You still have to prove that thoughts and feelings are equally experienced, in order to affirm that I am only my subjective experiences. — Mww

I can have the subjective experience of thought, and can have the subjective experience of feeling. My subjective experiences can include both thoughts and feelings. To say "I am my subjective experiences" means that "I am my subjective experiences of thoughts and feelings".

There doesn't need to be identity between "my subjective thoughts" and "my subjective feelings". But there does need to an identity between "I" and "my subjective experiences"

As a hot temperature is not identical to a cold temperature but have something in common, ie, temperature, thought is not identical to feeling, but have something in common, ie, in that they are both subjective experiences.

The crucial aspect is that "I am my subjective experiences" rather than "I have subjective experiences". That is what I need to prove.

Descartes — Wayfarer

Descartes "cogito, ergo sum" uses thought to prove his existence.

I observe an apple, and think about it. I doubt the reality of the apple. I doubt the existence of the apple. Because I doubt the existence of the apple, there must be an "I" doing the doubting, proving the existence of an "I"

But also, I feel a pain. There is no doubt that I feel a pain. I don't doubt the reality of the pain. I don't doubt the existence of the pain. Because I feel a pain, there must be an "I" doing the feeling, proving the existence of an "I"

Descartes was obviously aware not only of thoughts but also of feelings, as he wrote "Nature also teaches me, by the sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a pilot in his ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken."

I am curious why Descartes only used thought to prove existence, and not feeling, which would seem to be a more obvious route.

This doesn't make science wrong but it surely challenges materialism — Wayfarer

Materialism is the view that all facts about the human mind are causally dependent upon physical processes, and reducible to them.

Even if Aristotle's Direct Realism was true - the claim that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world - the causal path from object in the world to thought in the mind can still be explained within materialism.

Even if Aristotle's Theory of Universals was true - whereby universals are understood by the intellect as only existing where they are instantiated in objects or things - the intellectual processing of information into concepts, such as tables and governments, can still be explained within materialism.

I don't see how Aristotle's Direct Realism or Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism.

I am not only my thoughts — Mww

True. I may think about the apple on the table, and I may have feelings of hope, despair and sadness.

Replacing "I am my thoughts" by "I am my subjective experiences"
When I think, I have a subjective experience, and when I have a feeling, I also have a subjective experience. As a high temperature and a low temperature are not two different kinds of things but two instances of the same thing, ie temperature, perhaps thoughts and feelings are not two different kinds of things but both instances of the same thing, ie subjective experiences.

One problem with qualia is in its forcing a division between thoughts and feelings
Qualia have been described as individual instances of subjective conscious experience, the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, etc. Qualia, the feeling of an experience, is contrasted with a propositional attitude, the thought about an experience. Therefore, one characteristic of qualia is the separation of feeling from thought. If qualia exist, then the feelings of qualia stand in contrast to the thoughts of propositional attitudes, then feelings and thoughts are of different kinds. However, the existence of qualia is not universally accepted, in that it has been argued that the qualia is a superfluous concept, for example, @Banno, Daniel Dennett. Why say "I am experiencing the qualia of pain" rather than "I am experiencing pain". What does the word "qualia" add to my subjective experience.

Thoughts and feelings may be two aspects of the same thing - the subjective experience
Some argue that thought and feeling are two aspects of the same thing. For example, Galen Strawson wrote in 1994 in Mental Reality “Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities”

Summary
Perhaps I should improve my previous conclusion and replace "thought" by "subjective experience". Rather than say "I am my thoughts", I should perhaps say "I am my subjective experiences", where the word "am" means identity, in that "A is A"

As Descartes might have said "I am my subjective experiences, therefore I am"

Taking the thread to be about substance dualism (the idea that the mind is a different substance to the brain), the question is what can we ever know about the mind.

Perhaps Descartes should have said "I am my thoughts, therefore I am"

Descartes said "I think, therefore I am", prompting the question "what is the link between "I" and my thoughts ?"

