As Wittgenstein pointed out, somewhere in PI, pointing at something only works if the other folk around you understand that they have to follow the direction of your finger - and that is already to be participants in a sign language. — Banno

It follows that Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism.

Definitions of Direct Realism
I defined Direct Realism as either:
1) Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) is a direct perception of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world
2) Semantic Direct Realism (SDR) is an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world

Wikipedia on Naive Realism writes: "According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves."

You wrote that: "Direct realism is where what we talk about is the tree, not the image of the tree or some other philosophical supposition."

In summary, some definitions of Direct Realism are limited to perception, free of language, and some definitions require cognition, involving language.

However, as the argument from illusion makes too strong case against Phenomenological Direct Realism, Semantic Direct Realism remains the only likely possibility.

The difference between perception and cognition
In perception, the brain receives sensory input through the five senses which it processes as simple and complex concepts, simple concepts such as the colour green, and complex concepts such as a tree. In cognition, the brain combines these concepts using memory, reasoning and language to understand what has been perceived, enabling propositions such as "the tree is green".

As language is part of cognition, I can perceive things without needing a language. There are many things in the world that I perceive that I have no words for.

The act of pointing
I agree that I have been assuming that the word "tree" in language is pointing at a picture of a tree existing in a mind-independent world.

However, you note that the act of pointing is already part of the language game, meaning that what is being pointed at exists in a world, but the world of the language game, not a mind-independent world.

Wittgenstein in para 31 of PI writes that the act of pointing only works if the observer has previous knowledge of what is being pointed out:
"Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone; and I begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the king; it can move like this, . . . . and so on."—In this case we shall say: the words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'".

Therefore, words being used in the language game are not pointing out objects in a mind-independent world, but are pointing out objects existing within the language game itself

However, Semantic Direct Realism is the position that we have a direct cognition of "trees" as they really are in a mind-independent world, allowing us to make the statement that "trees are green" is true IFF trees are green in a mind-independent world.

As Wittgenstein's language game says that the statement "trees are green" does not point to something in a mind-independent world but rather points to something already existing in language, Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism, which says that "trees are green" does point to something existing in a mind-independent world.

Summary
IE, Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism.

Why would you submit this as an example as a counter to direct realism if you don’t have idea what it is countering? — Richard B

I gave my definition of Direct and Indirect Realism here.

Best answered by a Direct Realist, as I don't know of anything that a Direct Realist has direct cognition of that isn't a representation of something in a mind-independent world.

Are you claiming that for the direct realist to be consistent with their position that when the person walks away, their height must appear the same the further they move away from the observer? — Richard B

Perhaps best answered by someone who believes in Direct Realism.

The other, a metaphysical theory positing “sense data” which is in principle private, unaccessible, and with un-unverifiable claims. Lastly, as I have been arguing irrelevant to the meaning of the language used. — Richard B

The Indirect Realist agrees that private experiences are private, but as Wittgenstein explains in para 293 of PI, language games work because private experiences drop out of consideration as irrelevant: "That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

How can the Direct Realist justify that the colours red and blue exist in a mind-independent world.

The Direct Realist argues that they have direct cognition of the colours red and blue as they really are in a mind-independent world. meaning that the colours red and blue exist in a mind-independent world.

Red covers the range 625 to 750nm and blue the range 450 to 485nm.

In a mind-independent world, what determines that a wavelength of 650nm has something in common with a wavelength of 700nm, yet nothing in common with a wavelength of 475nm ?

Defining Direct Realism.

Some Direct Realists argue for Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR), aka casual directness, a direct perception and a direct cognition of the object as it really is, and some argue for Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), aka cognitive directness, an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object as it really is.

The argument from illusion makes a strong case against PDR.

Supporters of SDR would argue that "Direct realism is where what we talk about is the tree, not the image of the tree or some other philosophical supposition."

However, it is equally true that "Indirect realism is where what we talk about is the tree, not the image of the tree or some other philosophical supposition."

