Well then we'd have multiple, slightly differing universals, a definitional contradiction. — Isaac

That seeming contradiction did not bother you that much when you explained at length why it is possible to have multiple, slightly different As. So you are ready to be a bit charitable with your concept of A but not with your concept of universal.

why redefine universalism to resemble nominalism, why not just call it nominalism in the first place? — Isaac

Because I believe we can do far better than nominalism.

The disagreement is over the existence of actual universals, not over things which are nearly, or quite like universals. The distinction is absolutely crucial for the argument at hand because the law of identity would have us hold that only where the concepts are identical in every way can they be said to be one entity, identical with itself. Otherwise we're talking about several entities, all very, very, very similar. No matter how many 'very's I put in there, it will not be enough to qualify as identical and so not one unity requiring it's own existence. — Isaac

When asked what passes for an A you answered: "anything that has enough resemblance to other As".

Let us agree then that anything that has sufficient resemblance to universals is a universal, for all reasonable purposes.

when we're discussing something like the physicality of the mind, that contextual convenience does not just carry over by default. The context has changed, it may no longer be convenient to use the façon de parler in this new context.... in fact it's getting very much in the way. — Isaac

I doubt it, seriously. Science as a whole is but a façon de parler that happens to be useful... I think your quest here is not knowledge-driven. Rather, it is a self-defeating metaphysical crusade against concepts, i.e. against yourself. Like all naïve materialists, you are sawing the conceptual branch on which you sit.

in any case you do admit there is a unified idea of “triangle” that we all (basically) share.

So why can’t the same be said of New York? Or “A”? — khaled

Good development. So there exist what we could call "near universals", concepts that we all or nearly all agree about, like Euclidian triangles.

Even Euclidian geometry as a whole is a "near-universal" in that we still haven't met a human being whose default mental GIS was non-euclidian. We all model space as perfectly Euclidian, intuitively.

Didn't we just play this tune though? — Kenosha Kid

Sure. This tune are us, essentially.

Really modelled in your real brain. — Kenosha Kid

Not only in mine, that's the hick. There's a certain universal dimension to concepts. Language depends on it.

our experiences of real, imperfect, circular things is prior to our concepts of circles. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, existence precedes essence. But even if essences (of concepts) are arrived at by successive approximations and refinements of mental and sense experience, it doesn't make them less interesting to precise and refine...

In that sense I agree that precise concepts are not fundamental to our experience. They are derived from it, but in my mind precise concepts are nevertheless useful, and to the degree that they are useful, they aquire reality, if only as useful hypotheses.

Dealing with the category of circles, taking perfection -- the average shape of a circular thing irl -- as a symbol of any referent (generalisation), was a way of making predictions about physical objects and processes — Kenosha Kid

Which is a good thing, right?

(setting aside that circles have a precise conceptual definition, not based on an average of approximate circles)

I have not and would not deny the existence of concepts. — Isaac

Okay then. Concepts have some ontological status, we agree, at least as "subjective approximations of absolutes residing in people's mind".

I like to define a concept as a set. There are fuzzy sets/concepts and neat ones. A well defined concept is a well defined set. But there is always a residue of ambiguity in human concepts. Witty said it best: concepts have fuzzy boundaries. Which is why they are often difficult to define precisely: they are not precise objects but categories of objects with many borderline cases.

Mathematical concepts are a bit better defined. Pi is a concept that any averagely intelligent student is expected to grasp in a rather precise, operational manner. They might ask: What's the circumference of the trigonometric circle? If she answers "a little more than 6", it's technically correct but not mathematically satisfying. The answer can be exact (2*Pi) so it needs to be exact. The concept of Pi is mathematically precise.

Of course, nobody will ask her: where does Pi reside: in the pure realm of eternal mathematics, in physical circles, or in your head? My answer to that question would be: why choose? Can't it be in all three?

If concepts are "subjective approximations of absolutes residing in people's mind", doesn't it follow that the absolutes which concepts approximate, these absolutes also exist, at least as "limits" or "directions" or "horizons" of human thought?


Once you start to learn trigonometry, you have to agree that 1) there exists the concept of circle (as a concept in people's minds); 2) physical circles exists, that approximate the concept; 3) the human mind can forge additional concepts that are useful for thinking about circles and measuring them, such as the number Pi; 4) etc. etc... It may be okay to remember all these caveats ("in people's minds") for whatever metaphysical reason, but it is heavy. Very soon, you find yourself speaking of Pi as if it was a real number...

Pun aside, it is more convenient theoretically to forgo the realist caveats, or just suspend them temporarily while learning trigonometry. Just assume numbers exist, Pi exists, and perfect circles exist. It may take a leap of faith, but it's worth it as it makes for easier, less encumbered learning. And what do you got to lose anyway? If they poke fun at you for "reifying Pi", send them to me.

