how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. — Ignoredreddituser

A whole is a particular relation between its parts, in that a table is a particular relation between its atoms. If the whole is more than the sum of its parts, then relations must have their own ontological existence over and above the ontological existence of the parts (putting to one side the question of what exactly is a part).

To argue against Steven French and argue for the non-eliminativist view, one will also need to argue that relations ontologically exist.

As the SEP on "Relations" notes: "Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80)"

I know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh, but does Glasgow know that it is west of Edinburgh !

IE, the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task.

D is the winner! — Alkis Piskas

:up:

In what the OP said, I have replaced "Ayes" with "animals", "Bees" with "four legs" and "Seas" with "cats". All the rest is the same. The conclusion (D or E) is what the OP also thought (maybe for another reason though). — Alkis Piskas

I have redrawn my Venn Diagram, including @Raymond and @tim wood's suggestions, and using animals, etc rather than Ayes, etc. The solution is still D.

Some animals have four legs
All cats have four legs — Alkis Piskas

However, I'm not sure about the left drawing. It doesn't show that mammals are a subset of animals. It shows that only a part of mammals are also animals. — Alkis Piskas

I agree that the left hand drawing is not correct for "our" world, where i) all mammals are animals (all B's are A's) ii) all cats are mammals (all C's are B's)

But the OP is not asking a question about "our" world. The OP is asking a question about a "possible" world, perhaps a fictional world, where i) some animals are mammals (some A's are B's) ii) all cats are mammals (all C's are B's), in which case the left hand drawing is correct.

I prefer to "translate" your puzzle-problem into something more meaningful: — Alkis Piskas

Then let a move — Raymond

would D still be a valid conclusion — DavidJohnson

@TonesInDeepFreeze gets to the heart of the matter. Personally, trying to solve in words would make my head explode, so I normally have to resort to diagrams.

Meaning of "which conclusion can be drawn"
Because the question is neither "which conclusions can be drawn" nor "can any conclusion be drawn" - the question is saying that there is only one correct conclusion.

D) No Ayes that are not Bees are Seas
The statement is using abbreviated language, making life more difficult.
In full - is the proposition "there are no A's that are not B's are C's" true or false.

Potential ambiguity in "there are no A's that are not B's are C's
Potential meaning one - There are (A's) that are (not B's are C's) - is ungrammatical, therefore ignore.
Potential meaning two - There are (A's that are not B's) that are (C's) - must be what is meant.



It reminds me of the "Four colour map theorem"

more examples — Josh Alfred

I am afraid the image is not from an "authoritative" source.
I used Microsoft "Paint".
For a few dollars a year one can subscribe to the Forum and be able to upload images onto the Forum - well worth the money.

Physicalism

What we understand as physical is a matter of definition and is constantly changing — Wayfarer

Yes. Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Materialists historically held that everything was matter. But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense. For example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense Physicalists don’t deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical, such as biological, psychological, moral, social or mathematical, but at the end of the day, such things either are or are founded on the physical.

The importance of the Law of Causation

the mind's contribution to everything asserted about the mind-independent world. — Wayfarer

I agree with the quote, as my position is that of Indirect Realism (our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation of the real world) rather than Direct Realism (our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, and the world derived from our sense perception should be taken at face value).

My immediate perception is of the sensations through my senses, not what caused these sensations. I perceive sensations through my senses - the colour red, a sharp pain, a bitter taste, an acrid smell, a screeching noise. The question is, how much can we discover about the reality of the external world just using these sensations through our senses

The only key we have to discover what is on the other side of our senses is the Law of Causation. As I believe in the Law of Causation intellectually and know the Law of Causation instinctively, being a priori innate, I both believe and know that there is an external world causing these sensations.

Critical Realism, RW Sellars and causation
Critical realism follows from RW Sellars and Critical Realism (1916). Sellars argued against Idealism, and proposed real substances (as opposed to ideas, universals, etc) as objects of perception. Sellars held that the normal objects of perception are real full-bodied independent substances, rejecting “the historical desiccation of the category of substance,” that is, the whittling down of the Ancient and Medieval robust notion of substance to Locke’s “I know not what”.

Critical Realism, Roy Bhaskar and causation
Roy Bhaskar is known as initiating Critical Realism, including A Realist Theory of Science (1975). He held the position that unobservable structures cause observable events, which supported the ontological reality of causal powers independent of their empirical effects. It follows that what scientists are learning about, therefore, cannot be causal laws, understood as invariant patterns of events, rather they are learning about causal mechanisms, tendencies that tend to bring about certain types of outcome, but do not always do so. Objects are able to exert causal powers, but only within a complex structure.

