Mr. Reductionist is trying to explain. — Pneumenon

If Mr. Irreductionist's objection to Mr. Reductionist's picture amounts to a merely pointing out that the individual motions of the particles requires taking into account the other particles, then it seems like there is no substantive disagreement between them. It would seem like Mr. Irreductionist would still ultimately agree that the ecosystem can in theory be described by a system of interacting particles, so it seems like the dispute is methodological. However, if Mr. Irreductionist's claim requires that there exist something over and above the particles themselves and their interactions, then there would be a substantive disagreement because we are now talking about an ontological dispute.

Is altruistic action necessarily mutually exclusive with inflicting harm though? If the intent of causing suffering in others is so that they too can achieve salvation, then I don't see why that can't be considered selfless. It is only when the intent was selfish that we don't have altruism, but such intent need not be present in the above, at least as I conceive it.

What about our conversation? Are you doubting whether or not we are having a discussion right now?

There's not a lot of clarity here. — Banno

You're right, there isn't. I've no idea what you're trying to say and it seems like you're deliberately being obtuse.

I don't, but I thought our conversation was about defining reincarnation.

Or perhaps you might explain what a subject is? — Banno

The entity that is having the experience. As for what that entity is exactly, that is something I cannot answer, as that is linked to the problems of understanding consciousness. But that doesn't stop us from understanding the former so I really don't see what you're on about.

I've no idea what it might mean. — Banno

The same subject who had Napoleon's experiences now has Banno's experiences. I honestly have no idea what's not to get about that.

I have long rejected reincarnation on the grounds that it uses a confused notion of the self. It is unclear how Banno could be the very same person who was previously Napoleon... — Banno

Banno is the reincarnation of Napoleon in the sense that both of those individuals share the same subject of experience. Do you have a problem with this definition? You may believe that they are both not the same "person" because you have a particular idea of what a "person" should be, but that just means that reincarnation doesn't involve a persistence of personhood.

Perhaps I have trouble understanding your scenario, but the idea of someone freezing their own time without freezing the time outside themselves doesn't seem to make sense to me. The examples that people have given seem to involve instances where people's perception of time is slowed down, but that is quite different from being completely frozen. A person can experience a billion years in a second, but not an instant (or whatever the smallest unit of time is, if you believe there is one). The former can be explained away as a difference in processing rates between one person's mind and the rest of the world, but such a phenomenon is quite normal, even occurring in our everyday lives where people's perception of time can slow down during critical moments.

The only way I can imagine the scenario is if the person is able to pause the world around themselves and the unpause it if they decide to resume their lives (like that episode of the Twilight Zone with the stopwatch), but in that case the answer is simple in that the world itself will be frozen forever without you getting killed at all. However, you said that that isn't what's going on, so to me the only other option would be that the question sounds meaningless. At that point, I can only say that because the question lacks any meaning, then there is no answer to it.

No it's not. We haven't had drastic changes in our livelihood over short periods of time. If it were a totalitarian regime it could fluctuate based on the leader. Since the Obama to Trump transfer of power there has been no huge change, the constitution still applies and all changes that happen in future will be slow. A totalitarian regime can change over night based on the absolute rulings of their leaders. That was my point, of course there could be stability like you mentioned in a totalitarian regime, but the democracy is overall more stable. — yatagarasu

I wasn't really referring to our livelihood, but the type of government that a country would have over time. Speaking of livelihood though, you say that it can change depending upon the leader, but of course, with totalitarian governments that's the one thing that rarely changes. If a leader is corrupt and selfish, then they will use any opportunity to better themselves at the expense of their people and unless they have a sudden change of heart (which sounds very unlikely) than the people will continue to suffer under their rule.

Corruption is just as bad in both systems, you just see its impact more readily in totalitarian regimes. Money in politics, division of the lower class by elites over "ideology" all are signs of corruption (propaganda). Bribery happens secretly but in broad daylight through "campaign contributions", which in most 3rd world countries is just called bribing. Democracy biggest achievement is its ability to slow down corruptions impact on the system as a whole (and it's population). — yatagarasu

Sure, there is corruption in both systems, but I wouldn't agree that they are both just as bad. Not only is it easier to get away with corruption under a totalitarian system than it is a democracy, but it is easier to get away with a greater amount of evil. A totalitarian ruler can execute someone in public and no one can do anything about it, but don't expect Donald Trump to get off with shooting someone on fifth avenue (though whether or not he would lose his core support is another issue). Democracy isn't able to stop all kinds of corruption, but it is, despite its flaws, able to stop the worst instances of corruption.