There are two possibilities:

1) Either, there is an "I" that thinks, where the "I" has an existence independent of its thoughts, as computer hardware has an existence independent of its software
2) Or, the "I" is its thoughts, in that if there were no thoughts, then there would be no "I", where the word "is" means an identity, in the same way that "A is A"

Solution A) - There is an "I" that thinks
To be conscious is to be conscious of something, and that something must be external to whatever is being conscious, that something cannot be itself.
Similarly, a thought must be of something, and that thought must be external to whatever is having the thought, that thought cannot be itself.
The inevitable consequence is that, as I can never know the nature of another person's mind, and as my mind can never know itself, the nature of the mind will be forever unknown, meaning that we can never say whether dualism is true or not.

Solution B) - The "I" is its thoughts

I cannot be conscious of my own consciousness, and my thoughts cannot be about themselves. However, I can be conscious of some of my thoughts, where such thoughts are about something.

Suppose that "I" am the set of my thoughts. Then my mind also is the set of my thoughts. Therefore "I am my mind". The words "am" and "is" mean identity, in the same way that "A" is "A"

If I am the set of my thoughts, and thoughts must be about things, then it follows that "I" am the set of things that is being thought about.

In order to know the nature of the mind, where the mind is a set of thoughts about things, then I need to know the nature of the set of things being thought about.

As these things are external to the mind, then this allows the possibility that the mind could be understood by reference to that which is external to the mind, avoiding the problem of self-reference laid out in Solution A.

Summary
There is a possibility of understanding the mind if the "I" is its thoughts rather than there is an "I" that thinks.

Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am"

your thoughts and attitudes can be directed at either yourself or at others — SophistiCat

I agree that my thoughts can be directed at another person's mind, as my thoughts can be directed at the table in front of, but this is not the same as being able to subjectively experience another person's mind.

Taking "mind" in its ordinary sense, we certainly can have insight into other minds — SophistiCat

If I touched a hot stove with my bare hand, I would know my subjective experience.

If I see someone touch a hot stove with their bare hand and instantly jump back exclaiming, I can understand what I have objectively observed, but I can never know what subjective experience that person may or may not have had.

I really don't understand this problem with "mind thinking about itself." — SophistiCat

I agree that to think is to think about something, and to be conscious is to be conscious of something, such as trees and pains.

There are different types of self-consciousness.

1) If the object of my consciousness is a pain in my arm, then I am being conscious of my self, and in a sense self-conscious.

2) If the object of my consciousness is my consciousness itself, then this can also be called self-consciousness.

In order for me to understand the nature of the mind, my object of consciousness cannot be the minds of others, which I can never know, but rather my object of consciousness must be itself.

The question is, is consciousness of itself possible ?

"'I' (my self) is nothing other than my mind (whatever that is)". — SophistiCat

I agree that "I am my mind".

If I want to understand the nature of the mind, I cannot look at the minds of others, which will forever be closed to me, in that I could never discover what beetles others have in their individual boxes.

My only recourse is to try to understand my own mind, which is accessible to me, but with the consequence that my mind has to think about itself.

I have no problem with the concept that my mind can think about something outside itself, such as the range of the Cybertruck, but I have a problem with the concept of my mind thinking about itself. Does it mean that my mind is thinking about my mind thinking about my mind thinking about my mind, etc. As Schopenhauer wrote: “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of”

IE, if I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at the minds of other, and I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at my own, then I will never be able to understand the nature of the mind.

mental content — Raymond

The problem with words.

Yes, if I perceive mental content, I would say "I am conscious of the mental content", rather than "my mind is conscious of the mental content".

Only minds can discuss, though — Olivier5

Would not disagree.

If dualism is true, then the mind is a different substance to the brain. If monism is true, then the mind is a synonym for the brain.

In both cases, the mind is doing the discussing.

The brain and the mind are two sides of the same medal. — Raymond

As if an abstract non-entity can be a force. — Mww

How would your analysis differ if its object was (what is usually thought of as) a physical entity or process? — SophistiCat

Trying to pull these ideas together.