Summary
To say the world is physical within Physicalism encompasses many things, and includes both matter and forces.
We can only discover what is on the other side of our senses using the Law of Causation. If our sensations such as pain had no cause and happened spontaneously, the world we live in would be a very unpredictable place.
The earlier Sellars Critical Realism required a world of real, full-bodied independent substances.
The later Bhaskar Critical Realism argued for objects in the world having causal powers.

IE, the Law of Causation is key in being able to discover what is not directly observable.

Your posts are written from the perspective of uncritical realism, starting with the assumption that the sensory domain possesses inherent and unquestionable reality, when in fact that is what is at issue in philosophy. — Wayfarer

Don't think I agree.

A physical world exists independently of us
I agree with Critical Realism in a belief in Ontological Realism, that a physical reality exists and operates independently of our awareness, knowledge, or perception of it.

Our knowledge is both a priori and a posteriori
I believe that we have knowledge of the world both a priori and a posteriori.
A priori knowledge is innate knowledge - of space, time, causation, colour, etc - that has been genetically built into the brain after millions of years of evolution.
A posteriori knowledge we gain through our senses.

Indirect Realism explains more than Direct Realism
I agree with both Direct and Indirect Realism that there is a correspondence between events in the world and how we perceive these events in our minds, even though in Direct Realism the correspondence is direct whilst in Indirect Realism the correspondence is indirect.
Because I believe that relations don't ontologically exist in the world, but do exist in the mind, and as Direct Realism is the claim that our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, then I don't believe in Direct Realism.
As regards Indirect Realism, taking an example, because an object emits a wavelength of 700nm, and yet we perceive it as the colour red, our perception of the colour red can only be a representation of the wavelength of 700nm, pointing to Indirect Realism as the true explanation. Accepting Indirect Realism as a true explanation, we can never know what is on the other side of our senses, we can never know the true nature of reality.

Trying to understand what is on the other side of our senses
I agree that when we perceive, we are directly perceiving our senses and not what is on the other side of them. Yet, because I also believe in the Law of Causation. I believe that what I perceive in my senses is an effect of a prior cause, and that prior cause is a world independent of me as an observer.
Each moment in time is a different reality. What I perceive in my senses is real, what caused these sensations in the world is real, going back in time through successive cause and effect to some time in the beginning.

I agree with Critical Realism
I agree with empiricism that the the only way to gain knowledge is what we sense through the senses, making the note that our a priori knowledge originally came through the senses.
I agree with positivism that only knowledge supported by facts is valid.
But I also agree with Critical Realism that knowledge is not gained by a simplistic conjunction between cause and effect, but rather is an ongoing process whereby we gradually and incrementally improve our concepts in trying to make sense of a complex world that exists independently of us.

Make sense, not in the sense of understanding the nature of absolute reality, but make sense sufficiently for us to pragmatically survive in the environment that we find ourselves in.

So if apples do not exist on account of being wholes, nothing exists — Olivier5

I agree that the parts of what we think of as an apple do physically exist in the world.
But the parts will still physically exist whether or not relations have an ontological existence in the world.
Therefore, the existence of the parts neither proves nor disproves the existence of relations.

In Newtonian physics, an atom in the Taj Mahal must by necessity attract an atom in the Empire State Building, — Olivier5

Considering atom A in the Empire State Building and atom B in the Taj Mahal
I agree atom A may experience a force from atom B, and vice versa.

Atom A may experience a force from atom B, but there is no information within the force that relates atom A to atom B.
Similarly, atom B may experience a force from atom A, but there is no information within the force that relates atom B to atom A.
There is also no information within the space between atoms A and B that relates atoms A to B

If an ontological relation does exist in the world between atom A and atom B, the question is, where is the information that there is such a relation.

Modern realism is the conviction that objects exist independently of any mind............Scholastic realism believes that universals exist 'in the mind of God'. The way I would interpret that is to say that universals are what is real for any rational intelligence, but that they're only perceptible by the mind — Wayfarer

What are objects
The whole is the relationship between its parts
An object such as an apple is the relationship between its parts
The parts of an an apple have a physical existence in the world.
The question is, does the whole, the object, the apple, have an ontological existence in the world.

Do relations ontologically exist in the world
As regards the world independent of any observer, if relations don't have an ontological existence, then objects such as apples, which are relations between its parts, cannot ontologically exist in the world.
If relations do have an ontological existence, then objects such as apples, which are relations between its parts, can ontologically exist in the world.

FH Bradley argued against the existence of external relations in his regress argument, whereby either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them, or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
I personally don't believe relations exist ontologically in the world for two reasons
Reason one. When looking at two parts A and B, there is no information within Part A as to the existence of Part B, there is no information within Part B as to the existence of Part A, and there is no information within the space between A and B as to the existence of either A and B located at its ends.
Reason two. If ontological relations exist in the world, then there must be ontological relations between all parts in the world, not just some of them. For example, there must be an ontological relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower, between an apple in France and an orange in Spain, between a particular atom in the Empire State Building and a particular atom in the Taj Mahal - none of which makes sense.