Um, since when did choice become a part of all this? Our discussion mainly had to do with determinism and its compatibility with QM, and not with free will. But if you're not interested in having a discussion, then I can't really do anything about that.

They don't study Bohm, instead they just copy errors. Bell actually took the time to study the equations and came up with a way of understanding it better. Bell favored Bohm's approach. Of course others later on tested Bell's equation later in the laboratory.

As I have said in other thread, scientists are human and they are full of biases. Bohm should have received a Nobel Prize for doing the impossible, instead he was ostracized and marginalized - by everyone except Bell. — Rich

As if Bell and Bohm were the only Bohmians around. And everyone else is simply biased against Bohm? I'm sorry, but there have been plenty of physicists who have written papers analyzing Bohmian Mechanics in detail and a number of them that I've glanced over acknowledge that they are discussing it as a deterministic interpretation.

I count four deterministic interpretations. Bohm no. Many-Worlds, Many-Mind, still probabilistic in our world and universe. And the last one I never heard of. — Rich

There are also the agnostic ones as well. Like I said all of these positions are compatible with a deterministic position.

I would like you to consider the silliness of Many-Minds. Observe to what extent scientists will the to deny choice in humans. It's bizarre. — Rich

Your arguments against MW and MM apparently stem from it's non-intuitiveness. However, for one, intuition is rarely a good guide to understanding reality, so you need something more substantial than that. In addition, it's hard to single out the strangeness of MWI when pretty much every interpretation suffers from a certain degree of non-intuitiveness itself.

The key to understanding the Bohm solution is the quantum potential. There is a lot there so rather than actually studying it, people just copy errors. — Rich

To be frank, I am still skeptical that many people, including physicists who should know better, are prone to this error. Some part of me suspects that there are different versions of Bohmian Mechanics, one which is commonly known to be deterministic and one which, according to Bohm, is not (this is what he calls the "Causal Interpretation"). Bohm apparently has gone through different phases in his thinking over the course of his life, having taken a mystical approach in his later years. The fact is, he did explicitly describe the Bohm interpretation as being deterministic when he introduced it in the 50s, your quote having been made in the late 80s. This would explain his spiritual sounding language in your quote, but this is just speculation from a lay reader who currently can't really determine the technical details of it all.

Either way, I have not mentioned this earlier, but you have only responded to two-three of the seven interpretations which allow for determinism. You still haven't demonstrated that QM is inherently indeterministic. And no, the Bell Inequality Tests do not demonstrate indeterminism, only the falsity of local realism.

Hmm, interesting. I didn't know of that. Unfortunately, like I said earlier, I have no technical knowledge to rely on so I can't look into it. The best I can do is listen to what others have to say about it. Still not entirely sure what " creative operation of underlying, and yet subtler, levels of reality" could mean though.

I just told you my source is Bohm himself. Read the source and not some chart. That is What I did. — Rich

Then perhaps you can show me a quote where he specifically says that his Bohmian theory is indeterministic.

You realize that Bohm himself said that his equations are causal but not deterministic. — Rich

What's the difference? Is causal compatible with uncaused indeterminism?

They can't be because the quantum potential has to be probabilistic and it's right there as a probabilistic function in his equation. So that person who created that chart is just copying someone else's error. It happens when people are lazy. — Rich

I'm sorry, but it's actually common knowledge that the Bohm interpretation is deterministic. It's a non-local hidden variables theory. The only person I've heard that seems to be suggesting otherwise is you. Of course I don't have the technical know-how to understand the details of the Bohm Interpretation myself (and it'd be impractical of me to learn about it on the fly) so I can only put your word against theirs.

That everything(almost everything) in this universe happens according to our laws of physics does not mean that everything is determined. — Barry

Yeah, I originally meant to say that the vast majority of our scientific theories (barring QM which is debatable) are and have been deterministic and operate on deterministic mechanisms. That's clearly evidence of determinism and not zero evidence.

