Our disagreement seems to be about what logic has to do with thinking foolishly or logically. — Athena

Bird sounds and language are not the same thing. — Athena

There is language and Language

Lakna Panawala's article What is the Difference Between Humans and Animals Brain makes sense to me.

She wrote:
1) The main difference between humans’ brain and animals’ brain is that humans’ brain has a remarkable cognitive capacity, which is a crowning achievement of evolution whereas animals’ brain shows comparatively less cognitive capacity.
2) Humans are more intelligent due to their increased neural connections in the brain while animals are comparatively less intelligent due to fewer neural connections.
3) Humans’ brain has the ability of complex processing such as conscious thought, language, and self-awareness due to the presence of a large neocortex while animals’ brain has a less ability of complex processing.

I find it hard to believe that there was a magical moment when one day there was no language and the next day there was language. Surely, language has developed over a long period of time.

Lakna wrote that humans have more ability of complex processing than non-human animals, not that non-human animals don't have any ability of complex processing. She wrote that complex processing includes conscious thought, language and self-awareness.

@ucarr used the division language-general of non-human animals and language-verbal of humans. Another terminological division could be between language of non-human animals and Language of humans, where language with a capital L is defined as language practised by humans. If this were the case, then I would agree that non-human animals don't have Language, although I would still argue that non-human animals do have language.

Every living thing communicates in some way. To be able to communicate requires a means of communication. Language is a means of communication.

Non-human animals communicate using non-verbal signals, bees dance, hummingbirds use visual displays, etc. Humans communicate using both non-verbal and verbal communication, smiling, crying, speaking, writing, etc.

The Britannica defines human language as a system of conventional spoken, manual (signed), or written symbols by means of which human beings, as members of a social group and participants in its culture, express themselves.

Wikipedia defines animal language as communication using a variety of signs, such as sounds and movement.

In summary, both non-human animals and humans communicate using language. Non-human animal language is non-verbal, human language is both non-verbal and verbal.

Out of interest who says crows don't have language? — Benj96

My response to @ucarr presented a hypothetical, not my belief that crows don't have language.

@ucarr had previously written: "Language and logic are synonyms. This boils down to saying you can’t practice cognition outside of language".

If it is true as I believe that the crow is using cognition, and if it is true as @ucarr wrote that it is not possible to cognize outside language, then it would follow that crows must have language.

(1) is valid — Srap Tasmaner

I cognize something x. Cognition is a higher level function of the brain. I can cognize about x both as an appearance and a noumenon.

As regards cognition, then why not A → (~B ˄ B) ?

This also follows the two-aspect interpretation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

"Either all cognition is cognition of appearance, in which case there can be no cognition of noumena, or there can be cognition of the noumenon, in which case cognition is not essentially cognition of appearance" — KantDane21

As regards cognition, it is not a case of either-or, in that I can both cognize about appearance and cognize about noumena, such that P ˄ Q is possible.

Cognizing about an appearance and cognizing about something that caused the appearance are not mutually exclusive.

Although I can cognize about the concept of noumena, because, by the definition of noumena, I can never perceive noumena in the world, I can never cognize about particular noumena.

cognition — KantDane21

Perhaps "perception" would be a more suitable word than "cognition" in this situation. Cognition implies an active act of manipulating concepts. Perception implies a passive observation.

In this context, does lexical layer refer to a range of movements bees can make? — ucarr

The article How human language could have evolved from birdsong differentiates between the expression part of language and the lexical part of language. For example, given the lexical components of subject "John", verb "to see" and object "bird", many different expressions may be created. Such as: "did John see the bird?", "John saw the bird", "you say that John saw the bird", etc. This is syntax and the semantics.

The article proposes that the foundations of the expression part of language and the lexical part of language were pre-existing in various non-human animals prior to human language.

Animals evolved about 750 million years ago, yet human language only began about 30,000 to 100,000 years ago. Was there a magical spark that gave language to humans? It seems more sensible to believe that human language developed from something pre-existing in non-human animals.

Overall bird design, with its wings, weak legs, lack of arms and beak instead of mouth, suggests a life form engineered by evolution for life in the air. — ucarr

Birds being engineered by evolution sounds remarkably teleological. Were feathers engineered by evolution for flight, or did animals having feathers discover they could fly. As Aristotle said: “…Natural things either invariably or normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of spontaneity or chance is this true …it follows that they must be for an end…”

It has been suggested that feathers had originally functioned as thermal insulation, as it remains their function in the down feathers of infant birds today, prior to their eventual modification in birds into structures that support flight.

It is considered probable that many, if not all, non-avian dinosaur species also possessed feathers in some shape or form. For example, the coelurosaurs were a small, slender bipedal carnivorous dinosaur with long forelimbs, believed to be an evolutionary ancestor of birds. I cannot picture the Tyrannosauroidea, a member of the coelurosaur family, flying, even though it probably had feathers.

What is the Difference Between Humans and Animals Brain — Lakna

I agree with the Lakna article, where she wrote:
1) Humans are more intelligent due to their increased neural connections in the brain while animals are comparatively less intelligent due to fewer neural connections.
2) Humans’ brain has the ability of complex processing such as conscious thought, language, and self-awareness due to the presence of a large neocortex while animals’ brain has a less ability of complex processing.
3) Humans’ brain produces a high cognitive capacity with complex processing including conscious thought, language, and self-awareness............animals show less cognitive capacities.
This agrees with what I previously wrote in that "It is true that the ability of animals to reason and conceptualise is very limited compared to humans, but this is a difference in quantity not quality."

I agree with you when you wrote that i) reacting to the environment is not logical thinking, ii) imitating others is not a function of logic, iii) perception must not be confused with logic.

I agree with you when you wrote that believing a god gave us language is neither reasonable nor logical. Society needs reason and logic.

Though I disagree with you when you wrote that i) most of our thinking is learned, ii) logical thinking is not an inborn talent but something you learn.

Is thinking learnt
Cognition is a higher level function of the brain and manipulates concepts used in reasoning, logic and language. Cognition requires thinking, but thinking does not require cognition, ie, I can think about my observation of a fact in the world without of necessity cognizing about it. IE, as thinking doesn't require cognition, it is innate and does not need to be learnt.

