Comments

  • Understanding Consciousness
    ↪Greta

    That's great. Thanks very much.
  • Understanding Consciousness
    ↪Greta

    Thanks for answering my second question.
  • The Non-Physical
    Is human gene data an example of particular form (i.e., the first actuality of an individual human being)?

    According to Hoffmeyer & Emmeche, it is inactive, and:
    1) Determinate to the extent that it preserves identity through time.
    2) Indeterminate with respect to material detail.

    Hoffmeyer, J. & Emmeche, C. (1991). Code-Duality and the Semiotics of Nature. pp. 117-166 in: Myrdene Anderson and Floyd Merrell (eds.). On Semiotic Modeling. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin and New York.
  • Understanding Consciousness
    Still, I find it more helpful not to think of everything as conscious, but reactive. The degree and nature of the reactivity varies in scale and complexity. Thus, on such a scale, entities like neutrinos would score very low because they interact with very little and those responses have no flexibility or control. Gradually one could us this approach to consider the increasing complexity of non living things until the emergence of life, then the emergence of multicellular organisms, and now abstractly intelligent ones. — Greta

    This coincides with my current conception of human consciousness (mass noun) as mind-body conditions which entail variations in awareness (a perceptive, sensitive, and cognisant condition) and responsiveness (a receptive and/or reactive condition).

    Does a flexible and controlled response require a mind?

    Which inanimate objects have the highest level of reactivity?

    At what level of complexity do organisms have awareness?
  • The Non-Physical
    Surely this is the lesson of Galileo's confrontation with the Church: in the empirical domain, explanations derived from verifiable empirical data (particular form) supercede explanations derived from theology.

    I would even go so far as to say that explanations derived from verifiable pure data (general form) supercede explanations derived from theology.

    Religion is a social institution, a means of social control which has conformity (ultimately, social stability) as its goal. This goal is antithetical to the scientific enterprise.

    For me, it makes more sense to keep theology out of science (let each have its appropriate domain), and dedicate it to explanations regarding the spiritual domain (which is non-physical).
  • The Non-Physical
    ↪apokrisis

    Nice summary.
    Clear, coherent, concise, and imbued with profound understanding, in short; very well written.
    Also, I am in general agreement with the concepts as presented (though my own concept of time is largely undeveloped).
  • The Non-Physical
    I must be honest with you Galuchat, and tell you that I always have problems understanding your terminology. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Fair enough.

    I will however address 3) above. The mind-body dualism of the human being is one instance of dualism. It is the example of dualism which is most evident to us because we have access to the non-physical within us. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Thanks for your clarification. It should come as no surprise that I can't buy into it.
  • The Non-Physical
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Nothing I have read so far warrants throwing Platonism out with Dualism.

    To clarify, on your view:
    1) Forms (both General and Particular) are not physical, mental, or spiritual?
    2) It is only information which may be intelligible (pure) or substance (empirical)?
    3) How does your "true dualism" address the mind-body problem?
  • The Non-Physical
    ↪Wayfarer
    Mind-body interactions are a matter of empirical fact, not metaphysics.
  • The Non-Physical
    Isn't it possible that spirit (a different domain) is somehow part of the mind-body equation which determines the behaviour of a human organism (a neutral monist substance)? — Galuchat
    A big question in its own right. There are many possible responses, but the Mahayana Buddhist analysis is instructive in this regard. — Wayfarer

    Right. My point is that mind-body dualism should be based on a scientific, not religious (or theological), argument; and that it would be proven to be unsound on that account.

    Aristotle sufficiently refuted Pythagorean idealism, and the form of Platonic idealism which is basically the same as modern Platonic realism. This did not prevent the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians from developing a form of dualism which was immune to such refutation. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Case in point: the re-definition of soul to mean mind instead of form, per Thomas Aquinas.
  • The Non-Physical
    Monism doesn't preclude the possibility of a spiritual realm. — Galuchat
    I would have thought any monism would preclude the possibility of separate realms. — Wayfarer

    Yes, monism precludes the possibility of separate realms, but not the possibility of different realms (or domains).

    For example, temperament (those aspects of personality considered to be innate, as opposed to learned) may be the result of differences in the natural frequencies and damping ratios of thalamocortical circuits. Robinson, D. L. (December 2008). Brain Function, Emotional Experience and Personality. Netherlands Journal of Psychology, Volume 64, Issue 4, pp.152–167).