As an Indirect Realist I directly see a tree, I don't see a model of a tree. Searle wrote "The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain". Similarly, the experience of seeing a tree does not have a tree as an object because the experience of seeing a tree is identical with the tree.

Something else is needed to distinguish Semantic Direct Realism from Indirect Realism.

One could write:

Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) is a direct perception of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world

Semantic Direct Realism (SDR) is an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world

Indirect Realism is a direct perception and direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in the world existing in the mind, with the belief that although there is no "tree" in a mind-independent world, there is something in a mind-independent world that has caused such perception and cognition.

And as Wittgenstein pointed out in the first few pages of PI, you would thereby, already be participating in a language game, and so trying to explain meaning by making use of meaning. Then he cut to the chase: Stop looking for meaning, and instead look at use. — Banno

There are two aspects: i) does a potential word have a use, ii) given a word has a use, what does the word mean.

From my position of Neutral Monism, within a mind-independent world are elementary particles, elementary forces and space-time, and relations don't ontologically exist.

Does a potential word have a use



For the mind, some possible relations of the parts are useful within the language game and the broader life, and some aren't. For example the shapes "mraba" and "msalaba" are useful, but the shape with the parts ADI isn't. Only those shapes which are useful are named, and shapes which aren't useful are not named.

For example, the word "peffel", being part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower, has little use in either the language game or broader life, and cannot therefore be found in the dictionary.

Given a word has a use, what does the word mean



It is an undisputable fact that naming using Hume's constant conjunction of events works. It may not completely work first time as it is an iterative process, but it clearly works.

Given that the word "ngoe" has a use within the language game and broader life, what does "ngoe" mean. More broadly, what does "mean" mean.

Meaning is neither in the word "ngoe" or the picture of a ngoe, meaning is in the link between the word "ngoe" and the picture of a ngoe.

We cannot say that the word "ngoe" has a meaning, we cannot say that the picture of an ngoe has a meaning, but we can say that the link between the word "ngoe" and the picture of a ngoe has a meaning.

The link between the word and the picture is where the meaning resides.

Upon the completion of the experiment, an indirect realist walks in to see the results. They are not sure what to think. Surely, they thought that even though they are reporting the community accepted color word for each object correctly, they must be having different a “experience” of color since different neuron cluster are lighting up for each individual...........The indirect realist has no way of knowing which color individual A or B is having in any of these “private experiences” of color based on these results. But how could they ever make sense of these results since there is no private language we could use to understand anyway of what is going on inside their “heads.” As Wittgenstein says in PI 293, “That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.” — Richard B

Your post lays out my position as an Indirect Realist.

1) The Indirect Realist doesn't need a private language to have the private experience of a colour.

There are many things I see that I don't have a word for. This doesn't stop me from seeing them.

2) Wittgenstein's PI 293 is a good explanation why Indirect Realism is a workable theory.

PI 293 explains how there can be a public language even though each person's private experiences may be unknown to anyone else.

I would argue that the word "grue" refers to their private experiences, which are different, despite the shared public use. — Michael

I agree, Indirect Realism is a workable theory.

Don't you mean to say that Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy justifies talk of indirect realism in relation to the third-personal public concept of perception, but that this doesn't justify talk of indirect-realism in the case of one's own perception? — sime

From the third-person, Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy shows that Bill and Bob can carry on a conversation even if they don't know what is in each other's mind. From the first-person, I could be Bill, and still be able to carry on a conversation with Bob.

consider the irrealist understanding of the beetle on the box — sime

Other than a general estrangement from our generally accepted sense of reality, I don't know Goodman's theory.

Given that each individual only has access to his or her private colour, and uses his or her mother-tongue in a bespoke private fashion when referring to the "shared" circle, then what is the purpose of colouring in the shared circle? — sime

I agree, henceforth I will remove the colour from the circle.

Following this line of thought further, one could even deny the very existence of a shared circle, as part of a strategy for defending direct-realism for all perceivers — sime

I agree, as my belief is in neutral monism, where in a mind-independent world there are only elementary particles, elementary forces and space-time. In a mind-independent world there are only parts and no wholes such as circles, trees, colours, etc.