Our understanding of the mind-brain relationship is ultimately limited by language
Using language, I can say "I feel a pain" or I perceive blueness"
But when I use language to talk about the relationship between the mind and the brain, what I can say about the relationship is necessarily limited not by the truth but by the nature of the language.

The difference between "I am conscious" and "My mind is conscious"
When I say "I am conscious", I am speaking in the first person as an inside observer of my consciousness.
When I say "my car is in the garage", I am speaking in the third person as an outside observer of my car. I would not say that "I am my car.
When I say "My mind is conscious", I am speaking in the third person as an outside observer of my mind.

The "mind" exists in language and the mind may or may not exist in the world
In any discussion about the mind, there are two aspects: the "mind" as a word being part of the language game and the mind existing as a real thing in the world.

Either minds exist or they don't

If minds don't exist
If minds don't exist, then minds can still be discussed, as unicorns can be discussed.

If minds do exist
If I say that "my mind exists", then I am speaking as an outside observer, and as an outside observer I may be mistaken.

If I say that "I am my mind", then I am speaking as an inside observer of my mind. But this leads to the problem that the mind is discussing itself, leading to a circularity, in that the statement becomes either "I am I" or "my mind is my mind".
The statement "A is A" may be logically true, but it gives no information as to what "A" empirically is.

We can discuss the mind without ever knowing whether it exists or not
If minds don't exist, we can still discuss them as we can discuss unicorns
If minds do exist, then the mind would be discussing itself, leading to the problem of circularity, meaning that the mind would be unable to determine the truth of its own existence.

IE, even though "minds " exist in language, it is logically impossible for us to determine whether they exist in the world.

The mind exists only as a part of language, not as part of the world

The gist of the comments are about how the mind and brain interact, inferring that the mind and brain are two different things, whether different substances or made up from the same physical stuff.

Taking intentionality as an example, where intentionality is the quality of mental states (e.g. thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) which consists in their being directed towards some object or state of affairs.

For example, I intend to raise my arm and my arm raises.

Rather than treat intentionality as a mental state of the brain that causes a new state of affairs, "intentionality" should be treated as a linguistic term that describes the state of the brain prior to its causing a new state of affairs.

IE, the mind is not a cause of a new state of affairs, the "mind" is no more than a word used in language to describe the state of the brain that causes a new state of affairs.

Language allows us to talk about unicorns, Sherlock Holmes, Martians, dragons, as well as minds.

The Binding Problem - the unity of consciousness

Relevant sentences about dualism from SEP - Dualism
Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world.
Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind.
In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical – or mind and body or mind and brain – are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing.

"Bearer of attribute" dualism
As it may be argued that relations only exist in the mind and not the world, then "bearers of attributes", of which relations are fundamental, must also only exist in the mind.
Then in this sense the mind is radically different from the world, which is dualism.
But "bearer of attitude" dualism does not explain the binding problem.

"Material with uniform properties" dualism
Even if there is a "material with uniform properties" dualism which has properties that explains the binding problem, and which is not part of the physical world, then how can we understand it if not amenable to scientific investigation.

Both routes seem insoluble to us.

Would we understand the solution even if shown it
It is true that one question to be asked is how do we solve the binding problem, but before we ask this, a prior consideration is that even if we were presented with the answer, do we, as humans, even have the intellectual capacity to understand the answer.

As we don't expect a horse to understand the allegories within The Old Man and The Sea, why should we, as humans, expect to understand the solution to the binding problem.

What does it mean to understand something
IE, before trying to understand the binding problem, can we justify to ourselves that even if presented with the explanation we would understand it. What does it even mean to understand something ?

:smile: All the very best to everyone for the coming year :smile:

If dualism is true, is science wrong ?

Questions about the mind-body problem
How does the mind as a whole emerge from disparate parts, the neurons that make up the brain.
How to explain the binding problem, the unity of consciousness, seemingly from the integration of highly diverse neural information.
How to explain that when we have the intention to raise our arm, our arm rises.
How can the mind emerge with properties that cannot be scientifically discovered in the neurons from which it has arisen.

Does substance dualism being true mean that science is false
Substance dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two distinct substances.
Science is an epistemic approach to gaining knowledge of our world, the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.

