Is it implying that assuming dualism is a possibility that all science must be false in order for that to be the case? — TiredThinker

Yes, Lewis is saying that if dualism was true, then the foundation of science would be shown to be false.

However, Lewis is also saying that dualism is not true, even if, as he writes, "humans are instinctive dualists".

Lewis argues that if there's no basis for dualism, then on death the self ceases to exist, writing "So what happens to the mind, or the self, after death? If there's no basis for dualism...............consciousness is lost..........self or essence ceases to exist." But Lewis concludes with his belief that the self ceases to exist on death, writing "You only live once". Therefore it follows that Lewis is arguing that there is no basis for dualism as on death the self ceases to exist.

Lewis also said that if dualism was true, then the foundation of science would be shown to be false, writing "for dualism to be true, all of science would have to be false." It follows that Lewis is saying that as there is no basis for dualism, then dualism cannot be used to show that science is false.

IE, Lewis is arguing that even though humans may be instinctive dualists, dualism is not true, and because it is not true, doesn't undermine science.

The article is setting out Lewis' beliefs, rather than justifying them.

It sounds about right I guess, yeah... — Tobias

:smile:

criterion for creativity......that bit of extra spark that makes you think......the job of the student is to think within the boundaries expected. That is primary, show you can combine different pre given ideas.............make an extra observation — Tobias

Does this lead to the requirement (definition) that "an undergraduate in writing a philosophy essay is not expected to develop new philosophical ideas but is expected to comment on existing philosophical ideas using reasoned and well-structured language, whilst including an original idea that makes the reader interested in thinking about the topic" ?

A paper that makes me think about counter arguments does something, it 'works' even though I think it is wrong and yes that counts in the students favour. — Tobias

As someone searching for what makes an A, from what you say, in addition to being well written (something that can be learnt through careful study) the student should also put forward an original spark of an idea, a potential new insight into the topic under discussion

Even if they don't have time to fully develop it within the confines of a particular essay, and even though the idea may ultimately prove to be wrong, its development may lead into new knowledge.

IE, perhaps a willingness by the student to push the boundary of what is conventionally accepted, providing they are willing to rationally argue their case - (pushing the boundary infers that they have to be knowledgeable in the first place as to where the boundary is).

As far as I know, never having taught, but from personal experience (in getting B's).

The Professor is not looking for the student to say something new in order to award an A

The Professor, knowing his subject inside out, having read every relevant paper, attended every germane conference, and after marking thousands of essays by bright-eyed and bushy-tailed students is not looking for new ideas when marking a paper, as the possibility of coming across a new idea is pretty remote. If the do come across an idea that it is new to them, then it is more than likely to be either wrong or nonsense.

All the professor is looking for is a workmanlike, well crafted, well written, logically argued, well researched essay that is relevant to the topic.

The Professor is not looking for an excellent paper by a budding Wittgenstein, just a good paper that he knows from his lifetime of experience is on the right lines.

So why does one student get an A and the others get B's if all that is needed is a good paper rather than an excellent one. Because the others trip themselves up, shoot themselves in the foot, make a balls of it, run around in circles and start up the creek without a paddle.

What this means in practice is that the others use convoluted language, don't answer the question, push their own philosophical ideas, use arguments where the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, where their premises are opinions rather than being obviously true, where the essay isn't structured into a beginning, body and conclusion, where they don't make use of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, etc

IE, all the student needs to do to get an A is to write a half-decent essay and let the others mess it up.

The person marking the undergraduate essay looking to award an A should not be looking for the student's original philosophical ideas but rather the student's original ideas about the relationship between established philosophical ideas.

In addition, such an essay should use clear and simple prose and be be well-structured with a beginning, a body that could be about five points and a short conclusion. The writer should use well-reasoned arguments, possibly making use of hypothetical examples, that lead the reader from obviously true premises to an indubitable conclusion. Each point within the body could start with a thesis describing a particular philosophical position, continuing with an antithesis describing one or more opposing philosophical positions, and finishing with a synthesis where the writer argues for their support of one position or the other.

IE, an undergraduate essay is not about developing new philosophical ideas but is about commenting on existing philosophical ideas in an interesting, reasoned and well-structured way.

There are some interesting comments on the Forum, but I doubt they would get an A because they are interesting.

