What Kimhi adds to this, in a manner I'm still grappling with, is the unity part: the claim that "the assertion 'p is true' is the same as 'I truly think p'." — J

I don't have access to Thinking and Being, so am using reviews of the book.

Khimi does seem to say that the expression "is true" in a proposition such as "the Moon circles the Earth is true" is redundant.

If I assert that the proposition "the Moon circles the Earth" is true, am I not asserting my belief that the Moon circles the Earth, that I truly think that the Moon circles the Earth?
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The proper object of an assertion of falsehood is always a proposition or representation, whereas the proper object of an assertion of truth can be reality itself. — Leontiskos

The assertion of both truth and falsity about reality

Accepting that the Moon is not made of cheese, the proposition "the Moon is made of cheese" is false, and the proposition "the moon is not made of cheese" is true.

The assertion of truth, that "the Moon is not made of cheese" is an assertion about reality, in that the Moon is not made of cheese.

But what about the assertion of falsity, that "the Moon is made of cheese", What is being asserted. It can only be that the Moon is made of cheese, meaning that an assertion of falsity is also an assertion about what does and doesn't exist in reality.

In this instance, the objects of assertions of both truth and falsity are about reality.

The symmetry of truth and falsity

I only know the meaning of the true proposition that "the Moon is not made of cheese" if I also know the meaning of propositions that are false, such as "the Moon is made of butter", "the Moon is made of diamonds" and "the Moon is made of aluminium".

In this sense, one only knows how to speak about a proposition that is true providing that one also knows about propositions that are false

Perhaps this is what Kimhi means by "speaking of truth one can equally well speak of falsehood". Though in fact, it is more the case that one can only speak the truth by being able to speak about falsehoods.
===============================================================================

There was truth in creation before the serpent spoke, and falsehood (and doubt!) only emerged by and through his speaking. — Leontiskos

On the other hand, truth and falsity only exists as a relation between language and the world.

"Parmenides of Elea was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher from Elea in Magna Graecia" is true IFF Parmenides of Elea was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher from Elea in Magna Graecia.

Before the serpent spoke, as pre-language there cannot be truth or falsity, there was no truth or falsity in creation.

As for "this sentence is false" or 'this statement is false"... its essentially meaningless because it doesn't actually "state" anything ie stating something requires the subject of the statement to be separate from the statement itself — Benj96

:100:

It can also be resolved another way by changing the statement itself from "this statement is false" to something like "this statements grammar false is" in this way it remains self referential but justifies falsity by adding a variable to contextualise its falsity - namely erroneous structure. — Benj96

I think that "This statements grammar false is" can be compared to Chomsky's "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously".

"Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" is grammatically correct, yet nonsensical.

The fact that "this statements grammar false is" has an erroneous structure (within English, though perhaps not in other languages) means that it is not grammatical, and if not grammatical, cannot have a meaning.

And if has no meaning, can be neither self-referential nor not-self-referential.

When I see a red box falling on my foot causing me to feel pain, it would be as sensible to say that I see the colour red because the box is red as it would be to say that I feel pain because the box is in pain.

Or in other words, the logical space of events or state of affairs, that which is, defined, by, again, what something is not. Positive facts are mutually related by negative facts in logical space. — Shawn

Yes. If the apple is not on the Moon, then it could be in Australia, it could be on Mars or it could be in New York, where "could" is a modal verb showing possibility.

There is a logical space of modal possibilities, possible states of affairs. Then a fact is a state of affairs that obtains (though this is not necessarily what is given in the Tractatus).

The negative fact, such as the apple is not on the Moon, can be related to a positive fact by the modal possibility in logical space that the apple could be in front of me.

Wittgenstein once said that the totality of facts makes up the world. Now, facts are determined from the sum total of counterfactuals determining what are "facts". — Shawn

There are positive facts, such as this apple is in front of me, and there are negative facts, such as this apple is not on the Moon.

Bertrand Russell thought that there were negative facts, whereas Wittgenstein didn't think that there were negative facts.

Assuming that a negative fact is a counter-factual, as Wittgenstein didn't think that there were negative facts, for Wittgenstein, a positive fact, ie, a fact, cannot therefore be either defined or determined by a negative fact, ie, a counter-factual.

Where it gets bizarre with Kimhi is his further claim that p itself is syncategorematic. You’re right that he regards p as a fact rather than a Fregean complex, but how then is p used? What is the context we need to provide in order to state a relation involving p? I don’t think that, e.g., joining it with q in ‛p & q’ helps. The problem lies in how facts are asserted – how they’re affirmed or denied. — J

I think Kimhi wants to say something more radical – that the context needed to make use of (syncategorematic) ‛p’ has to involve a monistic understanding of what it is to assert. — J

Following on from @Leontiskos, it seems that truth and existence are meta-predicates rather than predicates.
Not "the apple is on the table is true" but "the apple is on the table" is true.
Not "the apple exists" but "the apple" exists.