As you said: une façon de parler, mais utile!

When was the last time you made your own argument and not just chiming in pro or con on someone else's claim? — schopenhauer1

Every single day.

Indeed you made a similar argument and I did recognise the limits of the term "universal" but that does not imply that no such thing exists as concepts or ideas and their abstract meaning... It just means that concepts, while being "universal enough" within the folks speaking a given language for the language to work, do not need to have exactly the same meaning across that population. Slight variations may apply to their boundaries, that's all.

You must still think in terms of the meaning of letters, words, and sentences if you care to understand language. And this meaning is not to be found in the letters or in the words themselves (which are arbitrary symbols). This meaning is often not about any individual thing, but about sets of things (e.g. "I don't like cats"), and relations between sets of things (e.g. "Dogs often don't like cats"). Thinking involves spotting and constructing generalities.

Take the example of the number Pi, defined as the constant obtained by dividing the circumference of any circle by its diameter. The number Pi is a concept, an abstraction, and it is different from the many ways one can in practice write down "Pi".

Does the number Pi exist? I don't know, not even sure the question has a meaning other than the trivial: "some people conceive of the number Pi".

Can we compute Pi? Not exactly.

Is it useful? Certainly yes, Pi is a very useful concept, in spite of its value being forever an estimate.

... then. — Isaac

Then, you need to think in terms of meaning, not just glyphs.

Point well taken.

I agree that much too much is made of "universals", that they are not as universal as they seem, and they only need to be sufficiently universal, or somewhat homogenous across individuals, not perfectly equal, like in your example of human DNA.

If we take a mathematical example, I think we can agree that the number Pi (singular) is not "physical" in the sense that it is not an individual thing out there that people can see or take in their hand, and that the number Pi is therefore an idea. But we can also agree that it is a very precisely defined idea that leaves very little room, if any, for personal interpretation. There is likely very little difference between what you conceive as Pi and what I conceive as Pi. Nevertheless, there will always be one guy or another out there who has a different conception, e.g. who thinks that Pi is equal to 3, or that it's a rational number.

Therefore the term "universal" is not really correct, even for Pi. I guess the word "concept" is better here, as it expresses the possibility of a personal or personalized concept, whereas a "universal" cannot logically be "personal".

This said, there still needs to be enough commonality between your meaning and my meaning of a given word for us to understand one another.

H';lkjdf 'kjvrq oijhsRGvw NDF KLcw opihjasetrrg óq23 serAFT'PA3 SDPOawkjjc? w435nmg24[-0vf5hj fd3q2=089fcq3 ser=r4tfm nw40 f0-s45 y=qwc- 9uybe5yh!!!


(edit: for those who do not happen to speak Isaac's similitude-based, approximately spelt and unconceivable language, the above means by-and-large : "if we jettison the idea of correct spelling, we might regret it some day" -- though it rolls down the tongue much better in the original!)

Dictionaries are physical objects, with a certain mass.

If you open one of them, and look inside, you will find pages, which are physical things too.

If you look at one page, you will find some scribblings on it; the scribblings too are physical. One could quantify the amount of ink used for instance.

If you have learnt your alphabet (a set of signs, i.e. non physical but conceptual) and are conversant in the language used, you may be able to decipher the meaning of some of the scribblings. Such meaning is conceptual rather than physical. The word "rose" might be written somewhere in the dictionary, but you won't find an actual rose in it.

And yes, it include a model of each word's correct spelling in terms of the one exact order of letters to be used, not some vague, ill-defined similitude.

Your computer spell check would normally tell you. Otherwise there are resources called dictionaries.

You don't need a memory of all the other attempts; you just need to know the one and only correct spelling of "polysaccharides".

i don't require an ideal 'correct' word. — Isaac

You actually do need to know how to write e.g. "polysaccharides" correctly in order to be understood as saying "polysaccharides". If you write it as "pauleessakorrydz", nobody will understand what you mean.

Of course if you want just to produce art and poetry, that's another matter. "Pauleessakorrydz" has a certain beauty, as far as meaningless collections of letters go...

Oliver is currently 'talking about' the ideal 'A', so we clearly need a bit more than merely talking about X as if it existed for us to conclude that X exists, yes? — Isaac

My name isn't actually "Oliver". It is "Olivier", which is the correct French spelling. In my opinion, that correct French spelling does exist, somehow, as does the correct English spelling "Oliver", as does the mistake of confusing one for the other. But maybe that's just me.

If correct spellings do not actually exist, thin wahatp thi fruck?

