@javra You can only go so far with the, ". . . but the experiments showcase its not rational to assume. . ."

As given enough time someone could construct a model from Classical or other such biases to make it consistent with both the math and experimental results.

You either have to meet them on a metaphysical/philosophical level or just commit in heart as well as to the spirit of the dictum:

Shut up and calculate!

For example, you could browse that link to viXra.org . It may be uncommon but corpuscular modeling is not dead among the non-mainstream nor is its mathematical maturity lacking.

@Wayfarer @javra So I've now taken some time aside after finishing Metaphors We Live By from George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics by Milic Capek, and an article titled Naturalism, Quietism, and the Threat to Philosophy by Thomas J. Spiegel & Schwabe Verlag. I've also consulted some articles from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and also some articles from the pseudoscientific paper posting hotspot called viXra.org. If that looks familiar, yes, its just the rather more heavily relaxed and non-mainstream equivalent of arXiv.org. I've decided to jump on giving a summary of what I've learned so as to hopefully generate novel discussion or questioning. Though, I'm doubtful I will do all this exquisite work any profound justice. This will be long and for that I apologize.

Something that underlies all these articles from the non-Mainstream to these dissident philosophical perspectives is a clear feeling of disenfranchisement from the establishment. There is something that is lacking among these 'ivory towers' which misses the core point of why one philosophizes to begin with, how one constructs scientific explanations, what it means to be scientific, or what deserves to be called a 'fact'. The dramatic displays of scientific rigor and success in documentaries or interviews is seen as increasingly suspect. Something to be ripped a part from analyzing the ambiguities of the language used and show how their own layman speech betrays them intellectually speaking. Each of the works listed explicitly above attempt to synthesize a solution, as is always done, to the perennial conflict of old.

--------

In The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics this message is front and center throughout the entirety of the work as Milic emphasizes the non-visual nature of how one can come to understand nature without the same perennial errors of those who came before. Such errors revolving around identity, the spatialized language with regards to time, the supremacy of the corpuscular-kinetic modeling of phenomena, the reign of determinism, certain properties of space, and an inherent splitting of nature into primary/secondary qualities.

A key point being the 'subconscious' element of Classical thinking which pervades all of modern physics despite their claims to the contrary. Even in antiquity, the attempts to circumvent perennial issues were rather devoid of rational teeth because the visual thinking they used had them imported in to begin with. An example of this is in the responses to the Eleatic problem of change and Zeno's arrow paradox. I.E. how can something change/move if its only ever composed stage wise of unchanging/un-moving instants? The mathematicians/theoretical physicist solution to this, in line with the Achilles tortoise paradox, ignores the perennial issue at its heart for a purely computational solution in terms of real analysis or limits. However, the usual solution to this from esoteric philosophies of old usually meant abandoning 'instants of time' for 'atomic intervals of time'. This, however, didn't deal directly with removing instants from our thinking as an 'interval' begs the question of a beginning and an end. Those edges being then instants in their own right even if only realized as limits. Further, this doesn't seem to have solved the perennial problem of change as we've rather substituted instantaneous moments for extended unchanging moments thereby still committing us to some peculiar view of nature in which change is. . . illusory or some purely mental phenomenon.

This is because the analogies that one visually conceives of when thinking of time itself, or space/causality/matter/motion, are fundamentally static in nature. Such as a block conception of time that views it pictorially as a collection of instantaneous NOW slices all stacked on top of each other similar to projector slides. That or put into analogy with a film strip whereby the change we perceive is, by the analogy itself, tricking us into thinking it's illusory as the real world doesn't yield true qualitative change but is unchanging fundamentally. I.E. its our consciousness that snakes up our worldline but not do to any 'internal' change of the worldline itself.

The Aristotelian notion of 'gunk' or matter that is not atomic but infinitely divisible is not deemed utterly irrational but rather stripped of much rationale to begin with as the change in size, weight, mass, momentum, energy, heat, or any other qualitative change is found in the unchanged. Heat is not some irreducible qualitative element of nature but a side-effect of the re-distribution/collisional interaction of the unchanging atomic constituents of reality. Any change in volume is by virtue of its 'parts' the result of them being moved farther apart or squished together and not some inherent qualitative change of the property of volume it possesses.

This idea of getting to the unchanged or fundamental then leads to a similar abstracted version of this which is the idea of looking for fundamental particles in nature. Even when Aether's were proposed by their originators to be 'fluidic' and a return to Aristotle's qualities in a sense they were then contradicted by those same physicists claiming this Aether actually had atomic parts. The only difference between this new Aether and the atomism before being the mere sheer number of atoms postulated. This thinking sinking deep into seeing phenomenon such as the Lorentzian contracted of electrons as not indicating qualitative change of fundamental elements but rather that our models indicate that the electron is itself not fundamental. There must be some more fundamental truly unchanging parts which explain how this electron gained or lost its volume! As the admittance of qualitative change in things would seem as if we've postulated the acceptance of 'something from nothing'. Whatever it is that atoms possess and what they are is unable to be changed including their shape or internal properties. In this sense, even if we attempted to undo the Classical biases of before by adopting a 'fluidic' Aether we'd still have to deal with the skepticism of others subconsciously that we have rejected the dictum ex nihilo, nihil fit.

Space is without boundary and fundamentally three-dimensional in nature. It being most importantly homogeneous, isotropic, casually inert, continuous, and Euclidean. There are esoteric philosophies which grabble with the Aristotelian idea of there being no space outside his spheres by using this pictorial imagery of throwing a spear or extending ones' arms beyond this outer most sphere. You can always imagine a more zoomed out view of an object of it sitting in a further, vaster, void and anything moving away from this thing still being 'in space'. The notion of a boundary of space, a hole, or a non-Euclidean nature being virtually ruled out fundamentally by such visual biases.

Further, space is itself not able to be influenced by physical things nor influence them as its core role is some vague logical differentiation of qualitatively similar atoms. It can be zoomed out as far as one pleases or zoomed in and similar to nesting dolls we can find universes within universes that themselves look eerily similar but just smaller. Ergo, the popular Rutherford analogy of an atom in complete similarity to our solar system. This is also dubbed the relativity of magnitude rather than mere continuity. Finally, space may serve the role of differentiating qualitatively similar atoms but its only matter itself that serves to distinguish a part of space from another and not space itself. Only the relative variation of atoms by separation and their motions serving to distinguish one place from another.

Another note is given about how this Classical line of thinking doesn't allow for one to leave the dichotomy of fatalistic determinism or random indeterminism. I.E. when one thinks of different frames of a universal 'movie' its either fully determined how it will all play out before you hit play or you could put in one frame after another with each being fundamentally disjoint/disconnected. The only reason then that this momentary blinking present has any sense of continuity or coherency being some great miracle of nature.

How does one circumvent this all? What interpretation should one then give special/general relativity which isn't one characteristic of a 'block' spacetime? What the true interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle?

Well, its to subvert everything brought about in the entire corpuscular-kinetic picture of the world including the usage of pictorial language. While the Classical picture separated out space from matter the lesson to be learned from General Relativity is one in which the two are rather actually conjoined. This means it becomes rather vague and uncertain fundamentally where space ends or matter begins. It also means to regard space as not homogeneous in the sense that its non-Euclidean of a certain sort. To regard it as discontinuous on some fundamental level similar to theories of quantum gravity which atomize space BUT without the problematic visual biases here so perhaps particles could in some sense be 'gaps' in space. Given matter is seen as another side of the coin of spacetime then this means it's not casually inert anymore but rather actively plays its own role.

The biggest change being to institute, via inspiring work from Bergson or Whitehead, a fundamental notion of change/time that is in no way reducible to the unchanging. Its an acknowledgement of the irrationality of such a pursuit and an admittance of what needs to be done. Here is where a clarification is in order as to how one should interpret Special Relativity and its relativity of simultaneity. Contrary to wide-spread belief there is actually nothing really shocking about what SR has to bring to the table as what becomes relativized in the theory. These being temporal measurements we ascribe intervals of time and casually un-related events. Events which are casually related cannot be made to happen in a different causal order by frame changes. They are in fact topologically invariant and so while it might be relative how long we ascribe metrical units. . . the 'flow of time' is in fact not so relative. The 'movement' from the 'future' to the 'past' is left untouched.

Our notion of an instantaneous NOW is left in shambles without instantaneous actions at a distance and with that our notion of NOW is inexorably intertwined with HERE. I.E. there is now only the HERE-NOW and the THERE-THEN where the notion of THERE-NOW is left in an undetermined or vague sense. Asking such a question as what its like THERE-NOW being as nonsense as saying we are interacting with them right here when in fact we are not.



