Excellent summary.

Consider it left.

You need to give Shannon & Weaver (Mathematical Theory of Communication,1949) a careful read.

No 7 says the opposite of what you are saying. No 7 says information is the creation of form. Which makes sense, otherwise you end up in an endless regress. — Pantagruel

What it says is:
"(now rare) The creation of form; the imparting of a given quality or characteristic; forming, animation."
Which has Aristotelian connotations (cf., hylomorphism).

Number 3 describes a process. — Pantagruel

Correct.

This isn't intended as a direct response to your point, but I have read a lot of information theory, starting with Pierce's early work. And I'm trained in coding. I don't think there is necessarily a facile answer one way or the other, it is a complex question, particularly when you consider the case of 'natural information'. — Pantagruel

Code and Form are specific and structured data: interrelated elements (foundational components).
From Communication Theory, code precedes information.

No.7 here, or No.3 here.

By definition, form (code) precedes information.

Yeah, like I have time for your vanity project. We are done here.

Good case in point.
You required a negative emoticon to communicate.

Okay, let's get simple: if your nation is invaded by another nation, aggression would be an appropriate (reasonable) response.

Inasmuch as the human psyche is a complex system which includes interactions between body, environment, sensitivity, affect, emotion, motivation, perception, cognisance (cognition and recognition), self awareness, and social awareness, the OP consists of simplistic (hence, unsound) premises and conclusions.

For example: it focuses on negative emotions (fear, hatred, envy, greed) without reference to positive emotions (e.g., attraction, interest, love, joy, acceptance, gratitude, relief, etc.), or to the combination of negative and positive emotions in secondary (or complex) emotions (e.g., submission, awe, remorse, aggressiveness, etc.) which are appropriate responses in various circumstances, or to social emotions (e.g., sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.) and common phobias which are essential to human survival.

Are you accusing me of lying, or of just being ambiguous? — Gnomon

I'm accusing you of willful ignorance.

If you think my definitions of Information gave Too Much Information (TMI). please don't look at the Information Philosopher website. It will boggle your mind. — Gnomon

Besides being presumptuous, that comment would be a case of psychological projection.
But I'm beginning to tire of such entertainment, so we are done here.

What did I miss? — Gnomon

The meaning of "equivocation" and "general definition".

Apart from that, I think it would be much more instructive to describe consciousness in terms of complex systems rather than in terms of information.

Perhaps a general definition of information is required which pertains to inorganic (physical), organic (biological), and semantic types of information.

Do you have one (or more) of those? — Galuchat

Sure. First, here's a general definition from the Enformationism Glossary : — Gnomon

Obviously not.
A definition in terms of probability is a mathematical definition, and Bateson's definition is a semantic definition, and a thermodynamic definition would be a physical definition, etc.
But keep working on it, even if it's not terribly relevant to the OP.

From the first two links in this post, information is:

1) the latent power of mental contents
2) That algorithm of Consciousness
3) the answer to a question that resolves some uncertainty
4) an integral component of Sentience, Consciousness, and Cognition. It is the raw material of Reason, the essence of Knowledge, and the structure of Mind.
5) the conscious motive behind an act of speech: Intention
6) extracted pieces of meaning are then labeled generically as information
7) A quality of physical patterns and processes that stimulates meaning to emerge in a mind. Since it has few directly perceivable qualities itself, generic information is usually defined in terms of its context or container. Unlike colorless, odorless, and formless water though, Information gives physical form to whatever contains it. In the Enformationism thesis it is the single Substance of the whole World.

And in this post, information is energy, and causation, and "both Energy and Matter."

Immaterial Information (energy) transforms into concrete Matter via the process of "Phase Change". It's a well-known physical phenomenon, but still a bit mysterious without an understanding that Information (causation) is both Energy and Matter. — Gnomon

Perhaps a general definition of information is required which pertains to inorganic (physical), organic (biological), and semantic types of information.

Do you have one (or more) of those?

Then dissipation. Then heat death.

Everything emerges from Platonic mathematics, monkeys evolve into transhumans, then heat death.
Next question. :wink:

What do Doctors mean when they say, "The patient regained consciousness two hours ago."?

Consciousness (mass noun): aware (perceptive and cognisant) and sensitive (responsive to stimuli) mind-body conditions.

Consciousness (noun): conscious (actively aware and physiologically unconstrained) mind-body condition.