Is logical thinking an inborn talent or learnt
The Lakna article makes the point that it is not that humans are intelligent and cognitive whereas non-human animals are neither intelligent nor cognitive, rather he makes the point that both humans and non-human animals have some degree of intelligence and cognitive ability. IE, as cognition is present in both humans and non-human animals, cognition and thereby logical reasoning is part of the evolutionary process rather than something solely learnt by humans - though of course humans can improve their innate logical reasoning through subsequent learning.

Reacting to our environment is not equal to logical thinking. — Athena

Where did human language, logic, reasoning, conceptualisation and consciousness come from if not from pre-existing non-human animal abilities ?

Humans are animals. Today, the human animal has a particular ability as regards language, logic, reasoning, conceptualisation and consciousness that non-human animals don't seem to have.

Animals evolved about 750 million years ago, yet human language, etc is relatively recent, possibly within the last 30,000 to 100,00 years.

I can understand human language, etc as a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation, in that whilst feathers evolved for warmth, as a by-product could be used for flight. I can understand human language as combining two existing forms of communication, the expression layer, eg found in birds, and the lexical layer, eg found in bees.

However, if that is not the case, I cannot understand the mechanism that originated human language, etc totally independently from any pre-existing non-human animal ability.

My question is, what is the mechanism that enabled the origination of human language etc
totally independently of any pre-existing non-human animal ability.

An alligator will endure an electric shock once its teeth get hold of meat but if it does not have the taste of meat, it will pull away from the shock — Athena

Sounds very human to me.

Being able to reason through complex concepts is unique to humans — Athena

It depends on where the line is drawn between a complex concept and a simple concept

My belief is that human language is a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation. IE, human language is not of a different kind to animal communication, but rather, human language has built on what already pre-existed (using the term animal to refer to non-human).

It is true that the ability of animals to reason and conceptualise is very limited compared to humans, but this is a difference in quantity not quality. After all, if animals were not able to reason and conceptualise, then humans would have had nothing to build on.

There are many professionals who believe that animals can reason and conceptualise

For example, as regards reasoning:
Planning for the future by western scrub-jays
Animal cognition
Do animals have reflective minds

As regards conceptualising:
Many animals can think abstractly
Analogical reasoning in animals
Ability of animals to think abstract concepts

Such a conclusion would not be surprising, as humans are animals. I am sure that even the crow has a basic understanding of the concept "on top of" (what we call a preposition), in that the crow certainly perceives that the food is on top of the water. Though I am sure other articles may be found concluding the opposite.

Animals can not know logos because they do not have the complex language as humans have complex languages that can express reasoning — Athena

The crow must be cognisant of the following concepts in order to gain the food:

Causation = putting a stone into the water will cause the water level to rise.
Negation = not putting a stone in the water will not cause the water to rise
Time = because putting a stone in the water in the past caused the water level to rise, putting a stone in the water in the future will cause the water level to rise
Space = the stone is spatially separated to the water
Logic = the water level will rise if a stone is put into the water. If the crow puts a stone into the water, then the water level will rise
Open-endedness = the stone the crow uses may be different in size and shape to the stone observed by the crow in the past
Concepts = the crow cognizes the glass beaker is not the stone
Relations = the crow must cognize that the food is on top of the water
Reasoning = the crow is observed to act in an ordered and rational way
Hypotheticals = the crow must reason that if a stone is put into the water, then the water level will rise.
Displacement (things not present) = the crow must cognize that the food will rise up the beaker if a stone is put into the water
Open response = the crow cannot predict how many stones are required to sufficiently raise the water level, but continues until it has reached its goal.
Questioning = the crow examines its environment in order to discover what tools are available for it to reach its goal.
Concrete nouns = the crow can distinguish between the beaker and the stone
Abstract nouns = the crow's hunger determines its course of action
Verbs = the crow cognizes that movement of the stone is required
Prepositions = the crow must cognize that the stone is outside the beaker.
Simile = the stone the crow uses may be different in size, colour and shape to the stone previously observed.
Conjunction = the glass beaker is not the stone, meaning that there is a glass beaker and a stone.
Adverb = the crow cognizes that the stone must be moved carefully and deliberately
Adjective = the crow cognizes that the colour of the stone is not relevant to its task.

IE, pre-language, the crow has the necessary concepts required for language.

Animals can communicate but that is not the same as conceptualizing and reasoning which are dependent on language — Athena

How human language could have evolved from birdsong

The article suggests that human language is a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation, in that that human language combines two forms of communication already found in the animal kingdom. There is the expression layer, the changeable organisation of sentences, such as birdsong, where learning plays a role in song development as it does in language development. There is the the lexical layer, such as the communicative waggles of bees. At some point between 50,000 and 80,000 years ago, humans may have merged these two types of communication.

IE, human language is not of a different kind to animal communication, but rather, human language has built on what already pre-existed.

That's animal communication not language. Conveying information is not a high enough bar for language. — Baden

What is language for if not conveying information ?

I think he would agree that the perception of logical connection is essentially non-verbal, and language follows later as an attempt to communicate the logical connection to others — alan1000

I agree @ucarr did write i) "grammar, the inferential platform and medium of language, is synonymous with logic" ii) Grammar is logic iii) logic is almost the same word for human utterance iv) Logic, then, being an attribute of language, stands subordinate to language. However, I don't know whether @ucarr is saying that logic or language came first.

My belief is that language is a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation. This is the theory posed by linguist Noam Chomsky and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, in that language evolved as a result of other evolutionary processes, essentially making it a by-product of evolution and not a specific adaptation. The idea that language was a spandrel, a term coined by Gould, flew in the face of natural selection. In fact, Gould and Chomsky pose the theory that many human behaviours are spandrels. These various spandrels came about because of a process Darwin called "pre-adaptation," which is now known as exaptation. This is the idea that a species uses an adaptation for a purpose other than what it was initially meant for. One example is the theory that bird feathers were an adaptation for keeping the bird warm, and were only later used for flying. Chomsky and Gould hypothesize that language may have evolved simply because the physical structure of the brain evolved, or because cognitive structures that were used for things like tool making or rule learning were also good for complex communication. This falls in line with the theory that as our brains became larger, our cognitive functions increased.