About how mental models design and define our life:

Maybe 'A' isn't a good example. What about "triangle". — khaled

You are probably right that for scientists, it is best to use examples from mathematics.

people like Chalmers say that there's still a question as to whether such a thing really experiences anything, or if it just behaves as if it does. — Pfhorrest

And other people worry about the sex of angels...

I got news for Chalmers. Philosophical zombies cannot possibly exist. The mind is not facultative, it is a necessary element of a functional biological human being, which MIGHT BE precisely why it exists in every single human being we've come across so far... And when human beings go into coma, they often die.

that metaphysical quality (which Chalmers et al call "phenomenal consciousness") is already present everywhere, so all you have to do to get some matter into the right form and thus function and it already has whatever else is metaphysically needed to experience things the way a human does. — Pfhorrest

I would say that the right form and thus function IS what determines phenomenal consciousness, and that the mystery is: what kind of form generates consciousness and what kind of form doesn't?

Some are more universal than others. Think of numbers for instance.

The content of the set defined by {the concept of the singular letter A} is made of all conceivable glyphs that could qualify as an A.

Categories generally are idiosyncratic. — Kenosha Kid

The same tends to be true of universals: in practice they have hazy boundaries, and those boundaries vary across people, so I don't see much a difference here between the two ideas. A category is still a universal if it is to be used effectively in communication. If your 'blue' is to be meaningful to me, there has to be some fairly wide overlap between my category of blue and yours.

What you are saying is that "universals" are not as universal as we may think, their limits are hazy, which is true and indeed an important point in that the verification of universals by interviewing locutors is never perfect. You can always find a guy who disagrees somewhere.

Nope. You were talking of ALL the As, which a concept.

For a start one is a set of existent things, the other a concept. — Isaac

A set is a concept, by definition.

What harm might I be predicting could come to me if I were to think in universals? — Isaac

Losing face on a message board.

Which, as I've just explained, does not require an ideal mental construct. It's just a façon de parler for "is this sufficiently like all the other 'A's". — Isaac

"All the other As" means the same thing as "the set of all As" which means the same thing as "the concept of the (singular) letter A". You are just playing conceptual hide and seek with yourself because you are afraid to think in universals.

They say things like: "is this an A or not?"

What possible evidence could you bring to bear that everybody uses the concept of an ideal 'A' even if they claim to use alternative methods? — Isaac

Because they speak of it, thus they know the concept of the letter A. You are lying to yourself.

If all you're saying is that it's useful to imagine a single ideal 'A' then...meh. Some people do, some don't. — Isaac

Everybody does, in actual fact, even those unaware that they do. The human mind thinks in universals.

What's absolutely a given is that it's neither necessary, nor foundational and so there's no cause at all to assume some second substance for it to be constituted of. — Isaac

Concepts that have been invented do exist, if only in our heads. Their "substance" is not an immediate concern of mine; I'm not even sure the word has a meaning in the context of abstract ideas.

As to whether concepts are foundational, I think they are historically so, not naturally so. The invention of the zero and base 10 counting for instance was purely conceptual, but it greatly facilitated computation.

wouldn't it be more parsimonious to assume just that our cognitive abilities are reliable? — SophistiCat

Exactly.

The challenge is to explain in a non theist manner the emergence of logical thoughts that actually help describe this universe correctly.

Your approach creates an entirely unnecessary category of existence — Isaac

It's about concepts and their usefulness, not about their existence. Once the concepts of letters and numbers have been invented, we'd be fools not to use them.

"Your 'A' is not similar enough to the ideal mental form for 'A', try again."

"Your 'A' is not similar enough to all the other 'As', try again."

What's wrong with the second teaching method? What does it fail to achieve by way of learning how to write? — Isaac

It is less elegant, heavier conceptually, and more complex to teach. Qualitatively, it implies that all recognisable As are equivalent, which is not the case. They are variations on a theme, derivated from the ideal A by adding little bars at the bottom (sheriffs) or thickened strokes (bold) or what not. These variations themselves become easily teachable when seen as variations from some basic shape.

Just teach them the alphabet; it's easier. Whether the alphabet "exists" or not is a not-too-meaningful question. Whether it is a useful concept is the right question. And the answer is yes.

So this discussion now circles around the ontological status of abstract forms, such as the letter N, conceived as an element of a set called alphabet.

As we all know, the invention of the alphabet or rather its derivation from earlier ideograms (the letter A for instance would derive from a stylized cow head, turned upside down) was a significant achievement in the history of writing, allowing a massive reduction in the number of distinct signs to learn.

If the alphabet does not really really exist, we have a problem.

So what is the ontological status of the alphabet? I would respond as follows: IFF the alphabet is said to exist as an abstract set, it becomes teachable to people and thus, it becomes a reality in their head. This allows them to do all sorts of amazing things like writing on TPF. If on the contrary the alphabet does not really exist as one abstract thing, it cannot be taught and used. I prefer the first hypothesis, personally.