Do relations ontologically exist in the mind
As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a a single experience
John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements?
I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts

Modern Realism
I believe that parts in the world have a physical existence independent of any mind.
As I don't believe that relations have a physical existence in the world, then no object, such as an apple, a table, a chair, etc, can have a physical existence in the world.

Scholastic Realism
I can only believe that both parts and relations do have an ontological existence in the mind, meaning that objects, such as apples, tables, chairs, etc do have an ontological existence in my mind.

The word "object" has two distinct meanings
Confusion arises in language as the two distinct meanings of "object" are generally not differentiated.
There is the "object" in my mind and the "object" in the world
The consequence is that when I perceive an object such as an apple, the apple I am thinking about exists in my mind but not in the world.
It would be wrong to say that the "apple" is an illusion, as the "apple" does exist, but in my mind rather than the world.

Conclusion
Objects such as apples ontologically exist in my mind but not in the world.
When I perceive an apple, I am perceiving something that is real, just that it is in my mind rather than the world
That relations do exist in the mind, allowing me a unity of consciousness is an absolute mystery to me, although a fact.

However, even the fact that relations exist in my mind neither supports nor opposes the question of dualism. Relations may exist in the mind whether the mind is separate substance to the brain or the mind is an expression of the brain

I wonder how you would account for the occurrence of extra-spectral colors in the purple-magenta range, for - not being part of the (visible) electromagnetic light spectrum - they don't seem to satisfy your requirement for being "objects in the world". — javra

Are extra-spectral colours "objects in the world" ?

Taking magenta as an example of an extra-spectral colour
To my understanding, in our eyes we have three kinds of cones configured to receive red, green and blue/violet light. We perceive magenta when both our red and blue/violet cones fire together. Magenta does not exist in the visible electromagnetic spectrum, it only exists in our conscious perception.

The are are two meanings to "object in the world"
The first meaning is from the viewpoint of an observer of the "object". For example, I observe a rock in front of me, and the rock is "an object in the world"
The second meaning is independent of any observer. For example, I am sure that on Mars there is a rock that has never been observed, yet is still an "object in the world".

Do relations ontologically exist in the world
An object is a whole comprising relationships between its parts.
A "rock" is a whole thing made up of parts, typically minerals, which are made up of atoms, which in their turn is made up of subatomic particles, such as bosons etc.
Whether relations have an ontological existence in the world is debated.
FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of external relations.
However Russell dismissed Bradley’s argument on the grounds that philosophers who disbelieve in the reality of external relations cannot possibly interpret those numerous parts of sciences which appear to be committed to external relations.

Terminology of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism
Idealism = the world only consists of ideas, ideas are the only reality, and there is no external reality.
Direct Realism = our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, and the world derived from our sense perception should be taken at face value.
Indirect Realism = our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation of the real world

In Idealism, there are no "objects in the world"
In Idealism, as there is no external world, there are no "objects in the world"

In Realism, whether one believes "objects in the world" exist or not depends on one's belief in the ontological existence of relations
If relations do have an ontological existence in the world, then a "rock" exists both as "an object in the world" and in the mind.
If relations don't have an ontological existence in the world, then a "rock", which is a relation between its parts, cannot have ontological existence in the world. As we are talking about rocks, they do exist in the mind.

Summary
Both red and blue/violet physically exist in the world as electromagnetic radiation.
Magenta is a relationship between red and blue/violet.
The question is, in what way does magenta exist as an "object in the world".
If Idealism is true, then magenta isn't an "object in the world"
If relations don't ontologically exist, then magenta isn't an "object in the world"
If relations do ontologically exist, then magenta is an "object in the world"

I personally don't believe relations have an ontological existence in the world for a couple of reasons, and therefore, for me, extra-spectral colours only exist in the mind and therefore are not "objects in the world"

“what do you think of “whiteness” — Mww

Abstract nouns are part of physicalism
If I hear the word "whiteness", in my mind I link the physical word "whiteness" with several physical objects in the world, such as snow, paper, milk, chalk, each of which has the physical property of being white.

It is interesting that the abstract noun "whiteness" can be explained as the product of a set of physical events - a physical link, a physical word, a physical object and a physical property.

IE, abstract nouns is an example of a universal that doesn't require dualism as an explanation.

white is not an object in the world. — Mww

White light is an object in the world
I agree that white is not an object in the world, as it is an adjective, though I would still argue, as I wrote before, "white light is a physical object"

An object is white if it emits electromagnetic radiation composed of a fairly even distribution of all of the frequencies in the visible range of the spectrum, ranging from 750 to 400nm

Consider red light. Red light is electromagnetic radiation of 750nm. Red light is a physical thing that is visible, tangible and relatively stable in form.