A new physical property emerges when two permanent magnets are placed alongside each other
Substance dualism claims that, because the properties of the mind cannot be scientifically discovered in the physical parts from which it has arisen, then the mind must be of a different substance to the physical brain from which it emerges.
To disprove this, one example is needed of a system which has physical properties that cannot be discovered from the physical parts from which it has emerged.
Consider a system consisting of a pair of permanent magnets. When placed in the vicinity of each other they may repel or attract resulting in a movement.
A single magnet may have certain properties, such as mass, but no scientific investigation of a single magnet may discover the property of movement that the whole system is able to show.

New physical properties may emerge when parts are combined into a whole
IE, the whole physical system has properties that cannot be discovered in its individual physical parts.
In a sense, a new property has emerged from a combination of physical parts, none of which have previously exhibited this property.
The example of the magnets is not to infer any resemblance between magnetic fields and interactions between neurons, it is just being used to prove that it is possible for new physical properties to emerge from physical parts that don't exhibit the same property.
It is a fact that the new property of the system that has emerged from its parts can have an effect on the parts, even though the individual parts don't show this property.

Dualism may be true, but it isn't necessarily true
In summary, this example of the magnets proves that because some properties of the whole cannot be scientifically discovered in the physical properties of its parts, it does not follow that the properties of the whole are not also physical.
The example of the magnets does not prove that dualism is not true, but it does prove that dualism isn't necessarily true.

If the mind IS a physical thing (i.e., mind=brain), then when you imagine a blue elephant in your mind, shouldn't there be a blue elephant inside your skull? — RogueAI

The correspondence between mental states and brain states

A computer may be programmed to give a response when input blue light. A brain may respond when sensing blue light.

As blue light is not physically present inside the computer, blue light does not need to be physically present inside the brain in order for the brain to respond when sensing blue light

It follows that a blue elephant does not need to be physically present inside the brain in order for the brain to respond when sensing a blue elephant.

Assuming Realism rather than Idealism, there are two possibilities regarding any correspondence between the brain state and the mental state.

Either the mental state mirrors their brain state, in which case when the brain state experiences a blue elephant, the mental state also experiences a blue elephant, ie Direct Realism.

Or the mental state is different to their brain state, in which case when the brain state experiences a blue elephant, the mental state could experience an orange crocodile, ie Indirect Realism

IE, whether one believes the mental state to be identical or not with the brain state depends on one's opinion as to Direct and Indirect Realism.

Is it implying that assuming dualism is a possibility that all science must be false in order for that to be the case? — TiredThinker

Yes, Lewis is saying that if dualism was true, then the foundation of science would be shown to be false.

However, Lewis is also saying that dualism is not true, even if, as he writes, "humans are instinctive dualists".

Lewis argues that if there's no basis for dualism, then on death the self ceases to exist, writing "So what happens to the mind, or the self, after death? If there's no basis for dualism...............consciousness is lost..........self or essence ceases to exist." But Lewis concludes with his belief that the self ceases to exist on death, writing "You only live once". Therefore it follows that Lewis is arguing that there is no basis for dualism as on death the self ceases to exist.

Lewis also said that if dualism was true, then the foundation of science would be shown to be false, writing "for dualism to be true, all of science would have to be false." It follows that Lewis is saying that as there is no basis for dualism, then dualism cannot be used to show that science is false.

IE, Lewis is arguing that even though humans may be instinctive dualists, dualism is not true, and because it is not true, doesn't undermine science.

The article is setting out Lewis' beliefs, rather than justifying them.

It sounds about right I guess, yeah... — Tobias

:smile:

criterion for creativity......that bit of extra spark that makes you think......the job of the student is to think within the boundaries expected. That is primary, show you can combine different pre given ideas.............make an extra observation — Tobias

Does this lead to the requirement (definition) that "an undergraduate in writing a philosophy essay is not expected to develop new philosophical ideas but is expected to comment on existing philosophical ideas using reasoned and well-structured language, whilst including an original idea that makes the reader interested in thinking about the topic" ?

