Nevertheless, isn't Kant making an assumption by saying there are "things in themselves"? This includes plurality, how do we know if there is such a thing? — Manuel

For two reasons, common sense and textual.

Common sense
What kinds of objects are things in themselves.
From A29 of CPR: For in this case that which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to colour.
From A272: Of course, if I know a drop of water as a thing in itself according to all of its inner determinations, I cannot let any one drop count as different from another if the entire concept of the former is identical with that of the latter.

By common sense, does anyone not believe in the existence of roses, drops of water, houses, camels, trucks, etc. Would anyone crossing a busy road and seeing a truck bearing down on them actually think that the truck, the thing in itself, doesn't exist in reality but only as a figment of their imagination. Wouldn't everyone make sure they quickly got out of the way. Doesn't everyone believe in that things in themselves exist independently of their own thoughts of them.

Would Kant have not worked at the University of Königsberg for 15 years if he thought that the thing in itself, the University, only existed in his imagination and not in reality.

Can anyone argue from common sense that Kant was not a Realist.

He was clearly not a Direct Realist, as the Direct Realist believes they have direct and immediate knowledge of the thing in itself.

His philosophy, as @mww writes "Matter, as such, cannot have a name, which is a representation derived from the synthesis of conceptions, hence given from thought, not sensation" is that of Indirect Realism, the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.

Textual evidence for the existence of the thing in itself
Kant makes numerous statement against the charge of Idealism.

In the CPR Anticipations of Perception, sensation can be understood both as stemming from the object of experience as well as the thing in itself. This duality may only be understood if the transcendental is distinguished from the empirical. Kant's Theory of Affection allows for two different explanations, though together make a coherent whole account of human knowledge.

It would be a mistake to conclude that because a thing in itself remains indeterminate it cannot exist. Common sense tells us that there is something behind an appearance, even if we don't know what it is.

Kant wrote in A536 of the CPR that appearances must have grounds that are not appearances.
If ... appearances are not taken for more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves, but merely as representations, connected according to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined. While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature.

We know that objects of experience, although they are mere appearances, are given to us. If the appearance has not been generated by the knowing subject, then an external cause must exist, even if the external cause is unknowable. The thing in itself allows for the very possibility of appearance.

There are many passages in the Fourth Paralogism where the thing in itself is declared as the cause of appearance, and even in the Second Analogy, the thing in itself is described as the source of affection.

Summary
Kant is clearly a Realist, and in today's terms an Indirect Realist. Kant's Theory of Affection
may be read as not only that sensation stems from the object of appearance but also from the thing in itself, not a contradictory position, but two parts of a coherent whole.

Paul Davies............by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers — Quixodian

Science tells us the Universe began about 13.8 billion years ago, and life began on Earth about 3.8 billion years ago.

Is Davies saying that as the Universe can only exist if there are observers to observe it, life must have begun 13.8 billion years ago.

Don’t be a pillock — Jamal

Pillock, a stupid person. I will have to remember to use that term in the future on the Forum.

I was just correcting your anglocentric assumptions. — Jamal

In what way is my belief that humans across the world subjectively perceive colour in a similar way Anglo-centric ?

Note that this is just cultural. Russians have no word for blue*. Light and dark blue, goluboy and siniy, are seen as different colours, as different as red and orange. — Jamal

I can only speak from general knowledge, but whilst I agree that colour has different linguistic and social meaning between different cultures, I don't agree that humans within different cultures would not have the same subjective perception of different wavelengths.

The Wikipedia articles on Color and Color Terms writes that whilst English has 11 basic colour terms, other languages have between 2 and 12. How the spectrum is divided into distinct colours linguistically is a matter of culture and historical contingency. Colours have different associations in different countries and cultures.

Even though a Russian and a Scot have different linguistic terms for colours, if you showed the Scot and the Russian the three wavelengths of 420nm, 470nm and 700nm, my belief is that they would both agree that there was a common feature between 420nm and 470nm but not between 420nm and 700nm

IE, colour perception is not just cultural, it is human, common across different cultures.

Colour is not wavelength — Metaphysician Undercover

If what I've read on this is accurate the human can distinguish about 10 million colours, although for simplicity we don't have many different names for them. — Janus

The visible spectrum is the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum that is visible to the human eye. A typical human eye will respond to wavelengths from about 380 to about 750 nm The average number of colours we can distinguish is around a million.

English has 11 basic colour terms: black, white, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, orange, pink, purple, and grey.

It is part a problem of terminology. On the one hand, a wavelength of 420nm is a different colour to a wavelength of 470nm, but on the other hand, even though we can distinguish them, we perceive them both as the single colour blue.

The interesting question is how we can perceive the wavelengths of 420nm and 470nm as two different things yet at the same time perceive them as a single thing.

Kant sometimes oscillates between the "thing-in-itself" and "things in themselves", and these, obviously, are different in an important respect, in that one presupposes individuation, the other does not. — Manuel

It seems "things in themselves" refer to several objects of experience, whilst "thing in itself" refers to one object of experience.