For Khimi, the proposition "p" is a syncategorematic expression, where "p" is a fact.

Khimi agrees with Frege that a proposition can be both asserted (reference) and unasserted (sense), but whereas Frege thinks that sense and reference can be disassociated, Khimi disagrees and believes that sense and reference are two parts of a single unity

The fact that "I saw the Morning Star" is both asserted, in that it refers to the planet Venus,
and unasserted, in that its sense is of a star the rises in the morning.

For Frege, "unicorns are mythical creatures" can have a sense, a horse-like animal with a single projecting horn from its forehead, even though it doesn't have a reference.

For Khimi, if a proposition has a sense, then it must also have a reference, as sense and reference cannot be disassociated.

Khimi agrees with Wittgenstein that there are no negative facts,

It comes back to Wittgenstein's puzzle, how can not-p negate p, when p may not be the case.

Khimi holds that the idea of a judgement without a contrary is incoherent, in that if I judge the postbox to be red, then I must also be judging whether the postbox is not-red.

This makes sense in that I only know what something is when I know what it isn't.

I only know what it means for there to be rain if I also know what it means for there not to be rain.

To know something, I must know not only "p" but also "not-p".

This concept is mirrored in Wittgenstein's truth tables in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein did not invent truth tables, but their use in modern logic is usually traced back to the Tractatus. Because an exhaustive list of the truth-possibilities of a proposition tells us everything we need to know about that proposition, the truth table then shows us what we need to know about that proposition.

For example, the proposition "It will rain" can be understood by all its possibilities: "it will rain and I will get wet", "it will rain and I won't get wet", "it won't rain and I will get wet" and ""it won't rain and I won't get wet".

A fact such as "p" has meaning only when it can be judged to be "not-p".

A fact such as "the postbox is red" has meaning to me when I can judge whether it is "not-red"

For Khimi, the proposition "the postbox is red" has a sense, as well as a reference, but also "the postbox is not-red" must have a sense as well as a reference, as sense and reference cannot be disassociated.

The question is, what does "the postbox is not-red" refer to?

The colour purple is not-red, as well as the colours orange, brown, turquoise and violet.

Therefore, the colour not-red could be the colour violet.,

Therefore "the postbox is not-red" could be referring to "the postbox is violet".

This introduces possible modal worlds. Wittgenstein is important for his introduction of modality.

From the SEP article Possible Worlds

However, the predominant version of combinatorialism finds its origins in Russell's (1918/1919) theory of logical atomism and Wittgenstein's (1921, 1922, 1974) short but enormously influential Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

IE, "p", although syncategorematic, gets its meaning from its contradictory pair "not-p".

All sorts of interesting questions hinge on getting clear about “and”, “or”, “if/IFF”, “can”, “must”, et al. -- well, who knows, maybe we need a better understanding of “on” too. — J

Yes, there are many logical systems other than Frege's First-Order Logic, such as noted in the Wikipedia article on Non-classical logic. Some, I am sure, not invented yet.

When we give the name "Y" to X, we then say such things as "Y is X". When you give the name "Buppy" to your dog, you then write "Bubby is my dog". When I give the name "The Pentastring" to "This sentence has five words" I then write "The Pentastring is "This sentence has five words"".
You SKIP the examples:
A puppy was born on August 30, 2024 at 8:00 AM in the house at 100 Main Street in Smalltown, Kansas. That puppy was named "Noorbicks". Noorbicks is the puppy born on August 30, 2024 at 8:00 AM in the house at 100 Main Street in Smalltown, Kansas. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I agree that when we give the name "Y" to X, we can then say "Y is X"

For example, when we give the name "Noorbicks" to the puppy born in Smalltown, Kansas, we can then say "Noorbicks is the puppy born in Smalltown, Kansas"

But this is not what you are doing. You are giving the name "The Pentastring" to "this sentence has five words". You are not giving the name "The Pentastring" to this sentence has five words.

Knowing that "The Pentastring is this sentence has five words" gives me no knowledge about the existence or not in the world of the Pentastring, meaning that I cannot say anything about The Pentastring in the world.

This includes being able to say that The Pentastring is "this sentence has five words".

Thanks, this helps. "Representing" is describing in words, while "mirroring" is more like ostension or making a picture. I'm not satisfied with how this carries over into logical form
(is "on" really a logical connective?), but that can wait till another day. — J

Another day has arrived.

True, prepositions such as "on" are not logical connectives, but rather syncategorematic.

From the Wikipedia article on Syncategorematic term

The distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms was established in ancient Greek grammar. Words that designate self-sufficient entities (i.e., nouns or adjectives) were called categorematic, and those that do not stand by themselves were dubbed syncategorematic, (i.e., prepositions, logical connectives, etc.)