As far as I know, as regards an undergraduate's philosophy essay, a well-written essay about philosophically interesting ideas will be marked down, whilst a well-written essay about the debate within philosophy about interesting philosophical ideas will be marked up.

It says something philosophically interesting. — jasonm

Assuming it is an essay by an undergraduate.

Be aware that "It says something philosophically interesting" is definitely not about any interesting philosophical ideas of the student

As I see it, what the teacher wants to see when marking an undergraduate essay is for the student to show that they have a good understanding of the history and nature of important philosophical discussion and argument, including up to the present day, and including such things as a knowledge of the branches of philosophy, specific terminology, key philosophers and principal attitudes towards major philosophical topics.

The student is expected to give their reasoned opinion about the pros and cons of the interesting philosophical positions of others, but the teacher does not want them to give their reasoned opinion about the pros and cons of their own interesting philosophical ideas.

IE, in the event that the student writes about their own philosophically interesting ideas they will definitely be marked down.

If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument against the idea that philosophy is futile

It may well be that a person's inherent beliefs are arbitrary, based on genes, upbringing, education, environment, etc. From this it would follow that an individual philosophizing in an empty room will only end up confirming their own beliefs, undertaking an empty philosophy.

However, Wittgenstein may provide a solution to this problem.

Descartes said that the only thing he was sure of were his thoughts. Wittgenstein argued against this, arguing that the notion of a private language is incoherent, in that thoughts require words, and words require other people. The consequence is that meaning can only be found in language as a social event between language users.

Wittgenstein explained his reasoning in Philosophical Investigations para 293. Suppose everyone had a box with something in it, which we call a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, but they can look into their own box. This means that everyone's idea of what a "beetle" is only comes from knowing what is inside their own box. Then what purpose does the word "beetle" have in the social language game if no one knows what anyone else means by the word beetle. Wittgenstein concludes that words used within social language game cannot refer to any particular object, with the consequence that "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant".

Therefore, even if an individual's belief, an individual's private beetle in a box, have been based on arbitrary factors such as genes, etc, in the context of a social language, the language game, these beetles, these objects which only exist in the mind of the individual, drop out.

Therefore, the argument that the language game of philosophy is futile because the beliefs of an individual user of the language game have been based on arbitrary factors such as genes, etc is negated if the beetles, the object-references, within the language game vanish.

IE, the consequence of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument is that philosophy within a social language game is independent of any arbitrary beliefs of any particular user.

As is common in discussions here on the forum, you and I are working from different definitions of a particular word. — T Clark

:up:

I just took a sip of water. My throat felt dry, so I reached over, picked up my glass, and took a drink. There were no thoughts like "I'm thirsty" — T Clark

I am in front of a glass of water. My throat feels dry. I can either pick up the glass of water or not pick up the glass of water. My brain "knows" there is a glass of water in front of me, and my brain "knows" my body is thirsty.

The question is, what process is underway whereby the brain moves the arm to pick up the glass of water rather than not move the arm at all. If the brain uses cognition, then the brain uses thoughts, either subconscious or conscious. If the brain is part of a deterministic system, then free will is precluded, and the raising of the arm has been completely determined by the previous existing cause of the body being thirsty, meaning that the brain has not needed either subconscious or conscious thoughts.

IE, one's beliefs in thoughts depends on one's position as regards free will and determinism.

Do thoughts have to be words? — T Clark

The Neanderthals, living in Eurasia about 40,000 years ago, may not have had a brain with the level of complexity required for modern speech, even if they had the physical apparatus for speech, but even without any words to describe their feelings, the sight of a woolly mammoth bearing down on them must certainly have given them cause for thought.

IE, thoughts don't have to be in words.

Even if they're thoughts, that doesn't necessarily mean they are ideas. — T Clark

As I understand it, a thought is fleeting, whilst an idea is something you expel into the world around you. As Pythagoras said “Thought is an Idea in transit, which when once released, never can be lured back, nor the spoken word recalled. Nor ever can the overt act be erased.”

IE, a thought remains in one's internal world, whilst an idea may become part of one's external world.

There's no idea "I want to open the door." There's just the wanting and then the opening. — T Clark

There is the conscious thought "I want to open the door".

Isn't the subconscious "wanting" not also a thought ?