From the CPR:
B xxvi Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves.
A30 For in this case that which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to colour.

From the SEP article on Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Prauss (1974) notes that, in most cases, Kant uses the expression “Dinge an sich selbst” rather than the shorter form “Dinge an sich”. He argues that “an sich selbst” functions as an adverb to modify an implicit attitude verb like “to consider”. He concludes that the dominant use of these expressions is as a short-hand for “things considered as they are in themselves”

I guess the whole point is that we don't know that there are things in themselves, only that we believe that there are. The "selbst" indicates a mental attitude to something rather than the physical state of something.

Do we have in mind noumenon in a negative sense or in a positive sense? — Manuel

Although Kant distinguished between positive noumena and negative noumena, as he didn't think positive noumena were possible, because they would require intellectual knowledge of a non-sensible intuition, the term noumena is assumed to mean a negative noumena, aka thing-in-itself, aka Dinge an sich selbst .

Also: being a realist does not preclude being an idealist — Count Timothy von Icarus

It depends what is being meant by realism and idealism. It comes down to definition, which are difficult to pin down, especially when there was even a thread on the Forum titled "Definitions have no place in philosophy". The SEP articles on Idealism and Realism are a start.
===============================================================================

Dorrien: Kant postulated a self-sufficient noumenal realm set apart from everything belonging to the phenomenal realm — Count Timothy von Icarus

A sensible acknowledgement that for the 10 billion years before life began on Earth, there was possibly no phenomenal realm.
===============================================================================

Dorrien: Kant’s Platonism, however, stood in the way of dealing with anything real — Count Timothy von Icarus

In another passage Hamann attacks Kant for elevating Reason into a universal Platonic ideal rather than being something grounded in a specific language and cultural context. An unwarranted criticism, in that a philosopher should not to be forced to make judgements unduly swayed by short term pressures from the particular society that they happen to live in.
===============================================================================

Kant realized that his critics would say the same thing about the thing-in-itself, but he needed the idea of the noumenon to account for the given manifold and the ground of moral freedom. The idea of a thing-in-itself that is not a thing of the senses is not contradictory, he assured — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is still a problem that Indirect and Direct Realism grapples with 200 years after Kant's death.
===============================================================================

Like Fichte, Hegel wants to find out how basic categories have to be understood, not just how they have in fact been understood. This can only be discovered, he believes, if we demonstrate which categories are inherent in thought as such, and we can only do this if we allow pure thought to determine itself—and so to generate its own determinations—“before our very eyes” — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is no problem of self-reference in Kant. It is not the case that thoughts can only be about thoughts.

For Kant, we think about objects of sensible intuition using the categories. The category doesn't determine what particular object is being thought about, although it is true that the categories limit what particular objects can be thought about.

It is true that the fact that I have the ability to see the colours red and green but not the colour ultra-violet does limit me in which colours I can see, but it does allow me to distinguish between the colours (of sensible intuition) that I am able to see.

Catastrophically irrelevant. — Mww

In what way is pointing out that Kant didn't have the advantage of knowing about evolution irrelevant to when it comes to finding a solution to the problem of infinite regression as laid out in the quote by Stephen Houlgate in his book The Opening of Hegel's Logic.

Fichte maintains that Kant himself “does not derive the presumed laws of the intellect from the very nature of the intellect,” but abstracts these laws from our empirical experience of objects, albeit via a “detour through logic” (which itself abstracts its laws from our experience of objects). In Fichte’s view, therefore, Kant may assert that the categories and laws of thought have their source in the spontaneity of the intellect, but—because of the way he proceeds—“he has no way to confirm that the laws of thought he postulates actually are laws of thought and that they are really nothing else but the immanent laws of the intellect.” The only way to confirm this, Fichte tells us, would be to start from the simple premise that the intellect acts—that the intellect is “a kind of doing and absolutely nothing more”—and to show how the laws of thought can be derived from this premise alone.

How can the question as to the source of our a priori non-sensible intuitions and categories of concepts be properly answered without reference to a modern understanding of Innatism ?

We are not living in 1781 when the Critique of Pure Reason was first published.

Do you think space and time are real independently of the mind? — Quixodian

As an Indirect Realist, yes. I believe that space and time existed independently of the human mind for at least the 10 billion years before life began on Earth.

How would that have mattered? — Quixodian

It has been said about Kant that he is dogmatic about us having a priori pure intuitions and categories of concepts, yet without explaining where they came from.

It seems clear with with hindsight, in part the debate between Innatism and Behaviourism, that a suitable candidate from their origin in the human mind is that a priori knowledge offers evolutionary advantages.

Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble (Emrys Westacott). And I think if it is understood in that spirit, it is still a perfectly understandable principle. "We do not see things as they truly are, but only as they appear to us". — Quixodian

As an Indirect Realist, something I definitely agree with.

Indirect Realism is the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework, as opposed to Direct Realism, the view that conscious subjects view the world directly.