Khimi uses the concept of an a syncategorematic expression, where a syncategorematic expression does not add anything to the sense of any proposition embedded in it.

Therefore, within the proposition "p is true", the expression "is true" is a syncategorematic expression, which adds nothing to the sense of "p".

From the Notre Dame review of Irad Khimi's Thinking and Being

A syncategorematic expression does not add anything (whether content or form) to the sense of any proposition embedded in it. On Kimhi's account, the assertions "Not-p", "A thinks p", "p is true" and, last but not least, "p" itself, do not add anything whatsoever to the sense of "p". None of these expressions stands for a relation. In fact, none of them stands for anything. They all are syncategorematic expressions. That the assertion "p" is itself a syncategorematic unit becomes intelligible once it is realized that the propositional symbol "p" consists in a fact rather than a complex (100).

This means that the proposition "the apple is on the table" is also a syncategorematic unit, meaning that it cannot stand by itself, as not being a self-sufficient entity. In terms of the Tractatus, this proposition is a fact rather than a complex, where a complex would be "the apple is on the table and the table is brown in colour". Complexes derive from facts using truth tables.

I think that I can understand that a Tracterian fact, such as the proposition "the apple is on the table" cannot stand by itself, in the same way the the equally valid proposition "matunda ni juu ya meza" cannot stand by itself, in that any proposition needs a context in order for it to be meaningful.

Syncategorematic expressions need a context.

"This sentence has five words" was named "The Pentastring". The Pentastring is "This sentence has five words". — TonesInDeepFreeze

I have no problem with "this sentence has five words" being named "The Pentastring". In other words, "The Pentastring is this sentence has five words".

My fundamental problem is that it is logically impossible to go from knowledge about the content of an expression, such as "The Pentastring is this sentence has five words", to knowledge about something that may or may not exist in the world, such as The Pentastring.

It is logically impossible to go from knowing that "unicorns are grey in colour" to knowing whether unicorns do or not exist in the world.

There is no logical connection between "This sentence has five words" was named "The Pentastring" and The Pentastring is "this sentence has five words".

As you said:

"London" is a city. (false - "London" is a word, not a city) — TonesInDeepFreeze

Can you say what the difference is between "representing" logical form and "mirroring" logical form? The example of the apple on the table suggests that, while "on" is undefinable without circularity, its logical form can nevertheless be shown through usage. That doesn't sound like the same issue -- or is it? — J

Suppose there are two people in a room, A and B. A has prior knowledge about apples on tables. B doesn't have prior knowledge, but wants to know about apples on tables.

Situation 1) The room is windowless. A describes in words to B what it means for there to be an apple on a table

Situation 2) The room has a window. A points to the window, and B sees through the window that there is an apple on a table.

In 1), the logic of an apple on a table is being "represented", it is being "said"

In 2), the logic of an apple on a table is being "mirrored", it is being "shown"

The problem with 1) is that if B has never previously been "shown" an example of one thing on top of another thing, B will never understand what A is saying, will never understand what is being "said".

Yes, because the word "on" is undefinable without being infinite or circular, its logical form cannot be "said", but its logical form can be "shown".

The question we are considering is whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism.

Within the literature, it seems to me that the words i) assertic force, asserted, force, extrinsic and assertion seem to be synonyms for Frege's "reference" and the words ii) content, semantic, intrinsic and unasserted seem to be synonyms for Frege's "sense".

From the Wikipedia article on Formalism (Philosophy)
Formalists within a discipline are completely concerned with "the rules of the game," as there is no other external truth that can be achieved beyond those given rules.

In these terms, situation 1) is a formalist situation.

But within situation 1), B, never having had prior knowledge of an apple on a table, no matter the words used by A, will never know the truth of what it means for there to be an apple on a table

IE, within a Formalist situation, B can never know the truth of the proposition "there is an apple on the table". True sentences can never be formulable within Formalism.

Hmm. Not quite sure I get this. Can you refer us to some passages in the Tractatus? — J

Wittgenstein argues in the TLP that propositions cannot represent logical form, that logical form cannot be expressed in language.

Logical form can only be mirrored in language, shown in propositions.

TLP 4.0312 My fundamental idea is that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.

TLP 4.12 Propositions can represent the hole of reality, but they cannot represent what they have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.

TLP 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.

TLP 4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said

As a practical example, given the proposition "the apple is on the table", how can the logical constant "on" be expressed in language?

The Merriam Webster defines "on" as "used as a function word to indicate position in contact with and supported by the top surface of". It then defines "top" as "the highest point, level, or part of something". It then defines "high" as "an elevated place or region". Any attempt to express "on" in language becomes either infinite or circular.

If logical constants cannot be expressed in language, then there is a dualism between language and its logic.

Khimi, however, believes that there is a psychological/logical monism.