"even if you arranged some non-living matter into the exact form and function of a real human being, such that it walked around and talked and lived life like a real human, and even reported on mental states it supposedly had, might there still be something missing that's not accounted for just by the functionality?" is "basically no". — Pfhorrest

This is done all the time. It's called reproduction, and I have no problem with it. Note the importance of EXACT FORM in the sentence. Form is what life is about. Whether you use these or those molecules of water makes no actual difference, but the form is what 'matters'.

My issue was rather with your definition of experience:

But "experience" in this sense is not thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation. It's whatever the supposed difference between a real human being and a fully functional replica of a human being who is "not actually conscious" (a philosophical zombie) is supposed to be. — Pfhorrest

In other words, you define experience as conscious experience... not sure that's more than a tautology, or that it makes much of a difference with "thought, belief, or even feeling, perception, or sensation".

My point is that conscious experience is fundamentally different from just matter or energy, not that it cannot be 'produced' or made to happen in this world.

it might be something I would refer to with the vocalisation something like 'en'. — Isaac

You can refer to it in many different ways, of course.

You've not answered the challenge that similitude gives sufficient clarity to be understood. — Isaac

You have not said what similitude means. It's a rather vague concept. W is similar to M but they are not the same letter.

Many fonts can be read as 'N' because they're all similar in ways close enough for the purpose. — Isaac

What is 'N' standing for in this sentence, if not the idea of the one and only letter 'N'?

Why? We don't have to define the boundaries of similitude to understand "stand roughly here", — Isaac

Actually we do, if we care to be understood we need to express ourselves clearly, and this means abiding to certain theoretical or practiced rules. What you write must be readable.

Labelling your own preferred position as 'the common sense one' is a cheap trick. We're talking about ontology here, there's no common sense account at all. — Isaac

I have addressed that in quoting Wikipedia above. There's a full blown typographic theory out there that underpins all modern written communications.

Are you suggesting that there exist no ambiguous cases? That there's no scribble I could make where some might read it as saying 'New York' and others might not? — Isaac

No. I am suggesting a test to your theory: a test on which it fails. It is not practical, it doesn't tell you how to write New York so that the reader understands New York. We cannot use it to think and express ourselves simply and clearly about typography and writing. Your similitude is empty blah, with no clear pragmatic application in the art of writing.

the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts, — Olivier5

A more complex and complete theory of typefaces and fonts exist, than the "common sense" one. A little detour via Wikipedia will convince you of that:

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Font

In metal typesetting, a font was a particular size, weight and style of a typeface. Each font was a matched set of type, with a piece (a "sort") for each glyph, and a typeface consisting of a range of fonts that shared an overall design.

In modern usage, with the advent of desktop publishing, "font" has come to be used as a synonym for "typeface" although a typical typeface (or 'font family') consists of a number of fonts.

For instance, the typeface "Bauer Bodoni" includes fonts "Regular", "Bold", "Italic" and Italic Bold and each of these exists in a variety of sizes. The term "font" is correctly applied to any one of these alone but may be seen used loosely to refer to the whole typeface. When used in computers, each style is in a separate digital "font file".

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Typeface
"Font family" redirects here.

A typeface is the design of lettering[1] that can include variations in size, weight (e.g. bold), slope (e.g. italic), width (e.g. condensed), and so on. Each of these variations of the typeface is a font.

There are thousands of different typefaces in existence, with new ones being developed constantly.

The art and craft of designing typefaces is called type design. Designers of typefaces are called type designers and are often employed by type foundries. In digital typography, type designers are sometimes also called font developers or font designers.

Every typeface is a collection of glyphs, each of which represents an individual letter, number, punctuation mark, or other symbol. The same glyph may be used for characters from different scripts, e.g. Roman uppercase A looks the same as Cyrillic uppercase А and Greek uppercase alpha. There are typefaces tailored for special applications, such as cartography, astrology or mathematics.

We commonly say that 'New York' has one name, but it is a façon de parler, what we really have is multidudinous instances all of which are similar enough for our purposes. — Isaac

We commonly say so because if we didn't, if we thought that New York has many different names that all share enough similarity, then our life would be far more complicated. We would have to define the boundaries of that similitude. Because we CAN recognised the same name New York written in seven different fonts on that pic I posted. So we would need another explanation of our recognizing New York than the common sense one (=it's the same mental concepts or "ideal mental forms", e.g. letters / words / name but simply written in different fonts, tweaking the shapes of the graphic symbols in a purely aesthetic manner, for the fun or beauty of it).

Now what would such a rival explanation be? Where would the boundaries of the "New York" similitude lie? What would it take for a scribble on a page to NOT be recognised as meaning "New York"?