If philosophy is about finding plausible ideas, but what we find plausible is based on our arbitrary intuitions, then isn't philosophy futile? — clemogo

Given that ideas are not based on arbitrary intuitions (previous post), it follows that what we find plausible is also not based on arbitrary intuitions.

A scientist would ask "how do I open this door ?". A philosopher would ask those questions that a scientist doesn't need the answer to, such as "does this door exist in my mind or as a fact in the world?"

Knowledge for its own sake cannot be futile. As Einstein said “The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, an almost fanatical love of justice and the desire for personal independence -- these are the features of the Jewish tradition which make me thank my stars that I belong to it.”

Is it the case that there is no 'good' reason to believe what I believe? — clemogo

I want to open a door, and I have the idea "I must turn the door handle in order to open the door".

My idea is partly based on my innate a priori intuition of causation - an effect needs a cause - and partly based on my empirical a posteriori observations - turning a door handle causes the effect of the door opening.

Innate a priori intuitions in sentient life are not arbitrary. They have evolved over hundreds of millions of years in order to ensure the survival of sentient life. Ideas based on empirical a posteriori observation are also not arbitrary, as based on the laws of nature.

IE, as ideas are founded partly on innate a priori intuition and partly on empirical a posteriori observation, ideas are not arbitrary.

Folks in the know are predicting a civil war in the US in 2024 — ZzzoneiroCosm

Another example of the irresponsible few happy to destroy society for their momentary intellectual amusement.

Is there is no proof equivalent to impossible to prove p? — Agent Smith

How to prove that the statement "no true statement can ever be proved true" is true.

Analytic statements
Quine in The Two Dogmas of Empiricism distinguished between two kinds of analytic claims - i) logical truths, true no matter how we interpret the non-logical parts in the statement, such as "no not-X is X" - and ii) synonymous truths, such as comparing bachelor with unmarried man.

As regards logical truths, logical truths are necessary truths, and necessary truths are beyond proof, in that no argument can be found to establish the truth of a necessary truth, as the nature of a necessary truth is to be true.

As regards synonymous truths, consider the statement "the sun rises in the east". By definition, the "sun" is something that rises in the east. So, the statement "the sun rises in the east" is analytically true. IE, if one morning something rose in the west, rather than the east, then that something wouldn't be the "sun", it would be something else.

IE, logical truths are beyond proof, and synonymous truths don't need to be proved as they are true by definition.

Synthetic statements
As regards whether the statement "the sun rises in the east" is synthetically true, one needs to prove that the sun rises in the east rather than the west.

If Idealism is true, and there is no external reality and the world only consists of ideas, then there is no sun, and the question as to where it rises becomes irrelevant.
If Indirect Realism is true, and our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, then impossible to prove something outside that which we have direct knowledge of.
If Direct Realism is true, and the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, then it would be possible to prove that the sun rises in the east.

But how do we prove which of Idealism, Indirect Realism or Direct Realism is true, something philosophers have debated for thousands of years. As my perception of the sun would be identical, regardless of whether Idealism, Indirect Realism or Realism was true, it would therefore be impossible to prove which of these is in fact the case.

IE, synthetic statements cannot be proved.

Summary
Given the statement S "no true statement can ever be proved true", if S is true, proving it true would result in a contradiction.

IE, some true statements cannot be proved true. Though, in practice, proof is secondary to what pragmatically works.

Let p = Shakespeare drank a cup of coffee on the morning of 15 July 1584. P is either true or false, as a proposition is either true or false by definition.

unknown isn't/can't be (?) be a truth value. — Agent Smith

P has a truth value, even though we may never know what it is.

To say p does not exist, we need proof that p does not exist. — Agent Smith

No statement can ever be proved

The phrase "to say p does not exist" is incorrect. The question is whether the proposition is true or false, not whether the proposition exists or doesn't exist.

If I say that p is false, then I am saying that Shakespeare did not drink a cup of coffee on the morning of 15 July 1584. If I make such a statement, then it is only reasonable that I justify myself, giving sensible reasons why I believe that my statement is true. But I can never prove my statement. Even science only deals in probabilities, not proofs. No statement can ever be proved with 100% certainty.