The sentence "come here" doesn't contain any preposition, yet signifies a spatio-temporal relation.

I infer you've concluded the video shows no practice of language by the crow. — ucarr

It depends what you mean by language.

Britannica defines language as "a system of conventional spoken, manual (signed), or written symbols by means of which human beings, as members of a social group and participants in its culture, express themselves." However, birds, as well as other animals do have language, in the sense that their calls, postures and other behaviours do convey information to other birds and animals, such as location of predators and sources of food.

The crow clearly cognizes that the food is on top of the water, and so is aware of the concept "on top of", which we call a preposition.

The crow has an awareness of logic. The crow knows that the water level will rise if an object is placed into the water. Therefore, the crow knows that if it places an object into the water, then the water level will rise.

Other crows learn that the water level will rise if an object is placed into it, not through verbal communication, but through behavioural communication, by observation of the behaviour of the crow attempting to reach the food.

There are two main theories as to how language evolved. Either i) as an evolutionary adaptation or ii) a by-product of evolution and not a specific adaptation. As feathers were an evolutionary adaptation helping to keep the birds warm, once evolved, they could be used for flight. Thereby, a by-product of evolution rather than a specific adaptation. Similarly for language, the development of language is relatively recent, between 30,000 and 1000,000 years ago. As the first animals emerged about 750 million years ago, this suggests that language is a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation.

I would propose that the human is not conscious of 99% of those events within the body necessary for the body to survive in the world, eg, heart rate, etc. I would also propose that 99% of what the human is conscious of at any moment in time is not linguistic, eg, when driving we don't have time to verbalise everything we are aware of within each constantly changing scene. I would conclude that at any moment in time, 99.99% (metaphorically speaking) of the actions taken by the body necessary to survive in the world it finds itself are not linguistic. IE, human interactions with the world are not fundamentally qualitatively different to that of a non-linguistic crow, although admittedly are quantitatively different.

Humans don't need language to survive in the world, but language enables the communication of thoughts between people. This creates a collective mind that is far more powerful than any individual mind making it up. Language thereby allows each individual a greater understanding of the world than would be possible without language. With such understanding, they have the possibility to significantly alter the environment they find themselves within.

Language and logic are synonyms. This boils down to saying you can’t practice cognition outside of language. — ucarr

Causal understanding of water displacement by a crow

It seems that the crow is using cognition. If the crow has no language, then it is using cognition outside of language.

It's like if the forms instead of being beautiful Platonic understanding, is just really a mining of complexities. — schopenhauer1

Do you mean something like the following ?

The graduate engineer was given the task of designing a bridge. The engineer went away and came back three weeks later with 100 sheets of computer printout, having laboriously checked each line and ensured that each piece of data was consistent with all other pieces of data, that there were no arithmetic errors and each part built up logically into a whole.

The senior engineer in charge, just approaching retirement, tore off a scrap of paper, took out their pencil, and after an hour, told the graduate engineer that their design was correct.

The graduate engineer had mined the complexities logically joining each part together to create a whole. The senior engineer started by looking at the whole, excluded that which was secondary, and only concentrated on that which was essential.

The graduate engineer lived in the cave looking at shadows. The senior engineer lived outside the cave looking at the beautiful Forms.

Pessimism is one of the consequences of not knowing what is important and not knowing what can be excluded, of knowing what doesn't need to be known. Optimism is one of the consequences of knowing what is important and knowing what can be excluded, of not knowing what doesn't need to be known.

We are estranged, but not everyone. — schopenhauer1

Alienation and technology

The technology that runs our lives is increasingly growing beyond the understanding of a single individual, with the disconnect increasing year by year.

A disconnect is of itself not a problem. As long as one can turn the lights on, potholes are filled in in the roads, the buses run on time and the citizen's life is angst-free, and where each citizen plays their part in the smooth running of the public services, then such a disconnect is not to be feared. As long as technology works to the benefit of the individual, the individual may pragmatically accept the benefits of a technology they may not understand. I don't need to know details of the crankcase to know that if I turn the key the car moves where I want it to move.

But as soon as the citizen begins to suffer at the hands of a technology that they are disconnected from, and are unable to either control or mitigate, then the situation becomes dire, and it is then we have become cogs in a blind machine with no real agency. A disconnect becomes problematic when technology no longer works for the benefit of the individual, and the individual is powerless to alter or control the technology they are suffering under. Typically, the increasing use of gaslighting being used by those who control the information that we depend on for our knowledge of a world that exists on the other side of our computer and phone screens.

Information technology, the electronic screen between us and the world, is turning us into Truman Burbanks. A world where information technology controls every aspect of our lives, where we live in a false reality, as an actor on a stage populated by other actors. We play a role, directed by unknown forces behind the images we see on the screens. We are perceiving a world that has already been interpreted by a media more concerned with advertising profits and its own financial benefits than the well-being of its consumers.

Information technology is leading us to a dystopian future where we are unknowingly trapped inside a simulated and virtual realist, a Matrix, where the individual is more a source of energy for the machine than a free person with independent hopes, desires and wishes.

Information technology, with its databases creating a synthetic world populated by all of us as electronic images is creating a world where we can all be be surveilled and regimented. As in Orwell's 1984, subjected to historical negationism and propaganda, facilitated by servants of the controllers in an omnipresent government, repressing and controlling the allowed behaviour of people in society.

Information technology works to minimise the power of the individual in order to gain more control. Individual European nation states are subsumed into a supranational political and economic European Union. Small countries of 5 million people intimately knowing their political leaders are bound into organisations run and controlled by unelected bureaucrats, responsible to a distant Commission rather than the population they are intended to serve. Where their oath of allegiance of the bureaucrats is to an amorphous group rather than their home country, where the individual becomes powerless and unrepresented amongst 400 million others, where the political leaders of the member countries are decided by the diktat of central bureaucrats and economists.