So, affect and cognition proceed from consciousness(mn), and from these, all other mental conditions and actions. Objectivity (body and environment) is consciousness input, and acts (corporeal actions) are consciousness output.

Thanks for your elaboration.

Could it be reasonable to assume that our perceived reality is (just) an external projection i.e. a representation of how we excogitate internally. And in that way is it perhaps just a ‘tool’ that we have developed in order to better process our ideas? — Yanni Nicolandos

Hello, Yanni.
For starters, what is:
1) Perceived reality? And how does it differ from unperceived reality, or reality in general?
2) An external projection? And how does it differ from an internal projection, or projection in general?
3) Internal excogitation? And how does it differ from external excogitation, or excogitation in general?
4) An idea, and how is it processed?

In short: crowds function on emotion, not thought, so; are capable of being easily directed (or manipulated), but not of providing direction.

The biggest problem with using the term "subjectivity" for this sort of thing is that, if at any time you find you want to refer to a consciousness' outlook, too, the term "subjectivity" is no longer easily available: you'll either have to find a way to integrate a typology (e.g. personal vs. generalised subjectivity - which could be hard, or might not work as seamlessly as you'd hope), or you'll have to find another term (which could become an entry barrier for other people, when it comes to adopting the terminology). — Dawnstorm

The shop is an organised social subgroup, having a culture (collective mindset) which predisposes its members to certain behaviours.

When the shop assistant agrees to grant me a 1-cent reduction, it is because he/she and I have a common understanding of the situation (intersubjectivity).

A crowd produces affective intersubjectivity among its constituents through the operation of many individual mirror neuron systems.

The term "Collective Subjectivity" (group, aggregate, or compound subjectivity?) confuses the distinction between social and cognitive psychology, whereas; "Intersubjectivity" (mutual subjectivity) seems better suited to bridge these domains.

Intersubjectivity overrides culture/social norms due to salience.

Competent urban planning mitigates the effects of crowd behaviour.

What seems to be more at issue is whether or not crowd behaviour:
1) Is spontaneously destructive (physically and/or socially), and
2) May be directed toward a productive end.

If the latter, direction is provided by leadership, which is a result of organisation (whether egalitarian or hierarchical), whereby the crowd ceases to be a crowd by definition.

Also, what did you mean by (3), 'Anti-normative collective action'? — StreetlightX

The typical reaction of the individual members of a group to situational factors without consideration of societal norms.

Canetti again:...
"In the crowd the individual feels that he is transcending the limits of his own person. He has a sense of relief, for the distances are removed which used to throw him back on himself and shut him in. With the lifting of these burdens of distance he feels free; his freedom is the crossing of these boundaries." — StreetlightX

Rather than a sublimation of individuation, I think a sense of empowerment and diffused responsibility are products of deindividuation.

As Jodi Dean writes: "the primary characteristic of a crowd is its operation as a force of its own, like an organism. The crowd is more than an aggregate of individuals. It is individuals changed through the torsion of their aggregation, the force aggregation exerts back on them to do together what is impossible alone". — StreetlightX

Crowd: transitory, unorganised, social group consisting of people who have undergone deindividuation.

Deindividuation: loss of self (personal and social) identity and acquisition of anonymity, caused by sensitivity to circular interactions with others which affect the arousal system, and result in:

1) Intersubjective affect.
2) Disconnection of social norms.
3) Anti-normative collective action.

The OP conflates language, speech, aesthetics, and non-verbal communication.

My current conception:
Awareness is perception (sensation mental effect) and cognisance (perception acknowledgment). Perception is objective (fact-based), and cognisance is subjective (value-based). So, empathy is ethical awareness (awareness of morality and immorality). Ethical perception involves exteroception and mirror neuron operation. Ethical cognisance draws upon ethical knowledge (morality).

In what sense can empathy be said to be objective? — Echarmion

Check out recent research on mirror neurons.

If it's an immoral fact, then there must be some facts that are moral and some that are immoral. That is, immorality needs to be established in addition to the facts. Therefore, it's not sufficient to just establish the factual nature of an event to establish immorality. — Echarmion

Correct.
As explained here, empathy establishes what is moral and what is immoral.

But I don't think many people suppose there is a moral object floating around somewhere that we can describe. — Echarmion

Events are as much fact as objects are.
The holocaust is an example of what was an immoral fact (perceived particular).

The problem is how we get from an objective descriptive fact to an objective normative rule. — Echarmion

Right action is the faultless performance of moral (good) action.