Consider an example of deductive reasoning: “All men are mortal. Harold is a man. Therefore, Harold is mortal". It is true that there is a sequence of logical statements, one implying another, and giving an explanation of why a given statement is true. But the starting point is always axioms, accepted "rules", statements or propositions which are regarded as being established, accepted, or self-evidently true, ie, unproved.

IE, for me to say that Shakespeare did not drink a cup of coffee on the morning of 15 July 1584, it is reasonable that I am required to justify my belief giving sensible reasons, but it would be impossible for me to prove my statement, in that it is impossible to prove any statement.

So, there's The Book, generalizing Erdős' idea, which contains all the proofs, elegant or inelegant (I'm not as demanding as Erdős), for each and every true proposition, mathematical or otherwise. — Agent Smith

There are many books in the world. Let one of these books be The Book.

Some of these books have flawed proofs and untrue propositions, whilst The Book has true proofs of true propositions.

So how would it be possible to know which of the many books is The Book, in order to be able to say "there's The Book" ?

IE, even if we were looking at The Book directly in front of us, we wouldn't be able to recognise it as The Book (a bit like my posts, they hold the truth, yet tend to be ignored).

If there was no reality, or if reality is only constructed, then any gain in knowledge would be nothing but the deepening of a fiction — Mersi

If there was no reality, then there wouldn't be anything existing able to gain knowledge.

reality would become a jigsaw with multiple possible solutions. — Mersi

There are two aspects to reality. Our subjective reality, for example, seeing the colour red, and reality as it objectively is independent of any observer, for example the wavelength of 700nm.

For Idealism, there is only one reality, where the subjective and objective become one.
For Direct Realism, there is one subjective reality, and only one possible solution as to the nature of objective reality.
For Indirect Realism, there is one subjective reality, and multiple possible solutions as to the nature of objective reality.

IE, back to the problem of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism.

Under which circumstance could objective reality remain inaccessible to us? — Mersi

Humans are animals. Humans may have the ability for more complex reasoning, but at the end of the day humans are still animals.

Whenever we look at other animals it is clear to us that they will never understand the reality of the world around them as we do. For example, a horse will never understand the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea, a mosquito will never understand the complexities of the American legal system, a dolphin will never understand quantum mechanics. So it is clear to us that the ability of animals to understand objective reality is limited by the physical structure of their brain. And yet humans are still animals, still limited by the physical structure of the human brain.

IE, the circumstance of being human means that objective reality will forever remain inaccessible to humans.

And if we cannot get such any accurate imagination of reality, how can any technological progress made by humanity be explained? — Mersi

Pragmatism.

Where pragmatism considers words and thought as tools and instruments for prediction, problem solving, and action, and rejects the idea that the function of thought is to describe, represent, or mirror reality.

racist humor — TheMadFool

Yes, racist humor is all Greek to me.

format — realmofgeorge

There seems to be two different sets of premises and conclusions

Premise/Conclusion Set One
In the first paragraph of the Introduction, the author writes - "Given the weight of the consequences of being charged with making a racist joke and the possible harmful effects on the audience of racist jokes, it is a bit puzzling that more attention has not been given to this issue."

Premise - possible harmful effects on the audience of racist jokes
Conclusion - it is a bit puzzling that more attention has not been given to this issue.

Premise/Conclusion Set Two
In the last paragraph of the Conclusion the author writes - "Given the prevalence of racial humor and the real world consequences that result from engaging in humor, philosophers should be keen on developing views that answer these questions."

Premise 1 - the prevalence of racial humor
Premise 2 - the real world consequences that result from engaging in humor
Conclusion - philosophers should be keen on developing views

These two sets of Premise/Conclusion are different
These are different as the author distinguishes racist jokes to racial humour. In Section 1 the author writes - "I mean to distinguish racial from racist humor. The former is a broad category that refers to humor about race, while the latter, a narrower category, refers to racial humor that violates norms concerning the treatment of people based on their perceived race."

The conclusions are similar, in that the author writes in section 3 - "the categories we employ for classifying racial humor can be expanded beyond the racist/non-racist binary. In contrast to only being racist or not racist, a piece of humor might also be racially insensitive."

The author opposes both racist jokes and racial humor
The author opposes racist jokes.
He writes in Section 1 - "Assuming that racism in a joke counts as a moral defect."