Alienation is not a new phenomenon. The masses have always been alienated. In the past it was powerlessness in the face of the forces of Mother Nature. Today, it is the increasing powerlessness in the face of the Big Brother computer algorithm.

I don't think this is true. If life was disconnected from what sustains it then it would not be sustained. Perhaps you mean that the discursive intellect cannot fully understand life and what sustains it? — Janus

I wrote "Life has always been disconnected from what has sustained it"

Consider the OP "We are disconnected from that which sustains us"

The Merriam Webster dictionary illustrates the complexity of the words "life" and "sustain"

The word "life" as a noun may be used in a physical context, as in 1a "the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body, or may be used in an emotional and intellectual sense, as in 2a "the sequence of physical and mental experiences that make up the existence of an individual - children are the joy of our lives".

Similarly, the word "sustain" as a verb may be used in a physical context, as in 2 "to supply with sustenance : NOURISH, or may be used in an emotional and intellectual sense, as in 5 "to buoy up - sustained by hope".

The title of the thread is "Series in pessimism: We can never know what sustains us". The thread is about our being emotionally and intellectually disconnected from what sustains us, where what sustains us is technology. Pessimism is the emotional part. Knowing is the intellectual part.

There are four possible meanings to the statement "we are disconnected from that which sustains us":
1) We are physically disconnected from technology which sustains us in a physical sense.
2) We are physically disconnected from technology which sustains us in an emotionally and intellectually sense.
3) We are emotionally and intellectually disconnected from technology which sustains us in a physical sense.
4) We are emotionally and intellectually disconnected from technology which sustains us in an emotionally and intellectual sense.

I agree with you that item 1) can be removed as illogical. Items 2) and 4) can also be removed as illogical. This leaves item 3).

Meaning depends on context. Sentences cannot be taken out of context.

Therefore, in the context of the Thread - "we are disconnected from that which sustains us" can only mean "we are emotionally and intellectually disconnected from technology which sustains us in a physical sense."

However, although the misuse of technology may be one contributor to alienation within society, it is not the only cause, as alienation existed in societies pre-modern technology.

The workings of the universe to prehistoric humans would have been mysterious, but there would have been a reverence to the mystery as well..............The modern world is mysterious, but in a mundane and/or perplexing way................Is it any wonder that people are so miserable?. — _db

Prehistoric humans may well have understood their simple tools and lived in reverence to a mysterious world. Modern humans may well not understand their complex tools, their computers, their Social Media, and live perplexed and disconnected in a mysterious world

Yet these two conditions are not mutually exclusive

The prehistoric human may have suffered misery from tools inadequate to mitigate their physical suffering, in growing crops in time of famine. The modern human may suffer misery from tools inadequate to mitigate their mental suffering, in gaining what they think they deserve.

The prehistoric human's misery did not come from having unachievable expectations, their misery came from what they knew to expect from life. The prehistoric human knew that they would never be treated like Royalty, they knew they were and would remain a low part of the hierarchy. They knew they would never be part of the decision making process, their opinion would never be respected and they knew their income would only be sufficient for basic survival. Their misery came from an acceptance of a hard and brutal life

The modern human may be miserable because they have expectations that are unachievable
The modern human expects to be treated like Royalty, regardless of birth. They expect to be an integral part of the decision making process, even if they have insufficient knowledge. They expect their opinion to be respected regardless of whether it has sense or not. They expect to have an income even if they haven't earned it. Their misery comes from unwarranted expectations of what they are due from life.

Modern humans look back to a Golden Age, a mysterious world where lives were lived in reverence to the great unknown. A Golden Age where the greatest of tasks were accomplished. A time as described by the early Greek and Roman poets as better and more pure. Hesiod described the Golden Age as a time where all humans were created directly by the Olympian Gods, living lives in peace and harmony. Oblivious to death, and dying peacefully in their sleep unmarked by sickness and old age. Ovid described it as a time before man learned the art of navigation, and as a pre-agricultural society.

Today, people look back with nostalgia to the Noble Savage who has not been corrupted by modern civilization and symbolizes humanity's innate goodness. The idealized picture of a human at one with nature, living in harmony with nature in a romantic primitivism .
As John Dryden wrote in The Conquest of Granada 1672:
I am as free as nature first made man,
Ere the base laws of servitude began,
When wild in woods the noble savage ran.

Is it true that misery is a modern phenomenon ? Consider The Great Famine of 1315–1317 and Black Death of 1347–1351 which reduced the population by more than a half. The Little Ice Age brought harsher winters with reduced harvest, resulting in malnutrition which increased susceptibility to infections due to a weakened immune system. The Great Famine struck much of North West Europe 1315 to 1317 reducing the population by more than 10%. Many of the larger countries were at war. England and France in the Hundred Years War, a time when when landowners and the Monarchy raised the rents of their tenants. In 1318, anthrax attacked the sheep and cattle of Europe, further reducing the food supply and income of the peasantry. As Europe moved into the Little Ice Age, floods disrupted harvests and caused mass famines. The Bovine Pestilence of 1319 to 1320 affected milk production, and as much of the peasant's protein was obtained from dairy resulted in nutritional deficiencies. Famine and pestilence, exacerbated with the prevalence of war during this time, led to the death of an estimated ten to fifteen percent of Europe's population. The Black Death was was fatal to an estimated thirty to sixty percent of the population where the disease was present. Before the 14th century, popular uprisings against overlords were common. During the 14th and 15th C there were mass movements and popular uprisings across Europe.

Hobbes described the state of nature as "war of all against all" in which men's lives are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short"

I don't think misery is a modern phenomenon.

We are disconnected from that which sustains us. — schopenhauer1

It has always been thus. Nothing has changed. I am sure that pre-technology the world was just as mysterious as it is today. Life has always been disconnected from what has sustained it.

And one could equally have written: "I’m particularly talking about the aspect of human existence where we cannot understand the forces of nature that we use and replicate. If anything, we can know and/or replicate a very very small portion of it."