Despite the claims to the contrary that one either accept a spatialized block interpretation of SR or some highly solipsistic presentist strawman we should admit to the best of both worlds. That the future is left indeterminate or in Aristotle's words filled with potentiality which awaits actualization in the present to then be shrugged off into the determinate past. A concept of time that is 'thick' and begets true 'novelty' in nature as the indeterminate future filled with potentialities talks to the present as the present does to the past in a strongly casual manner but one which allows for true variation in the world. One which cements the irreducibility of the arrow of time and scoffs at the idea of eternal recurrence.

A cohesive and beautiful orchestra of distinct voices which form a coherent whole yet remain distinct. Notes which lose their reality if you analyze them in too short an interval of time and whose reality isn't really so unless you hear their full beat. This usage of musical metaphor being what Milic and those he credits with process philosophizing use rather than pictorial or spatialized ones in getting at these esoteric notions of reality.

There is another characteristic of the approach here which is to regard quantitative ascriptions as something required by our need to manipulate nature but ill-equipped to deal with nature on its own terms. We yearn for boundaries, clear separations, static states, patterns, continuity, etc. However, it seems that nature begets both this quantitative view and the visual analogies we use which force such concepts on us to begin with. Our quantitative manipulations may be useful but their universality is itself the illusion.

What language do we use then? How can we un-visualize our language for the purposes of physics which doesn't fall into mere mathematical symbolism?

--------

It's not that quantification is either simply abstract or entertaining, but that it's exact. Insofar as you can quantify, you can predict and control. One of the prime factors in the success of science is the increasing scope and accuracy of measurement. In Plato there is recognition of the exact nature of arithmetical proofs, which are contrasted with value judgements about the sensory domain, hence dianoia, arithmetical reasoning, being judged higher that sense experience; when you know an arithmetic proof, you know it with perfect clarity and without reference to anything else. The Galileo quote you refer to was 'nature is written in mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures, without which it is impossible to humanly understand a word; without these, one is wandering in a dark labyrinth.' Hence the fundamental significance of quantitative data in science, and the division I mentioned in the earlier post between primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes. — Wayfarer

I would feel then that in line with Milic the only direction to go would be to one of a highly metaphorical or esoteric sense of philosophizing which also acknowledges the fallibility of such an approach or its limitations. That way we, as Milic feared, neither fall into some esoteric animisim of old or be accused of seeing math in nature (panmatheism)

--------

Are you equating these models to what science in essence is? If you are, you then seem to disagree with my appraisals of what empirical science consists of. No biggie, but I am curious. — javra

More playing devils advocate here. Course, its not too far from the Stanford Encyclopedia article's on science to think that true scientific explanation is to be found in visual analogical modeling. Especially given most of scientific theorizing is merely mathematical modeling, visual analogical modeling, and metaphorical prose. Its just a question of intuitive primacy as to which of these aspects should be emphasized more and what we think an explanation amounts to philosophically speaking.

Math for example makes for a rather good description of nature. . . but an explanation?

When I stated that the data remains, I was addressing the verifiable results which are for example obtained from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment—which pose serious problems either for classical notions of causation, for classical notions of physical identity, or else for both. And I so far understand both these classical notions to be requisite for any mechanistic account, even more so for any "highly mechanistic" account of the world in scientific philosophy. — javra

So did GR. . . and Quantum mechanics. . . or any physics which has come before. Experiments do not decide interpretations in any determinate sense but rather can remain stubborn biases without proof or dis-proof or in lieu of apparent dis-proof. Take the idea of talk about fundamental particles or constituents of reality which is a stubborn assumption of a Classical mentality. No amount of scientific argument or experimentation could settle the rationality of such a doctrine as either the particle is split showcasing its not fundamental, its postulated it is fundamental if it meets certain requirements, or if those requirements aren't met then its assumed to be not fundamental. ITS NOT TESTABLE!

Again, taking the example of the Lorentzian contraction of an electron. This doesn't have to imply a disproof of the corpuscular model but rather a proof of its non-fundamentality model-wise.

You don't falsify the corpuscular-kinetic biases of old and also don't falsify the conception of energy conservation. You don't falsify Classical mechanics or prove an indeterminate reality from Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Its only on higher order philosophical intuitions that this is done.

The replicable data obtained from this experiment, then, will yet need to be accurately accounted for regardless of the implemented models, mathematical or otherwise; regardless of the philosophical explanations which inevitably make use of metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of space, time, and causality; and so forth. As to the mathematics involved, it is directly related to the data—such that were the mathematical system implemented to be contradicted by empirical test, it would hold no scientific value. Here, for example, thinking of the classic tests which were accordant to Einstein's theory of general relativity; were these test to have not so been, the mathematical system/theory would not have held water. (Related to this, because string-theory is currently not falsifiable via tests, this mathematical system is argued by some to be non-scientific—even if other speculate that M-theory can be further developed into a unified theory of physics.) At any rate, while explanations and models for the acquired data can change, the data nevertheless remains. — javra

Exactly, the epicycles of the day and the things they model remain unchanged as they are correct by coincidence but if shown wrong then the math is MODIFIED to account for this. You may claim its not done so in the sense of curve fitting but its fitting nonetheless and this may be curve fitting which takes into account more than the data itself. Its still just theory fitting.

Math is ambivalent to interpretation and can beget ANY interpretation.

For example, does General relativity make gravity not a force? According to Einstein's field equations it does not but according to a mathematically equivalent version which predict all the same things, teleparallel gravity, its more akin to a force or a change of torsion rather than curvature. This is similar to how Newtonian gravitation can be geometrized into what is called Newton-Cartan gravity which removes the force from gravity to make it a part of the curvature of space mathematically speaking.

I would recommend looking into the origins of mathematical philosophy in Pythagoras. The Greeks had the insight that only number could be completely knowable; the expression A=A (the law of identity) offered an intrinsic certitude that things in the material/sensory world could only aspire to. If you can get hold of a copy of Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy, have a look at the chapter on Pythagoras. You might also enjoy an essay - originally a lecture - by Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus. — Wayfarer

I admit it's a trope of philosophical and scientific thought to think so highly of only the most abstract things we can entertain ourselves with. Galileo thought the world was written in that fashion if I recall and it's a further trope today to declare something as pseudo-science more so because it lacks mathematical basis rather than experimental one. However, something feels lacking and I fail to see how any attempt at explicating visually/metaphorically a casual "omph" could be seen as inferior to the black board.

As I was developing my personal philosophical worldview, I didn't intentionally seek to cast hard science into softer poetic forms. But Quantum Physics --- "the most mathematically accurate theory in the history of science" --- is also the most counter-intuitive and irrational. So, the use of metaphors & analogies seems to be mandatory. But such mushy terminology --- wave-particle is an actor playing two roles --- goes against the grain of classical mechanical physics. The simple cause-effect relationship is complicated by inserting a conscious mind into the event : cause-observation-effect (two slit experiments). Even the math of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle includes confounding infinities. Consequently, I was left with no choice, but to follow the lead of the Copenhagen compromise between objectivity and subjectivity. Hence, to combine physics with metaphysics. :cool: — Gnomon

That is one way to approach it which is to showcase the necessity of such language.

I assume the "entity" you refer to is something like an entangled wave-particle, which is neither here nor there, but everywhere. That's literally non-sense, but physicists eventually learned to "accept" such weirdness in exchange for uncanny technologies like quantum tunneling, that make your cell phone work wonders. I'm not familiar with Čapek, but Bergson and Whitehead were influential in the formation of my information-based worldview. :nerd: — Gnomon

I was actually talking about the void or space as such an entity wasn't so alien but in fact was in a close alliance with Classical physics.

I do have Bergson and Whitehead on my list to read as they are prominent voices in giving new "organic" and "dynamic" language to talk about the world.

Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate. — javra

On the contrary we already do this modern return to mechanism except it's not called mechanism.

It's called physical analogue modeling. While blindly juggling symbols and operational procedures may be common practice it leaves a sense of unintuitiveness of how to deal with some mathematical models.

This is a common thing to do in General Relativity as well as Quantum mechanics. They may use a mixture of combined physical phenomenon which are mathematically similar in certain respects/situations to wrap ones head around the derived mathematical relation we are referring to. Such as the case in this article which uses fluid and acoustic analogies to "investigate" black holes as well as hawking radiation.

However, the paper still uses talk or language about Einstein's field equations as to it being about "curved spacetime" which I see as a metaphorical line of speaking. The same in analogy to the mathematical/physical analogies they are creating.

The question then is whether a mathematical model without such physical analogies is really rather vacant and devoid of explanatory value. Is it possible to hold to a mathematical model as explanatory without either metaphorical or physical analogies as a part of it? Is it also possible/acceptable for one to construct a scientific explanation based only on analogue modeling and metaphorical speech?

As it seems that the impression I get from such articles is that these analogies are SLAVES to the mathematical model in question that they are meant to clarify. They do no work of their own and if needed physicists would be fine with purging such analogies from their being for a one inch long equation.