Quantum mechanics predicts the chance of a particulair event. For example if one is about to measure the position of an electron, quantum mechanics can predict the chance you will find the electron in lets say position x. It is impossible to predict exactly what will happen. Not because the theory is incomplete or a because of a lack of information. It seems that this is how nature works, which would suggest that the universe is nondeterministic. — Barry

Like I told Rich and the OP, there are different interpretations of QM, and not all of them are deterministic. A deterministic worldview is just as compatible with the science as any.

1) There is no such thing as the Laws of Nature. It is a made up please with no definition. It is precisely equivalent to God and has its roots in religion. — Rich

Then what are the scientists looking for if not laws that describe how our world works?

2) Science says that events are non-deterministic. If they were we could throw out Schrodinger's equation and replace it with Newton's. But, alas, science decided 100 years ago that Newton's Laws do not correspond to experimental evidence including Bell's Inequality which demonstrate non-locality. — Rich

This is the listing of all of the interpretations of QM (there are probably more but this is most of them). Realize that not all of them are indeterministic:



The Schrodinger Equation works, certainly. It's been experimentally verified time and time again by science. How we choose to interpret that is a whole other matter.

Determinism has zero evidence. There is absolutely nothing to support the notion that everything is determined or anything it's determined and the choices we make are either governed by some supernatural God or Laws of Nature which in turn are mystically creating the illusion of choice. — Rich

Yeah, determinism has zero evidence, apart from the fact that we find that pretty much everything in the physical universe is determined by the laws of nature. That's what science is all about.

In 1920's 'they' found out that the idea of determinism is not right due to the discovery of quantum physics. So how do quantum physics give the Universe 'free will'? Or is quantum physics just an other thing we have yet to fully understand and is determinism still right? — FMRovers

Not necessarily true. The Copenhagen interpretation of QM says that there is indeterminism, but there also exist other interpretations as well that say there are hidden variables which support a causal view of nature, such as the Bohm interpretation. In fact, there are plenty of interpretations, some of which are deterministic but some aren't, and there doesn't seem to be any consensus agreement that any one is true, so the question of determinism is up for grabs.

As for the implications of this quantum indeterminism on free will if such indeterminism does exist, whether or not this grants us "free will" depends on what you want to get out of the idea. If by "free" you are just looking for us to make decisions that are unhinged by any sort of deterministic influence (simply making choices that are uncaused), then we can technically have free will if we can draw a clear line linking the decision making processes in our minds and the quantum process of the subatomic world. In theory, this seems possible, as the former is reducible to the latter, but it seems like a very rare occurrence even if it does occur. Of course, if you're looking for anything more substantial than that (or somehow less "chaotic") than that, then I don't think you can get that from QM.

The fact is, QM isn't really the best theory we have, since it doesn't mesh well with GR, and vice versa for GR. We are still looking for a theory of Quantum Gravity so it's likely that one or both will be replaced in the future. How this all will mesh with determinism isn't really clear, but it seems like alot of different ideas are on the table with respect to a theory of QG (continuity, the multiverse and the existence of higher dimensions being some examples), so it's debatable which ones are right and which are wrong.

I doubt that most Quinians or Wittgensteinians would say that it is a benign regress and would reject it, given it's similarity to the Modus-Ponen's infinite regress paradox of Lewis Carroll, as used by critics of truth-by-convention to attack the idea that the notion of logical necessity is representable or derivable from a finite supply of community conventions. — sime

Okay, so what exactly in the infinite chain is objectionable?

Also, what is this "Modus-Ponen's infinite regress" you're referring to? Quick google search doesn't give me anything.

One variety of vicious infinite regress could be when trying to justify some proposition, p, and justifying p is done with (or requires) a different proposition, p1, which, in turn, depends on p2, ..., ad infinitum, where pn diverges. — jorndoe

I think this sounds similar to my own theory, just with different wording. Instead of saying that an infinite regress involves "solving a problem", you instead say that it would involve justification. I've also heard it said that a vicious regress is one that is meant to be explanatory as well, but again it all sounds the same to me.