    Temperament (a mental condition) and thalamocortical circuit function (a neurophysiological process) are two different types of actualities (empirical data accessed at different levels of abstraction) which are inextricably linked. Yet, temperament behaviour is a unity.

    So, isn't it possible that spirit (a different domain) is somehow part of the mind-body equation which determines the behaviour of a human organism (a neutral monist substance)?
  • The Non-Physical
    Thus I've done what few people in this forum seemed to have any interest in doing: provide a general definition of physical stuff that at the same time demarcates naturalism from supernaturalism. Clearly God should not be energetically constrained! And the soul can apparently survive for eternity after death. So, very much a reasonable dividing line between the two realms. — Uber

    Absolutely. Monism doesn't preclude the possibility of a spiritual realm.
  • The New Dualism
    In the fountain analogy of consciousness, via neurons, the entropic force is at work as ions shift between the two sides of the membrane; neurotransmitters induce variable permeability, transmitting entropic signals through the water; inside and outside the neuron.

    To know how this works and impacts the organics, you need to understand the nature of hydrogen bonding. This takes time to develop, so I will do this another time.     — wellwisher

    Thanks very much for the link and further explanations.

    Hopefully you are committing your insights to writing, and I look forward to reading your exchanges with others on this forum who are more knowledgable in biology than myself (including the metaphysical implications).
  • The Non-Physical
    It is the fact that the same information/proposition/idea can be represented in any number of languages or physical media. I can write out the recipe for chocolate cake, or the specifications for building a box-girder bridge, in any number of languages or codes.

    So, the material representation is completely different, but the information is the same. So how can the information be the same as the material representation?...This is where I tend towards dualism.     — Wayfarer

    I very much like Gerson's notion of the incommensurability of form and matter, but I find your use of the term "representation" to be equivocal, and your use of the term "information" to be confused.

    Because I associate "mental representation" with semantics, and "material representation" with physical signs, I would re-phrase your conclusion as follows:

    The signs (in this case, recipes and specifications encoded in different languages, i.e., physical information) are completely different, but their associated semantic information is the same.

    Some of my current relevant working definitions:
    1) Signs are empirical (i.e., physical and/or mental) objects (actualities) associated with semantic information.
    2) Data (Form): asymmetries.
    3) Pure Data (General, Platonic, Form): idea asymmetries.
    a) Transcendental Data (General Form): transcendental asymmetries.
    b) Universal Data (General Form): universal asymmetries.
    4) Empirical Data (Particular, Aristotelian, Form): object asymmetries.
    a) Physical Data (Particular Form): physical asymmetries.
    b) Mental Data (Particular Form): mental asymmetries.
    5) Information (Process Asymmetries): communicated data (form).

    And so on, down to semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic data/information as types of mental data/information.

    So, your question ("So how can the information be the same as the material representation?") doesn't make sense to me.

    I think Gerson is talking about the incommensurability of pure data/information (i.e., universals) which is intelligible, and empirical data/information (i.e., "particular elements") which is matter.

    To further confuse things (or not) my current working definition of communication is: pure data (general form) discovery and reaction(s), or empirical data (particular form) production, encoding, transmission, conveyance, reception, decoding, and reaction(s).

    So, dualism in terms of separating physical and mental? I don't think so. But dualism in terms of separating reality and existence? Definitely. Maybe it's better to call the latter Platonism?

    This is where I tend towards dualism. But the crucial caveat is, that mind is *not* a 'substance' in the sense that it is now universally misunderstood. It never appears as an object, but is always that to which everything appears. The profound error of modern philosophy is to reify or objectify mind and then ask what kind of thing it could be. It is simply 'that which grasps meaning', and in that sense the ground of meaning itself. — Wayfarer

    If I define "object" as "actuality", can noumena be called mental objects? I agree that "mind" per se, does not exist, however; as a mass noun, it is the label we attach to the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by an organism which produce its behaviour. So, calling it simply 'that which grasps meaning' is a gross oversimplification (which we can explore in greater detail if you like).
  • The New Dualism
    The water can sends signal beyond the fixed hardware; induce organic changes. — wellwisher
    Hence, neuroplasticity?

    This aspect of the physics borders on the metaphysical. — wellwisher
    How so?