Are you longing for a return to a softer kind of science, or maybe a more poetic brand of philosophy*2? — Gnomon

I'm not exactly sure. . . part of my journey here into these other works is motivated not by undoing the whole hardness of science nor is it entirely to soften it into poetic verbiage with merely aesthetic qualities. Perhaps, its more a research question as to whether there is some way to intuitively hold onto those poetic perennial forms of philosophy without succumbing to the same critiques from the 'shut up and calculate' crowd.

Again, take the example of non-Euclidean geometry. This would seem to be rather fully accepted and straight forward vernacular of a well founded, rational, modern scientific theory but perhaps there is a sense of how the establishment has glossed over any arguments as to its true intuitiveness. Arguments which don't found themselves on 'proof' or 'falsification' as those requirements have been shown to hold no water in the debate over philosophical 'obviousness'. Interpretations are a dime a dozen and claims as to the true 'spatialization of time' because a well founded theory is currently 'accepted' are non-starters.

Your screename, "Substantivalism"*3, harks back to the ancient roots of modern science in debates about the substance of reality. Greek Atomism was a good start toward a mechanistic worldview, except that it postulated no empty space for change, because nothingness was taboo. Yet, mechanism requires both hard stuff (substance) and soft space (relation) to produce a dynamic material & physical world that won't stand still for us to examine it. — Gnomon

However, that did not stop the mechanistic theories of Classical physics of accepting such an entity, as that book by Milič Čapek supports, and that there are more concepts that such a view of the world accepted than is usually let on. Such a Classical view of the world interpreting them in a fairly consistent and specific fashion for their purposes. . . or biases.

If that's what this thread is all about, you will find some sympathetic ears, but be prepared for accusations of preaching mystical "obsessions" and metaphysical woo-woo. — Gnomon

Well, you could say this obscurity also pervades modern physics in general and the public is thrashed around as a rag doll in a storm of such poetic expressions which are neither clarified explicitly nor literalized properly to remove any confusion. Perhaps its not just obscure philosophy that needs to do some better PR but also modern physics as well.

Everything that is declared modern physics is starting to be seen by me as preachy mystical "obsessions" as well. The only thing that survives being the math and its practical applications. All else would seem to be in need of clarification as to whether we formulate some transformation of these metaphorical statements into literal ones or become comfortable with metaphorical rhetoric. If its the former then this approach shouldn't have the same problems or failures of those that came before it. If its the latter then it becomes a question of what metaphors and their overlaps are to be considered scientific to begin with.

I will take that to heart. Thank you.

I'm just worried this realization will decay away as others in the past have.

@Wayfarer I'm shaking right now and have tears streaming down my face as thinking on all this has driven me to an emotional self-revelation. I'm not so sure if its the same for others and I should not speak on it as to defame them or ascribe to them what is not intrinsic.

Within all positions, fears, and philosophies there is something we are striving for/against that we could not attain/fight through other means. There is much in my life that feels so. . . written in stone. So much minor suffering and monotony that I strive to repress it lest it destroy this being I call me. I asked myself a series of questions while looking over that Wikipedia link you gave. Why would I be so antagonistic towards religion, spirituality, mysticism, and the esoteric thinking of modern physicists? Is it all from a place of astute observations mixed in with critical reflections on the veracity of these claims? A question of lazy social engineering and indoctrination? Perhaps. . .

However, maybe the answer is more existential. I desire control of my surroundings as they are in most cases un-yielding. On and on again my days pass as those Humean patterns of causally apparent truth make it so clear. I have neither the will, methods, or know-how to influence them so they remain so un-yielding. Its similar to a learned sense of helplessness which compounds to a point that all of nature seems content on being so externally malevolent. So therefore I've either forgotten or never had some experience of the creativity and ingenuity that certain philosophers showcase. One that leaves open the door to a narrow path into something obscure.

Its an emotional realization of that fascination with which people gravitate towards fantasies of various sorts whereby the mere will of a passerby and a carefully chosen collection of spoken words a solution of esoteric origins will slay the monster or whisk one off the ground to safety.

I desire to bear witness to at least one such true miracle with which the shackles of objectivity and that learned sense of helplessness can be undone by its mere presence. However, as far as my experience goes, no such miracles have made their presence known to me. So it all bears down on me from the personally mundane to the scientifically sound.

@Wayfarer Despite the appeal and curiosity I hold to that approach of Lakoff and Johnson it doesn't seem to assuage the worry within of deeply misleading myself. An objectivist who says, "There is a fundamental language, perspective, and methodology out there but you choose to ignore it as you settle for intellectual hedonism of various sorts."

I have also been intending to read into this long article on threats of Naturalism and quietism to natural philosophy. Something that hopefully showcases the biases inherent in what were supposed to be rather neutral theses but rather are not as nuanced as they appear to be.

Milič Čapek has been helpful here as well in that his collection of papers from others on the concepts of space and time as well as his E-book on the philosophy of physics seem to showcase the assumptions in thought that form Mechanistic physics. A peculiar world view that always seems to be removed from the clear definitions of others but pervades all of Classical physics and it also seems that those biases died hard when coming into modern physics. You may even say they are still rather prevalent despite the apparent 'transcendence' of physics disciplines from such thinking.

Particularly with regards to metaphors such as time as a substance and time as a film strip. I.E. that time is similar to a solid block without change or movement only mere spatial juxtaposition of its internal parts to each other. . . not some temporal sense of sequential following. That time is composed of fundamentally unchanging eternal 'instants' which either flash by out of existence or become non-real in a different sense. In that they are not 'projected' or lit up in the film analogy. Temporal metaphors such as time as a river or time as change are much more difficult to wrap ones head around and to theoretical physicists their worth seems next to nothing as they exude no easy mathematical/abstract/predictive avenues. Ergo, they are declared as poetic and handwaved away.

It seems to me it's been written from a perspective of a kind of disillusionment, by someone who formerly believed that the role of science was to develop a true picture of the world, but has now come to see that this seems increasingly remote. — Wayfarer

You are not wrong in that assessment. In my life I have few interests and fewer things to be proud of in their stability as well as their personal meaningfulness. However, the deflationist and deconstructivist views of others upon all philosophy, but especially scientific thought, has resulted in a rather bitter view to it all.

So that even though you say you've seen through naive or scientific realism, you're still not really able to let it go, or see what could replace it. You seem to be expressing a fear that, if you completely let go the mechanistic world-picture, then (heaven knows) anything goes. — Wayfarer

Its more a natural bias as the mentality of laymen including myself is to make recourse to authorities and minds that are supposed to reveal deep truths about the world. The second you realize they weren't doing any better than you, in certain philosophical respects, it sort of screams of a certain ill-fitting title of 'genius' or 'Nobel physicist'. Once that respect is lost. . . where am I supposed to turn to?

Also, yes. . . in a sense this bid against realism of a scientific sort seems to threaten to dismantle not just those intellectual domains but also great social ones. What would you expect if you let epistemological anarchism into the greater social sphere? I feel its rather obvious the fear this instills and the deep desire to push back against this whether this means to back track or forcefully move on to other avenues of thought.

Odd choice of an example object. One usually picks 'a billiard ball' or some other simple object - of course it is true that pens will fall at the same rate as billiard balls, all things being equal, but pens are primary for communication, and physical predictions of how it will behave when dropped will tell you nothing about what you might write with it when you pick it up. I think perhaps that your choice of metaphor here is an inadvertant expression of the problem you're grappling with! — Wayfarer

I used it rather arbitrarily but did not come to think of it in the manner you are presenting.

Again, there seems a kind of fear at work, that letting go the scientific outlook will result in devolution into some kind of voodoo magic. I also notice your mention of Capital T Truth. But I don't think science is about that - certainly, philosophy as taught in the English-speaking academy is not. I think you feel a kind of longing for a unitive vision, a sense in which everything will hang together or make sense, but it's diabolically difficult in the modern world to arrive at that, now that everything is so specialized, and there are such vast amounts of information available. — Wayfarer

Its not only difficult in its attainment but its also a disease of the mind that infects not only those of the highest physics esteem to the greatest critical dissidents of the Mainstream. Everyone seems to want to create a unified picture of the world in the simplest terms. . . fewest symbols. . . fewest meanings. . . no matter the contradictory consequences.

One book I've been studying which might be of assistance to your quest is Incomplete Nature by Terence Deacon. He attempts to account for intentionality within a naturalist framework, although it's a pretty tough read. But a romantic or mystic, he ain't.

Me, I'm more drawn to classical philosophy (as well as philosophical spirituality), although it's taken me a lifetime to begin to understand it. But I'm realising the richness of our Platonic heritage, and I would recommend to anyone looking at Plato again. Also reading philosophy in a synoptically and historically - trying to form a picture of the way in which the subject started and developed through the history of ideas.