The author also opposes racial humour.
He writes in Section 1 - "Lastly, much racial humor depends on the inclusion of racial stereotypes."
He writes in Section 3 - "In order for the view proposed below to work, an account of the badness of racial stereotypes must be given. "

Summary
The reader needs to understand the author's use of the terms "racist jokes", "racial humor" and "racially insensitive humor", as the lines between them sometimes seem to become blurred.

@realmofgeorge "Struggling to find the premises and conclusions of this text.... Racist Humor"

In a well-written essay, the premise should be in the Introduction and the conclusion should be in the Conclusion.

No academic employed by an American university would ever suggest that racism or anything to do with racism is good. Therefore the author's position can only be that not only racism but anything associated with racism must be bad.

Therefore, both the premise and conclusion are implicitly included within the title of the essay: Racist Humor is Bad.

That would seem to me to make the mind the "internal world." — Ciceronianus

:100:

I believe we both acknowledge that we exist in the world, as do other living organisms and things. You clearly think that those other creatures and things are "external" to us. If by that you mean they exist in the world along with us, in addition to us, I agree. If you mean they exist in a world that is outside us, I don't agree. — Ciceronianus

I agree that in this world that we live in, other living organisms and things are external to us.

I too don't believe in a multiverse, where other living organisms and things external to us live in a world outside the world we live in.

Words have meanings, and as regards the phrase "external world" in the context of a discussion about the philosophy of the mind, external means external to the mind and world means the world we live in, not another world outside our world in the multiverse.

It is of course OK for you to give words meanings that are not commonly accepted within the context that they are being used in, but it does cause confusion.

Direct Realism is a philosophy of the mind based on the theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.

Philosophers often use “Naïve Realism” as a synonym for “Direct Realism”, though sometimes Naive Realism is taken as a strong form of Direct Realism, more along the lines of Aristotle's approach.

In the context of the philosophy of the mind, the phrase "External World" is the view that in the world there are things or events that exist independently of the mind.

I don't think our minds are separate from the world; I think they're parts of the world just as we are — Ciceronianus

If the mind is part of the world, then in the world there is the mind and there is that which is outside the mind, ie, an "external world" - ie leading to the possibility of Naive Realism, Direct Realism or Indirect Realism.

So, the question "Is there an external world which exists independently of the mind?" seems to me to be...well, weird. — Ciceronianus

This would mean that there is no "external world" - ie, Idealism


These two viewpoints seem contradictory.

The phrase "external world" has an accepted meaning, and it is about things or events that exist independently of the mind.

1) For the Psychology Dictionary, the world of real and existing things external to and independent of our consciousness.
2) For Wiktionary, the world consisting of all the objects and events which are experienceable or whose existence is accepted by the human mind, but which exist independently of the mind.
3) For GE Moore Proof of an External World, the category of “external things” is the category of space-occupying things that may fail ever to be perceived.
4) For Putnam, “If we can consider whether [the hypothesis that we are brains in vats being electrochemically stimulated to have the very experiences that we’ve had] is true or false, then it is not true… Hence it is not true”
5) For Davidson and McDowell, agreement that experiences justify beliefs about the external world only if experiences have contents that can be assessed for truth.

It is definitely not about the concept expressed in the statement - "The world" cannot be "external" to – ontologically separate from – itself, which includes its constituents (Spinoza)

Given agreement as to the meaning of the phrase "external world", then the topic "there's no "external world" can be discussed.

For me, there's no "external world." — Ciceronianus

Here's what I'm proposing, regardless of whether it comports with anyone's idea of naive realism or direct realism. — Ciceronianus

Are you saying there must be an "external world" unless the universe feels pain (for example)? — Ciceronianus

Your question leads to a paradox. If the "external world" must exist, then it must exist whether or not it feels pain. But if it feels pain, then it cannot exist. But it must exist..............

Definitions
A common definition of "external world" is "the world consisting of all the objects and events which are experienceable or whose existence is accepted by the human mind, but which exist independently of the mind".
A common definition of "Direct Realism" is that the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism), and we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct).

The world and pain
I believe that humans, and sentient beings in general, feel pain. My belief is that pain does not exist in the world external to sentient beings.

I am not saying there must be an "external world", as my knowledge about the world is insufficient for me to know that, but I am saying that I believe that there is an "external world".