A paper that makes me think about counter arguments does something, it 'works' even though I think it is wrong and yes that counts in the students favour. — Tobias

As someone searching for what makes an A, from what you say, in addition to being well written (something that can be learnt through careful study) the student should also put forward an original spark of an idea, a potential new insight into the topic under discussion

Even if they don't have time to fully develop it within the confines of a particular essay, and even though the idea may ultimately prove to be wrong, its development may lead into new knowledge.

IE, perhaps a willingness by the student to push the boundary of what is conventionally accepted, providing they are willing to rationally argue their case - (pushing the boundary infers that they have to be knowledgeable in the first place as to where the boundary is).

As far as I know, never having taught, but from personal experience (in getting B's).

The Professor is not looking for the student to say something new in order to award an A

The Professor, knowing his subject inside out, having read every relevant paper, attended every germane conference, and after marking thousands of essays by bright-eyed and bushy-tailed students is not looking for new ideas when marking a paper, as the possibility of coming across a new idea is pretty remote. If the do come across an idea that it is new to them, then it is more than likely to be either wrong or nonsense.

All the professor is looking for is a workmanlike, well crafted, well written, logically argued, well researched essay that is relevant to the topic.

The Professor is not looking for an excellent paper by a budding Wittgenstein, just a good paper that he knows from his lifetime of experience is on the right lines.

So why does one student get an A and the others get B's if all that is needed is a good paper rather than an excellent one. Because the others trip themselves up, shoot themselves in the foot, make a balls of it, run around in circles and start up the creek without a paddle.

What this means in practice is that the others use convoluted language, don't answer the question, push their own philosophical ideas, use arguments where the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, where their premises are opinions rather than being obviously true, where the essay isn't structured into a beginning, body and conclusion, where they don't make use of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, etc

IE, all the student needs to do to get an A is to write a half-decent essay and let the others mess it up.

The person marking the undergraduate essay looking to award an A should not be looking for the student's original philosophical ideas but rather the student's original ideas about the relationship between established philosophical ideas.

In addition, such an essay should use clear and simple prose and be be well-structured with a beginning, a body that could be about five points and a short conclusion. The writer should use well-reasoned arguments, possibly making use of hypothetical examples, that lead the reader from obviously true premises to an indubitable conclusion. Each point within the body could start with a thesis describing a particular philosophical position, continuing with an antithesis describing one or more opposing philosophical positions, and finishing with a synthesis where the writer argues for their support of one position or the other.

IE, an undergraduate essay is not about developing new philosophical ideas but is about commenting on existing philosophical ideas in an interesting, reasoned and well-structured way.

There are some interesting comments on the Forum, but I doubt they would get an A because they are interesting.

As far as I know, as regards an undergraduate's philosophy essay, a well-written essay about philosophically interesting ideas will be marked down, whilst a well-written essay about the debate within philosophy about interesting philosophical ideas will be marked up.

It says something philosophically interesting. — jasonm

Assuming it is an essay by an undergraduate.

Be aware that "It says something philosophically interesting" is definitely not about any interesting philosophical ideas of the student

As I see it, what the teacher wants to see when marking an undergraduate essay is for the student to show that they have a good understanding of the history and nature of important philosophical discussion and argument, including up to the present day, and including such things as a knowledge of the branches of philosophy, specific terminology, key philosophers and principal attitudes towards major philosophical topics.

The student is expected to give their reasoned opinion about the pros and cons of the interesting philosophical positions of others, but the teacher does not want them to give their reasoned opinion about the pros and cons of their own interesting philosophical ideas.

IE, in the event that the student writes about their own philosophically interesting ideas they will definitely be marked down.

If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument against the idea that philosophy is futile

It may well be that a person's inherent beliefs are arbitrary, based on genes, upbringing, education, environment, etc. From this it would follow that an individual philosophizing in an empty room will only end up confirming their own beliefs, undertaking an empty philosophy.

However, Wittgenstein may provide a solution to this problem.