As Indirect realism was popular with several early modern philosophers, including Descartes (1596 - 1650), Locke (1632 - 1704), Leibniz (1646 - 1716) and Hume (1711 - 1776), each born before Kant (1724 - 1804), Kant would have been familiar with the concept.

On the other hand, while stipulating what those “sure principles a priori” actually are, he doesn’t say how reason comes into possession of them. — Mww

Kant (1724 to 1804) unfortunately didn't have the advantage of Darwin's book On the Origin of Species 1859, so couldn't include the theory of evolution in his philosophy.

Your examples are just an attempt to avoid the issue because explaining what it means to perceive one specific type of red does not explain how we perceive red in the general sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the same problem as to how we are able to perceive any concept, such as triangles, the colour red, mountains, love, giraffes, tables, apples, democracy, etc. Things that exist only the mind and not outside the mind, unless one believes in Plato' Forms.

If I could explain how the brain processes concepts I would be well on the way to solving some of the deepest problems in philosophy today, including the mystery of consciousness.

However, it seems a sensible evolutionary advantage to have limit our concepts of colour to seven: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. If the human could only distinguish one colour, they couldn't distinguish between an edible green apple and a rotten brown apple. If the human could distinguish 1,000 colours, this would probably give the brain too much information to satisfactorily process. Therefore, the concept of 7 colours seems a good, middle-of-the-road evolutionary solution.

That things are not percieved as they are in themselves is fundamental in the Critique — Quixodian

Totally agree, and also a position held by the Indirect Realists.

However, this is different to ChatGPT's quote that "For Kant, noumena are things-in-themselves that exist independently of human experience and cognition."

If that were true, then how can we be discussing them.

As Kant is committed to the principle of Affection, whereby things-in-themselves causally affect us, things-in-themselves don't exist independently of human experience and cognition.

That concluding phrase ('that space itself is in us') should torpedo any suggestion that Kant was a realist tout courte. — Quixodian

As he writes in A370 of the CPR, "The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist", this suggests that the idea that Kant was a Realist cannot be torpedoed because of his belief in the a priori.

There is no contradiction in being an Indirect Realist, a belief that we perceive the world indirectly, and Innatism, a belief that the mind is born with certain ideas and knowledge.

As Innatism is the foundation to Indirect Realism, non-sensible intuition and the a priori categories are the foundation to Transcendental Idealism.

Note, however, that in the wake of the Feder-Garve review, Kant evidently felt that “transcendental” idealism may have been a poor choice of name. In the B Edition, Kant adds a footnote to his definition of transcendental idealism to remark that perhaps he should have called his position “critical idealism”.

This makes no sense to me. There are many different shades of red, produced from many different combinations of wavelengths. We learn how to perceive the colour red by learning how to correctly apply the word "red". Without learning the word "red", we would perceive many different shades of colours without knowing any of them as "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

When someone looks at an object emitting a wavelength of 700nm they perceive a particular colour.

The English speaking world has determined that not only is the wavelength of 700nm named "red", but also the wavelengths 620 to 750nm are also named "red".

It is not true that we learn how to perceive the colour of the wavelength 700nm by knowing its name. I don't need to know the name of the wavelength 700nm in order to perceive it.

I've been consulting ChatGPT on Kant's conception of the phenomenal-noumenal distinction — Quixodian

What epistemic grounds can Kant have for the proof of such noumena that don't rely on presuppositions—on dogma? He can't have any empircal support for such things, by his own admission. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kant was a Realist not an Idealist

The following is mainly taken from SEP - Kant's Transcendental Idealism

Kant is committed to Existence, Humility, Non-spatiality and Affection, where Affection is the principle that things-in-themselves causally affect us. Kant has the position that sensory content is not generated by the mind, but is generated by Affection with mind-independent objects, things-in-themselves.

Kant writes in A19 of CPR that cognition relates immediately to objects:
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought through the understanding, and from it arise concepts. But all thought, whether straightaway (directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us

Kant is not an Idealist. In the Prolegomena Kant wants to distinguish his view from Berkeley's Idealism. Kant reinforces that his view is not Idealism. The Critique constantly maintains that bodies exist in space and time, and maintains that we have immediate non-inferential knowledge of them.

Kant is not a strong phenomenalist, in that his position is that there are objects outside the mind.

Kant argues that his idealism is a formal idealism. It is only the form of the object that is due to our minds, not their matter. Kant makes the point that sensory content is not generated by the mind, but is generated by affection with mind-independent objects, things-in-themselves. Using such sensory content, we can then cognize about objects by synthesising intuition and concept in the unity of apperception. IE, non-sensible spatio-temporal intuitions and concepts logically structured by the a priori categories of quantity, quality, relation, modality.

Therefore, Kant's epistemic grounds for the understanding of things-in-themselves is Affection, the principle that things-in-themselves causally affect us.

Therefore, ChatGPT's comment that Kant's things-in-themselves are entirely beyond our capacity to experience or comprehend is incorrect for the same reason, that of Affection, the principle that things-in-themselves causally affect us.