Of particular importance to the kinds of questions you're asking would be the metaphysical assumptions behind the advent of science (e.g. this). And also philosophy of science - Kuhn, Feyerabend and Polanyi. They can help re-frame the issue, such that the distinct difference between the philosophical and purely scientific perspectives comes into view. — Wayfarer

I have been looking into this from the purview of other philosophical lines of thought. More specifically that of Carnap and a modern day reemergence of his internal/external distinction in meta-philosophy but not founded on the analytic/synthetic divide. Instead, my own interests have turned in the direction of metaphor to support this deflationist view of philosophy in terms of a literal/figurative divide. I've also just read a book by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson that attempted to skirt the rationalist/empiricist divide as well as potentially other such divides on the back bone of metaphor itself rather than attempting to, as is the case in literalist traditions of analytic philosophy, to rid ourselves fundamentally of metaphorical speech.

My question is how does one know when that is the case - ie they're chatting sh*t. And to the contrary, when they really do know what they're talking about.

What is the litmus test in the realm of discourse with others which may be either just as misinformed or very much astute and correct?

Is there an universal logic/reason? Or only a circumstantial one? — Benj96

They, figuratively, castrate themselves among those who have yielded themselves up as an audience.

They attempt, however limited, to stretch out all possibilities through which they may fail or be found in error and through humble admittance acknowledge honestly what their true intentions are no matter how arrogant or self-centered. That they don't hide behind authoritative labels, arguments for tradition, or throw out terms indicating their presumptuous forcing of your opinion. Such as truth, objectivity, proven, obvious, rational, etc. They leave as few absolutes besides the most significant ones they wanted to get across but still proliferate their discussion with open endings.

To me its how honest they are of why they do what they do or at least they appear to be presenting that as much. Isn't acknowledging ones' faults seen as a strength?

My assertion is that as far as what defines belief, knowledge is indeed fully included. That is all. Knowledge is only belief. It is fully included in that set. — Chet Hawkins

Which does depend on your definition of a what a belief even is. A cursory look at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists a number of predictable positions such as highly reductive ones no different than behaviorism or functionalism as well as the ever popular cousin positions of instrumentalism/fictionalism/eliminativism. The more constructive ones build beliefs out of mental states or mental representations regardless of the metaphor used which has us thinking about stored information similar to a computer, representations as propositions, and literal mental maps.

We cannot be certain of any justification applied to a belief that 'makes' it or transforms it into knowledge. So this is where we are working with the mathematical concept of limits. It would seem that that effect is one way to cause the Sorites paradox. Since the definition of a category is weak, not specific enough, the paradox appears. But there is a difference. When for example we feel the need to define a heap of sand as containing a finite number of grains in order to escape the Paradox, we CAN do that. Assuming we were willing to take the time, we COULD possible count. And yet the Sorites Paradox is still deemed present simple because users of the 'heap' term refuse to do so. — Chet Hawkins

They also may refuse to define the terms as such BECAUSE it wouldn't do justice to the difference between a few grains and a heap. Not a decision of laziness or failure to assuage the troubling ambiguity bubbling within our accuser but rather to emphasize that something deeper is going on. Something that a mere precisification of terms will not solve.

But the limit is different. Limits are special in that nothing is being said about the content of either the axis or the asymptote. It is their relationship that is the point. The asymptotic relationship defines the characteristics of the limit.

So, no, this is not the same thing.

It is the 'fact' or 'knowledge' or better as I mentioned, let's say it is the awareness of something that approaches objective knowing, BUT NEVER GETS THERE, that is the point. And it cannot get there. That is critical to understand. One is tempted to say or add, '... in finite time'

So before we continue I wanted to address that part of the issue. It is not clearly just Sorites. — Chet Hawkins

However, similar to a Sorities it will have the same solutions or attempts at one. Whether this is along esoteric mystical routes, semantic ones, or in adopting new novel forms of logical grammar/syntax.

Second, the idea of a limit seems to underwrite part of your thought process on 'knowledge' and such an analogy is what allows for or is inferred from holding knowledge as the greatest unreachable but one with which we can in principle. . . approach. Despite the intuitiveness of this, that I admit to, I can't help but feel that all an opponent would need to attack is the coherency of 'getting closer to the truth'. Even in ignorance of such a journey.

There are two approaches that come to mind with one being rather esoteric and the other that probably has semantic/psychological positions in greater philosophical literature ->

Meaning Equivalency: Basically, this position denies that any of the assertions you are making which 'seemed' to be distinctly different claims/descriptions/beliefs of the world were in fact not so. Specifically regarding ones which resist any or all attempts at justification and truth assessment even in principle. I have a feeling that one of the methodological methods, lingo, that would be used to get at this point would be to split up assertions into falsifiable and unfalsifiable. However, that may have its limitations and therefore I leave open what such a criterion even is. Suffice as to say once such a split is made between claims/beliefs which can be assessed versus those which are impossible allows us to then use this positions' patented semantic translator to render all such inaccessible beliefs as vacuously true/false about the world. Instead of allowing for each belief to independently be possible of being true or false this person's intention is to figure out how it is that huge swaths, if not all, such types of beliefs are all equally as vacuously true or false. Basically, its to give you your point about beliefs being closer to this objective thing as more true or false but only in the most vacuous sense possible so almost all such similar beliefs are similarly true/false. In the same manner as tautologies or contradictions, they don't say much but they are true/false strictly speaking.

Mental Reductivism: This position is simply to assert the meaninglessness of assertions regarding the outside world and our language as having any coherent connection to begin with. In principle, then, such a position would survive off of re-translating everything into purely observable/experiential language or throw it in the garbage bin of meaninglessness if it cannot be. Could such a position dissolve into Berkleyian subjective idealism of a sort or external world skepticism? Yes, but perhaps this is a cost worth being subjected to if it removes us from some unhealthy dichotomies. Basically, it doesn't even let your idea of 'getting closer to the truth' or this objective thing off the ground and denies that assertions about the external world have any meaning at all let alone truth values.

So if one denies that there is a difference between knowledge and belief, one also drops realism. — Banno

So perhaps there is then a hierarchy of belief differentiations similar to the ontological categories of Aristotle?

Presumably, because they are true; not because they are certain.

Confusing these two is the reason this thread is at page 14. — Banno

Well. . . there is a discussion that could perhaps go on without this obfuscation dealing with whether that intuition we call the certain/uncertain distinction (or the true/untrue distinction) with regards to beliefs is coarse or fine grained.

I don't want to put words in @Chet Hawkins mouth, I may sadly have already and I apologize, but that he may consider it more fine grained.

While people such as yourself with regards to statements being strictly either true or not true and nothing greater, lesser, or in between yields a coarse grained reading. In fact, a strict dichotomy. The greatest coarse-ness possible.

I don't think saying 'knowledge is mere belief' solves the conundrum we all started with or what was the entire point of making up the 'knowledge' concept to begin with.

We are still left with the question of why certain beliefs are more privileged compared to others and why? I.E. we are back where we started.

Except, as I stated in a reply above. Its as to the correct methodology of determining the entry status of beliefs into the 'certain' category rather than talking about whether a particular belief counts as 'knowledge'. Its seems merely semantic.

Am I going insane here?!

You can call it whatever delusional thing you prefer to call it. It still is actually JUST belief. — Chet Hawkins

I'm missing a lot of context here because you write so much and your philosophical thinking is rather dense but I feel as if there is really just a thinly veiled Sorites argument getting in the way of all of this. Whether on the part of your opponents or you.

How your opponents see it is that perhaps you'd make the horrible jump of thinking. . . that because there is vagueness in some categories, whatever they may be, they can be abandoned along with their intuitions for new intuitions both familiar and peculiar for only one of the categories in consideration. I.E. if statement 'A' of strong intellectual support is a belief, expression of scientific confidence 'B' is a belief, and irrational nonsense postulate 'C' is a belief then it would seem they are all the same in kind as they are also in value. When in reality its obviously the case that various beliefs entertain certain hierarchies of certainty. . . intuitiveness. . . truth-likeness. . . knowledge status. . . etc. Regardless of what word we give to that doxastic attitude.

To state it another way, even if you say 'knowledge is merely belief' the hidden illusory specter of knowledge doesn't leave us but rather returns with a vengeance as you attempted to remove from reality a stubborn aspect of our psychology or a rigid part of the world. Except you don't call it knowledge but certainty.

Boy do I love philosophy. . . the great pointless semantic game we all play it seems. "We aren't talking about knowledgeable beliefs and unknowledgeable beliefs. . . but certain beliefs and uncertain beliefs!"

Analogously, as I beat a dead horse, to talk about change you need that which doesn't and if you made change fundamental to the world you have to do a whole lot of heavy lifting to resurrect the term, permanence, that you thought you killed.