Typical statement: “The critical insight -- that any unity in consciousness is essentially self-consciousness of that unity -- is recognized to coincide with the insight that the consciousness of logical activity is inseparable from the capacity to manifest this activity in language.” — J

Depends what he means by "manifest". From Merriam Webster, a synonym of "manifest" is "show".

As Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, one can show logic but not say it.

Kimhi will have a hard time in arguing for a psychological/logical monism, and against the dualism of psychological saying and logical showing. Language can be said, but the logic within language can only be shown.

This is a little tricky. Doesn't it depend on exactly what we mean by "say 'p'"? — J

As you wrote:

I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J

Yes, the expression "p is true" says no more than "p".

I agree that "says no more" is a figure of speech, but is intended to have the same meaning as your "adds nothing".

Consider the sentence "there are a hundred thalers on the table is true".

Because the word "true" is internal to the sentence, it cannot be making a judgment or assertion about either i) the other parts of the sentence it is within or ii) the sentence as a whole.

For the word "true" to be making a judgment or assertion about the sentence "there are a hundred thalers on the table" it will have to be external, such as "it is true that "there are a hundred thalers on the table"".

In other words, a sentence cannot be "self-conscious", using another figure of speech.

So this seems like quite a parallel between “truth” and “existence, — J

As I see it, truth is about the relation between different things, and these different things exist.

The expression "p is true" says no more than "p"
We can't meaningfully say "p" is true, because there is no relation, but we can say "p" is true IFF p

We can't meaningfully say "x", but we can say "x exists"

For example, "there are a hundred thalers on the table" is true IFF there are a hundred thalers on the table.

Where "there are a hundred thalers on the table" exists in language and a hundred thalers on the table exists in the world.

What I'm trying to pin down is whether anyone has addressed specifically the apparent parallel between "Existence is not a predicate" and "Truth is not a predication." Does it ring any bells? — J

I agree that the following doesn't help in knowing which philosophers addressed the problem, but is just a couple of random thoughts.

"A hundred thalers exist"
In the expression "A hundred thalers are heavy", what is the predicate "are heavy" referring to?

The predicate "are heavy" cannot be referring to the expression in language "A hundred thalers", as an expression cannot be heavy. The predicate "are heavy" must be referring to a hundred thalers in the world.

"A hundred thalers are heavy" is true IFF a hundred thalers are heavy.

Similarly, in the expression in language "A hundred thalers exist", the predicate "exist" is not referring to the expression in language "A hundred thalers", which would be a redundancy, but is referring to a hundred thalers in the world.

"A hundred thalers exist" is true IFF a hundred thalers exist.

IE, the expression "a hundred thalers exist" is a valid statement.

"It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table"
If I told someone that "there are a hundred thalers on the table", they may not believe me. This forces me to say "it is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table".

But in language as we don't normally use quotation marks, what I am actually saying is ""it is true that "there are a hundred thalers on the table""

IE, I am not saying "it is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table", but rather ""it is true that "there are a hundred thalers on the table"".

Can you possibly see how answering this (again) might be considered "feeding the trolls"? — bongo fury

I am making a case that your previous statement was factually wrong, and am backing my case up with additional evidence from Yannis Stephanou's book A Theory of Truth

If you think that this is being inflammatory and provocative, then I'm sorry.

I won't bother you again.

So your comments aren't helping you or RussellA to understand the passage. — bongo fury

Given ""This sentence is false" is false"

So which sentence is attributing falsity no longer to itself but merely to something other than itself?

This topic is mentioned Yannis Stephanou in his book A Theory of Truth in chapter 1, Aspects of Paradox.

One line of reasoning that leads to contradiction relies on the schema (T)
S is true iff p.

Some versions of the liar involve falsity rather than truth.
Take the sentence (6)
(6) is false.
This sentence attributes falsity to itself.
By (T), (6) is true iff (6) is false.

From Quine, ""This sentence is false" is false"
From Stephanou, (6) is false
Therefore (6) is "This sentence is false"

From Stephanou, the sentence (6) attributes falsity to itself
Therefore, ""this sentence is false" attributes falsity to itself

From Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays

"the whole outside sentence here attributes falsity no longer to itself but merely to something other than itself".

Therefore, "this sentence is false" is the outside sentence.

This is what I read both Quine and Stephanou to be saying.

Not wanting you to waste your time on my ludicrous arguments, I will just make the following point, which seems central to your argument that a self-referential sentence can be meaningful:

Let "The Pentastring" refer to "This sentence has five words". — TonesInDeepFreeze

OK
===============================================================================

The Pentastring has five words, since the Pentastring is "This sentence has five words" and "This sentence has five words" has five words. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Separating into parts

IF - the Pentastring is "this sentence has five words"

Incorrect. As you have said many times on this thread, something in the world cannot be an expression in language. Using the model of "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, then "the Pentastring" exists in language and the Pentastring exists in the world.