Only to some degree. I can believe magic will let me drive my car through a wall, but when I try it, I presume my perceptions will not match up to my past belief. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hugh Urban has described chaos magic as a union of traditional occult techniques and applied postmodernism.

As a believer in neither the occult nor postmodernism, chaos magic does not appeal, although I find its cut-up technique interesting.

That being said, as one reads that 99% of Morocco are Muslim, 68% of Norway is Christian, 94% of Thailand are Buddhists, 74% of Israel are Jewish and 79% of India are Hindu, this suggests that one's perception of the world can be changed by changing the beliefs of one's geographic location.

But surely there is a difference between the conditions required for the acquisition of knowledge, and knowledge itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

The distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that was brought to prominence in epistemology by Gilbert Ryle who used it in his book The Concept of Mind

As regards the concept of the colour red, which is descriptive knowledge, I know that vehicles need to stop at traffic lights on red . As regards the intuition of the colour red, which is procedural knowledge, the brain knows how to perceive the colour red when presented with a wavelength of 700nm.

Knowledge can exist in the absence of consciousness, as with a knowledge-base.

The brain knows how to acquire knowledge. IE, the brain has the innate knowledge of how to acquire knowledge.

So this is akin to post-modernism's notion of "all is text". — schopenhauer1

Yes. As the Wikipedia article on Postmodernism writes:

Postmodernism is an intellectual stance or mode of discourse characterized by skepticism toward the "grand narratives" of modernism; rejection of epistemic certainty or the stability of meaning; and sensitivity to the role of ideology in maintaining political power. Claims to objectivity are dismissed as naïve realism, with attention drawn to the conditional nature of knowledge claims within particular historical, political, and cultural discourses. The postmodern outlook is characterized by self-referentiality, epistemological relativism, moral relativism, pluralism, irony, irreverence, and eclecticism; it rejects the "universal validity" of binary oppositions, stable identity, hierarchy, and categorization.

Unless we can trust in the truth of language, we must dismiss its meaning entirely. Chaos will reign, but no one will listen to its proclamations. — unenlightened

That's the direction many think Society is heading towards at the moment.

As the Wikipedia article on Criticism of postmodernism writes:
Postmodernism has received significant criticism for its lack of stable definition and meaning.

"Intuition" appears to refer to a faculty or means by which we obtain knowledge directly, without the need for sensation nor reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

In today's terms it's referred to as Innatism. Chomsky mentions it.

But is it really appropriate to call something acquired through intuition, Knowledge? — Metaphysician Undercover

SEP - Innateness and Language
The philosophical debate over innate ideas and their role in the acquisition of knowledge has a venerable history.

Wikipedia - Innatism
In the philosophy of mind, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs.

Within language there are true statements of fact — unenlightened

There may well be, but does anyone agree what they are.

It also depends whether one is using the Correspondence, Semantic, Deflationary, Coherence or Pragmatic Theory of Truth.

The issue here is the type of "intuition" which could receive the noumena — Metaphysician Undercover

I can only Kant understand through an analogy.

We perceive the colour red, yet science tells us the cause of our perceiving the colour red is a wavelength of 700nm. Science tells us that what we perceive as the colour red doesn't exist outside the mind. What exists outside the mind is a wavelength of 700nm.

Our knowledge that the cause of our perceiving the colour red is the wavelength 700nm comes indirectly through science. It is impossible for us to directly see the wavelength of 700nm.

It is also a fact that we are not able to imagine the colour red in the absence of seeing it. Only by being presented with a wavelength of 700nm can we ever perceive the colour red. The brain has the innate ability to perceive the colour red, but only when presented with a wavelength of 700nm

However, we are able to think about the colour red in the absence of being presented with a wavelength of 700nm through the use of concepts. I know that when a traffic light turns red, vehicles are required by law to stop, some roses are red in colour and the colour red has a wavelength of 700nm.

On the one hand, the brain has the ability to perceive the colour red but only when presented with the wavelength of 700nm, and on the other hand the brain can imagine the concept of red other than when presented with the wavelength of 700nm.

Summarising:
i) I have an innate belief in cause and effect, and although I may never know what caused my perceiving the colour red, I know something in the world caused me to perceive the colour red. The category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves, and phenomena are caused by noumena..
ii) We can never directly know what a wavelength of 700nm looks like. We can never directly know what a noumena looks like
iii) What we perceive as the colour red doesn't exist in the world outside the mind. Similarly, what we perceive as space doesn't exist in the world outside the mind. What we perceive as a phenomenon doesn't exist in the world outside the mind
iv) We can have the concept of the colour red in the absence of being presented with a wavelength of 700nm. We have concepts.
v) We have the innate ability to perceive the colour red, but can only perceive the colour red when presented with a wavelength of 700nm. We have intuitions.

Alternatively, the referent of the noumena is simply a thought structure of a person who buys into the idea that phenomena are caused by things we can know nothing about. That is, one solution to Kant's implicit dualism is to simply say that the person thinking of noumenal is simply referring to their own delusions — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kant is saved from nihilism by his categories of understanding, which includes that of cause and effect.