If 'society' is the light, then its merely mob rule. Morality isn't owned by anyone. It's a free-floating ideal which alters person-to-person and is used internally to guide one's behaviour. Social 'morality' is just "Oh, most of us agree so here's a policy. Nice". — AmadeusD

Yes, but I'd emphasize that this guide is a delusional one which through religion or philosophy we acknowledge its unreality yet we desire to hold to its dictates. If we had a great enough external, or internal, conflict to change it then we'd create not some truth but another delusion through which to carve the world up once more. Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake.

Respectable by whose lights? ;) — AmadeusD

Obviously, its by society. A mischievous fellow who follows your every move who transcended the plurality of the many to confine itself it to your head to critically examine every action or step taken. Perhaps with a gritty or dark monologue or two. Its obviously not you because the big "M", Morality, isn't owned by any one person?

Yep. Morals are emotional positions and nought else, on my view. Its a good idea to discuss them, and form groups of affinity. Some would very much enjoy seeing a woman 'engage' with her dog on a bus. It may be their optimal fantasy, in fact. — AmadeusD

Its interesting to see someone who makes such a claim as to the identity of moral concerns as being confined largely to emotional concerns. Which is peculiar in view of common views of morality which emphasize their independence from emotional concerns or how one may personally view a moral dictate. I.E. moral dictates are given strength to survive regardless of whether we all became rather heavily apathetic or that the emotional views that one might have on certain issues is irrelevant to their straight faced immorality or morality. I guess this is because morality and justice are so often seen as perfectly interwoven.

Its a question I've been concerned with for a while about the current climate of media induced desensitization to worldly suffering and our perceived moral opinion on it. Should one, if able or possible through whatever means, force themselves to be more emotional about a particular issue or any such intuitive moral issue that arises? Given that we desire to be moral. . . to be moral may require us to entertain a proper emotional reaction to a given event. . . so perhaps it follows that if we do not have such a reaction its almost tantamount to declaring it as having less moral weight.

If that is the case, how would one obviously react introspectively to themselves if every issue they were met with in their greater awareness was met by their apathy or indifference? Perhaps they would not or should not see themselves as moral as they desire to see themselves as and therefore their self-worth would be found lacking as they lack moral footing. Its not the best ego boost to realize, "I'm not a rather morally respectable Human being."

No, I hadn't heard of him, although looked up his Wikipedia entry now you've mentioned him. — Wayfarer

He has a cheap E-book on Barnes & Nobles which outlines much of his thinking which is heavily influenced by Whitehead as well as Bergson among others. Its a peculiar set of interpretations of quantum mechanics as well as Classical physics that sort of seems to leave open the door to organicism or non-mechanistic views of nature. At least he seems to do so by attempting to diagnose what I would call mechanistic views of nature and then developing language that goes against it.

But in some ways, what you're point to is the way dialectic was conceived in the classical tradition isn't it? You mention Heraclitus and Parmenides - wasn't Plato very much engaged in the dialectic between those two apparent contraries? All very deep and difficult questions. — Wayfarer

I don't remember much from such a dialectic or the details therein. I'll have to go back and review this.

Would you include the so-called 'primary intuitions' of time and space? (It might be their very 'primitiveness' that makes them so hard to explain!) — Wayfarer

Have you heard of Milik Capek? He is a writer and philosopher who has taken odds with spatialized approaches to the language of change/time present in much of Mainstream or Classical physics. In the spirit somewhat of Bergson and Whitehead. His own solution, as was the two approaches of the prior philosophers listed, was to refuse outright to give a definition of change/time as analyzable fully into something else. Yielding a primitive sense of temporal change/becoming that was fundamental to their philosophies.

I.E. the paradoxes that resulted from Zeno's paradoxes was, perhaps, in trying to make one primitive (rest) explain and define what it means to move. This continues to the modern era with unchanging instantaneous spatio-temporal slices.

Perhaps this fascination with hopping into primitives and fundamental concepts, unanalyzable ones, is a reaction to paradoxical situations as is the case above. It might also make us short sighted in that while motion is contrary to rest it seems that even as primitives or undefined they are required to be present in our thinking. Motion is nonsense without rest but can't be fully reduced to it nor can rest be made sense of via purely by virtue of the concept of motion. However, it is also nonsense to perhaps demand that all rest is therefore illusory in a radical Heraclitan-like twist on the old Parmenidean tradition.

Is there a philosophical perspective on language/meaning/truth/metaphysics that acknowledges this weak inter-definability and balance of dependence/independence of our core concepts?

I guess my point is, doesn't pragmatism always assume some goal or make some kind of commitments? — NotAristotle

Yes, but in doing so you could admit to a high degree of arbitrariness about it. I.E. be highly subjectivist about this choice or view it in the same sense that a Pyrrhonian skeptic would with regard to every belief they have. To fully, or as best as one could, suspend judgement on the veracity of any such beliefs and even regard the thought that it may be 'correct' or 'true' as mere delusion. Perhaps, as those same ancient skeptics would contend, you haven't thought hard enough about a possible contrary position of equal footing.

Further, even once you admit to goal seeking or possessing commitments the possible scenario under which we possess a plethora of options can dilute the philosophical weight that any one single position has. To the point that we may become rather indifferent to the choice. See it as rather meaningless.

I am reminded of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. This is a debate that may have implications for both naturalists and supernaturalists and one that both can engage. — NotAristotle

That is what I've been coming into conflict with but in a more generalized sense of meta-metaphysical attitudes. What happens to the god debate or the debate among competing theories if we all became deflationists/pragmatists/quietists?

That is, in Carnap's sense and other modifiers of his position, we all accept a plurality of languages that say things true/false within a language but any questions as to choices among languages are not to be truth bearers. The only debate to be had now is how all these languages may be cohered or shown to be mutually impossible to inter-translate. With possibly no clear end goal in sight. Some may in that case prefer their ideas of parsimony which may restrict the range of or lengths that their philosophical imagination may take them. I.E. that its metaphorical story telling of a "scientifically" realist sort.

It's rather redundant of me to say that most of philosophy in general doesn't change those phenomenological impressions we intuitively take as fundamentally true in the moorean sense. Its outside the confines of those certainties that we can't help but speculate to our own detriment. Perhaps we shouldn't? If we start down that road then the certainties of our everyday world might start to crumble under the weight of our scientific "truths" or soul weighty "revelations". Which can be truly detrimental in some cases.

No matter the outcome of supernaturalism vs naturalism, or all the critiques of classic philosophy, I'm still not going to drink bleach or attempt to walk through the nearest wall by mere will alone. Is that because I've accepted a scientific truth about the world? I have some immutable knowledge? Naturalism is true? Some weighty revelation of a spiritual sort has made itself to me? Does it even matter what excuse I come up with?

I really don't think this issue involves morality. That is one of the chief problems I have with almost every activist I've ever encountered in any medium. Morality, usually, doesn't matter to solving the problem of reducing numbers of victims of whatever it is.. — AmadeusD

Come to think of it this seems to happen rather often in treatments of societal problems but generally not because of giving morality the lime light. I.E. there is a focus on one particular aspect of why people resist embracing a new paradigm when another more pressing concern is claimed as more prominent.

For example, think of the notorious transgender bathroom situation. As far as solutions go its rather simple if not obvious what should happen and its peculiar it hasn't happened sooner. In the same sense in which bathrooms, or in analogy any other public place, can be made independent of race so can they do so for gender expression. . . sex. . . disability. . . intersex condition. . . etc.

Why then the resistance? One such prong of disagreement seems to be that greater pain in the transition to such a gender neutral world would become widespread and hidden from the sight of judicial/societal action. Beyond the rhetoric with which gender roles retain their objectivity by religious conviction or biological necessity. Beyond mere conservative pearl clutching, emotional distain, and the collapse of western civilization. They shout out statistics indicating both rare cases of cross dressing abusers and the prevalence of assaults' on women in mixed restrooms. This is not deniable albeit quibbling on how these statistics may be more skewed given the possibility of under-reporting.

The issue then turns to addressing a societal problem that could be seen as a specific case of true 'toxic masculinity'. Think we will get somewhere now? Or rather is it the case that one or the other side will push us back down the causal run to another fundamental level? Morality or not. . . religiosity or not. . . mental health or not. . . etc.

I understand a close friend of mine is thinking about transitioning. We've had conversations like this, though they were difficult at the time. Its at emotional times like these that I feel we should ask ourselves to be more objective. — Philosophim

Such explicitly emotional times have passed and I have come to a homeostasis both in living with them as well as on such a personal level. However, curiosity of a worrisome manner tugs at me occasionally. Nothing that would circumvent an internal or an outward sense of respectability that I feel I should intuitively possess on such matters.