I am also not saying that the world external to sentient beings cannot feel pain, as again my my knowledge about the world is insufficient for me to know that, but I am saying that I believe that the world external to sentient beings doesn't feel pain.

IE, I am not saying that "there must be an "external world" unless the universe feels pain", I am saying that "I believe that there is a world external to sentient beings, and I believe that this world external to sentient beings doesn't feel pain"

Summary
One aspect of Direct Realism is that the external world exists independently of the mind. As you propose that there is no "external world", am I correct in thinking that your view is neither Naive Realism nor Direct Realism, but something else, such as Idealism, as @Hanover suggests ?

For me, there's no "external world." There's a world of which we're a part. There isn't one world for us and another world for everything else. — Ciceronianus

I think they're attributes of human beings, and so are part of the world in that sense, but don't know that it follows that they're attributes of the universe. — Ciceronianus

I was misled by your use of the phrase "external world"

There must be an "external world" if pain, love, colour, consciousness, etc are attributes of human beings, yet not attributes of the universe.

Though I agree with the idea that just because a human has the attribute of perceiving the colour red, it doesn't follow that the colour red is also an attribute of the "external world"

For me, there's no "external world." — Ciceronianus

Direct Realism and Panpsychism

I agree that the human is part of the world, and has evolved as part of the world over hundreds of millions of years. However, the world can still be divided into humans and that which is external to humans.

Humans have what Chalmers calls "qualia" and others call subjective experiences, such as pain, love, colour, consciousness, etc.

If there is no "external world", then human experiences are just part of the world's experiences. IE, all the attributes of the mind - pain, love, colour, consciousness, etc - are also attributes of the world. As consciousness is a human experience, then consciousness must also be an experience of the world.

Panpsychism is the view that the mind is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. It seems that it necessarily follows that one of the consequences of Direct Realism is a belief in panpsychism.

I'd say we're responsible for the insertion (for science as well, in fact). If we're part of the same world, there is no insertion of anything. There's nothing (no thing) between us and the rest of the world that is the "red" of which we speak. This purported "thing" is something we dreamt up, I think. — Ciceronianus

A letter box emits a wavelength of 700nm. When looking at the letter box we perceive the colour red.

Direct Realism claims that when we do perceive something, the immediate and direct object of perception is the external world, not the mind.

I cannot understand how the immediate and direct object of perception (the colour red) is the external world (the wavelength of 700nm).

How does the Direct Realist justify that the colour red exists independently of any observer in the wavelength of 700nm ?

"Naive realism" (a/k/a direct realism) is the view that those things we deal with every day, indeed every instant, taken for granted by all but philosophers and their students (so it may seem), are perceived by us immediately or directly. — Ciceronianus

Consider our perception of the colour red. The cause of our perception is not the colour red but a wavelength of 700nm. As it is commonly agreed that that humans when observing a wavelength of 700nm consistently perceive the colour red, it is therefore not unreasonable to say that our perception of the world is valid and presents no concern. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that what we perceive, the colour red, is being caused by the colour red. In fact, it is being caused by a wavelength of 700nm.

This question refers back to the debate about Kant's thing-in-itself. In the dual object view, the thing-in-itself is an entity distinct from the phenomena to which it gives rise. In the dual aspect view, the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears are two "sides" of the same thing. As the perception of the colour red is a distinct entity from what caused the perception, a wavelength of 700nm, it seems reasonable to say that the dual object view is the more reasonable.

Science shows us that our perception of red has been caused by a wavelength of 700nm, so it is science that has "inserted" something between our perception and the external world, a science with its roots in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia around 3000 to 1200 BCE.

One could conclude that, taking this example of our perception of the colour red, Direct Realism does not explain how we perceive the world.

However, the fact that Direct Realism is not the explanation does not mean that our senses don't function quite well, it does not mean that we are detached from the world and it does not mean that our interaction with the world is not immediate.

As regards the "veracity of our senses", our senses accurately translate a wavelength of 700nm into a perception of the colour red, and as regards "perceived by us .......directly", there is a direct correspondence between our perception of the colour red and the wavelength of 700nm.

IE, Direct Realism would mean that our perception of the colour red has been caused by a colour red, but science has shown us that this is not the case. A better term would be Indirect Realism, allowing for the fact that our perception of the colour red has been caused by the wavelength of 700nm.