He wrote in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 that the category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves.
"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

As an Indirect Realist, having an innate belief in cause and effect, I may not know the cause of an appearance, but I know that there has been a cause.

Kant — Quixodian

A couple of thoughts.

Concept vs intuition
As there is a distinction between phenomena and noumena, for Kant, there is also a distinction between concept and intuition. In the third and fourth arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the CPR, he writes that our intuition of space is neither a concept of space nor a sensation of space. IE, as you write, we can have the concept of a chiiiagon without having an intuition of a chilliagon.

Categories
On the one hand he writes in B308 of CPR that the categories cannot be used to know the thing-in-itself:
"But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves"

On the other hand he writes in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 that the category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves.
"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

IE, given an appearance, we can never know what in the world caused the appearance, though we can know that there is something in the world that caused the appearance.

From the fact that one can arrange words as one likes one cannot correctly deduce that one can rearrange thereby the facts — unenlightened

We see a large disorganised group of people, which are facts in the world.

One person may connect the fact disorganised with the fact group of people and say "I see a mob", and another person may connect the fact disorganised with the fact group of people and say "I see a crowd".

Within language, facts in the world may be combined to give grammatically correct propositions, yet the fact that a proposition is grammatically correct does not guarantee its truth.

The human mind is so hyper-ready and prepared to find meaning in any way possible, that it will find one in the most obtuse and obscure sources — schopenhauer1

Totally agree.

The Wikipedia article on Chaos Magic writes that our perception of the world is conditioned by our prior beliefs, and our perception of the world can be changed by changing those prior beliefs. An idea that relates back to Kant.
Chaos magic teaches that the essence of magic is that perceptions are conditioned by beliefs, and that the world as we perceive it can be changed by deliberately changing those beliefs.

The Wikipedia article also writes that William S Burroughs, who practised chaos magic, found importance in the cut-up technique as having a magical function, in not only politics but also science. The concept of the cut-up was developed by the Dadaists in the 1920's
Burroughs – who practised chaos magic, and was inducted into the Illuminates of Thanateros in the early 1990s – was adamant that the technique had a magical function, stating "the cut ups are not for artistic purposes". Burroughs used his cut-ups for "political warfare, scientific research, personal therapy, magical divination, and conjuration" – the essential idea being that the cut-ups allowed the user to "break down the barriers that surround consciousness".

One example of the cut-up technique may be found in poetic philosophical writings, including sometimes the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where it is often the role of the reader to make sense of the article rather than the role of the writer.

Another example may be found in mainstream media, for example a BBC article on Trump. From observations about facts in the world, the following words may be used as a foundation for one's beliefs: supporters - Trump - America - great - threat - democracy - forces dominated - driven - intimidated - mob - stormed - patriots - insurrectionists.

We can then grammatically connect them to give:
Supporters of Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" agenda are a threat to democracy. "Maga forces are determined to take this country backwards." "But there's no question, that the Republican party today is dominated, driven and intimidated by Donald Trump and the Maga Republicans, and that is a threat to this country." Trump supporters thought of the mob who stormed the US Capitol last year as patriots rather than insurrectionists.

Or we can put them in a different random order and then grammatically connect them to give:
Patriots must now stand together against the threat posed by those mysterious figures who wish to destroy and must not be driven into despair or intimidated into silence. We applaud the great supporters of America who stand against the insurrections hiding in our midst, and like the mob who stormed the Bastille in 1789, seen as a symbol of the abuse of power, Trump has marshalled the forces for democracy in a world dominated by forces subverting the will of the people.

It may be seen that two people observing the same facts in the world may come to two completely different coherent understandings. The fact that an understanding of the world based on the same facts is coherent is no guarantee that the understanding is either true or correct.

The cut-up technique of chaos magic gives insight into art, politics and science.

However, is there a contradiction if we talk of a "something" (i.e., a "thing"), since noumenon is not an object for a subject...even if we replace "thing" with "reality", "an existence,"...still it must be a reality/existence for a perceiving subject? — jancanc

This is the same problem with Direct Realism. For example, we see the colour red, yet science tells us the cause is a wavelength of 700nm.

In Kant's terms, our seeing the colour red is the appearance and the 700nm is the noumenon. If it weren't for science, just by seeing the colour red, we would have no idea that its cause was 700nm.

The mind has evolved to equate effect with cause, to equate appearance with its noumena. When seeing the colour red, the mind equates the appearance with its cause, such that the mind believes that the cause of our seeing red was the colour red. Yet we know that science tells us the cause was a wavelength of 700nm.

The noumenon is named after the appearance, in that, if the appearance is given the name "red", then the noumenon is also give the name "red", regardless of what the noumenon actually is.

Similarly with the other senses. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause grating. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause acrid. If I feel something silky, I name its cause silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause bitter.