    The main problem is the biological sciences do not give water enough credit in terms of its contribution to life...The result of not stressing water enough is the life science tends to fixate on the brain using the assumptions of the solid state; organic structures. The water adds liquid state parameters which adds features not found in solid state models like computers. — Wellwisher
    Where can I read more about this idea, or related ideas?
  • The Non-Physical
    It's all physical. — Uber
    If so, mental would be a type of physical (just as inorganic and organic). I don't have a problem with that in principle. But can science demonstrate that nothing except physical things exist, or that nothing is real?

    I do have a problem with reducing mental to corporeal (e.g., the brain) in the absence of empirical evidence establishing causation ("we already played this game and you lost").

    Brains don't do anything but send and receive neural signals. And minds don't do anything but experience the conditions (e.g., consciousness, affect, personality, mood, and emotion) and exercise the functions (e.g., processing semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics) which produce human (not brain, not mind) behaviour.

    A ‘physical mental state’ is a contradiction in terms. — Wayfarer
    Perhaps, but I don't think that a physical-mental (i.e., physical and mental) state is a contradiction in terms. The above list of conditions are in fact mind-body states.

    Some fundamental work has already been done along these lines by neuroscientists like Anil Seth, Karl Friston, and Giulio Tononi, among many others. — Uber
    Sure. And I'm very much interested in examining the Free-Energy Principle mentioned by Wellwisher and yourself in the New Dualism thread. But disappointed to read that it is "based upon Helmholtz's observations on unconscious inference". Because, according to Bennett & Hacker, that is a "misconception of perceptions as conclusions of inferences".
  • The Education of the Emotions
    It would appear the OP's agenda is not so much about "the spirit of inquiry and learning" as it is "the spirit of selling" books and consulting services (similar to George Cobau).
  • The Education of the Emotions
    Peters concludes by claiming: “In other words emotions are basically forms of cognition. It is because of this central feature which they possess that I think there is any amount of scope for educating the emotions.” — michael r d james

    How would you compare this to Barrett's Theory of Constructed Emotion (i.e., emotions are a physical/mental construction of interoception, concepts, and social reality)?
  • The New Dualism
    This spontaneous change cycle of neural memory is where the mind lies. Mind is connected to the free energy flow, that has the capacity to follow the hardware and also go where the hardware has not yet been; institute new change. — wellwisher

    Very interesting. A cognitive psychology based on memory? Could very well be do-able. Cheers.
  • The New Dualism
    In fact, it appears that something non-physical has emerged from physical brains. This is really no stranger than life emerging from nonlife, something that appears to have actually happened. — George Cobau

    Does this mean that the same mechanism which caused life to emerge from non-life (how did it actually happen?) also caused mind to emerge from life?

    If so, is this a new dualism, triplism, or quadruplism?
  • The New Dualism
    The article reviews his experimental results. Did you not read it? Or more accurately, were you not impressed because it happens to contradict some profound and misguided belief you happen to hold? — Uber

    The linked article states:

    1) "Damasio’s essential insight is that feelings are “mental experiences of body states,” which arise as the brain interprets emotions, themselves physical states arising from the body’s responses to external stimuli."

    2) "His insight, dating back to the early 1990s, stemmed from the clinical study of brain lesions in patients unable to make good decisions because their emotions were impaired, but whose reason was otherwise unaffected—research made possible by the neuroanatomical studies of his wife and frequent coauthor, Hanna Damasio."

    So:
    1) Affect produces moods and emotions.
    2) Brain damage affects emotions and decision-making.

    And this is the empirical research you think establishes that mind is an emergent physical state? Right. We're done here.
  • The New Dualism
    One of the greatest neuroscientists of our time, Antonio Damasio, holds the view that consciousness is an emergent state. The following article from MIT gives a quick rundown of his theories. — Uber

    Yeah, well, that's what I figured: no empirical research to support the claim, just theory.
  • The New Dualism
    It's true that correlation does not prove causation, but I believe that, given the evidence, the most likely explanation by far is that the brain causes conscious experience. — George Cobau

    Please cite such evidence. Also, doesn't this statement contradict your dualist position?

    Yes, there are different levels of abstraction (that appears to be the point that Uber was making) but the difference between brain and mind is certainly more than this. — George Cobau

    Beyond occupying different levels of abstraction, what other differences exist between brain and mind?