"London" is a city. (false - "London" is a word, not a city) — TonesInDeepFreeze

The Pentastring may be named as "this sentence has five words", but the Pentastring isn't "this sentence has five words".

AND - "this sentence has five words" has five words

OK

THEN - the Pentastring has five words

Incorrect conclusion.

The following are OK:
The Pentastring may be named "this sentence has five words"
"This sentence has five words" has five words

Just because the name of the Pentastring has five words, it doesn't follow that the Pentastring itself has five words.

Just because a name for the Eiffel Tower has two words, it doesn't follow that the Eiffel Tower itself has two words.
===============================================================================

"The Pentastring has five words" asserts that "This sentence has five words" has five words. — TonesInDeepFreeze

"The Pentastring has five words" is not how "the Pentastring" has been defined.

Suppose we define 'the Pentastring' as the "This string has five words". — TonesInDeepFreeze

For the sake of argument, using sentence instead of string

Then "the Pentastring is this sentence has five words"

Therefore, "the Pentastring is this sentence has five words" is true IFF the Pentastring is this sentence has five words.

Also, "the Pentastring has five words" is true IFF the Pentastring has five words

But, the Pentastring is this sentence has five words is not the same as the Pentastring has five words.

Therefore, "the Pentastring has five words" is not how "the Pentastring" has been defined.
===============================================================================

"This sentence has five words" asserts that "This sentence has five words" has five words. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Same problem as before.

And I may stipulate that in the context of my post, "This sentence" refers to "This sentence has five words"...On what basis is it claimes "This sentence has five words" not meaningful? — TonesInDeepFreeze

On the basis of infinite recursion.

Self-referential case
In the self-referential case, "this sentence, the sentence "this sentence contains five words", contains five words".
But we know that this sentence is the sentence "this sentence contains five words".
Therefore, "this sentence, the sentence "the sentence "this sentence contains five words" contains five words", contains five words".
Ad infinitum. Infinite recursion. Therefore meaningless. — RussellA

In " "this sentence is false" is false", "this sentence is false" is the inside sentence — bongo fury

In the expression ""this sentence is false" is false", what does Quine mean by "outside sentence".

Does he mean "this sentence is false", or does he mean ""this sentence is false" is false"

Quine says that the outside sentence is no longer attributing falsity to itself.

I would have thought that the sentence "this sentence is false" is no longer attributing falsity to itself.

What would it mean for the sentence ""this sentence is false" is false" to be no longer attributing falsity to itself?

No. Quine doesn't say that, and he doesn't say anyone else has said that. — bongo fury

Quine said:

But the whole outside sentence here attributes falsity no longer to itself but merely to something other than itself, thereby engendering no paradox.

I interpret Quine as saying that in the expression "this sentence is false" is false, the outside sentence is "this sentence is false". It seems to me that Quine is saying that there is no paradox because the outside sentence is not referring to itself but to something other than itself. Quine is saying that there is a hierarchy of references.

IE, "this sentence is false" is not being used self-referentially.

How do you interpret what Quine is saying?

here's Quine — bongo fury

The professor looks at a Geography student's essay and says to the student: this sentence is false.
The student had written "Paris is in Germany".
As Quine might say, there is no paradox with the professor saying "Paris is in Germany" is false.

The professor looks at a Philosophy student's essay and says to the student: this sentence is false.
The student had written "this sentence is false", referring to the sentence "Quine was born in 1908".
As Quine says, in this situation, there's no paradox with "this sentence is false" is false
There's no paradox because, as Quine says, "this sentence is false" is referring to something other than itself.

But the whole outside sentence here attributes falsity no longer to itself but merely to something other than itself, thereby engendering no paradox. Quine

The paradox arises when "this sentence is false" is not referring to something other than itself. IE, when it is self-referential.

Wrong. "This sentence has five words" is "This sentence has five words". They are the same linguistic object. As RussellA himself says, the wording is identical. So they are the same sentence. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Picking up on just one of your 33 comments:

Mary in 1975 in New York said "This sentence has five words".
Rafael in 1923 in Rio de Janeiro said "This sentence has five words"

Just because the wording is identical, this doesn't mean that they are the same sentence, the same linguistic object. In part, because we don't know what sentence they are referring to.

However, I don't want to waste any more of your time if my arguments are dialectically incompetent.

But that's not fair to the inquiry, since the fact that one dialectically incompetent poster can't come up with a good argument for his claim should not be taken to entail that no one can. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It’s really simple; the self-referential sentence “this sentence contains five words” is meaningful. I understand what it means, you understand what it means, and everyone else understands what it means. It’s not some foreign language or random combination of words. And we can count the words in the sentence to determine that it’s true. — Michael

Question: how do you avoid the problem of infinite recursion in a self-referential sentence?

"This sentence contains five words".