In fact, we don't need to "know" what sustains us if our approach is Pragmatic. Pragmatism requires neither a pessimistic nor optimistic frame of mind. Pragmatism works equally well both pre and post-technology. Pragmatism avoids a descent into pessimism because of not "knowing" what sustains us.

I press the enter key. I don't "know" why what happens happens. I am just optimistic that what I intend will happen will happen.

There are different definitions of neo Luddite. However, the definition given in the OP is: "An individual who opposes the use of technology for ethical, moral or philosophical reasons."

I am surprised that 36% of those Forum members who responded believe that the world-view of an individual who opposes the use of technology for ethical, moral or philosophical reasons is dangerous.

I could understand 36% finding the world-view of an individual dangerous if the world-view was based on dogmatism, prejudice or fanaticism.

But what better reasons are there to have a position on a topic than ethical, moral or philosophical ?

Simon Fraser's article What is a Neo-Luddite expands on the topic.

Is the neo-Luddite worldview dangerous? — Bret Bernhoft

You define Neo Luddism as "An individual who opposes the use of technology for ethical, moral or philosophical reasons", and ask "Is the neo-Luddite world-view dangerous?".

The Wikipedia article on Neo Luddism concludes "Neo-Luddism distinguishes itself from the philosophy originally associated with Luddism in that Luddism opposes all forms of technology, whereas neo-Luddism only opposes technology deemed destructive or otherwise detrimental to society."

In what way is the view that opposes technology deemed destructive or otherwise detrimental to society dangerous ?

Whether or not any given meta-language sentence is a translation of any given object-language sentence is a separate matter entirely. — Michael

Susan Haack Philosophy of Logics
"Tarski emphasises that the (T) schema is not a definition of truth – though in spite of his insistence he has been misunderstood on this point. It is a material adequacy condition: all instances of it must be entailed by any definition of truth which is to count as 'materially adequate'. The point of the (T) schema is that, if it is accepted, it fixes not the intension or meaning but the extension of the term 'true'".

Given the T-schema - "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white

From my reading, Tarski's T-schema doesn't give the meaning, ie intension, of "snow is white", but if "snow is white" is true, then the T-schema does give the extension of "snow is white", ie snow is white. The T-schema, in not giving an intension for "snow is white", is using the concept of "satisfaction" to allow for a recursive definition of truth.

As the T-schema doesn't give the intension of "snow is white", then it doesn't allow translation between "snow is white" and "schnee ist weiss".

Yes, whether "snow is white" is a translation of "schnee ist weiss" is a separate matter to Tarski's T-schema.

You seem to know a helluva lot about the history of language. — Agent Smith

I'm pretty confident that 100,000 years ago people weren't going around saying "snow is white".

Tarski mentioned no such pointless tautology. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I quite agree that Tarski never said ""snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow".

But I imagine you are inferring that I said that Tarski made this tautological comment.

I have never said Tarski made this tautological comment.

I made the tautological comment to illustrate, as Umberto Eco and others have done, the complexity of meaning in the word "denote".

But Tarski doesn't need to give a comprehensive account of meaning to make his point. — Michael

But if we don't know what Tarski means by the words he uses, then how do we know what he means ?

Doesn't this lead to a chicken-and-egg situation?

We can't know "Snow is white" is true unless we know Snow is white and/but we can't know Snow is white unless we know "Snow is white" is true. — Agent Smith

We can know snow is white before we know "theluji ni nyeupe".

There was a world pre-language
In the world 100,000 years ago, there was something that was snow having the property white. In this world, the English language had not yet been invented, and therefore not only did the words "snow", "is" and "white" not exist, but neither did the proposition "snow is white".

IE, even if there was a life-form that knew snow is white, it couldn't have known that "snow is white".

The world post-language
At some point in the past, in an Institutional Performative act in the English-speaking world (metaphorically speaking), snow was named "snow", is was named "is" and white was named "white". Subsequently, these words were then accepted by society as a whole as the proper names of these things.

Today, an individual within society can decide whether "snow is white" is true or false in two ways.

First, even without observing white snow in the world, but knowing from the dictionary that "snow is white". IE, I know that Aristotle was a Greek philosopher and polymath during the Classical period in Ancient Greece even though I have never met him.

Note: I know Aristotle was Greek not be acquaintance but by description. IE, I don't know the person, but I do know the description. My knowledge is of the description, not the person.

Second, by observing white snow in the world, knowing "snow" names snow, "is" names is and "white" names white, they know "snow is white". IE, I know from my knowledge of language and the world that "snow is white"

IE, in answer to your question, the situation is not circular as we can know snow is white by observing the world even if we don't know that "snow is white". IE, I know snow is white by observing the world even if I don't know that "theluji ni nyeupe".

What does this have to do with Tarski? — Michael

If I understand what you're after, because the meaning of denoting (designating) is central to Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth.

Tarski's overriding concern is with defining 'is true' in context of formal languages for mathematics and the sciences. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Tarski's approach is certainly rigorous. I would say logical rather than mathematical or scientific.

He wrote in The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantic: "The predicate "true" is sometimes used to refer to psychological phenomena such as judgments or beliefs, sometimes to certain physical objects, namely, linguistic expressions and specifically sentences, and sometimes to certain ideal entities called "propositions." By "sentence" we understand here what is usually meant in grammar by "declarative sentence"; as regards the term "proposition," its meaning is notoriously a subject of lengthy disputations by various philosophers and logicians, and it seems never to have been made quite clear and unambiguous. For several reasons it appears most convenient to apply the term "true" to sentences, and we shall follow this course".

As formal languages include logic, mathematics, the sciences and linguistics, it is clear from his article that his definition of "true" is more relevant to the formal language of linguistics than either mathematics or science.

He uses an ordinary sense of 'denote' (or cognates of 'denote), but then moves on to instead specify the method of formal modals, where 'denote' is subsumed by certain kinds of functions from linguistic objects to model theoretic objects. This is the movement from informal semantics to formal semantics that Tarski provides. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree that Tarski was concerned with formal rather than informal language.

As he wrote in The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantic: "While the words "designates," "satisfies," and "defines" express relations (between certain expressions and the objects "referred to" by these expressions)." IE, "designates" ("denotes") is about relations.