White light is the set of violet light, blue light, cyan light, green light, yellow light, orange light and red light. Such a set is visible, tangible and relatively stable in form.

The definition of an object is anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.

IE, it follows that white light fulfils the definition of an object.

The world is the existence of things, so the simultaneous thing and no-thing cannot be a condition of the world — Mww

Humans may invent many logical systems, but only that logical system which corresponds to what has been discovered in the world is accepted and used

Humans are able to invent numerous logical systems. For example, I could invent a logical system whereby i) a single identity can exist and not exist at the same time, ii) a statement can be true and false at the same time, iii) one plus one equals three. Tomorrow, I could invent a totally new logical system.

The question is why is one invented logical system accepted and used rather than another.
The answer is that logical system which corresponds with what has been discovered in the world.

IE, Humans may invent many logical systems, but only that logical system which corresponds to what has been discovered in the world is accepted and used.

Metaphors are never sufficient for knowledge; only the literal will suffice. — Mww

I would say that to date we have no literal knowledge of anything, meaning that there is no alternative but for the metaphor to suffice.

As the saying goes "Getting knowledge about something is like making a map of a place or like travelling there. Teaching someone is like showing them how to reach a place".

stuff like.....the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. — Mww

Bertrand Russell wrote "That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them". Perhaps I should have written "the object white light", where white light is a physical object, having the wavelength between the ranges of 400 and 700 nm. Though I am sure endless debates could be had as to whether light is an object as much as is an apple an object.

The word "whiteness" exists as a physical object on the screen that you are currently reading.

You’re of the opinion that human thought is not anything to be taken seriously — Mww

I don't understand your logic in saying that because I believe that an object in the world cannot both exist and not exist at the same time then it follows that I also believe that human thought is not to be taken seriously.

A determined object cannot be independent of that which determines it. — Mww

I agree. That is why I wrote "for the present purposes of discussing the nature of logic, I am simplifying the true nature of "apples" by assuming that they exist as facts in the world as apples"

I could have based my post on "logical objects" rather than "physical objects", but this would have created more questions than it answered

Perhaps one should think of the apple as a metaphor rather than something literal.

You need to show how the principles of logic can be derived from materialist principles. — Wayfarer

Some scholars think that the passage "In the beginning was the word (logos) " is more accurately translated "In the beginning was logic"

Logic is intrinsic to reality
Logic is primordial, intrinsic to reality, requires no proof, is self-validating, requires no justification and needs no validation. Reality if the initiator of logic, reality produces the basic laws of logic and the nature of logic is reality itself. The basis law of logic exists independently of the mind. The fundamental laws of logic are intuitively obvious and self evident. The burden of proof will be on the sceptic to disprove them. The fundamental laws of logic are universal and have been discovered not invented. They applied when the Solar System formed and they apply today. They apply on Earth and they apply on Mars.

The fundamental laws of logic
As described by Aristotle, the foundation of logic is the proposition “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect”

There are three fundamental laws of logic:
1) The law of identity, where every entity has an identity, an entity cannot possess two identities and an entity without an identity cannot exist because it would be nothing. IE, an apple is an apple.
2) The law of non-contradiction, where a statement cannot be both true and false, such that A is B and A is not B are mutually exclusive. IE, The object is an apple and the object is not an apple are mutually exclusive.
3) The law of the excluded middle, where a statement is either true or false, and there can be no middle ground. IE, "the apple is on the table" is either true or false, in that the apple cannot be both on the table and not on the table.

Knowledge starts with logic
True knowledge starts with logic. We use logic to evaluate the truth, and we use our reason to manipulate the laws of logic in order to evaluate the truth using valid arguments.

Logic is more than a proposition
Confusion may arise because people think of the basic law of logic as a proposition, but the basic law is not a proposition in this sense, it is simply a reality. In discussing logic we have to use language, with the inevitable confusion between the statement "an apple is an apple" and the fact in the world - an apple is an apple. The situation is further confused by the nature of the "apple" itself, whether one's position is that of Direct Realist or Indirect Realist. For the present purposes of discussing the nature of logic, I am simplifying the true nature of "apples" by assuming that they exist as facts in the world as apples.

We have derived logic from materialistic principles, as logic is the nature of materialistic principles.
Consider an object having a physical existence independent of any observer, such as an apple. Logic, as primordial and intrinsic to reality, dictates that the apple is an apple is true, and the apple is not an apple is not true.

It is for those who don't believe that logic is intrinsic to reality to show a single instance whereby an object in the world exists at the same time as not existing.