Better yet, to be consistent with Wittgenstein's view of “private language” one should remove the colors inside the heads of the figures. — Richard B

Wittgenstein p 293 PI
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

Wittgenstein writes that everyone says there is something in their head, even if no one else knows what it is, so I cannot leave Bills' head blank. It may be the colour yellow, but it may not.

to be consistent with indirect realism and to prevent any real-world bias, it would be best not to colour the circle in the middle — Michael

I agree that not colouring the circle would be more consistent with Direct Realism.

the same kind of light will trigger the same kind of experience — Michael

Yes, in practice this must be the case, as Bill and Bob are the product of the same 3.5 billion years of evolution, they share 99.9 % of their genetic makeup and they share the same common ancestor, Mitochondrial Eve.

Knowing these facts, Bill and Bob will agree they most likely have had the same private experience and therefore can sensibly name it "grue".

The private language argument is that such a thing cannot be understood in a coherent fashion. That there can be no private languages. That such a thing could not count as a language. — Banno

I agree.
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When the indirect realist says "I see the Earth", they are referring to the brown thing. When the direct realist says "I see the Earth", they are referring to the Earth. — Banno

This is misleading wording. To say that the Direct Realist is referring to the Earth is pre-judging that the Direct Realist is in fact correct in their belief that they are referring to the Earth.

Better wording would be: When the indirect realist says "I see the Earth" they believe they are directly seeing a representation of the Earth. When the direct realist says "I see the Earth", they believe they are directly seeing the Earth.

The question is, who is right.
===============================================================================

Summarising, what the private language argument shows is that one cannot construct a private language that is about one's private sensations. If indirect realism holds that what we see is not the world but a private model of the world, then one could not construct a language about that private model. — Banno

Indirect Realism doesn't need to construct a private language about one's private sensations. I can have the private sensation of a colour without the necessity of having to describe it in words, or of having a private language.



For example, the colour blue has been named "Blue" in a public performative act in the English language, and both Bill and Bob know this.

Note that the public word "blue" and the public colour blue are both objects in the world. For clarity, using the use-mention distinction, the blue in the object "blue" is a "mention", whilst the blue in the object with the colour blue is a "use".

It may be that when looking at the public colour blue, Bill has the private experience of yellow and Bob has the private experience of red, but both Bill and Bob have linked their private experience with the public word "blue", thereby allowing them to talk about objects in their shared world.

For example, if Bill asks Bob to pass over the "blue" object, even though Bill has the private experience of yellow and Bob has the private experience of red, Bob will successfully pass over the object Bill intends.

Indirect Realists can engage in a public social language without needing to be able to describe their private sensations.

Wittgenstein in para 293 in PI describes how everyone's private sensations may be different:
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

Wittgenstein continues that the private sensation has no place in a public language, and even if we do use the word "pain" in a public language it doesn't explain the sensation, only indicate that there is some kind of sensation
One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

Wittgenstein continues that the private sensation drops out of consideration within a public social language.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
===============================================================================

Treating this as a reductio, we do have language about the world, and therefore we talk about the world, and not about our private world-models. At least that form of indirect realism is wrong. — Banno

Indirect Realism accepts they have private sensations, but as argued by Wittgenstein in his beetle in the box analogy, such private sensations drop out of consideration within a public social language as irrelevant.

Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy justifies Indirect Realism.

"Ngoe" means at least a third of the picture is green? Or the picture is an odd number from the left? — Banno

Good first attempt. We are on the path to successful communication, definitely an iterative process. It's a bit like the Twenty Questions parlour game using deductive reasoning and creative thinking.

I will have to come up with five more pictures that excludes at least a third of the picture of the "ngoe" being green and excludes "ngoe" being an odd number.

As Wittgenstein said in para 32 of PI:
"Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong."