Descartes said that the only thing he was sure of were his thoughts. Wittgenstein argued against this, arguing that the notion of a private language is incoherent, in that thoughts require words, and words require other people. The consequence is that meaning can only be found in language as a social event between language users.

Wittgenstein explained his reasoning in Philosophical Investigations para 293. Suppose everyone had a box with something in it, which we call a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, but they can look into their own box. This means that everyone's idea of what a "beetle" is only comes from knowing what is inside their own box. Then what purpose does the word "beetle" have in the social language game if no one knows what anyone else means by the word beetle. Wittgenstein concludes that words used within social language game cannot refer to any particular object, with the consequence that "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant".

Therefore, even if an individual's belief, an individual's private beetle in a box, have been based on arbitrary factors such as genes, etc, in the context of a social language, the language game, these beetles, these objects which only exist in the mind of the individual, drop out.

Therefore, the argument that the language game of philosophy is futile because the beliefs of an individual user of the language game have been based on arbitrary factors such as genes, etc is negated if the beetles, the object-references, within the language game vanish.

IE, the consequence of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument is that philosophy within a social language game is independent of any arbitrary beliefs of any particular user.

As is common in discussions here on the forum, you and I are working from different definitions of a particular word. — T Clark

:up:

I just took a sip of water. My throat felt dry, so I reached over, picked up my glass, and took a drink. There were no thoughts like "I'm thirsty" — T Clark

I am in front of a glass of water. My throat feels dry. I can either pick up the glass of water or not pick up the glass of water. My brain "knows" there is a glass of water in front of me, and my brain "knows" my body is thirsty.

The question is, what process is underway whereby the brain moves the arm to pick up the glass of water rather than not move the arm at all. If the brain uses cognition, then the brain uses thoughts, either subconscious or conscious. If the brain is part of a deterministic system, then free will is precluded, and the raising of the arm has been completely determined by the previous existing cause of the body being thirsty, meaning that the brain has not needed either subconscious or conscious thoughts.

IE, one's beliefs in thoughts depends on one's position as regards free will and determinism.

Do thoughts have to be words? — T Clark

The Neanderthals, living in Eurasia about 40,000 years ago, may not have had a brain with the level of complexity required for modern speech, even if they had the physical apparatus for speech, but even without any words to describe their feelings, the sight of a woolly mammoth bearing down on them must certainly have given them cause for thought.

IE, thoughts don't have to be in words.

Even if they're thoughts, that doesn't necessarily mean they are ideas. — T Clark

As I understand it, a thought is fleeting, whilst an idea is something you expel into the world around you. As Pythagoras said “Thought is an Idea in transit, which when once released, never can be lured back, nor the spoken word recalled. Nor ever can the overt act be erased.”

IE, a thought remains in one's internal world, whilst an idea may become part of one's external world.

There's no idea "I want to open the door." There's just the wanting and then the opening. — T Clark

There is the conscious thought "I want to open the door".

Isn't the subconscious "wanting" not also a thought ?

If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Given that ideas are not based on arbitrary intuitions (previous post), it follows that what we find plausible is also not based on arbitrary intuitions.

A scientist would ask "how do I open this door ?". A philosopher would ask those questions that a scientist doesn't need the answer to, such as "does this door exist in my mind or as a fact in the world?"

Knowledge for its own sake cannot be futile. As Einstein said “The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, an almost fanatical love of justice and the desire for personal independence -- these are the features of the Jewish tradition which make me thank my stars that I belong to it.”

Is it the case that there is no 'good' reason to believe what I believe? — clemogo

I want to open a door, and I have the idea "I must turn the door handle in order to open the door".

My idea is partly based on my innate a priori intuition of causation - an effect needs a cause - and partly based on my empirical a posteriori observations - turning a door handle causes the effect of the door opening.

Innate a priori intuitions in sentient life are not arbitrary. They have evolved over hundreds of millions of years in order to ensure the survival of sentient life. Ideas based on empirical a posteriori observation are also not arbitrary, as based on the laws of nature.

IE, as ideas are founded partly on innate a priori intuition and partly on empirical a posteriori observation, ideas are not arbitrary.