Therefore, any contradiction disappears, because when we talk about a "red post-box", we are not taking about something that exists in the world. We are not taking about a noumenon which we cannot know about. We are actually talking about how the something in the world appears to us, in that we are talking about an appearance.

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"? — jancanc

Kant wrote in A249 of Critique of Pure Reason that noumena, aka things-in-themselves, are given to a priori intuition. Note that intuitions are not concepts, which are a different thing altogether.

A249 - Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories, are called phenomena. If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali),then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia).

Kant wrote in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 that the category of cause and effect can be applied to things-in-themselves.

"And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

A noumena is an unknown something that causes an appearance. Therefore, the referent of a noumena is the unknown something that causes such an appearance.

Because Kant applies the category of cause and effect to things-in-themselves, although the thing-in-itself cannot be known, that there is something that caused the appearance can be known.

The central defining tenet of chaos magic is arguably the idea that belief is a tool for achieving effects...............Excuse me if my thoughts got a bit jumbled near the end. — HarryHarry

The trick, as used by many writers on philosophy, including sometimes the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is to start by arranging a set of appropriate terminology in some random order and then grammatically connecting them.

The cut-up technique is an important part off Chaos Magic, where a written text is cut up and rearranged, often at random, to create a new text.

For example, taking from the SEP article on Belief the following appropriate words: symbol - hot water - mind - particular fact - entities - representationalism - mass of water - memory - accessed- proposition.

We can then put them in one random order and then grammatically connect them to give:

Take the symbol of hot water as part of a belief in the mind, where hot water is taken as a particular fact in the world. Such facts lead to a novel entity in the mind, specifically an important feature of representationism. It follows that the representation of a mass of water as hot, as one says, hot water, is something stored in the memory and accessed when required in the form of a proposition.

Or we can put them in a different random order and then grammatically connect them to give:

Beliefs are part of propositions about entities that exist in an observed world, such as the object mass of water which is accessed by the mind from observation as having the form of hot water. Such objects become a symbol in the mind, things that have been been observed in the world, and retrieved as a memory when required, being brought back to light as a particular fact, in other words, as a form of representationalism

IE, as long as the terminology is appropriate, it is often the role of the reader to make sense of the article rather than the role of the writer.

Who was it who said "Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people; tiny minds discuss grammar." — Jamal

Presumably not the philosopher who said "Half of good philosophy is good grammar.’

I struggle to see the sense in defining anything as relative. — Matt Thomas

In the mind, definitions and relations between absolutes exist. The world, however, is another matter.

As the SEP article on Relations wrote:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh?

Bradley's Regress makes the same point.

Either a relation R is nothing to the things it relates, in which case it cannot relate to them. Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them. But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them. But now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b. But positing more relations to fix up the problem is only throwing good money after bad. We fall into an infinite regress because the same reasoning applies equally to R' and however many other subsidiary relations we subsequently introduce.

IE, I can say "the Sun is larger than the Earth", in that "larger" exists as a concept in my mind, but where in the world does "larger" actually exist ?

And brain states aren’t Innatism; they’re cognitive neuroscience. Or quantum biology maybe. Sure as hell ain’t proper metaphysics. — Mww

I wouldn't classify the mind-body problem, the debate between Dualism and Monism, and the debate between Innatism and Behaviourism, as not proper metaphysics.

As it should. Since it is Kant’s notion of space and time being discussed, we would use Kant’s notion of perception. Which is……? — Mww

As regards Kant's notion of perception, the the IEP article on Kant: Philosophy of Mind writes:

One has a perception, in Kant’s sense, when one can not only discriminate one thing from another, or between the parts of a single thing, based on a sensory apprehension of it, but also can articulate exactly which features of the object or objects that distinguish it from others. For instance, one can say it is green rather than red, or that it occupies this spatial location rather than that one. Intuition thus allows for the discrimination of distinct objects via an awareness of their features, while perception allows for an awareness of what specifically distinguishes an object from others.

From B147 of Critique of Pure Reason

Things in space and time, however, are only given insofar as they are perceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), hence through empirical representation.

For Kant, perception allows us to not only distinguish green from red, left from right, etc, but also to be aware of what distinguishes green from red, left from right, etc.

So Hume's explanation is not consistent with our natural sensation which is to see the object moving from right to left, in a manner of spatial-temporal continuity of the object — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume writes in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.

I would have thought that Hume based his theory of constant conjunction on our natural sensations, not on some abstract philosophical reasonings.

Just as the itch requires more than its sensation for the determination of its cause, so too must an object’s relation to you, that it is left or right, that it is above or below, that it is this or that, require more than its mere perception. — Mww

It comes down to the meaning of perception.

From the Wikipedia article on Perception

Perception is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the presented information or environment. Perception is not only the passive receipt for of these signals, but it is also shaped by the recipient's learning, memory, expectation, and attention.