An illiterate deaf mute with no language can see a tree "in their mind". They just won't call it "tree"...I've seen many animals that I don't have a name for...But perception doesn't depend on meaning — Michael

I agree, perception doesn't depend on meaning. There is an asymmetry between meaning and perception.

You need to read up on the use-mention distinction. — Michael

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist directly perceive a tree in their minds. For both the Indirect and Direct Realist, the tree they perceive exists in the world. Note that Wittgenstein in Tractatus didn't specify where this world existed.

Example of "the tree is green" is true IFF the tree is green
"The tree is green" being in quotation marks is within language. The tree is green not being in quotation marks is in the world.

For the Indirect Realist, the world in which the tree exists is in their mind. For the Direct Realist, the world in which the tree exists is in a mind-independent world.

The meaning of the word "tree" has nothing to do with perception — Michael

If that were true, you would know the meaning of the word "mlima" even if you had never perceived one.

You could argue that even if you have never perceived a "mlima", it could be described to you, such that a "mlima" consists of "mwamba" and "theluji". But this doesn't solve the problem, in that you you cannot know the meaning of either "mwamba" or "theluji" until having perceived them. Sooner or later, meaning depends on perception. In Bertrand Russell's terms, knowledge by acquaintance.

Who told you what the name of the effect was? — Isaac

In a sense, no one needs to tell me the name of the image that I perceive. I would assume that just from five pictures you could hazard at a guess at the meaning of "ngoe". I discover the name from a constant conjunction of events.

This is a misreading of the private language argument. — Banno

My proposal is that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations does not support Direct Realism.

Direct Realism argues that we perceive objects in the world as they really are, immediately and directly.
If Direct Realism is true, one person's private experience of something in the world, such as a tree, will be the same as another person's private experience of the same tree, meaning that each person will know the other person's private experiences.

Wittgenstein argues that nobody can know another person's private experiences
In para 272 of PI, Wittgenstein writes that nobody can know another person's private experiences:
"The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another."

The Private language argument prevents talking about or discussing the pros and cons of Indirect and Direct Realism
There is an excellent and informative article in Wikipedia, the Private language argument that I always refer to.

The Wikipedia article Private language argument notes that the private language argument argues that a language understandable by only a single individual is incoherent, from which it follows that there is no language that can talk about or describe inner and private experiences.
1) The private language argument argues that a language understandable by only a single individual is incoherent,
2) If the idea of a private language is inconsistent, then a logical conclusion would be that all language serves a social function.
3) For example, if one cannot have a private language, it might not make any sense to talk of private experiences or of private mental states.
4) In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others

Direct Realism is the position that our inner experience of an object in the world is direct and immediate. Indirect Realism is the position that we cannot know whether or not our inner experience of an object in the world is direct and immediate.

As Wittgenstein's private language argument argues that no language can talk about or describe inner and private experiences, it follows that the pros and cons of Indirect and Direct Realism is not something that can be talked about or described.

Summary
On the one hand, Wittgenstein's private language argument prevents discussion of Indirect and Direct Realism, but on the other hand, Wittgenstein writes that nobody can know another person's private experiences. That nobody can know another person's private experiences is at odds with the consequences of Direct Realism.

In the absence of any English speaker the word "tree" wouldn't exist, but the object currently referred to by the word "tree" would exist. — Michael

Exactly, that is what an Indirect Realist would say. The Direct Realist would have said "In the absence of any English speaker, the word "tree" wouldn't exist, but the tree would still exist in the world"

There's a very peculiar obsession with language in this discussion — Michael

As I believe in the ontology of Neutral Monism, where reality consists of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, the meaning of the word tree is fundamental to my philosophical understanding.

What could we call that thing...? If only there was a word for the thing in the world which I can make furniture out of, climb, get fruit from, paint the image of, sit under the shade of........ We really need a word for thing.......I suggest "tree(a)", what with the word "tree" already having been taken and all. — Isaac

This is the slightly mad bit.......That 'something that has caused me to perceive a "tree'?...........It's a tree........That's what a tree is. — Banno

Yes, "tree" is a good word. Within our language game we have the word "tree".