Emotional appeals are often irrational and not fully voiced. Its a simple example, but when someone complains about a movie. "I didn't like the movie, it sucks." "Why?" I don't know, but the director should be fired and never make a movie again." While this interchange is inconsequential between friends, if the person has the power to actually fire the director and ensure they never make a movie again, we need to ask if the action taken from the initial emotion is rational. — Philosophim

Obviously, though, emotions can be justified or we can even see certain emotional states as something one ought to possess in certain circumstances?

I'm curious then. In being so morally objective is something lost if we were to remove our emotional connection/impetus/drive for such a conclusion in the first place? Perhaps emotions are neither sufficient nor necessary for moral practice including the prescription of moral judgements but they clearly dictate the strength of such judgements. This may lead to a perceived weakness/strength of a moral sort for certain individuals. Is such a 'strength' redundant and perhaps altogether without purpose?

To me, the transgender/transexual community is finding its footing in its desire to be accepted by society, as well as accept itself. As such it is at an extremely immature stage of rational thinking, and is mostly in a reactive and nascent stage of thought. If it remains this way, it will fail. People do not tolerate such things for long. It needs rational discourse. It needs to refine its language and be more clear in its desires and intents. It needs better arguments. If not, I feel it will cause damage both inside and outside of its community and find itself in a worse position than it started with. — Philosophim

There is whiplash at the moment from both degenerative relativists and authoritarian moral absolutists to a point that layman have to distinguish themselves from two greater evils first before they can speak.

Very interesting. Appreciate both parts of the wider response here. — AmadeusD

In such discussions as this, is external hypocrisy seen as a requirement to better mend our society? Or is political/social/moral honesty no matter its implications, whether intended or not, preferred?

Is neutral compromise all that we can fight for here or are there moral mountain peaks to climb ourselves to instead? Leaving some to reap the benefits while others fall onto lesser moral rocks below.

While I take it you're probably joking for effect, — AmadeusD

I've had my fair share of posts a while back on these gender issues which in hindsight only appeared out of a pathetic defensive need. I had, at that time, recently come to find a person close to me is transgender of a certain sort at a certain stage in the process. As of late, after taking a break, I've come to grips more with the perceived looming threat that questioning this "narrative" comes with.

Beyond the obvious objectivity of biological features or the subjectivity of other human elements there were. . . moral questions I still grapple with. Both in terms of moral oughts and emotional oughts or states of mind that I should take on this.

Artificial shame (or, arbitrary consequence) is the issue. It's pretty much unavoidable if you allow the former it's full extent in a modern society. Such is life. I enjoy a bit of motivational shame (and no, that's not an innuendo lol). — AmadeusD

It's one of emotional oughts and your perception, apathetic/saving face/guilty/judgemental, of others that I find concerning/intriguing. Not so much because of political narratives which dissuade it but because how I feel about someone may be in sharp contrast to how I feel I should be by philosophical introspection. Even if I never mention that to their face.

Philosophy leaves no stone unturned no matter how socially or personally destructive said "truth" might be.

I'm trying to understand your position by posing questions to you that your position entails an answer to... Why does not extend to teh age, race, weight and height one 'considers' themselves to be? This exact logic is why 'adult babies' are a thing. I would assume you note the patent mental arrest involved in that notion? Why do you not apply the same logic to people who are, lets say, unique in their aberrant (socially speaking) perception of themselves? It just seems like you'v enot thought about htis at all, and rely on compassion for a position that has much, much deep implications than "i don't like to upset people" — AmadeusD

It's so peculiar to permit forms of perceived abnormality to such an irrational degree. Where does this naïve compassion/entertainment end and a repression of a natural shaming mentality begin?

I believe people should be free to do what they want to do in life. There are people who also want to cut their arm off. If after a discussion they still want to, let them. — Philosophim

Are we really at such a point that a 'discussion' mitigates other such concerns that may have primacy with regards to such extensive/extreme modifications.

I see no safe haven to be ourselves on any part of the political spectrum. — Bylaw

Perhaps they are all worried that the other side will convince you that your sins are virtues.

A person can also not want to reproduce without being an Antinatalist, and for several reasons. I find antinatalist as people who want to deflect from reasons why they can't actually have kids because it would bring THEM more suffering. They don't want to hold themselves accountable for how they feel. So they say it's immoral instead. — Vaskane

Its the same, I'd say, for every person who considers themselves 'moral' or having fulfilled their moral duties as proven by some 'justification' so that they can take a break to 'live life' as they so desire it (most every person including you and me). Its an ad hoc excuse being masked in rational language to seem more palatable and less emotionally weak as it really is. At least, I speculate as much.

The which is a ... rather observant and uninvolved approach, the path of fear. Do you agree? I might say I find the 'get on the field and participate' advice of Joseph Campbell more to my taste, but it's no surprise I'm an anger type. — Chet Hawkins

I haven't personified what concepts lie in the field enough into flesh and blood. Nor has a clear methodological motive made itself clear to me. My target hasn't been found through which to intentionally exercise this anger.

I would like to ask directly to make sure you are not being simply coy and poking fun back at me, 'Do you mean (solely or mostly) me, when you call out idle speculations?' {is that a tongue in cheek dig?} — Chet Hawkins

I mean everyone here including myself.

You might have to demystify that sentence for me. — Chet Hawkins

Any term you or me use is polluted by colloquial meanings and socially present biases. To call something "truth" without further elaboration on what that means or how to methodologically showcase something as such. . . and the limitations of these strategies. . . leaves you open to having your speculations be handled as a hammer by others against 'dissidents'. Whether that is your intention or not.

When it comes to philosophical speculation we are left with a handful of attitudes with which to motivate philosophical progress on. Pyrrhonean skeptics who seek to passively take a back seat or actively seek for balancing the arguments for as much as against a specific position. Pragmatic fictionalists who see it as merely make believe in a cosmic mental game to play out depending on the accepted rule set. That or become a supremacist. . . what I called a philosophical dominator. . . or it could also be called a dogmatist/fundamentalist. A position, that despite the immediately negative connotations, isn't meant to be seen as purely negative. However, the word "truth" can be used rather loose in a political sense comparable more to a sociological tool to immediately discredit the viewpoints of others to the benefit a given philosophical dominator.

Until there is an admittance that such a word is merely to portray your high sense of confidence or you later present an elaborate theory of truth I hope you don't fault me for my own idle speculations.

Well, correct me if I am wrong. But, you seem to be maligning your suffering state while at the same time actually admitting that it, your chosen state, is at least slightly wrong. Is that a correct assessment of what you were saying here. If so, then I can relax a bit that you are not finding me any more offensive than your own choices are. — Chet Hawkins

At least in principle I'd consider the opinions of another as their own without emotive objection and unless I have sufficient basis, besides idle discussion, to point out perceived flaws it always seem to be more psychological projection on my part than anything else.

I rarely believe I have sufficient basis. . .

As to 'maligning [my] suffering state', similar to what I've stated before something about taking a position to its breaking point and then realizing the solution with which to gain balance again seems rather appealing. . . but not until a sufficient back reaction sets me free. More so at the moment in principle, not so much in practice. In practice, it may mean that once such a principle has served its purpose it may go into hibernation.

Ha ha! Well, I get it. That means 'real life' distracts you from the important questions. And, people aren't wearing enough hats! — Chet Hawkins

I wouldn't exactly say that only 'real life' does so. I've also felt. . . impeded. . . by the idle speculations of others here and elsewhere.

Yes, that's the final truth in everyone's case. Of course get on a philosophy site and start going on and on about objective morality and improving more and more to approach perfection and morality being the hardest thing there is, and one wonders, is it worth it? How many converts to truth will there be? Comforting lies has a much longer line to the booth than truth does. — Chet Hawkins

To call it truth is to commit such a mischievous intuition entrance to the armory of a philosophical dominator.

I get that also. We are too exhausted to put in more effort to contain others' immorality. — Chet Hawkins

What spirit I have is exhausted, period. I want such motivations, intuitions, or moral imperatives to cease their chants regardless of my actions. . . or lack thereof. I just want it to simply end. They only bring me heartache and immediate awareness of how I should view my apathy/indifference as mental hypocrisy.

Well, this word subversion is problematic. How far do you go with it? — Chet Hawkins

You know, this is something I thought about frequently a good while ago. The answer is still rather indeterminate but my circumstances have always seemed to mitigate against such an extensive investigation.

We are it, the chooser, the speaker. We know of none greater than ourselves in moral agency. Yes, we properly respect all other moral agents, the animals, the planet, all atoms even; but humility can be taken too far. When we deny the infinity of choice within ourselves, we fail morally. — Chet Hawkins

Humility as forced upon me (ticked into me) or by my own hand? Perhaps much of the former has overflowed but the latter requires further improvement.