The word "denote" may be used in different ways, but as there is no substantial difference in meaning between the "ordinary" sense of the word "denote" and a formal sense of the word "denote", he cannot have moved from an "ordinary" sense to a formal sense.

Whether 'snow is white' is analytic depends on which definition of 'snow' we're looking at. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I doubt there are many definitions of "snow" whereby being white isn't included as a property.

Second, (4) is not about the meaning of the word 'denote' but rather it's about the meaning of 'true'. That 'true' has different conceptions. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The complete paragraph containing item 4) is:
It seems to me obvious that the only rational approach to such problems would be the
following: We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one
concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word; we should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations.

How is this paragraph about the meaning of true. The word "true" isn't mentioned. ?

Tarski wrote that we are confronted with several concepts denoted by one word, ie, one word may denote several concepts.

How is this not about the meaning of the word "denote" ?
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Tarski in 1931 and 1944 is concerned with mathematical logic, not literary criticism. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I have never said that Tarski was concerned with literary criticism.

Tarski's article The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics was published in 1944.

Within the article he wrote:
Semantics is a discipline which, speaking loosely, deals with certain relations between
expressions of a language and the objects (or "states of affairs") "referred to" by those expressions. As typical examples of semantic concepts we may mention the concepts of
designation, satisfaction, and definition as these occur in the following examples:
the expression "the father of his country" designates (denotes) George Washington; snow satisfies the sentential function (the condition) "2 is white"; the equation "2 . x = 1" defines (uniquely determines) the number 1/2.

The Cambridge Dictionary defines semantics as the study of meanings in a language.

I haven't said that Tarski was not concerned with mathematical logic. I pointed out that Tarski had a concern with the semantic conception of truth, and the semantic conception of truth is not the same as the mathematical conception of truth.

You write that Tarski is using "denote" in the ordinary sense of the word.

@TonesInDeepFreeze: "However, Tarski does mention elsewhere that there are different senses of 'denote', but it's a highly technical matter he's addressing. Usually, he uses 'denotes' or 'names' in the very ordinary sense of the words."

Are you saying that the ordinary sense of the word "denote" is the mathematical sense of the word "denote" ?
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It's the very simple idea: 'Chicago' maps to Chicago. 'Carl Sagan' maps to Carl Sagan. 'Cats' map to cats. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It is a simple idea until one considers how "a unicorn" maps to a unicorn, or "beauty" maps to beauty.

How exactly does "beauty" map to beauty. ?
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If you want to understand Tarski and not be bogged down in misunderstandings, then you'd do well to start there, and to refrain from dripping goop all over by ridiculously dragging Umberto Eco into it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

We are specifically discussing the meaning of the word "denote".

You wrote that "He uses "denotes" in a very ordinary sense"

I am pointing out, as Umberto Eco pointed out, that the meaning of "denote" is far more complex than as used in the ordinary sense of "a cat" denotes a cat.

If you reject Umberto's Eco's later contribution, then perhaps consider earlier contributions by Frege and his theory of sense and denotation 1892, Russell's On Denoting 1905 or Saussure's Course in General Linguistics based on notes of lectures 1906 to 1911.

How exactly does "snow" denote snow ?

In the ordinary sense, "snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow.

If the answer to that was agreed, then many of the problems in the philosophy of language would be well on the way to a solution.

Trying to make Tarski look confused isn't helping you. — bongo fury

At no time have I ever suggested that Tarski was confused.

Are you making this up? Bye.

They are presented as a single quote; they come from 3 different pages — bongo fury

They are quite clearly not presented as a single quote, because the four quotations are individually numbered 1), 2), 3) and 4).

You have the document so obviously know they aren't a single quote.

The important knowledge to be gained from these quotations is that Tarski can use one expression to denote one or more objects, concepts or expressions.

Not really — bongo fury

I had written: "the meaning of "denote" is much debated".

I agree that the word "denote" can mean from a word to thing or things. Yet there is more to it than this. For example, people agree that beauty is a combination of qualities, such as shape, colour, or form, that pleases the aesthetic senses, yet millions of words have been written about the meaning of beauty.

For example, Umberto Eco in Meaning and Denotation 1987 wrote: "Today denotation (along with its counterpart, connotation ) is alternatively considered as a Property or function of (i) single terms,(ii) declarative sentences (iii) noun phrases and definite descriptions. In each case one has to decide whether this term has to be taken intensionally or extensionally: is denotation tied to meaning or to referents? Does one mean by denotation what is meant by the term or the named thing and, in the case of sentences, what is the case ?"
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But hopeless if you misunderstand "denote". — bongo fury

I had written: "when I hear the word "unicorn", the word "unicorn" is doing more than pointing to a unicorn".

The sentence is about "pointing", not "denoting".
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Don't edit when quoting. — bongo fury

When an article is edited, the article is changed. My three quotes were neither edited nor paraphrased, they were verbatim and in context.

I'll say it again (as this is certainly not a mere "detail"): The schema says that for any sentence P, we have: 'P' is true iff P. He does not say that 'P' has to be analytic. Look it up. Anywhere. — TonesInDeepFreeze

My goal is to understand Tarksi's Semantic Theory of Truth, not get bogged down in unimportant detail and misunderstandings.

I wrote "Denotes infers points to, and "snow" is doing more than pointing to snow."
You wrote "That is not correct. The word 'denotes' doesn't infer. People infer; words don't infer."
Of course I am not suggesting that the word "denote" is doing the inferring.

Of course the T-sentence "P" is true IFF P is not a detail. It is extremely important. I never said it was a detail.
I said that in my opinion "snow is white" is an analytic proposition.
I never said that in my opinion "P" is an analytic proposition.
I never said that Tarski said that "P" has to be analytic.

@TonesInDeepFreeze

You are quibbling over details and things I never said.

And no! It's all pointing!... just how is "snow" doing more than pointing to snow?? — bongo fury

The meaning of denote
The exact meaning of "denote" is debated, whether in linguistics or mathematics, and books have been written about the topic, e.g., Umberto Eco Meaning and Denotation, John Lyons Language and Linguistics, Bertrand Russell On Denoting.