Non self-referential case
Let "this sentence" refer to the sentence "this sentence contains five words"

Then, "this sentence, the sentence "this sentence contains five words", contains five words". This is meaningful.

Note that the sentence "this sentence contains five words" is not the same sentence as "this sentence contains five words", even though the wording is identical. These are two completely different sentences.

Note that the truth of the sentence "this sentence contains five words" is independent of the truth of the sentence "this sentence contains five words".

Self-referential case
In the self-referential case, "this sentence, the sentence "this sentence contains five words", contains five words".
But we know that this sentence is the sentence "this sentence contains five words".
Therefore, "this sentence, the sentence "the sentence "this sentence contains five words" contains five words", contains five words".
Ad infinitum. Infinite recursion. Therefore meaningless.

Note that in the self-referential case, the sentence "this sentence contains five words" is the same sentence.

It’s meaningful even when it’s referring to itself. — Michael

From Wikipedia -Meaning (Philosophy)

In philosophy—more specifically, in its sub-fields semantics, semiotics, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metasemantics—meaning "is a relationship between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they intend, express, or signify".

If "this sentence contains five words" is referring to itself, then "this sentence contains five words" means that "this sentence contains five words".

In other words, "X" means "X".

In logic, the law of identity states that each thing is identical with itself.

I agree that "X" means "X", but how can "X" be described as a meaningful sentence?

I maintain that barbers are people who shave people who are in the world.......................Therefore, if a barber tries to shave himself, there is an inherent contradiction. — bongo fury

Makes sense to me. I've never understood any validity in the barber paradox.

The expression ‘secondary employment’, also commonly referred to as ‘double jobbing’, simply describes a situation where an employee takes on a second job.

During the day, someone works as an engineer in an engineering works. In order to pay their rent, during the evening they work in a cafe as a barista.

No one would call someone who serves you coffee an engineer.

No one would call someone welding machinery a barista.

As you say, being a barber is what someone does, not what they are.

The redundancy theory of truth usually applies to all sentences, whether it be "this sentence contains five words" or "it is raining". Seems strange to only apply it to self-referential sentences. — Michael

Not the case.

I did include the non self-referential example:

To say that "a horse is a horse" is true is saying no more than "a horse is a horse".

I also included Frege's 1918 comment:

It is worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets" has the same content as the sentence "it is true that I smell the scent of violets". So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth.

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But even then, there's still nothing problematic with the sentence "this sentence contains five words". It is meaningful, despite your protestations to the contrary. — Michael

I totally agree that there is nothing problematic with the sentence "this sentence contains five words", and can indeed be a meaningful sentence.

As long as "this sentence contains five words" is not referring to itself.

Which sentence were you referring to when you made these statements? — EricH

1) "this sentence contains five words" is true IFF this sentence contains five words

We don't know what "this sentence" is referring to, but, for example, it could be referring to the sentence "this house is grey in colour", "this book is important", "this animal is a cat" or "this sentence has five words".

Suppose it is referring to the sentence "this sentence has five words".

In language is the sentence "This sentence has five words"

I see on my screen the following shapes - This sentence has five words - which I recognize as the sentence "This sentence has five words".

2) This sentence has five words. Not true? Yes, true.

I am using the model of "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white.

Not being in quotation marks - this sentence has five words - is something that exists in the world, for example, on my screen, and is true in the sense that I can see it on my screen, rather than not see it on my screen.

In context we do know. — Michael

I agree that in the context of a thread on the Liar Paradox, the discussion is about can a self-referential sentence have any meaning.

If you want to be explicit, then: The self-referential sentence "this sentence contains five words" is true. — Michael

Truth depends on a correspondence between language and the world

To be even more explicit, if in the sentence "this sentence contains five words" the expression "this sentence" is referring to "this sentence contains five words", can the sentence "this sentence contains five words" have a truth-value, or is it meaningless.

You are arguing that "this sentence contains fifty words" has a truth-value.

I am arguing that any concept of truth in a self-referential expression is redundant.

My belief is that an expression in language can only have a truth-value if it corresponds with something in the world.

I accept Tarski's paradigm for defining truth, ie, Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth:
"snow is white" is true IFF snow is white.

It can be argued what exactly this world is, but whatever the world is, it is external to a linguistic expression.

In the self-referential sentence, as the sentence is referring to itself, it cannot be referring to any world that exists outside of itself.

If a self-referential sentence is not referring to anything in the world, then it can have no truth-value.