However, in the absence of any English speaker, the word "tree" would not exist, and "trees" would not exist in the world. In the absence of any English speakers, no one could discover in the world "trees". "Trees" only exist in the minds of speakers of the English language.

I perceive something that has been named "tree". As "trees" only exist in the mind, I am perceiving something in my mind that only exists in my mind, leading to a self-referential circularity.

This is the flaw in Searle's solution of the "intentionality of perception" to the epistemological problem of how we can gain knowledge of objects in the real world from private sense data, in that his solution leads to a similar self-referential circularity.

As an Indirect Realist I directly see a tree, I don't see a model of a tree. Searle wrote "The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain". Similarly, the experience of seeing a tree does not have a tree as an object because the experience of seeing a tree is identical with the tree.



I have an innate belief in the law of causation, in that for every effect there is a cause, as well as the belief that the cause of an effect cannot be known just from knowing the effect. Combining these, my perceiving a "tree" must have been caused by something, yet I cannot know just from my perception what caused it.



Yet I need a name for the cause of my perception of a tree. My solution is to give the cause the same name as the effect. Therefore, if I see the colour green, I name its cause green. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause a grating noise. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause an acrid smell. If I feel something silky, I name its cause silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause bitter. If I perceive a tree, I name its cause a tree.

"Trees" only exist within the language game. "Trees" exist within the mind as not only the name for what is perceived by the mind but also as the name of the unknown cause of that perception, ie "a tree" is the cause of perceiving "a tree".

If this is true, it's not a discovery about seeing but only about the grammar of 'see.' — green flag

Yes, which shows the importance of Wittgenstein's discussion of the language game in Philosophical Investigations.

I can build furniture out of fallen trees. Can I build furniture out of what you see in your dreams and hallucinations? — Isaac

You can build furniture out of the something in the world that has caused me to perceive a tree providing this had been a veridical experience, but not if a dream or an hallucination.

How could one ever be mistaken about what one sees? — Isaac

One can never be mistaken about what one sees. If you see a tree, it is absolutely certain that you have seen a tree. If you see a unicorn running through Central Park, it is absolutely certain you have seen a unicorn running through Central Park.

However, one can be mistaken in one's belief whether it was a veridical experience, a dream, an illusion, a film or an hallucination.

But can they see trees? — Isaac

According to Do blind people dream in visual images?, yes.

Instead, scientists have performed brain scans of people blind since birth while they are sleeping. What scientists have found is that these people have the same type of vision-related electrical activity in the brain during sleep as people with normal eyesight. Furthermore, people blind since birth move their eyes while asleep in a way that is coordinated with the vision-related electrical activity in the brain, just like people with normal eyesight. Therefore, it is highly likely that people blind since birth do indeed experience visual sensations while sleeping. They just don't know how to describe the sensations or even conceptually connect in any way these sensations with what sighted people describe as vision.

What about the tree that you climb? Is that a representation? — unenlightened

I know that I perceive something and I know that this something has the name "tree".

As I innately believe in the law of causation, in that every effect has a cause, I therefore believe that there is something that has caused me to perceive a "tree". I don't know what this something is, but I do believe it exists.

As language doesn't exist in the absence of sentient beings, the something in the world that we call a "tree" cannot be a "tree", as "trees" only exist within human language. "Tree" as a word in human language represents something else.

Therefore the "tree" that I climb as a word is a representation of something else but the something else that has caused me to perceive a "tree" isn't a representation.

So, for you, the eyes are not involved in seeing. A blind man can see? — Isaac

I see what you mean. I see the reason for your post. I see the relation between the eyes and what is seen. I see trees in my dreams. A fool cannot see beyond the end of their nose. I see trees in my hallucinations. I see myself on holiday. I see the light at the end of the tunnel. A blind man can see the truth. A blind man can see where they went wrong. A blind man can see the error of their ways.

Yes, a blind man can see.