Many philosophers, such as Jerry Fodor, write that the purpose of perception is knowledge. However, evolutionary psychologists hold that the primary purpose of perception is to guide action. They give the example of depth perception, which seems to have evolved not to aid in knowing the distances to other objects but rather to aid movement. Evolutionary psychologists argue that animals ranging from fiddler crabs to humans use eyesight for collision avoidance, suggesting that vision is basically for directing action, not providing knowledge.

Perception is more than sensation. Perception is what interprets sensations. Perception is what gives us the spatial relationship between objects, whether to the left or to the right, whether above or below.

Perhaps this is why one reads in the SEP article on Kant's Views on Space and Time that

But leaving that complication aside, it is surely very surprising to hear that intuition, which in some regards is akin to perception (Parsons 1992, 65–66; Allais 2015, 147ff), can also be empirical or a priori in character.

According to Locke’s view, a version of which was also defended by Hume (Treatise, 1.2.3), we obtain a representation of space—not of places, but of the one all-encompassing space, which may be akin to geometric space—from the perception of spatial relations.

It is our perception of the world that allows us to distinguish left from right, above from below.

===============================================================================

Understanding. Plain and simple. It’s all in the text. Not in wiki. Space and time are irrefutably merely representations, all representations are products of either sensibility as phenomena, or thought as conceptions. Both sensibility and cognition insofar as they are active processes of the human intellect, are not themselves innate, thus it follows that neither are their respective products. That humans can sense and can think may indeed be innate, but the process by which these are done, which implies a system, is not that by which they are possible, which is given from a certain kind of existence alone. — Mww

From SEP - Kant's Views on Space and Time

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. A23/B38

Finally, transcendental idealism, in so far as it concerns space and time, has the following essential component: we have a non-empirical, singular, immediate representation of space. Part of Kant’s innovation is to introduce into the philosophical lexicon the very idea that we can have non-empirical intuition.

As you say, the ability to think is probably innate. The question is, is what we think, our understanding, limited or not by our "natural instincts".

For Kant, our non-empirical intuition of time and space doesn't come from observation, doesn't come from any perception of the world, but comes from pure cognition in our minds.

The question is, what is the link between the innate ability to think and what is thought. Even if we accept Innatism, that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs, is it possible for our thoughts to be independent of such ideas, knowledge and beliefs. Does our innate ability to think determine what we think, or can what we think be independent of such innate ability of thought.

Any thoughts we have must be expressed in the physical state of the brain. There must be some correspondence at any moment in time between what we are thinking and the physical state of the brain. Any new thought must require an altered state of the physical brain. But any physical change requires a physical cause, in that a physical state cannot spontaneously change without a preceding physical cause. An effect needs a cause.

Summing up, any new thought requires a change in the state of the physical brain, but any change in the state of the physical brain requires a preceding physical cause. But in its turn, any preceding physical cause must require its own preceding physical cause, and so on, leaving no possibility that our thoughts have not been determined by a pre-existing physical state of the brain.

IE, understanding cannot be free of the physical state of the brain. Cognition is a function of the state of the physical brain, not something that can be achieved free of the state of the physical brain.

So in answer to my question, regarding Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition. The source can only be the momentary physical state of the brain, which has been determined by the preceding physical state of the brain, and so on, eventually leading back, to the innate ability of humans to think. In other words, Innatism.

What would be called today, perhaps, insofar as Innatism, being a rather more psychological formalism, had no standing in Enlightenment metaphysics. — Mww

From the Wikipedia article on Innatism, Innatism refers to the philosophy of Descartes.

Innatism and nativism are generally synonymous terms referring to the notion of pre-existing ideas in the mind. However, more specifically, innatism refers to the philosophy of Descartes, who assumed that God or a similar being or process placed innate ideas and principles in the human mind.

Nativism represents an adaptation of this, grounded in the fields of genetics, cognitive psychology, and psycholinguistics. Nativists hold that innate beliefs are in some way genetically programmed in our mind—they are the phenotypes of certain genotypes that all humans share in common. Nativism is a modern view rooted in innatism. The advocates of nativism are mainly philosophers who also work in the field of cognitive psychology or psycholinguistics: most notably Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor.

Descartes' (1596 - 1650) rationalist system of philosophy is one of the pillars on which Enlightenment (1685 - 1815) thought rests.

Kant (1724 - 1804) came after Descartes, so we can assume that Kant was aware of the concept of Innatism.

Our friend Chomsky (b. 1928) is a contemporary supporter of Innatism against the Behaviourism of Skinner (1904 - 1990).

As regards Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition if not innate ?

I don't think that this is right at all. Think about how sensation works. Sight and hearing receive the activity of waves. But people were seeing and hearing long before they knew the manner of this motion. And the other senses perceive the activities of molecules, but the perceptions which result do not include anything about the manner in which the molecules are moving. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is true that I may perceive an itch on my hand, but the itch does not represent what caused it. This has been my argument in the past against Direct Realism. The Direct Realist's position is that just knowing an effect, say an itch, this would automatically enable them to know its cause, say a thistle.