In cases of linguistic self-reference, the concept of truth is redundant

1) "This sentence contains five words" is true IFF "this sentence contains five words".
The word true is redundant in that:
"This sentence contains five words" IFF "this sentence contains five words"

In the Wikipedia article Redundancy Theory of Truth

Gottlob Frege was probably the first philosophical logician to express something very close to the idea that the predicate "is true" does not express anything above and beyond the statement to which it is attributed. In 1892, he wrote:

One can, indeed, say: "The thought that 5 is a prime number is true." But closer examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence "5 is a prime number." The truth claim arises in each case from the form of the declarative sentence, and when the latter lacks its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even the sentence "The thought that 5 is a prime number is true" contains only a thought, and indeed the same thought as the simple "5 is a prime number."[1]

In 1918, he argued:

It is worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets" has the same content as the sentence "it is true that I smell the scent of violets". So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth.[2][3]

To say that "a horse is a horse" is true is saying no more than "a horse is a horse".

To say that "this sentence contains fifty words" is true is saying no more than "this sentence contains fifty words".

To say that "x" is true is saying no more than "x".

Truth only enters when self-reference disappears and the world appears:
"x" is true IFF x

The words "has" and "contain" have identical meaning in the context of this discussion. — EricH

I agree.

Conclusion? "This sentence contains five words" is true. QED — EricH

No one would say that "this house contains five rooms" is true without first knowing which house is being referred to.

No one would say that "this book contains important knowledge" is true without first knowing
which book is being referred to.

Therefore, how can any one say that "this sentence contains five words" is true if no one knows which sentence is being referred to?

For example, so far, we have three sentences:

1) The sentence "this house contains five rooms", which happens to contain five words.
2) The sentence "this book contains important knowledge", which happens to contain five words
3) The sentence "this sentence contains five words", which happens to contain five words.

The sentence "this sentence contains five words" isn't telling us which sentence is being referred to.

Therefore, how do we know that it is true?

Do you think each of them is dependent on each other, or should we look at them individually? — javi2541997

Perhaps the following:

I know I see the colour red independently of any beliefs, thoughts or attitudes I may have towards sunsets.
I cannot have a belief about sunsets without having thoughts or attitudes towards them.
I cannot have a thought about sunsets without having an attitude towards them.
I cannot have an attitude towards sunsets without thinking about them, having beliefs about them or knowing about them.
I cannot have a thought about sunsets without having a belief in them or knowing about them.
I cannot have a belief about sunsets without knowing about them.

IE, I can know something like the colour red without having any beliefs, thoughts or attitudes towards it. But if I have a belief, thought or attitude towards something like a sunset, then I must know something about it.

The self-referential sentence "this sentence contains five words" is true because it contains five words.........................This is incredibly straightforward. — Michael

I wish it were.

"Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white.

The sentence "this house is very tall" contains five words.
The sentence "this sentence contains five words" also contains five words.

"This house is very tall" is true IFF this house is very tall, where this house is referring to, or pointing at, a particular house in the world.
Similarly, "this sentence contains five words" is true IFF this sentence contains five words, where this sentence is referring to, or pointing at, a particular sentence in the world.

It is not correct to say that the sentence "this house is very tall" is true because it contains five words.
Similarly, it is not correct to say that the sentence "this sentence contains five words" is true because it contains five words.

"This house is very tall" is true IFF this house is very tall, not because the sentence "this house is very tall" contains five words.
Similarly, "this sentence contains five words" is true IFF this sentence contains five words, not because the sentence "this sentence contains five words" contains five words.

The subjective content of the sentence "this sentence contains five words" cannot determine the objective form of itself, ie, that it contains five words.

What is a belief, and what is an attitude? — Noble Dust

There is also knowing. When looking at a sunset, I know that I see the colour red, I believe my seeing the colour red was caused by the sunset, I think that sunsets happen every day and I have a positive attitude towards them.

Knowing is more fundamental than believing, believing is more fundamental that thinking and thinking is more fundamental than having an attitude.

It's grounded in that we can count how many words are in the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words". There are five words, not fifty, and so the sentence is false. — Michael

Exactly. The sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" in order to have a truth value must be grounded in the world.

"This sentence contains fifty words" is true IFF this sentence contains fifty words.

The sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" in order to have a truth value cannot be grounded in itself. The expression "this sentence" within "this sentence contains fifty words" cannot be referring to itself, ie, it cannot be referring to "this sentence contains fifty words".

All I'm trying to say is that an expression that self-refers cannot be grounded in the world, and if not grounded in the world cannot have a truth value.

Form and content

I see on my computer screen the following shapes – this sentence contains fifty words.

I recognize these as words, part of a grammatical sentence, having the meaning "this sentence contains fifty words"

I can also see that on my computer screen that there are five words.

The subjective content of these words is "this sentence contains fifty words"

The objective form of these words is that there are five of them.

Subjective content and objective form are linked by:
"This sentence contains fifty words" is true IFF this sentence contains fifty words.

The word "truth" in the following would be redundant:
"This sentence contains fifty words" is true IFF "this sentence contains fifty words"

"this sentence contains five words" is grounded and is true.
"this sentence contains fifty words" is grounded and is false.
"this sentence is false" is ungrounded and is neither true nor false. — Michael

I agree with you that if the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is grounded in the world then it can have a truth value, and it is false.