But for indirect realism, what everyone sees is some private mental image, and hence what you see and what the other person sees are quite different. — Banno

Almost, in that my private perception of a tree may or may not be the same as anyone else's, but it is impossible to know, as it is a private mental image.

Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations may be used to give insights into Indirect Realism, including his strong case against the possibility of a private language and his arguing that nobody knows another person's private sensations.

The Indirect realist accepts Wittgenstein's conclusion that one's private perception of an object, such as a tree, is forever unknown to anyone else.

The Direct Realist doesn't accept Wittgenstein's conclusion. The Direct Realist argues that we perceive objects in the world as they really are, immediately and directly. Therefore, if two people are looking at the same object in the world, such as a tree, as both will be perceiving the same object in the world immediately and directly, their private mental images will be the same, meaning that each will know the others private sensations.

Therefore, whether one is an Indirect or Direct Realist depends in part of whether one accepts Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

If indirect realism were taken at face value, two people cannot both look at the same thing — Banno

Wittgenstein's para 293 in Philosophical Investigations about a beetle in a box provides a solution to the problem raised about Indirect Realism, ie, how is communication possible between people using a public language when nobody can know another person's private sensations.

For example, as an Indirect Realist, my private mental image of a tree may be different to everyone else's, yet I can use use the word "tree" in a social language game with others. Within the language game, the word "tree" isn't describing my mental image, as each particular mental image has dropped out of consideration within a language game as irrelevant.

Wittgenstein's beetle in the box explains the connection within Indirect Realism between private mental images and a public language.

The indirect realist says what one sees is the model of the tree — Banno

As an Indirect Realist, I am not saying that I see a model of a tree, I am saying that I directly see a tree, though the tree I see is an indirect representation, image or model of something that exists in the actual world.

A key concept is intentionality, in that my mind is directed at the tree that I perceive, not in virtue of the tree representing another object, another tree, as this would lead into an infinite regression and the homunculus problem.

In terms of intentionality I'm talking to (and seeing) my parents, but given the physics and mechanics of external objects and light and sound and the central nervous system, the phenomenology of experience is indirect. — Michael

Yes, intentionality is closely associated with phenomenology.

Taken from the article What Is Intentionality, and Why Is It Important? by Robert Sokolowski:

"The term most closely associated with phenomenology is “intentionality.” The core doctrine in phenomenology is the teaching that every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional: it is essentially “consciousness of” or an “experience of” something or other. All our awareness is directed toward objects. If I see, I see some visual object, such as a tree or a lake; if I imagine, my imagining presents an imaginary object, such as a car that I visualize coming down a road; if I am involved in remembering, I remember a past object; if I am engaged in judging, I intend a state of affairs or a fact. Every act of consciousness, every experience, is correlated with an object. Every intending has its intended object."

Intentionality is common to both Indirect and Direct Realists.

As an Indirect Realist, when I see a tree, there are two aspects. First, intellectually, I know that my mind is directed onto a representation of a tree. Second, viscerally, I know that my mind is directed onto a tree, not a representation of a tree.

After all, even as an Indirect Realist, if I was standing in the middle of the road and saw a truck approaching me, I wouldn't think "just a representation of a truck" and remain where I was.

This is the exact red herring that is almost always brought up in the debate between direct and indirect realism. — Michael

I am sure that we both agree with Indirect Realism.

Searle definitely supports Direct Realism, and within Direct Realism, as also discussed by Pierre Le Morvan in his article Arguments against Direct Realism and how to counter them, there is causal indirectness (PDR) and cognitive indirectness (SDR).

I would assume Searle agrees with the cognitive indirectness version of Direct Realism, as he must well know the bent stick problem.

What do you mean by red herring ?

Yeah, but what Searle is suggesting is not what you are criticising. — Banno

I think I am criticising what Searle is suggesting.

I don't agree with Searle in his support of naive realism (direct realism), as it seems to me that only Indirect Realism can satisfactorily explain how we interact with the world.