Folks in the know are predicting a civil war in the US in 2024 — ZzzoneiroCosm

Another example of the irresponsible few happy to destroy society for their momentary intellectual amusement.

Is there is no proof equivalent to impossible to prove p? — Agent Smith

How to prove that the statement "no true statement can ever be proved true" is true.

Analytic statements
Quine in The Two Dogmas of Empiricism distinguished between two kinds of analytic claims - i) logical truths, true no matter how we interpret the non-logical parts in the statement, such as "no not-X is X" - and ii) synonymous truths, such as comparing bachelor with unmarried man.

As regards logical truths, logical truths are necessary truths, and necessary truths are beyond proof, in that no argument can be found to establish the truth of a necessary truth, as the nature of a necessary truth is to be true.

As regards synonymous truths, consider the statement "the sun rises in the east". By definition, the "sun" is something that rises in the east. So, the statement "the sun rises in the east" is analytically true. IE, if one morning something rose in the west, rather than the east, then that something wouldn't be the "sun", it would be something else.

IE, logical truths are beyond proof, and synonymous truths don't need to be proved as they are true by definition.

Synthetic statements
As regards whether the statement "the sun rises in the east" is synthetically true, one needs to prove that the sun rises in the east rather than the west.

If Idealism is true, and there is no external reality and the world only consists of ideas, then there is no sun, and the question as to where it rises becomes irrelevant.
If Indirect Realism is true, and our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, then impossible to prove something outside that which we have direct knowledge of.
If Direct Realism is true, and the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, then it would be possible to prove that the sun rises in the east.

But how do we prove which of Idealism, Indirect Realism or Direct Realism is true, something philosophers have debated for thousands of years. As my perception of the sun would be identical, regardless of whether Idealism, Indirect Realism or Realism was true, it would therefore be impossible to prove which of these is in fact the case.

IE, synthetic statements cannot be proved.

Summary
Given the statement S "no true statement can ever be proved true", if S is true, proving it true would result in a contradiction.

IE, some true statements cannot be proved true. Though, in practice, proof is secondary to what pragmatically works.

Let p = Shakespeare drank a cup of coffee on the morning of 15 July 1584. P is either true or false, as a proposition is either true or false by definition.

unknown isn't/can't be (?) be a truth value. — Agent Smith

P has a truth value, even though we may never know what it is.

To say p does not exist, we need proof that p does not exist. — Agent Smith

No statement can ever be proved

The phrase "to say p does not exist" is incorrect. The question is whether the proposition is true or false, not whether the proposition exists or doesn't exist.

If I say that p is false, then I am saying that Shakespeare did not drink a cup of coffee on the morning of 15 July 1584. If I make such a statement, then it is only reasonable that I justify myself, giving sensible reasons why I believe that my statement is true. But I can never prove my statement. Even science only deals in probabilities, not proofs. No statement can ever be proved with 100% certainty.

Consider an example of deductive reasoning: “All men are mortal. Harold is a man. Therefore, Harold is mortal". It is true that there is a sequence of logical statements, one implying another, and giving an explanation of why a given statement is true. But the starting point is always axioms, accepted "rules", statements or propositions which are regarded as being established, accepted, or self-evidently true, ie, unproved.

IE, for me to say that Shakespeare did not drink a cup of coffee on the morning of 15 July 1584, it is reasonable that I am required to justify my belief giving sensible reasons, but it would be impossible for me to prove my statement, in that it is impossible to prove any statement.

So, there's The Book, generalizing Erdős' idea, which contains all the proofs, elegant or inelegant (I'm not as demanding as Erdős), for each and every true proposition, mathematical or otherwise. — Agent Smith

There are many books in the world. Let one of these books be The Book.

Some of these books have flawed proofs and untrue propositions, whilst The Book has true proofs of true propositions.

So how would it be possible to know which of the many books is The Book, in order to be able to say "there's The Book" ?

IE, even if we were looking at The Book directly in front of us, we wouldn't be able to recognise it as The Book (a bit like my posts, they hold the truth, yet tend to be ignored).