IE, we have derived logic from materialistic principles, as logic is the nature of materialistic principles.

logical relations are abstracted from, derived from perceptible actualities — Janus

:up: :up: :up:

To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on — Wayfarer

Computers are instruments of the mind. Nothing they do is meaningful in the absence of a mind — Wayfarer

Logic is not an invention of the mind but a discovery in the world

Independent of the mind, logic exists in the world. The world is a logical place, in that we don't observe the world doing anything illogical.

In the world, an apple "is" an apple, an apple "is not" an orange, an apple falls from the tree "because" of gravity, an apple "is the same as" an apple, an apple "is different from" an orange, etc.

We use the logic we use because it corresponds with the logic we observe in the world. If we discovered that the logic we were using was different to the logic in the world then we would stop using it. For example, if an engineer designing a bridge decided in their calculations that one plus one equals three, they would quickly discover that their constructions would start to fall down.

The logic of the world is such that one apple plus one apple "equals" two apples. For example, if on the table was one apple, and I placed another apple alongside it, and discovered that I had ended up with three apples, I would either doubt my sanity or try the same thing with kruggerands.

IE, as logic exists in the physical world independently of any human mind, logic cannot be used as an argument to show that materialism is not true.

To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on. — Wayfarer

A computer can deal with the logic of 'is', 'is not' and so on without the need of a mind.

A computer is an example of what a physical brain can achieve.

universals — Wayfarer

Limiting myself to Russell's quoted text. In our minds are concepts such as whiteness, trees, government, two, time, space, etc. In what sense are concepts universal ?

Russell's text ignores the crucial role of language in universals
Russell's analysis is incomplete in his ignoring the crucial role of language in the world of universals. Below is a simplified example to illustrate how language underlies the world of universals.

The importance of language in universals
On one particular day, Tuesday 5th March, a group of people gather.
Over several occasions during the day they observe several examples of whiteness, and to each example is attached the same nominated public word "whiteness", such that each individual learns to associate their concept of whiteness with "whiteness".
The mental concept of whiteness has now been created in the individual minds of a group of people on this particular Tuesday 5th March.
As days follow, this group can now sensibly discuss "whiteness" using a common language.

Comments on Russell's text
Russell is correct when he says - "We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist". Within this group, the concept whiteness came into existence on Tuesday 5th March

Russell is correct when he says - " The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being". Within this group, the concept whiteness subsists through time, not only as the concept whiteness within their individual minds, but also as the word "whiteness" within their common language.

Russell is also correct, but besides the point, when he says - "That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them". It may well be that when I observe an object in the world labelled "whiteness", within my mind I may subjectively experience it as blueness, and in the mind of another person they may subjectively experience it as orangeness, but this is irrelevant in preventing any sensible discussion amongst a group of people as to objects labelled "whiteness".

Summary
IE, whiteness and "whiteness" came into existence on Tuesday the 5th March, and subsist through time within the minds of a group of people having a common language. Whiteness will remain a universal as long as the group having a common language survives.

As regards materialism, both the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. In my mind is the concept whiteness, and in the neurons of my brain the idea of whiteness is somehow stored. The question as to whether the the mind is a separate substance to the brain or an expression of the brain remains unanswered. Therefore, the question as to whether concepts as universals challenges materialism remains unanswered.

thoughts and feelings — Mww

:smile: Maybe what we need is a conjunction between the thoughts of analytic philosophers and the feelings of continental philosophers. :smile:

Because of the idea that even sense data (pain) could be deceiving, or doubted for the sake of the argument. — Olivier5

I may be deceived by a splitting headache but I can never doubt that I have one.

There's no analogy for universals in the physical world — Wayfarer

Aristotle universals are incorporeal and exist only where they are instantiated in material things. If relations between objects have an ontological existence, then Aristotle's Universals have an ontological existence, and so are part of the material world.

FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of external relations.
However Russell dismissed Bradley’s argument on the grounds that philosophers who disbelieve in the reality of external relations cannot possibly interpret those numerous parts of sciences which appear to be committed to external relations.

So whether Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism or not depends on one's opinion as to the ontological existence of relations.

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common. — Mww

I would not say that "I am what thoughts and feelings have in common". I would say that "I am my subjective experiences. My subjective experiences include thoughts and feelings. What thoughts and feelings have in common is that they are part of my subjective experience"

For example, a car is an engine and wheels (simplifying). Engines and wheels have nothing in common. Therefore, cars are made up things that are not only different but have nothing in common. IE, we don't say that the essence of the car is what engines and wheels have in common.

You still have to prove that thoughts and feelings are equally experienced, in order to affirm that I am only my subjective experiences. — Mww

I can have the subjective experience of thought, and can have the subjective experience of feeling. My subjective experiences can include both thoughts and feelings. To say "I am my subjective experiences" means that "I am my subjective experiences of thoughts and feelings".