As Searle said "I think the rejection of naive realism was the single greatest disaster that happened in philosophy after Descartes...................but the idea that you can't ever perceive the real world but only a picture in your mind that creates a disaster, because the question that arises is what is the relationship between the idea you do perceive or the sense datum of the impression that you do perceive and the real world, and there is no answer to that which is satisfactory once you make once you make the decisive move of rejecting Naive Realism"

I don't agree with Searle's solution to the epistemological problem of how we can gain knowledge of objects in the real world from private sense data, how we can know the public objective from the private subjective and how we avoid scepticism, subjectivism and solipsism.

Searle proposes the "intentionality of perception". Whereas I agree that we are shaped by evolution, and the object causes the visual experience, I don't agree that the intentional content of our minds (intentional state) is causally self-referential. IE, I may perceive a car, but it is the car that has caused me to have that very perception. Such self-referential causality is inadequate to ensure a condition of satisfaction between the intentional content and object in the world, whether a veridical perception or an hallucination.

Searle tries to avoid Kant's transcendental link between intentional content and actual world by attempting to naturalize intentionality, ie, treating intentionality as just another biological function using a self-referential intentional causation.

Searle attempts to show that a self-referential causation between intentional content and world will ensure that any link between intentional content and world will be logical rather than empirical, and therefore directly observable, avoiding Hume's problem of inference using regularity of observation.

Searle's approach fails because he ignores the asymmetry of cause and effect, and incorrectly assumes a symmetry in the direction of fit from world to mind and from mind to world.

Such asymmetry between cause and effect and effect and cause means that the link between intentional content and actual world cannot be self-referential, as is required by Searle in his support for naive realism.

Who said that there's such a thing as "direct realism"? — Alexander Hine

From Wikipedia Direct and indirect realism

"In contemporary philosophy, indirect realism has been defended by Edmund Husserl[17] and Bertrand Russell.[9] Direct realism has been defended by Hilary Putnam,[18] John McDowell,[19][20] Galen Strawson,[21] and John R. Searle.[22]"

From John R. Searle The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument

"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes."

"The second mistake almost as bad is the view that we do not directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world."

I may be absolutely certain of what I am seeing, whether a tree or snooker balls on a snooker table, but knowing the present effect doesn't allow me to know the preceding cause.

As I cannot know from the position of the snooker balls in the image the preceding state of affairs, I cannot know from seeing an image of a tree the preceding cause of that image.

A Direct Realist would need to explain how the cause of an effect may be unambiguously known just from knowing the effect.

The onus is on direct realists to explain, if only broadly and superficially, how direct realism is supposed to work. Thoughts? — frank

Pierre Le Morvan wrote an article Arguments against Direct Realism and how to counter them

A major problem with Direct Realism is the belief that because one knows an effect, such as the image of a tree, the cause of that effect can be directly and unambiguously known.

The guy on the left is an image of direct realism. He doesn't get a cloud. He just directly sees the tree — frank

You say the Direct Realist is not seeing an image of the tree, which is what the Indirect Realist would say, but is directly seeing the tree.

An Indirect Realist would say that they are looking at an image of the tree, and therefore don't know, just from the image, whether the tree is 5m tall 10m away or is 10m tall 20m away.

If the Direct Realist is directly seeing the tree and not an image of the tree, how does the Direct Realist know, just from the image, whether they are looking at a 5m tall tree 10m away or a 10m tall tree 20m away ?

How can the Direct Realist justify that they are not looking an an image of the tree ?

@Eugen In Physicalism, everything is physical. But the question remains, is a protoconsciousness an intrinsic part of the physical.

What's the difference between protoconsciousness and matter? — Eugen

I would use the term Physicalism rather than Materialism. Physicalism is closely related to Materialism, but Physicalism grew out of Materialism with advances in knowledge about the physical sciences. In the world of space-time there is more than just elementary particles but also elementary forces.

Therefore, an understanding of consciousness needs more than an understanding of matter but also the forces between this matter. The question with the mind-body problem is how consciousness is grounded in broadly physical systems, how the property of feeling pain could be instantiated by an entirely physical object, such as the nervous system.