If there was no reality, or if reality is only constructed, then any gain in knowledge would be nothing but the deepening of a fiction — Mersi

If there was no reality, then there wouldn't be anything existing able to gain knowledge.

reality would become a jigsaw with multiple possible solutions. — Mersi

There are two aspects to reality. Our subjective reality, for example, seeing the colour red, and reality as it objectively is independent of any observer, for example the wavelength of 700nm.

For Idealism, there is only one reality, where the subjective and objective become one.
For Direct Realism, there is one subjective reality, and only one possible solution as to the nature of objective reality.
For Indirect Realism, there is one subjective reality, and multiple possible solutions as to the nature of objective reality.

IE, back to the problem of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism.

Under which circumstance could objective reality remain inaccessible to us? — Mersi

Humans are animals. Humans may have the ability for more complex reasoning, but at the end of the day humans are still animals.

Whenever we look at other animals it is clear to us that they will never understand the reality of the world around them as we do. For example, a horse will never understand the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea, a mosquito will never understand the complexities of the American legal system, a dolphin will never understand quantum mechanics. So it is clear to us that the ability of animals to understand objective reality is limited by the physical structure of their brain. And yet humans are still animals, still limited by the physical structure of the human brain.

IE, the circumstance of being human means that objective reality will forever remain inaccessible to humans.

And if we cannot get such any accurate imagination of reality, how can any technological progress made by humanity be explained? — Mersi

Pragmatism.

Where pragmatism considers words and thought as tools and instruments for prediction, problem solving, and action, and rejects the idea that the function of thought is to describe, represent, or mirror reality.

racist humor — TheMadFool

Yes, racist humor is all Greek to me.

format — realmofgeorge

There seems to be two different sets of premises and conclusions

Premise/Conclusion Set One
In the first paragraph of the Introduction, the author writes - "Given the weight of the consequences of being charged with making a racist joke and the possible harmful effects on the audience of racist jokes, it is a bit puzzling that more attention has not been given to this issue."

Premise - possible harmful effects on the audience of racist jokes
Conclusion - it is a bit puzzling that more attention has not been given to this issue.

Premise/Conclusion Set Two
In the last paragraph of the Conclusion the author writes - "Given the prevalence of racial humor and the real world consequences that result from engaging in humor, philosophers should be keen on developing views that answer these questions."

Premise 1 - the prevalence of racial humor
Premise 2 - the real world consequences that result from engaging in humor
Conclusion - philosophers should be keen on developing views

These two sets of Premise/Conclusion are different
These are different as the author distinguishes racist jokes to racial humour. In Section 1 the author writes - "I mean to distinguish racial from racist humor. The former is a broad category that refers to humor about race, while the latter, a narrower category, refers to racial humor that violates norms concerning the treatment of people based on their perceived race."

The conclusions are similar, in that the author writes in section 3 - "the categories we employ for classifying racial humor can be expanded beyond the racist/non-racist binary. In contrast to only being racist or not racist, a piece of humor might also be racially insensitive."

The author opposes both racist jokes and racial humor
The author opposes racist jokes.
He writes in Section 1 - "Assuming that racism in a joke counts as a moral defect."

The author also opposes racial humour.
He writes in Section 1 - "Lastly, much racial humor depends on the inclusion of racial stereotypes."
He writes in Section 3 - "In order for the view proposed below to work, an account of the badness of racial stereotypes must be given. "

Summary
The reader needs to understand the author's use of the terms "racist jokes", "racial humor" and "racially insensitive humor", as the lines between them sometimes seem to become blurred.

@realmofgeorge "Struggling to find the premises and conclusions of this text.... Racist Humor"

In a well-written essay, the premise should be in the Introduction and the conclusion should be in the Conclusion.

No academic employed by an American university would ever suggest that racism or anything to do with racism is good. Therefore the author's position can only be that not only racism but anything associated with racism must be bad.

Therefore, both the premise and conclusion are implicitly included within the title of the essay: Racist Humor is Bad.

That would seem to me to make the mind the "internal world." — Ciceronianus

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