On the other hand, if all propositions/claims can be shown to collapse into one (like pn+1 = pn), for example, then it's not a vicious infinite regress. — jorndoe

Interesting. So, would statements such as "Every event has a prior cause" and "Every region of space is composed of smaller regions" work here to describe an infinite past or a continuous interval of space? Though I am not sure if they qualify as regresses, I am inclined to think of continuity and causality as being benign if they are so that'd be nice.

First off, I would want to say that I do not believe in any sort of "objective" morality. Or to put it another way, I don't think that there any absolute fact as to what is right or wrong. However, that doesn't mean that I don't think that there doesn't exist any morality at all. Clearly we do have a deep-rooted sense as to what is right or wrong, and I believe that this is grounded in our own capacity as human beings to empathize and feel compassion for others. We are social beings after all, so it's not surprising that we have evolved with an inborn conscience. This, I think, is where laws such as the golden rule come from, and why they are so pervasive across different cultures.

Democracy's weakness and strength is the stability it gives. With totalitarianism you can actually have really good times if your leader is benevolent and knows what he is doing. (Example: See Singapore/Lee Kuan Yew, or Korea/Sejong the Great). But unfortunately most of history has been the exact opposite. Democracy avoids this but makes actually fixing issues a slow and sometimes impossible task. — yatagarasu

I think it's the opposite really. Democratic systems tend to change their ruling party from time to time (for instance just look at the U.S. where they went from Obama to Trump). In contrast, totalitarian countries usually have the same ruling party (and in a lot of cases the same person) as the head of government for decades. Democracy, if anything, is good at avoiding corruption, which is unfortunately something that most totalitarian governments fall victim to.

P2: Time and space emerged at the moment of the big-bang.
P3: Before the big-bang, there was neither time nor space.
P4: It is probable that there was a reason, or a cause, for the big-bang (for, the universe is magnificent and even contains conscious human beings with remarkable minds). — Brian A

Seems like you decided to go with the idea that the big bang was the origin of time and space. That seems to create a problem with your P4. though like I said earlier, because if there is no such thing as a "time before the big bang" then how can anything stand in a relation of causality to it? Causality conceptually requires time to exist.

Also, you say that the big bang, which caused the universe must have a cause because the universe is magnificent, but wouldn't the same reasoning apply to God, which I imagine you would also say is magnificent?

I'm having trouble reading your argument, since I don't see how your premises are all related to one
another (in the sense that they all should point to a single conclusion). Most of them seem to make unjustified assumptions about the world, and others seem to outright contradict each other if not the whole conclusion of the argument (with one of them being just a statement about the conclusion itself).

Premise-1: Everything in the world has a cause. — Brian A

Wait, wasn't your argument that an infinite chain of causation was impossible? That seems to be your conclusion, but apparently one of your premises assumes that the conclusion is false. If you're trying to prove that it is false by way of a reductio, then I do not see where that comes into play.

On top of that it may not necessarily be the case that the premise is true anyways. This premise assumes determinism but it is not clear that determinism is true.

Premise-2: If we trace the causes back, we arrive at the big bang, and the cause of the big bang. — Brian A

Willing to grant that current cosmological theories suggest that there was a big bang in the earliest moments of the universe that we know of, but the idea that there was a cause to the big bang is debatable. Some physicists have suggested that there is no meaning to a "time before the big bang" and therefore no meaning to a cause of the big bang.

Premise-3: Even if God was not the cause of the big-bang, and something natural was, still, it is very improbable that there is an infinite chain of causes going back forever. — Brian A

This is a bald assertion that basically states the conclusion you want to prove. Why is it improbable that there cannot be an infinite chain of causes? That is what your argument is trying to make the case for.

So on the one hand you have a premise that assumes that everything has a cause, and in another you have a premise that basically states that an infinite chain of causes is improbable, and your conclusion is that an infinite chain of causes is impossible.

Conclusion: Therefore, it is very probable that a non-contingent first cause exists; and this must be God, since there is nothing greater than the non-contingent first cause. — Brian A

Your conclusion makes other statements that might as well be additional premises: that there must exist a first cause, that it must be a non-contingent first cause, and that that cause must be God. Like the other premises, I think you need to offer some more supporting reasons for these statements as well.