Referring to the SEP article Russellian Monism, according to Bertrand Russell, fundamental physical entities are intrinsically qualitatively special such that they necessitate conscious states in macro structures, such as humans, but as yet, our understanding outstrips current knowledge. Russellian monism comes in two varieties: panpsychist and panprotopsychist. The former holds that the special intrinsic properties are themselves consciousness properties, and the latter denies this.

I find it hard to believe in panpsychism, in that electrons are conscious, but panprotopsychism seems a more sensible approach, whereby elementary particles and forces have certain intrinsic properties that enable the realization of consciousness in certain circumstances. For example, the property of movement cannot be observed in a system consisting of a single magnet, yet can be observed in a system consisting of several magnets in close proximity. It is also the case the the property of momentum of an objects exists neither in its mass or velocity, but is a product of the two. The property of volume of an object doesn't exist in its parts but in the relation of the parts making up the whole. Perhaps in the same way, the property of consciousness cannot be discovered in an individual element, but only emerges when several individual elements are combined in certain particular ways.

Perhaps protoconsciousness is an intrinsic feature of elementary particles and forces that only emerges as the property of consciousness when these elementary particles and forces are in certain combinations.

Ok... elaborate a bit please, it looks like you're saying something there — Eugen

Intellectually, my belief is that of Neutral Monism, where reality consists of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time. Consciousness may be explained by Panprotopsychism. However, the unity of consciousness, the neural binding problem, Kant's unity of apperception remains beyond comprehension, and must remain what McGinn called Mysterianism.

On the one hand I cannot believe in Conceptualism but on the other hand I know Conceptualism is true.

As an "experience" is a concept, and therefore a type, perhaps the wording should be "there are no experiences, only tokens of experiences", though I know what you meant, which is the main thing.

But, if I were a materialist, I would go further and eliminate the notion of Type altogether. — Eugen

If I started as a Materialist, this would lead me into becoming a Physicalist, and eventually a Panprotopsychist.

I would have thought that to be a Materialist means rejecting the notion of a type. A Conceptualist would accept the existence of types in the mind, but I don't think that a Materialist would be a Conceptualist.

There are no types of experiences, only experiences. — Eugen

As an aside, an "experience" as a concept is a type.

I referenced cognition because the most popular models of how the brain works are computational — Count Timothy von Icarus

Numbers are computed in language

If asked the question "what is one plus one", as the answer is not contained in either number, I need to carry out a computation in my mind.

If I put one pebble on a table, and then put another pebble next to it, I can see two pebbles.
I don't need any mental computation to know that I see two pebbles, in the same way that I don't need to compute that I see the colour green. Seeing the colour green is the direct effect of the cause of a wavelength of 550nm entering the eye.

Regarding causation, if Bertrand Russell was correct that the notion of causality is objectively redundant, there would be no work for the National Transportation Safety Board which investigates every civil aviation accident in the United States, for example.

Therefore, I only need to carry out a computation if presented with a problem expressed in language, ie, in the computation of numbers where language and naming cannot be ignored. In language, one object is named "one". When another object is added, the set of objects is named "two". When another object is added, the set of objects is named "three", etc. Therefore, when I see one pebble on the table, I can say "I see one pebble". When I see another pebble added I can say "I see two pebbles". I can then answer the question "what is one plus one" as "two".

Therefore, the computation of numbers within the mind can only occur within language.

In terms of grouping rocks together, it's probably easier to conceptualize how the cognition of "there are two rocks over there," and "there are 12 rocks over there," requires some sort of computational process to produce the thought "there are 14 rocks in total." — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I see two rocks on the left, I know that two objects has the name "two".
If I see twelve rocks on the right, I know that twelve objects has the name "twelve".
If I see fourteen rocks in total, I know that fourteen objects has the name "fourteen".

IE, I know there are fourteen rocks in total not from any computational process but from how objects are named.