There doesn't need to be identity between "my subjective thoughts" and "my subjective feelings". But there does need to an identity between "I" and "my subjective experiences"

As a hot temperature is not identical to a cold temperature but have something in common, ie, temperature, thought is not identical to feeling, but have something in common, ie, in that they are both subjective experiences.

The crucial aspect is that "I am my subjective experiences" rather than "I have subjective experiences". That is what I need to prove.

Descartes — Wayfarer

Descartes "cogito, ergo sum" uses thought to prove his existence.

I observe an apple, and think about it. I doubt the reality of the apple. I doubt the existence of the apple. Because I doubt the existence of the apple, there must be an "I" doing the doubting, proving the existence of an "I"

But also, I feel a pain. There is no doubt that I feel a pain. I don't doubt the reality of the pain. I don't doubt the existence of the pain. Because I feel a pain, there must be an "I" doing the feeling, proving the existence of an "I"

Descartes was obviously aware not only of thoughts but also of feelings, as he wrote "Nature also teaches me, by the sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a pilot in his ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken."

I am curious why Descartes only used thought to prove existence, and not feeling, which would seem to be a more obvious route.

This doesn't make science wrong but it surely challenges materialism — Wayfarer

Materialism is the view that all facts about the human mind are causally dependent upon physical processes, and reducible to them.

Even if Aristotle's Direct Realism was true - the claim that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world - the causal path from object in the world to thought in the mind can still be explained within materialism.

Even if Aristotle's Theory of Universals was true - whereby universals are understood by the intellect as only existing where they are instantiated in objects or things - the intellectual processing of information into concepts, such as tables and governments, can still be explained within materialism.

I don't see how Aristotle's Direct Realism or Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism.

I am not only my thoughts — Mww

True. I may think about the apple on the table, and I may have feelings of hope, despair and sadness.

Replacing "I am my thoughts" by "I am my subjective experiences"
When I think, I have a subjective experience, and when I have a feeling, I also have a subjective experience. As a high temperature and a low temperature are not two different kinds of things but two instances of the same thing, ie temperature, perhaps thoughts and feelings are not two different kinds of things but both instances of the same thing, ie subjective experiences.

One problem with qualia is in its forcing a division between thoughts and feelings
Qualia have been described as individual instances of subjective conscious experience, the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, etc. Qualia, the feeling of an experience, is contrasted with a propositional attitude, the thought about an experience. Therefore, one characteristic of qualia is the separation of feeling from thought. If qualia exist, then the feelings of qualia stand in contrast to the thoughts of propositional attitudes, then feelings and thoughts are of different kinds. However, the existence of qualia is not universally accepted, in that it has been argued that the qualia is a superfluous concept, for example, @Banno, Daniel Dennett. Why say "I am experiencing the qualia of pain" rather than "I am experiencing pain". What does the word "qualia" add to my subjective experience.

Thoughts and feelings may be two aspects of the same thing - the subjective experience
Some argue that thought and feeling are two aspects of the same thing. For example, Galen Strawson wrote in 1994 in Mental Reality “Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities”

Summary
Perhaps I should improve my previous conclusion and replace "thought" by "subjective experience". Rather than say "I am my thoughts", I should perhaps say "I am my subjective experiences", where the word "am" means identity, in that "A is A"

As Descartes might have said "I am my subjective experiences, therefore I am"

Taking the thread to be about substance dualism (the idea that the mind is a different substance to the brain), the question is what can we ever know about the mind.

Perhaps Descartes should have said "I am my thoughts, therefore I am"

Descartes said "I think, therefore I am", prompting the question "what is the link between "I" and my thoughts ?"

There are two possibilities:

1) Either, there is an "I" that thinks, where the "I" has an existence independent of its thoughts, as computer hardware has an existence independent of its software
2) Or, the "I" is its thoughts, in that if there were no thoughts, then there would be no "I", where the word "is" means an identity, in the same way that "A is A"

Solution A) - There is an "I" that thinks
To be conscious is to be conscious of something, and that something must be external to whatever is being conscious, that something cannot be itself.
Similarly, a thought must be of something, and that thought must be external to whatever is having the thought, that thought cannot be itself.
The inevitable consequence is that, as I can never know the nature of another person's mind, and as my mind can never know itself, the nature of the mind will be forever unknown, meaning that we can never say whether dualism is true or not.

Solution B) - The "I" is its thoughts

I cannot be conscious of my own consciousness, and my thoughts cannot be about themselves. However, I can be conscious of some of my thoughts, where such thoughts are about something.

Suppose that "I" am the set of my thoughts. Then my mind also is the set of my thoughts. Therefore "I am my mind". The words "am" and "is" mean identity, in the same way that "A" is "A"

If I am the set of my thoughts, and thoughts must be about things, then it follows that "I" am the set of things that is being thought about.