I am on record for saying that the distance between any two events (points in spacetime) can be expressed by pure spatial separation or by pure temporal separation, or if right on the edge between the two, then undefined singularity. That assertion contradicts my denial of existence of things not in our reference frame. — noAxioms

So which one are you rejecting here? Seems like the former, but if that is the case, then I still don't understand where the assertion that some things don't exist in some reference frames if they are moving away faster than light. Your response still amounts to this assumption that they do, but I am afraid I don't see how or why.

Also, since we are on the topic of absolute frames, I don't think that GR allows for the notion of a reference frame, due to the curvature of space-time. Instead the idea of an absolute frame is replaced with a preferred global foliation, which though technically not a frame of reference, defines a global time like the correct inertial frame should under SR. I am not sure if your statements above apply there, but I think I should throw that out since GR is the theory we are currently using.

Any designation of one would render over 99% of the universe nonexistent since only a tiny percentage of matter exists in any particular frame. Most of it is increasing its distance from that frame at a pace considerably faster than light and thus can never ever interact with the matter reasonably stationary in the frame.The bulk of all matter is nonexistent in any given frame. — noAxioms

Not sure I am getting the connection between things that expand from us at a speed faster than light and them not existing. Sure they won't ever interact with us given the light speed limit and all, but that does not imply that they would cease to exist for us.

If the definition of Atheism is merely lack of belief, both of these diagrams make no sense whatsoever. — WiseMoron

I'm not sure about that, since any time I see a chart like the ones you brought up, they seem to always take atheism as being merely a lack of belief or "whatever isn't theism". Really, this is why people take the whole black and white approach with regards to atheism/theism, which is what your charts seem to indicate.

I also have a counter-argument against the definition of Atheism being merely lack of belief as well. Given that someone has the opinion that God doesn't exist and yet says s/he is an atheist, in the sense that s/he merely lacks belief, isn't that a contradiction in a way? What I am saying is, "having an opinion requires believing." If you merely lack belief in God, then you ought to be under the title of agnosticism than atheism because logically that makes more sense and is less misleading. I know that atheism isn't a religion, but how can you have an opinion on the same subject that you have no belief nor disbelief in? That makes no sense to me. Also, beliefs aren't only in the systems called religions, anyways. It makes more sense to me that atheism is disbelief and not merely lack of belief. — WiseMoron

The response here, I imagine, for someone defending the definition in question is that if your stance on God does not include a belief that he exists, regardless of whatever opinion you hold on the matter, you are an atheist by definition. Your objection amounts to using a definition they already reject and the whole disagreement lies in the differing ways you both define the terms "agnostic" and "atheist".

That is not to say I don't sympathize with your definition. Indeed, the thing that irks me about the definitions that atheists have been insisting upon has always been the way in which it obscures the difference between simply not having an opinion, and disbelief (believing that God does not exist). For instance, I believe that the Earth revolves around the Sun is true, and I believe also that Santa Claus existing is false, but I am on the fence on whether Donald Trump colluded with the Russians and I am not willing to say whether that is true or false. All three are clearly different stances on a particular issue, and to me it'd be better if they were distinguished with the proper terms, but by redefining atheism as being merely "not theism", we lose that distinction.

Like, imagine if we decided to flip the scenario and had atheism traditionally defined as disbelief and theism as "whatever isn't atheism". We'd have the same problem of course, but I imagine the atheists wouldn't be the ones pushing this definition for reasons I'll leave you to figure out.

Based on what? — Coldlight

Give me any belief that you have apart from those about your experiences and your existence. Do you know that any of these beliefs are true with absolute certainty?

I never said that a fact stated as absolute with certainly is to be believed without thinking. — Coldlight

I never said you did. I was saying that a fact can be believed without being absolutely certain with regard to its truth. In fact I'd say most of our beliefs, apart from introspective beliefs (such as the cogito and our own direct experience), are like this. I don't know with certainty if there is an external world, that I'm not a brain in a vat, but my money is definitely on that being true, that I know for certain. For what little we do absolutely know, that can work as an argument against the metaphysical agnosticism you're talking about, but again I should note that it doesn't apply to agnosticism as normally defined in religious discussion.