There are nineteen uses of the concept “noumenon” or its derivatives in CPR. None of them equate noumena with the ding an sich. — Mww

I didn't know of the debate about how a noumenon relates to a "thing-in-itself". More reading to do.

A relevant paragraph in Critique of Pure Reason is:
"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., a thing which is not at all to be thought as an object of the senses, but rather only as a thing on its own (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory, for we still cannot assert of the sensitivity that it be the single, possible manner of perspective."

Rather than writing "In Kantian philosophy, a noumenon is a thing as it is in itself.", perhaps I should have written "In Kantian philosophy, a noumenon is a thing on its own".

we don't simply imagine the things in the world in any way analogous to how we imagine the things of our literary fictions. — Janus

I am trying to be careful in distinguishing complex objects, such as "unicorns", "tables" or "multiverses" from simple empirical experiences through our five senses, such as a screeching noise, the colour red, a sweet taste, an acrid smell, the pain of a needle.

This is why I previously wrote: "My belief, along the lines of Kant's phenomenon and noumenon, is that all understanding we have of complex objects in the world is fictive, whether "unicorns", "tables" or "multiverses""

I believe that our understanding of complex objects, such as a table, is as fictional as our understanding of Sherlock Holmes, but this does not include our experience of simple sensations, such as the pain of a needle, through the five senses.

You keep going back and forth between calling everything in our experience and imagination fictional (thus rendering the claim vacuous) — SophistiCat

Not quite.

Taking a table as a particular example of "everything in our experience". Our understanding of what a table is may be fictional, without rejecting the idea that there are facts in the world which we think of as a table. The word "fictional" retains meaning, as fictions in the mind are set against facts in the world.

You keep going back and forth between calling everything in our experience and imagination fictional (thus rendering the claim vacuous) or specifically those things that we cannot empirically verify (thus merely misusing the word 'fictional'). — SophistiCat

Not quite.

Our concept of complex objects, such as a table, is a fictional interpretation of facts in the world. Our knowledge of facts in the world derives from empirical observation of the world discovered through our five senses, such as a screeching noise, the colour red, a sweet taste, an acrid smell, the pain of a needle. Our imagination assembles these parts into a whole. Each part, a particular sensation through one of our five senses, directly comes from a fact in the world through empirical observation. The whole, our concept of a table, is a fictional assembly of mereological relations between these parts.

you refer to as 'noumenon' is real according to the first criterion (as opposed to the 'phenomenon') and fictive according to the second. — SophistiCat

Kant did not argue that the world of the noumenon does not exist, for there to be an appearance, there must be something for there to be an appearance of. In Kantian philosophy, a noumenon is a thing as it is in itself, as distinct from a thing as it is knowable by the senses through phenomenal attributes.

There are things in the world, and as facts in the world they are real. But, our understanding of complex objects, such as tables, which are assemblies of things in the world, is fictive.

First, most people on the forum here don't accept personal experience as evidence. A good example is reported personal experience of God. Based on that, there is no evidence at all for qualia, so, yes, it is a metaphysical property or meaningless. No, I don't believe that — T Clark

Your previous statement was "There is strong evidence that I experience the color red. When you hold up a card colored red, ask me what color it is, and then I say red. When my brain lights up in a red way on the MRI. That's all evidence."

Your new statement seems contradictory to your previous statement.

Your new statement seems to say that there cannot be evidence for what may be called "qualia".
Your previous statement seems to say that there can be evidence for what may be called "qualia"

Previously you used the term 'fictional', which means imagined, now you have changed to 'fictive' which has different, although related, connotations, for me at least. (Perhaps I should look them up in the fictionary) — Janus

To save you having to look words up in the dictionary, both fictive and fictional are adjectives describing literary ideas created by the imagination, ideas that are unreal or untrue.

However, fictive is more creative, or more imaginative, than fictional, as in the fictive world of Blade Runner and the fictional world of Around the World in Eighty Days.

There is strong evidence that I experience the color red. When you hold up a card colored red, ask me what color it is, and then I say red. When my brain lights up in a red way on the MRI. That's all evidence — T Clark

The MRI scanner can make measurements of your brain when you look at the colour red, but can the MRI scanner determine that you are experiencing what Chalmers calls the "qualia" of the colour red and others call the subjective experience of the colour red ?