In order to know the nature of the mind, where the mind is a set of thoughts about things, then I need to know the nature of the set of things being thought about.

As these things are external to the mind, then this allows the possibility that the mind could be understood by reference to that which is external to the mind, avoiding the problem of self-reference laid out in Solution A.

Summary
There is a possibility of understanding the mind if the "I" is its thoughts rather than there is an "I" that thinks.

Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am"

your thoughts and attitudes can be directed at either yourself or at others — SophistiCat

I agree that my thoughts can be directed at another person's mind, as my thoughts can be directed at the table in front of, but this is not the same as being able to subjectively experience another person's mind.

Taking "mind" in its ordinary sense, we certainly can have insight into other minds — SophistiCat

If I touched a hot stove with my bare hand, I would know my subjective experience.

If I see someone touch a hot stove with their bare hand and instantly jump back exclaiming, I can understand what I have objectively observed, but I can never know what subjective experience that person may or may not have had.

I really don't understand this problem with "mind thinking about itself." — SophistiCat

I agree that to think is to think about something, and to be conscious is to be conscious of something, such as trees and pains.

There are different types of self-consciousness.

1) If the object of my consciousness is a pain in my arm, then I am being conscious of my self, and in a sense self-conscious.

2) If the object of my consciousness is my consciousness itself, then this can also be called self-consciousness.

In order for me to understand the nature of the mind, my object of consciousness cannot be the minds of others, which I can never know, but rather my object of consciousness must be itself.

The question is, is consciousness of itself possible ?

"'I' (my self) is nothing other than my mind (whatever that is)". — SophistiCat

I agree that "I am my mind".

If I want to understand the nature of the mind, I cannot look at the minds of others, which will forever be closed to me, in that I could never discover what beetles others have in their individual boxes.

My only recourse is to try to understand my own mind, which is accessible to me, but with the consequence that my mind has to think about itself.

I have no problem with the concept that my mind can think about something outside itself, such as the range of the Cybertruck, but I have a problem with the concept of my mind thinking about itself. Does it mean that my mind is thinking about my mind thinking about my mind thinking about my mind, etc. As Schopenhauer wrote: “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of”

IE, if I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at the minds of other, and I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at my own, then I will never be able to understand the nature of the mind.

mental content — Raymond

The problem with words.

Yes, if I perceive mental content, I would say "I am conscious of the mental content", rather than "my mind is conscious of the mental content".

Only minds can discuss, though — Olivier5

Would not disagree.

If dualism is true, then the mind is a different substance to the brain. If monism is true, then the mind is a synonym for the brain.

In both cases, the mind is doing the discussing.

The brain and the mind are two sides of the same medal. — Raymond

As if an abstract non-entity can be a force. — Mww

How would your analysis differ if its object was (what is usually thought of as) a physical entity or process? — SophistiCat

Trying to pull these ideas together.

Our understanding of the mind-brain relationship is ultimately limited by language
Using language, I can say "I feel a pain" or I perceive blueness"
But when I use language to talk about the relationship between the mind and the brain, what I can say about the relationship is necessarily limited not by the truth but by the nature of the language.

The difference between "I am conscious" and "My mind is conscious"
When I say "I am conscious", I am speaking in the first person as an inside observer of my consciousness.
When I say "my car is in the garage", I am speaking in the third person as an outside observer of my car. I would not say that "I am my car.
When I say "My mind is conscious", I am speaking in the third person as an outside observer of my mind.

The "mind" exists in language and the mind may or may not exist in the world
In any discussion about the mind, there are two aspects: the "mind" as a word being part of the language game and the mind existing as a real thing in the world.

Either minds exist or they don't

If minds don't exist
If minds don't exist, then minds can still be discussed, as unicorns can be discussed.

If minds do exist
If I say that "my mind exists", then I am speaking as an outside observer, and as an outside observer I may be mistaken.

If I say that "I am my mind", then I am speaking as an inside observer of my mind. But this leads to the problem that the mind is discussing itself, leading to a circularity, in that the statement becomes either "I am I" or "my mind is my mind".
The statement "A is A" may be logically true, but it gives no information as to what "A" empirically is.

We can discuss the mind without ever knowing whether it exists or not
If minds don't exist, we can still discuss them as we can discuss unicorns
If minds do exist, then the mind would be discussing itself, leading to the problem of circularity, meaning that the mind would be unable to determine the truth of its own existence.

IE, even though "minds " exist in language, it is logically impossible for us to determine whether they exist in the world.

The mind exists only as a part of language, not as part of the world

The gist of the comments are about how the mind and brain interact, inferring that the mind and brain are two different things, whether different substances or made up from the same physical stuff.

Taking intentionality as an example, where intentionality is the quality of mental states (e.g. thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) which consists in their being directed towards some object or state of affairs.

For example, I intend to raise my arm and my arm raises.