At one moment in time I may perceive two objects spatially separated, say one to the left and one to the right. But perception is not only spatial, it is also temporal, in that I may perceive an object at one moment in time to the right and at a later moment in time to the left. Not only does perception allow spatial separation but perception also allows temporal separation. If that weren't the case, all my perceptions would be frozen in time, making life unworkable.

In driving along a busy road through a city centre, if all me perceptions were of instants of time, and I had to connect these frozen perceptions by cognitive judgement, I would have crashed my car within the first five minutes. No amount of quick thinking would allow the human to successfully succeed in any task requiring a quick response - such as driving through a city centre, playing tennis, reading a novel, cooking a meal, engaging in conversation - if they had to constantly consciously reason how one event at one moment in time is connected to a different event a fraction of a second later.

Humans, as animals, have evolved such that their perceptions are not only spatial but also temporal. As Kant said, humans have a unity of the manifold of intuition imposed by the unity of consciousness.

But the point is that Hume describes sensation as apprehending distinct states, then using what you call "natural instinct" to infer that motion has occurred between these distinct states. This is completely different from Kant who places the intuitions of space and time as necessary for the possibility of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is an object to the right of my field of vision, and one second later there is an object to the left of my field of vision. Hume induces that there is only one object and it is moving from right to left.

One can ask where the human faculty for induction came from. Is Innatism true, whereby humans are born with certain innate abilities, ie "natural instincts", or is Behaviourism true, whereby humans are born a blank slate having no innate abilities and everything is learnt from their environment.

Is the human faculty for induction an innate "natural instinct" or learnt from the environment.

There is evidence that Hume believed that not only animals but also humans are born with "natural instincts", ie, a form of Innatism. Kant argued for non-empirical intuitions, ie, in today's terms, a form of Innatism

In this regard, it can be seen that both Hume and Kant have an acceptance of what would be called today, Innatism.

That the truck is moving straight toward you is a conclusion, not a perception. You perceive (sense) motion, and you make a judgement as to whether the truck is coming toward you or not. The judgement that it is coming straight toward you is not a perception, and is independent from the sensation that it is moving. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree I perceive something moving towards me and then judge it to be a truck.

But I cannot perceive an object moving without perceiving the manner in which it is moving. When I perceive a moving object, my perception includes the manner in which it is moving. I don't perceive an object moving and then judge it to be moving to the left. I perceive an object moving to the left.

I agree judgement is independent to perception, but when perceiving a moving object, the fact that the object is coming straight towards me is part of the perception, not part of a subsequent cognitive judgement.

You make a judgement that the cause of your pain is cold water, rather than that it is something else, like hot water. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, I perceive pain and then judge the cause to be cold water.

But according to Kant, you do perceive (sense) activity and motion. And this is why space and time, as a priori intuitions, are said to be prior to sensibility and sense experience in general, as necessary conditions for the possibility of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. Perhaps would be called Innatism today.

This is perhaps the fundamental difference between Hume and Kant. Hume represents sensations as static, states of existence, which change from one moment to the next. Kant represents sensations as active, according to the necessary requirements for sensation, those pure a priori intuitions, space and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily.

It is true that Hume is described as an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by reason, but by experience", such that the cornerstone of his epistemology was the problem of induction.

However, such a philosophy may be argued to be founded on Hume's belief in natural instinct, rather than reason, thereby discovering a strong link between Hume's inductive inference and Kant's non-empirical intuition.

The following is taken from James Hill's The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human Reason

In a detailed and enlightening discussion of Hume's conception of instinct, Bertram Laing maintains that ‘a theory of instinct’ is fundamental and it ‘underlies his other doctrines’. Laing associates this implicit theory of instinct above all with the First Enquiry where, ‘in contrast to the Treatise,’ a doctrine of instinct can be seen ‘to stand out more prominently’ (Laing 1926). Let us set out this theory of instinct, starting with an enumeration of the different instincts that Hume attributes to man.

We should not be surprised to find the so-called ‘primary appetites’, such as hunger, thirst, and ‘affection between the sexes’, described as instincts (T 2.3.9.8/439 ; NHR Intro; EPM app. 2.12/301). Nor will we be surprised to learn that passions and desires such as love of progeny, love of fame,2 and ‘a desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them’, are all instincts for Hume (T 2.2.12.5/398 ; T 2.2.7.1/368 ; NHR Intro; EPM app. 2.12/301).

In addition to these ‘low’ appetites and often turbulent passions, Hume follows Francis Hutcheson (1756: 292) in treating more elevated and humane dispositions of the soul as instincts.3 The moral virtues expressed in the ‘calm desires’ of benevolence, compassion, generosity, appetite to good, aversion to evil are originally determined by nature and thus qualify as instincts (T 2.3.3.8/417–8; L 38). This means that, like Hutcheson, Hume takes moral judgement, and conduct in accordance with it, as stemming from instinct not reason, although reason and reflection will still have a part to play in the final determination of this judgement and conduct.

IE, Hume often makes the case that natural instinct, rather than reason, is the foundation of human behaviour, of which induction is one example.