So, instead say, it's the balancing of the ego, with the id and superego; or the balancing of fear with anger and desire that brings clarity. — Chet Hawkins

I feel that perhaps you have to bring about that state of affairs continually. To have it swing back from a violent perturbation. To embody. . . bear witness. . . mentally to what one is capable of despite our proclivities that we've inherited from modernity. What wrath we can bring about so that we can feel the moment with which to grant ourselves a caring hand to pull us away. To see what lust we possess and grow disgusted at the impulsive drives that arise.

The more extreme the perturbation the more chaotic and beautiful the fall to the minimum is. Put into difficult circumstances it scrambles to find justifications. . . reasons. . . grounding. . . to launch oneself off again. Creativity makes its appearance with open arms for all.

Punishment is already included by objective morality. And morality is not punishing you. You are! The chooser is the only one with the power to punish. They punish themselves. But remember, you are me and I am you. So, any evil act in all the universe punishes us all. That is harmonics, out of resonance with the perfect good. — Chet Hawkins

Without abandoning those intuitions I possess I either have my head painfully throb for the evil others conduct or I see myself as a part of it and somewhat capable. In the end such a punishment shouldn't end if I'm to remain consistent and sane.

Suffering is required to stay wise as well as to become wise. The wise seek out greater and greater means of challenging themselves to suffer more exquisitely than others. They could not be wise otherwise. — Chet Hawkins

Perhaps it's the subversion of the ego then that brings about clarity. If not just by mental will but also by physical action on the self.

The real problem is now that people think this is prosperity. It will take much monger before the stubborn realize the pain they are in on a daily basis despite oxycontin, porn, cheap whiskey, and other 'easy' addictions. — Chet Hawkins

Perhaps the lesson to be learned then is to see the signs and pity those that fall for them. Their actions require us, gifted with greater awareness, to suffer for them as they themselves do not know to do so for themselves. Our inaction deserves recognition as the mental parasite it is. As does our personal hypocrisy which, if it cannot be extinguished, should be beaten back.

Is sounds like you are saying that you do not believe space and time are substances nor that they are objective relations or properties of objects, is that correct? — Bob Ross

I attempt to be 'quiet' about the choice metaphysically speaking. Whether they are substances or pure relations are question only with answers internally (in Carnap's sense) to a particular language. The choice between them is pragmatic and if anything more impulsive a choice. . . I.E. asking which is "correct" is an external question which is subjective at its core.

Course, I'm also using Carnap in a sense that is. . . hopefully. . . differentiated from the analytic/synthetic distinction and rather is founded on our intuitive sense of metaphor.

You seem to be giving a sparknote of the landscape, but I am more interested in what your take is on space and time. What do you think? — Bob Ross

In lieu of my sparknote comments, I tend to want to think of them more as metaphorical tools in the physicists/philosophers tool box rather than as 'substances' or 'emergent non-thing's'. Think of how we use spatialized language to talk about time and how popular its gotten since Minkowski or Einstein (whether they intended it or not). Rather than think of such a language as wrong/right or as properly 'carving nature at its joints' rather we should consider it to be nothing more than poetic/practical story telling. Beautiful metaphor that overlaps in certain ways with certain intuitions and clashes with others while not being too overly comfortable. Course, sometimes that type of story telling outlives its usefulness. . . or leads us astray in a practical sense. . . so perhaps rather than the spatialization of time we go towards a temporalization of space instead as Milič Čapek has presented.

Perhaps, its time for a language that is reductionist about time but realist about space as quantum theories of gravity seem to 'gravitate' (no pun intended) towards rather classical views of absolute simultaneity. . . ergo. . . the language of Newtonian space realism might resurge once again with a few tweaks. Perhaps before I'm dead. . . it will go into hibernation again.

If there is a lesson I've learned from meta-philosophy and all those who have been advocating for dissolving these discussions, to put them into the irrelevancy bin, its that they may not disagree on as much as you think they do. A-theory or B-Theory of time. . . spacetime realism vs. anti-realism. . . emergentism vs. non-emergentism. They say a myriad of the same things and only differ when important, indeterminate/subjective, decisions of practicality in terms of scientific advancement (or personal worldviews) comes to light.

A scientist likes his spacetime realism and the concreteness of it to do abstract work. The lived person might enjoy more the process philosophy of Whitehead to understand the onward flux of appearances. Not that you couldn't combine the two or intermingle to your hearts content.

In terms of the latter, I find it very plausible that spatiotemporal relations are real constraints and properties of the things in themselves. If this is not granted, then either (1) one’s conscious experience is equivalent to a hallucination or (2) how or what is being represented is completely unknowable (thusly making one’s conscious experience basically equivalent to an hallucination). For example, the speed at which that car is moving towards you is not real if spatiotemporal relations are not real—for speed is a spatiotemporal relation between objects in accordance with laws. Without granting spatiotemporal relations as real, speed cannot be real. Likewise, for example, the distance between you and that house is not real if there is not some definite relation between you and that house, and there cannot be any definite relation between the two of you (as objects) if spatiotemporal relations are not real—for the only way to produce a definite relation between you and the house is to produce at least a spatial, mathematical relation. If this be denied, then one has to accept that, at best, nothing they experience, not even the relations between objects, is real but somehow that the objects which they experience are somewhat accurate representations of whatever is going on in reality—but what sort of relation could exist between you and that house that is not at least spatial (even if the space itself, the perceptive depth, is merely the form of your experience)? It seems like denying spatiotemporal relations sideswipes all of knowable reality and replaces it is with a giant question mark, and makes reality (which we can speak of) phantasms. — Bob Ross

In a similar vein, I agree that the most interesting forms of relationism are those that are also the most unintuitive. If we want to avoid the claim of sneaking in spacetime through the back door by use of irreducible distance relations then something significant or grand most replace it. Usually this means making friends with old enemies such as action-at-a-distance, platonism, and making extensive use of modal notions.

One paper which seems to attempt, and fail multiple times, at defining some form of relationism through modal notions or weak/strong forms of platonism is outlined here. It doesn't investigate what I think is the far more intriguing avenue of action-at-a-distance.

It is rather peculiar that even though relationists have usually objected to "occultist" notions such as spacetime and seek to replace them with rigorous physicalist replacements the tools they'd need to do so seem rather un-physical/"occultist" themselves.

Of course, this doesn't even broach the topic of Leibnizian relationism which is a beast in of its own and not something I'm familiar with myself aside from 'common' knowledge.

I have been thinking about the metaphysics of space and time, and wanted to share my thoughts. — Bob Ross

I'm glad you have! I must, though, apologize for all that I have written.

The two aspects of the metaphysics of space and time that I am going to address is the reality or unreality of them in terms of being substances and relations. By the former, I mean whether or not space and time are themselves subsisting entities in reality which things inhere to; and by the latter I mean whether or not things, as they are in themselves, adhere to any spatiotemporal relations (irregardless of whether or not space and time, as subsisting entities, are substances). — Bob Ross

The debate between substantivalists and relationists is one fraught with accusations regarding everything under the sun including psychological theories, metaphorical speech, base ontological disputes with regards to substantiation, grounding/fundamentality, absolutism vs. relativism, emergence vs. non-emergence, and even the purviews of modern meta-metaphysical uncertainty.

I've always been peeked for interest since being a young one as to where these disputes would lead me and they've only led me to asking whether such a discussion is even substantial at all. I'm not alone here. On multiple articles I've read it seems that others, renowned or not, have struggled in attempting to resurrect this debate in the modern era without the slightest possibility of it being merely 'semantics'. I'd recommend the article by Robert Rynasiewicz if you can access it but similar opinions can be found else where. Pro or con.

If I can postulate something and it does everything that something else is supposed to do then is there really a debate as which word/concept/intuition we should use? This sort of undercuts the whole issue that Einstein had in interpreting his general theory with the often quote mined parts of his confusion as to how in attempting to rid himself of an aether he gave rise to a rather aether-like thing. A 'thing' imbued with physicality in its mutual interaction with every day objects. Course, you could also flip this and consider a purely relationist aether of material things with irreducible distance/temporal relations to be quite like a 'container' spacetime that is filled. Its not a far cry for many philosophers to then ask if the debate between substantivalism vs relationism (or space/matter vs. aether) is a nonsense metaphysical dispute that has outlived its intellectual usefulness.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the book Space, Time, and Spacetime by Lawrence Skylar he brought up the rather rarely discussed topic of the epistemology of spacetime which further fragments the discussion as to its modern day relevancy. Do such questions as to the geometry of the world make any sense at all in an objective sense or are we committing some dreadful reification? People such as Poincare seemed to advocate for seeing such questions as only being answered in a conventional/arbitrary sense because you could always manipulate the laws regarding how physical objects behave to make another different spacetime consistent with the former. . . experimentally speaking. Apparently even Einstein held similar inclinations, at least at one point, noting that what mattered was the combination of one's physical guiding laws and a particular spatiotemporal structure. As long as the observations are left invariant or untouched you could in principle substitute in a postulation of a new geometry and merely tweak the field equations to mathematically get it to work.