We can go further by claiming that no absolute truth can be known, and that nothing metaphysical can be proven. I think that this view is wrong because it puts agnosticism itself as an absolute truth, as something we can know with certainty. — Coldlight

First off, this doesn't show that agnosticism as defined by Rowe is self-defeating, it shows that your expansion upon agnosticism, as the belief that no absolute truth can be known with certainty is self-defeating.

But despite that fact, your argument still doesn't work out. You can believe that the above is true without thinking that fact is absolutely certain.

Another problem is why would some things be brute when most things are not? What makes God, or Quantum Mechanics, or Daisen brute? What distinguishes the brutally existing things from the non-brutal ones? Is it just being brute? Is there a brute property? How does brute existence result in contingent existences? — Marchesk

I find this sort of comment strange. Bruteness to me seems synonymous with fundamentality. When materialists say that matter is "brute", some physicists say that QM is "brute", and some dualists say that consciousness is "brute", they seem to me to mean that it is fundamental. They aren't reducible to anything deeper (as far as we are concerned), but rather everything that exists reduces to them, so of course it should come as no surprise if the non-fundamental things in the world vastly outnumber the fundamental ones.

So if you're asking why some there are even fundamental (or brute) entities at all, then you seem to be suggesting that it can be otherwise. But unless we are willing to argue for turtles all the way down in all cases, then it seems like it's necessary that there be a fundamental level of some kind and that there exist fundamental entities that make up the universe.

Of some kind, yes. But the spatial relation that exists between the Earth and the Moon is not it, nor is it the temporal relation between an ice cube and that cube melted an hour later. — noAxioms

Is it? We are talking about something related to physics which means we are dealing with something physical here. So it seems closer to say that these worlds, if they should exist, exist within a physical space rather than say the space of abstract ideas (not a Platonist myself or anything but I'm just saying). These parallel worlds could be said to exist in another dimension of space for instance, and not necessarily the dimensions that we are normally accustomed to either.

Worlds have positions?? Can I say which is left of the other? Can these four identical worlds be put in some kind of order? — noAxioms

If the worlds are supposed to exist in the same reality, and they are numerically distinct (despite having the same qualitative properties) from one another then I cannot see how that makes sense without saying that they occupy different regions of some kind. How they are distributed may be a problem to explain in detail, but it seems to necessarily be one that it has to deal with.

It seems like you are saying that we should do away with the concept of causation altogether, but I thought your point was that there was no distinction between cause and correlation? If you're saying that causation is correlation then that's one thing, but if you were just saying that causality is a mistaken concept to begin with then that's something else entirely.

Also, the kind of correlation that I gave in my earlier example (of two symptoms of an illness) isn't exactly spurious as it certainly implies a deeper relation that isn't coincidental and is thus in that sense useful. However, my point was that relation wasn't one of causality, where one causes the other to happen. Instead, we would say that they both are related in sharing a common cause. They can be related, but not in the same way that, say, a brick thrown at a window is related to its being broken.

I am not sure how you plan to distinguish between both cases, or if you even intend on doing so, but it doesn't seem like persistency is a good enough way of doing so. The symptoms of an illness are usually found to be tightly correlated in many cases, as is healing when a chemical is ingested. But that doesn't mean we should treat both cases the same way.

The correlation vs causation dichotomy is one that has occupied my mind a fair bit over the last couple of years. I used to think there was a clear distinction between the two, but now I am not so sure. — andrewk

Consider me part of the camp that finds this line of thought confusing. The distinction between correlation and causation seems pretty clear to me. For instance, the symptoms of a particular illness can be said to be statistically correlated with one another, but that does not mean that they are in a relationship of causality. In actually, they are both said to be shared by a common cause, the illness itself. Although causation necessarily implies correlation, correlation does not imply causation. The former is merely the subset of the latter.

You've probably responded to this line of thought already, but I just want to get something to chew on.

When consciously experiencing the world, we seem to always be aware that we are doing so. — JulianMau

I don't think so. I may be aware of my experiences when I have them, but I am not also
aware of the fact that I am having experiences. That sort of awareness requires an extra act of introspection which IMO we don't always exercise at every moment in our lives. So, for example, I may be having a red visual experience, but that does not necessarily mean that I have the thought that I am having a red visual experience.