Rather than treat intentionality as a mental state of the brain that causes a new state of affairs, "intentionality" should be treated as a linguistic term that describes the state of the brain prior to its causing a new state of affairs.

IE, the mind is not a cause of a new state of affairs, the "mind" is no more than a word used in language to describe the state of the brain that causes a new state of affairs.

Language allows us to talk about unicorns, Sherlock Holmes, Martians, dragons, as well as minds.

The Binding Problem - the unity of consciousness

Relevant sentences about dualism from SEP - Dualism
Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world.
Whether one believes that the mind is a substance or just a bundle of properties, the same challenge arises, which is to explain the nature of the unity of the immaterial mind.
In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical – or mind and body or mind and brain – are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing.

"Bearer of attribute" dualism
As it may be argued that relations only exist in the mind and not the world, then "bearers of attributes", of which relations are fundamental, must also only exist in the mind.
Then in this sense the mind is radically different from the world, which is dualism.
But "bearer of attitude" dualism does not explain the binding problem.

"Material with uniform properties" dualism
Even if there is a "material with uniform properties" dualism which has properties that explains the binding problem, and which is not part of the physical world, then how can we understand it if not amenable to scientific investigation.

Both routes seem insoluble to us.

Would we understand the solution even if shown it
It is true that one question to be asked is how do we solve the binding problem, but before we ask this, a prior consideration is that even if we were presented with the answer, do we, as humans, even have the intellectual capacity to understand the answer.

As we don't expect a horse to understand the allegories within The Old Man and The Sea, why should we, as humans, expect to understand the solution to the binding problem.

What does it mean to understand something
IE, before trying to understand the binding problem, can we justify to ourselves that even if presented with the explanation we would understand it. What does it even mean to understand something ?

:smile: All the very best to everyone for the coming year :smile:

If dualism is true, is science wrong ?

Questions about the mind-body problem
How does the mind as a whole emerge from disparate parts, the neurons that make up the brain.
How to explain the binding problem, the unity of consciousness, seemingly from the integration of highly diverse neural information.
How to explain that when we have the intention to raise our arm, our arm rises.
How can the mind emerge with properties that cannot be scientifically discovered in the neurons from which it has arisen.

Does substance dualism being true mean that science is false
Substance dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two distinct substances.
Science is an epistemic approach to gaining knowledge of our world, the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.

A new physical property emerges when two permanent magnets are placed alongside each other
Substance dualism claims that, because the properties of the mind cannot be scientifically discovered in the physical parts from which it has arisen, then the mind must be of a different substance to the physical brain from which it emerges.
To disprove this, one example is needed of a system which has physical properties that cannot be discovered from the physical parts from which it has emerged.
Consider a system consisting of a pair of permanent magnets. When placed in the vicinity of each other they may repel or attract resulting in a movement.
A single magnet may have certain properties, such as mass, but no scientific investigation of a single magnet may discover the property of movement that the whole system is able to show.

New physical properties may emerge when parts are combined into a whole
IE, the whole physical system has properties that cannot be discovered in its individual physical parts.
In a sense, a new property has emerged from a combination of physical parts, none of which have previously exhibited this property.
The example of the magnets is not to infer any resemblance between magnetic fields and interactions between neurons, it is just being used to prove that it is possible for new physical properties to emerge from physical parts that don't exhibit the same property.
It is a fact that the new property of the system that has emerged from its parts can have an effect on the parts, even though the individual parts don't show this property.

Dualism may be true, but it isn't necessarily true
In summary, this example of the magnets proves that because some properties of the whole cannot be scientifically discovered in the physical properties of its parts, it does not follow that the properties of the whole are not also physical.
The example of the magnets does not prove that dualism is not true, but it does prove that dualism isn't necessarily true.

If the mind IS a physical thing (i.e., mind=brain), then when you imagine a blue elephant in your mind, shouldn't there be a blue elephant inside your skull? — RogueAI

The correspondence between mental states and brain states

A computer may be programmed to give a response when input blue light. A brain may respond when sensing blue light.

As blue light is not physically present inside the computer, blue light does not need to be physically present inside the brain in order for the brain to respond when sensing blue light

It follows that a blue elephant does not need to be physically present inside the brain in order for the brain to respond when sensing a blue elephant.

Assuming Realism rather than Idealism, there are two possibilities regarding any correspondence between the brain state and the mental state.

Either the mental state mirrors their brain state, in which case when the brain state experiences a blue elephant, the mental state also experiences a blue elephant, ie Direct Realism.

Or the mental state is different to their brain state, in which case when the brain state experiences a blue elephant, the mental state could experience an orange crocodile, ie Indirect Realism

IE, whether one believes the mental state to be identical or not with the brain state depends on one's opinion as to Direct and Indirect Realism.