As is common to all debates regarding theory falsification the problems of inter and intra theory underdetermination rear their ugly head again. The conventionalist shouts from his soap box to the realist that, "I can imagine indefinitely many different geometries of the world and physical laws under guiding their interactions all of which are in principle beyond the pure view of science to distinguish. Theoretically/philosophically they are distinct but experimentally, not. So, what meaning could such statements hold if any at all? Perhaps it is all mere convention?"

Of course, you could throw these same critiques against substantivalists or relationists seeing them both as hypocrites in service of a distinction that is as hotly debated as it is illusive. One relationist postulates irreducible distance relations and the substantivalist may posit irreducible physical constituents while both agree as to many of the general intuitions one has about spatio-temporal relationships holding between material constituents.

In that vein in the same book, in analogy to responses to radical/external world skepticism, Skylar gives a handful of positions one could take in response to this theoretical/semantic/philosophical under-determination. They also may have their own doppelgangers in the classic substantivalism/relational dispute as well. In response to this challenge of determining the geometry of the world one could either view such statements as irreducibly related to one's own experiences to give them meaning (anti-reductionism) or still hold there are things-in-themselves that give meaning to these statements independent of our mind (reductionism). The former position is a dead end in its own as it leads to some form of epistemological idealism or phenomenology that seeks to ground the meaning of these statements in our own mind. The thought being that perhaps it would be misguided to consider our mental conceptions as having any fundamental relation to the external world. That doesn't mean such a person is a solipsist per say (they would be in good company) but that the external world is in some sense unintelligible. A monkey typing randomly on a typewriter no matter how many coherent statements they make will not imbue us, or them, with true external access even by accident.

If you still considered there to be things-in-themselves that objectively ground the meaning of such statements then by following this reductionist road we would be lead to a trichotomy: Skepticism, conventionalism, and realism. Course, we could always take the middle man position of skepticism in any such discussions and its the latter two that make much more intriguing claims. Conventionalism regards the choice of the geometry of this world as. . . well. . . conventional in choice but they could still admit that even though its arbitrary we are all in some sense talking about the 'same thing'. Realists would emphasis the importance of a language/theory that actually 'carves nature at its joints' and would be optimistic about attempts to discover such a thing. Whether that be through experimental confirmation or rather subjective extra-theory considerations including neo-rationalist strategies or a-prior thinking.

Why does the above all seem so familiar? IT'S JUST THE MODERN DAY META-METAPHYSICS DISPUTE as to the meaningfulness or worth of metaphysics! Similar to the responses above, people who have been rather skeptical of the whole point of metaphysics ask rather similar questions yielding rather similar positions. Such as Sider's ontological realism, modern day Carnapian conventionalism, or forms of indifferent pragmatism/quietism. Strange how such a specific metaphysical dispute can devolve right into core philosophical or meta-philosophical issues common to other discussions.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So, where does that leave us? if we think such conversations are still worth having and are salvageable then the only problem remaining is how they can be saved at all. Some approaches to this abandon the substantivalism/relationism for an emergence/fundamentality dispute in a similar manner to how the former classical debate transcended the more ancient absolute motion vs. relative motion controversy. Substantival spacetimes or any such entities usually admitted to a variety of relative motions but also held many absolutist features. Despite the nomenclature, forms of relationism were also not unfriendly entirely to absolutism of certain sorts either. Depending on the formulation of course. You could be a substantivalist and view certain motions as absolute/relative contrary to some other substantival opponent just as much as the relationist could.

A random paper I came across not long ago seemed to indicate that we could do the same but with emergentism vs. fundamentality. While a dualistic spacetime/matter was perhaps somewhat indistinguishable before from some form of super-substantivalism (spacetime makes up matter) or a highly reductive form of relationism, perhaps, its now not a question of substantiality but of independence. Through the language of emergentism, new positions can arise and also perhaps new debate which could maybe cut through the fat of the former. I haven't read much about such subject matters to begin with so I wouldn't know too much beyond super-layman basics.

We even get something, I think, out of looking at the bad things in the world and watching ourselves being concerned about it. It can be a kind of little performance we do for ourselves, so that we might consider ourselves good people, worthy of love ourselves. I remember Victor Frankl talking about this, how we cry for others and then cry a little extra for ourselves, while patting ourselves on the back for being such compassionate people. We probably also unconsciously perform our caring for others, so that they might see us as good people.

It's also a little hard to take it all in, to really appreciate what's going on around the world. It's hard to carry the weight of the world's suffering on your shoulders. Naturally, much of the time, we just want to shut it all out and pretend that this cute puppy in front of us is all there is. — petrichor

Now I remember why i've been sober for almost a year straight. Such thoughts are maddening and any attempt to satiate them is a pointless endeavour. . . including ignoring them. . . or attempting to satiate them through what are actually selfish actions that appear to be 'self-less'. I survive only by turning my gaze away into a kaleidoscope of distractions.

It is a fundamental attack on the identity of a vulnerable group that has become more aggressive in recent years and the consequences are becoming more blatant each year. — Andrew4Handel

You know what is funny. One of the biggest issues posed for a feminist viewpoint is actually getting at a definition of unison among all woman and therefore the rights such a group therefore deserves to be given. It's been split along the gendered discussion but also along economic as well as racial lines it seems. They may all be XX chromosome biologically but what is to be done, what rights, or what attributed global 'identity' they are given may usually fall short of just stereotyping them all at best or at worst steam rolling important differences.

That is why it seems some feminists seem to consider a white middle class female as a different kind woman than a poor african american female. I.E. the social unison or class here is not marking off important differences or needs to account for those in a way that naive approaches are argued to supposedly miss completely.

But you have not made a case for why certain situations divided by sex: bathrooms, sports, and shelters for example, should suddenly be changed because of gender. A subjective outlook that can differ from individual to individual has no basis overriding biological fact that stands despite subjective outlooks. — Philosophim

Those subjective outlooks however question to what extent this biological fact is supposed to rule divide them in the first place. Notice how you haven't actually explained why sex (as chromosomes alone) is the only criterion used to make these distinctions. You've said it is, not why it is.

No it doesn't. Bathrooms are for personal hygene and getting rid of waste bodily fluids. The sexes have different ways of getting rid of those. Dressing or acting in a particular way does not change that. Its not a party place. Its not a place to express fashion. Its to go to the bathroom. And since you have to undress or put yourself in a vulnerable position to expel certain bodily fluids, we keep the sexes separate. — Philosophim

Except when it comes to biologically transitioned individuals and intersex people who still, besides their possibly 'discordant' sex organs, can use either bathroom just as easily.

Yes it is. It has nothing to do with your gender expression. I want to make it VERY clear. Transgender people are not sexual predators. Sexual predators are sexual predators. We keep the sexes clear for sexual privacy, not gendered privacy. — Philosophim

So a person is a trans-female who passes. . . are they seen as a sexual predator or not?

If you're saying that acting like something you are not, or identifying as something you are not, makes you that something, that's false. — Philosophim

Unless what that thing is, is nothing above the act itself. Being feminine/masculine (NOT TALKING ABOUT SEX) is heavily enforced by and cemented socially in a variety of acts that do not have to involve you taking your clothes off or revealing your chromosomes.

Now, if you want to internally identify yourself as whatever you want, feel free. Invent your own language as you see fit. But when you go into society which has accepted definitions and language, you do not get to tell society to accept yours. — Philosophim

Society then has what right to tell us who we are internally? None.

If you identify as a woman in society, but you are not a woman by sex, you are simply wrong in your identity. — Philosophim

That is, if they are talking about a woman as someone with XX chromosomes. However, they are probably talking about woman as a social and protected political identity which is where the discussion comes in.

No, I've said several times that its based on the very real sex differences between men and women. — Philosophim

The sex differences between men and women are chromosomes or what primary/secondary sexual organs you possess. Sex is not the 'potential to rape' or 'probably going to rape'. That is something that ISN'T SEX.

You may use sex as a classification scheme to reduce the possibility but sex is still not a 'statistical likelihood' or an 'uncomfortable' feeling or 'the potential to. . .' .

We're not talking about being around the same sex. Anyone can make friends or hang out with people of any sex or gender. But there are particular places and events that are divided based on sex. The way you act or dress does not suddenly make this sex divide go away. — Philosophim

. . . and it's there because. . . why? Why should it be there?

People can make decisions based off of gender, which would be the stereotype of some individual or culture. But you have not made a case for why certain situations divided by sex: bathrooms, sports, and shelters for example, should suddenly be changed because of gender. A subjective outlook that can differ from individual to individual has no basis overriding biological fact that stands despite subjective outlooks. — Philosophim

. . . and these divisions by chromosomal status are there because. . .? Why should it be there?