"Snow" does more than point to snow
Starting with @Tones whereby the denotation of 'snow' is: precipitation in the form of small white ice crystals formed directly from the water vapor of the air at a temperature of less than 32°F (0°C). Remove the expression "formed directly from the water vapor of the air at a temperature of less than 32°F (0°C)", as this describes how "snow" formed rather than what "snow" is. As "snow" is precipitation, can remove the expression precipitation. Therefore, can simplify the denotation of "snow" as small white ice crystals.

In the world we observe small, white, ice crystals, which we name "snow". The unstated and reasonable assumption is that small, white, ice crystals is snow. Therefore, we have named snow as "snow", ie, "snow" is the name for snow and "snow" refers to snow.

Note that the intension of "snow" is white, such that white is necessary but not sufficient for snow.

But note also that snow does not exist independently of its properties. Snow is small, white ice crystals in the sense that A is A. If the properties small, white and ice crystals were removed, there would be nothing left. IE, it is not the case that first we observe small, white ice crystals and then we observe snow, rather, we observe them contemporaneously as they are the same thing.

When I hear the word "snow", there are two aspects. On the one hand, "snow" denotes snow, in that "snow" is actively pointing out something in the world, namely snow. On the other hand, "snow" is passively being denoted by small, white ice crystals.

Similarly, when I hear the word "unicorn", the word "unicorn" is doing more than pointing to a unicorn. When I hear the word "beauty", the word "beauty" is doing more than pointing to beauty.

IE, words have meaning even when there are no unicorns or beauty in the world for them to point to.

Tarski's usage of denote
Tarski in The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics uses denote for one or more items.

For example, he wrote:
1) The expression "the father of his country" designates (denotes) George Washington.
2) We have seen that this conception essentially consists in regarding the sentence "X is true" as equivalent to the sentence denoted by 'X' (where 'X' stands for a name of a sentence of the object language).
3) While the words "designates," "satisfies," and "defines" express relations (between certain expressions and the objects "referred to" by these expressions)
4) We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word

In summary, the meaning of "denote" is much debated, and words do more than pointing to snow and unicorns in the world.

Anyway, I suggest not saying: 'snow' is denoted as snow
But instead: snow is denoted by 'snow' or 'snow' denotes snow — TonesInDeepFreeze

Tarski used "denote", but I don't think this term is strictly grammatically correct, but that is the word he used. I think snow is named "snow" would be better, rather than "snow" denotes snow. Denotes infers points to, and "snow" is doing more than pointing to snow.

I agree with "snow" denotes snow and snow is denoted by "snow", but I still believe that "snow" is denoted as snow is grammatically correct.

Within a sentence, "as" points forwards, and "by" points backwards. The Cambridge Dictionary supports this, giving the examples of i) Fetal heart rate is denoted as the percentage of time in fetal tachycardia per 12-hour period ii) a marking is graphically denoted by a distribution of tokens on the places of the net.
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liar paradox problem — TonesInDeepFreeze

In L, "this proposition is false" is a paradox.
In the world there are no paradoxes. An apple is an apple, if an apple is to the right of an orange then the orange is to the left of the apple, an apple can never be a non-apple.
To avoid paradox in language we need to ensure that language corresponds with the world, because the world is logical.
Tarski is aiming at the same goal.
From the IEP - The Semantic Theory of Truth - "To be satisfactory SDT must conform to so-called conditions of adequacy. More specifically, this definition must be (a) formally correct, and (b) materially correct Condition (a) means that the definition does not lead to paradoxes and it is not circular."

IE, paradoxes in language may be avoided by ensuring that language corresponds with a world that is logical.

(As an aside, correspondence works not when a concept in the mind corresponds with an object in the world, but rather when a concept in the mind corresponds with a public word that has been established during an Institutional Performative Act. The word can be concrete as in "apple" or abstract as in "beauty". Conversation then becomes about the public word, which in its turn corresponds with concepts in the minds of all those taking part in the conversation.)
===============================================================================

Tarski doesn't even say that 'snow is white' is true — TonesInDeepFreeze

You wrote - the denotation of 'snow' is: precipitation in the form of small white ice crystals formed directly from the water vapor of the air at a temperature of less than 32°F (0°C)
The denotation of 'white' is: has the achromatic object color of greatest lightness characteristically perceived to belong to objects that reflect diffusely nearly all incident energy throughout the visible spectrum

It is true that Tarski does not say that white is a necessary condition for snow.
However, this is part of the problem that Tarski uses the analytic proposition "snow is white" rather than a synthetic proposition such as "snow is always welcome" .

You wrote - "snow" is precipitation ..............white...............
You didn't write "snow" is precipitation.........which may or may not be white.........

This infers that white is an intension of "snow", meaning that white is a necessary condition for "snow".

Ask anyone in the street whether snow is white or purple, and I am sure nearly all would say white. People know "snow" is white, in an analytic sense.
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Tarski says, "Let us suppose we have a fixed language L whose sentences are fully interpreted." — TonesInDeepFreeze

As an example of interpretation, "snow" is frosty stuff and "white" is the colour of St Patrick's Day T-shirt are external

From the IEP - The Semantic Theory of Truth
"A standard objection against STT points out that it stratified the concept of truth. It is because we have the entire hierarchy of languages Lo (the object language), L1 ( = MLo), L2 (= ML1), L3 (M L2), …. Denote this hierarchy by the symbol HL. It is infinite and, moreover, there is no universal metalanguage allowing a truth-definition for the entire HL."

IE, for each MML there is a language L, and for each language L there is a ML.
Where L = "snow is white"
MML = "snow" is snow and "white" is white
ML = "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white
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The truth or falsehood of 'snow is white' is not dependent on 'snow' naming snow (precipitation...) and 'white' naming white (the chromaticity...). — TonesInDeepFreeze

Given snow is white

If in MML One, "snow" denotes snow - and "white" denotes green
Then in the ML "snow is white" is false

If in MML Two, "snow" denotes snow - "white" denotes white
Then in the ML "snow is white" is true

IE, the truth or falsehood of "snow is white" is dependent on naming in the MML.
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should we take it that Raatikainen's summary of Putnam is correct? — TonesInDeepFreeze

Raatikainen argues against Putnam's objections to Tarski's theory.
However, for me, Raatikainen doesn't make his case, and Putnam's objections to Tarski's theory of truth make sense to me.