I would think that we look for an objective standard in order to justify applying that standard to others. If we regard moral propositions as purely subjective, enforcing law and order amounts to nothing more than 'might makes right', right? — JosephS

Morality is a mental construct which has many subjective (personal) and intersubjective (cultural) manifestations. A person's morality construct develops in parallel with mental maturation, personal experience, and social influences (Kohlberg, 1983).

Ethical propositions are subjective; they are statements of, or pertaining to, ethical value.

With regard to ethics, only human events having a moral or immoral quality are objective (factual). So, there are moral facts and immoral facts.

Empathy (identification with, and the vicarious experience of, the thoughts and/or affect of another person) is a faculty of ethical awareness, having both cognitive and affective components (Rogers, et al., 2007) which informs a subject of an ethical fact (except in the case of mental disorders such as psychopathy).

So, there is no separation of "is" (fact) and "ought" (value), because awareness is both objective (fact-based) and subjective (value-based). Ethical fact and value constitute the two poles of empathy.

Conscience is the intuitive faculty which evaluates ethical options and self conduct (including motives and intent) in accordance with morality.

Questions of subordination and rebellion, while somewhat more complex than most other ethical questions, are not a function of cultural bias (individualism or collectivism).

Besides that functor approach -- which is not necessarily easy to use -- I don't know of any other attempt at juxtaposing (morality) systems. — alcontali

Comparative Religion would be one.

I dont see how that makes moral relativism absurd. — Harry Hindu

I can't help you with that.

The main point I made was that of being able to make predictive claims as to which mores will develop and whether this reflects a sense of an objective moral standard (objective is reflective of its predictive capability -- it is the encompassing standard that would be objective and universal, not any particular principle in any particular environment). — JosephS

Morality (the classification of human events as moral or immoral):
1) Is a human universal. (Brown, 1991)
2) Facilitates the survival of humanity by counteracting the inherent capacity for misinterpretation (bias, error, and illusion) which leads to social conflict.

Similarities between the moral codes and value systems of the World's major Book Religions and systems of Moral Philosophy form a consensus on morality which is likely to have a basis in human nature rather than human culture.

If I could, with enough information, tell you which moral principles will tend to develop in which environments (and possibly with what justifications) does that undermine theories of moral relativism? — JosephS

Moral relativism is absurd, because if morality is different for every person and/or social group, everything and nothing is moral and immoral across individuals and/or social groups.

Well, it is obviously legitimate. I should have said that they are not part of "formal knowledge". — alcontali

Fair enough.
Obviously, tacit knowledge is not beyond the capacity of AI (e.g., self-driving vehicles, robotic manufacturing, etc).
So, I'm surprised that we are not dropping JTB as a general definition of knowledge, and substituting it with something after Floridi (e.g., factual and/or logical semantic information).

Beliefs that are not expressed in language or not possible to express in language are ineffable. They are not part of knowledge. You must be able to express the belief, or else it is not knowledge. Hence, legitimate knowledge can always be represented by using language expressions. — alcontali

Tacit (implicit empirical) knowledge is difficult to communicate because it is only partially codifiable, or uncodifiable. It is processed in an automatic, or intuitive (as opposed to a controlled, or cogitative), manner. Types include motor sequences (e.g., driving a car), skills (e.g., hammering a nail), and schemata (e.g., primary social interactions).

So tacit knowledge (which is ineffable) is not actually knowledge, or better: is illegitimate knowledge?

English and German belong to the Germanic subgroup of the Indo-European language family. They are analytic languages, whereas; Greek is a synthetic language. So, due to these similarities and differences, German should be easier to learn than Greek for a native English speaker.

When I say introspection is inevitable, I mean that it is an essential feature of any kind of conscious thinking. — James Laughlin

Thanks for your elaboration, however; I think this conceptualisation is too broad.

Introspection is an essential aspect of critical inquiry, if not critical inquiry itself. — James Laughlin

This agrees with my conception of introspection as the examination of mental events, a type of reflection (examination of experience). How would you define introspection?

Also, what do you think is the epistemological and verificatory significance of introspection?

Introspection is inevitable. — James Laughlin

Please elaborate.

If this was a response, in part, to me, let me clarify. — Coben

It wasn't.

It appears that introspection is frequently confused, or conflated, with metacognition.

Knowledge may be based on metacognition and/or experience, which entails imagination and/or reflection (introspection, observation, or empathy), respectively.