For example:
"Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white
"This sentence contains fifty words" is true IFF this sentence contains fifty words.

Given the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words", whether it has a truth value or not all depends on what "this sentence" is referring to.

I have been trying to make the point that if "this sentence" refers to "this sentence has fifty words" then there is no grounding in the world and there can be no truth value.

I may be wrong, but you seemed to suggest that "this sentence" does refer to "this sentence has fifty words" when you said:

I do know that. It refers to itself, it contains five words, and so it doesn’t contain fifty words. — Michael

My question is, if the expression "this sentence" within "this sentence contains fifty words" is referring to itself, ie referring to "this sentence contains fifty words", then how can there be any grounding in the world?

I do know that. It refers to itself, it contains five words, and so it doesn’t contain fifty words. — Michael

In the sentence "this ferry contains fifty people", we don't normally think that "this ferry" is referring to the sentence "this ferry contains fifty people". We normally think that it is referring to a ferry in the world.

So why would we think that "this sentence" is referring to "this sentence contains fifty words". It seems more likely that "this sentence" is referring to another sentence.
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They are discussing the liar paradox. We are not discussing the liar paradox. We are discussing the sentences "this sentence contains five words" and "this sentence contains fifty words". — Michael

We are discussing self-referential expressions, of which the Liar Paradox is an example.

From the IEP article on Liar Paradox

The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The Classical Liar Sentence is the self-referential sentence: This sentence is false.

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From the SEP article on self-reference:... self-reference is not a sufficient condition for paradoxicality. The truth-teller sentence “This sentence is true” is not paradoxical, and neither is the sentence “This sentence contains four words” (it is false, though) — Michael

In language is the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words".

In language is the sentence "X"

The only means of knowing the truth value of "X" is by comparing it to the world, ie, by grounding it in the world.

From the Wikipedia article on the Liar Paradox

Kripke proposes a solution in the following manner. If a statement's truth value is ultimately tied up in some evaluable fact about the world, that statement is "grounded". If not, that statement is "ungrounded". Ungrounded statements do not have a truth value. Liar statements and liar-like statements are ungrounded, and therefore have no truth value.

This is why "X" is true IFF X, where "X" is in language and X is in the world.

An expression in language that referred to another expression in language, such as "this sentence" referring to "this sentence has fifty words", cannot be grounded in the world, and if not grounded in the world, can have no truth value,

As regards the SEP article.

In language, meaning is often inferred. If I said "Paris is cool", the listener might infer that I meant "Paris is an excellent city to visit as a tourist".

Similarly, if I said "this sentence contains fifty words", the listener may infer that I meant that this sentence, ie the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words", contains fifty words.

I agree that if the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is inferred to mean that this sentence, ie the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words", contains fifty words, then this is not paradoxical and is false.

However, we are not discussing what the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is inferred to mean, we are discussing what it literally means.

And because not grounded in the world, if "this sentence" is referring to "this sentence contains fifty words", it has no truth-value and is meaningless.

It is quite possible you and Tones went through this exact point, but honestly if I read through all 8 pages I might develop dementia before I even hit middle age. — Lionino

At least you have middle age to look forward to.

But you weren't talking about the liar paradox. You were talking about the sentences "this sentence contains five words" and "this sentence contains fifty words". These two sentences are meaningful, with the first being true and the second being false. — Michael

You say that the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is false.

But you don't know that. It all depends on which sentence "this sentence" is referring to.

In the same way, we don't know whether the sentence "this ferry contains fifty people" is true or false, if we don't know which ferry is being referred to.

Similarly, we don't know whether the sentence "this idea contains fifty thoughts" is true or false, if we don't know which idea is being referred to.

If "this sentence" is referring to the sentence "The Eiffel Tower is a lattice tower on the Champ de Mars in Paris, France. It is named after the engineer Gustave Eiffel, whose company designed and built the tower from 1887 to 1889. Nicknamed "La dame de fer", it was constructed as the centrepiece of the 1889 World's Fair" then this sentence does have fifty words.

If "this sentence" is referring to the sentence "The Eiffel Tower is a lattice tower" then this sentence doesn't have fifty words.

If "this sentence" is referring to itself, ie, "this sentence contains fifty words", then both the SEP and IEP discuss the problems of self-referential expressions.

The SEP article on the Liar Paradox starts with the sentence "The first sentence in this essay is a lie"

The IEP article Liar Paradox talks about "this sentence is a lie"

But there is insufficient information within the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" to know which sentence "this sentence" is referring to.

As we don't know which sentence "this sentence" is referring to, we cannot know whether the sentence "this sentence contains fifty words" is true, false or meaningless.

That you blatantly skip this point over and over is intellectual dishonesty. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Au revoir.