Panu Raatikainen, More on Putnam and Tarski
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but maybe Tarski is conceding that we can't have a truth definition that covers all interpretations, but only, for each interpretation, its own truth definition? — TonesInDeepFreeze

You wrote: "Let M interpret 'snow' as the frosty stuff, and 'white' as the color of a St. Patrick's day T-shirt"

Yes, within a particular MML, there is only one interpretation. Between different MML's there are different interpretations.
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If 'white' denotes green, then 'snow is white' is true iff snow is white is not true. But it is still true. Made explicit — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, but each new denotation requires a new MML.

In MML One, "snow" denotes snow and "white" denotes green.
Therefore the T-sentence "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white is valid

In MML Two, "snow" denotes snow and "white" denotes white
Therefore the T-sentence "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white is valid
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Tarski's schema is a definition not a claim of a logical truth — TonesInDeepFreeze

IEP - The Semantic Theory of Truth
"To be satisfactory SDT must conform to so-called conditions of adequacy. More specifically, this definition must be (a) formally correct, and (b) materially correct Condition (a) means that the definition does not lead to paradoxes and it is not circular."

Yes, but is founded on logic in order to avoid paradox and circularity.
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Given a language L, and an interpretation M of L, and a sentence P of L: A sentence 'P' is true per M iff P. That's just like any textbook in mathematical logic. No meta-metalanguage. — TonesInDeepFreeze

From Wikipedia - Mathematical Logic - Concerns that mathematics had not been built on a proper foundation led to the development of axiomatic systems for fundamental areas of mathematics such as arithmetic, analysis, and geometry.

In a language L there could be "1 + 1 = 2", "1 + 1 = 5", "1 + 1 = 3"
These may be true or false
The axiom 1 + 1 = 2 exists within a Metametalanguage (MML)
This allows in the Metalanguage (ML) the T-sentence: "1 + 1 = 2" is true IFF 1 + 1 = 2
Note that the axioms are not in the ML, and the ML cannot question the axioms that it has been given.

Truth and Meaning — Banno

Thanks, I have downloaded it. I understand more this week about Tarski's STT than last week, and hopefully more next week than this week, but I think that there is coherent light at the end of the tunnel, unless I'm mistaken.

@TonesInDeepFreeze @Banno

I'm answering my own (grammatically correct) question: "In Tarski's T-sentence, "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, where exactly is "snow" denoted as snow and "white" denoted as white ? Because if not included within the T-sentence, then how can the T-sentence be formally correct ?"

Definitions
"Snow" denotes precipitation in the form of small white ice crystals formed directly from the water vapor of the air at a temperature of less than 32°F
'White' denotes has the achromatic object color of greatest lightness characteristically perceived to belong to objects that reflect diffusely nearly all incident energy throughout the visible spectrum.

Let "snow" denote snow and "white" denote white. Tarski used the word "denote", and so I will continue to use the same word, even if not strictly grammatically correct.

I observe precipitation, etc and name it "snow". The mereological object precipitation, etc is snow. In the sense that A is A, snow is precipitation, etc. To say that snow has the properties precipitation, etc is metaphorical.

I observe achromatic, etc and name it "white". The mereological object achromatic, etc is white. In the sense that A is A, white is achromatic, etc. To say that white has the properties achromatic, etc is metaphorical.

The proposition "snow is white"
1) Snow is precipitation + in the form of ice crystals + that are small + and white + formed directly from water vapour + of the air + at a temperature of less than 32F.
2) Therefore, white is a necessary condition for snow
3) Snow is white in the sense that the intension of snow includes white
4) Even though the T-sentence "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white is given in a Metalanguage (ML), it is assumed that in a Metametalanguage (MML) snow has been named "snow" and white has been named "white".
5) "Snow is white" in the sense that the intension of "snow" includes "white"
6) Therefore, "snow is white" is true because i) snow is white, ii) snow is named "snow" and white is named "white"
7) IE, "snow is white" is not dependent upon a biconditional, as it is an analytic proposition.

Putnam's argument against Tarski's Theory of Truth
Taken from More on Putnam and Tarski - Panu Raatikainen, Tampere University.

Hilary Putnam argued against Tarski's Theory of Truth. He had two basic objections, ’the unsoundness objection’ and ‘the modal objection’.

I doubted that the T-sentence could be formally correct, if snow had not been named "snow" and white had not been named "white" within the ML.

The answer to my own question is that the notion of naming does not occur in Tarski’s definition of truth, but only in the Criterion of Adequacy, and being a test of a definition, is formulated only in the metametalanguage (MML).

Tarski always said that truth can only be defined for a particular formalized language, a language that had already been interpreted, where the meaning of the object language was fixed and constant. Truth is relativized for a particular object language

In the event that the object language was reinterpreted, for example defining "green" as white, the language changes to a different language, requiring a different T-Sentence

IE, precipitation, etc has been denoted as "snow", and achromatic, etc has been denoted as "white" in a MML.

This raises the problem that truth in the ML depends on arbitrary decisions in the MLL, ie, naming white as "white" rather than as "green". Putnam complained that it isn’t a logical truth that the (German) word ‘Schnee’ refers to the substance snow, nor is it a logical truth that the sentence ‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true in German if and only if snow is white.

Putnam made the point that the truth in the ML now becomes dependent on a truth in a MLL, saying "And, pray, what semantical concepts will you use to state these ‘semantical rules’? And how will those concepts be defined?” (Putnam 1988)

In summary, the truth of Tarski's T-sentence in a ML has been pushed back to a MML.

Denotations are stipulated — TonesInDeepFreeze

In Tarski's T-sentence, "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, where exactly is "snow" denoted as snow and "white" denoted as white ?

Because if not included within the T-sentence, then how can the T-sentence be formally correct ?