    Also, I don't believe that the mind is an epiphenomenon...
    I don't think that the mind is spiritual. I believe that mental aspects and conscious experiences are a natural result of evolution.     — George Cobau

    What do you believe mind is, if not an epiphenomenon or spiritual (beyond being a natural result of evolution)?
  • The New Dualism
    The basis for this general knowledge is empirical, rooted in the results of modern neuroscience and modern physics. So the details still need to be finished, but the general idea is already there: consciousness is an emergent physical state. — Uber

    While I'm not opposed in principle to the notion that mind "is an emergent physical state", I'm not aware of any research which comes to this conclusion. Could you provide a citation to such?
  • The New Dualism
    ↪George Cobau


    I think with regard to:

    Existence of Mind
    1) Inductive evidence in the form of physiological correlates, and criterial evidence in the form of observed behaviour, establish the existence of mental conditions and functions.

    Mind-Body Dependence
    1) Corporeal and mental conditions and functions are mutually dependent, but incommensurable because:
    a) Correlation does not imply causation.
    b) Corporeal and mental data are accessed at different levels of abstraction.
    2) The fact of neuroplasticity is sufficient reason to reject epiphenomenalism.

    So, with regard to substance, I currently hold to a dual aspect (i.e., physical and/or mental) neutral monism (cheers, Javra).
  • Personal Location
    The puzzling thing for me is how we come to inhabit this conscious location of having experiences of a reality and how this subjective location arises. (People have framed this issue with the question "Why am I me?") — Andrew4Handel

    Awareness ( a perceptive, sensitive, and cognisant condition) and self identification (the recognition of one's self as distinct from the environment and others) combine to produce subjective experience (the effects of an object upon an organism).

    For self identification, see Rochat, Philippe (2003). "Five Levels of Self-Awareness as They Unfold in Early Life". Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003): 717–731.

    And I don't see how we can know the true nature of reality without knowing how we consciously access and to what extent that perceptual access is accurate or illusory. — Andrew4Handel

    I agree.
  • The only problem to be solved is that of the human psychology?
    What we do, our actions are all without exception instinctually driven. Try to think of one that is not? — Marcus de Brun

    I understand instinct to be a natural or innate impulse, inclination, or tendency, not acquired through learning, nor contingent upon volition.

    In modern psychology, human instinctual behaviour is considered to be limited to the primitive reflexes, cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instinct#In_psychology.

    So, it is inappropriate to describe other (i.e., most) human behaviour as instinctual.
  • honesty,compassion,generosity are they inexplicably linked?
    ↪Germain Hass


    From Weil, Simone. (1952). The Need For Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London:

    1) "The fulfilment of one's moral responsibility has a beneficent impact on human character."

    2) "The liberty of men of goodwill, though limited in the sphere of action, is complete in that of conscience. For, having incorporated the rules into their own being, the prohibited possibilities no longer present themselves to the mind, and have not to be rejected."

    Extrapolating from Weil, I think that self-judgement (i.e., self-commendation or self-condemnation) has psychological and corporeal effects which provide an incentive for moral conduct. To wit,

    The Effects of Self Commendation:
    1) Peace
    2) Confidence
    3) Innocence
    4) Joy
    5) Self Esteem
    6) Reinforcement of Moral Conduct
    7) Development of Virtues
    8) Good Corporeal and Mental Health

    The Effects of Self Condemnation:
    1) Anxiety
    2) Embarrassment
    3) Guilt
    4) Remorse
    5) Shame
    6) Neglect of Introspection
    7) Development of Vices
    8) Corporeal Disability-Illness and Mental Disability-Illness
  • Losing Games
    And this is different from "real life" (or whatever you want to call it)... how?

    This is such a last-century attitude towards communication on the Internet! For some reason it is taken as something less than real, something that cannot be taken seriously on pain of being mercilessly ridiculed by some dick. I could never really understand this. If you cannot see my face, or if you don't know my legal name, or if the interaction is mediated via digital rather than analog channels, then it is all so different? Why?     — SophistiCat

    Good questions, and relevant to the OP, because they address communication in the context of an internet forum.

    The biggest difference between digital communication using internet media and analog (e.g., face-to-face) communication is that approximately 65% of all communication is nonverbal, as opposed to verbal (Birdwhistell, 1974). Of the remaining 35%, much is simultaneous nonverbal and verbal communication with nonverbal and verbal elements reinforcing, complementing, emphasising, contradicting, substituting, and regulating each other (Ekman, 1965).

    Unless all communication on an internet forum is conducted using video, a significant amount of information is not transmitted. The result is virtual relationships, not personal relationships.

    The Japanese are apparently susceptible to replacing personal relationships with virtual relationships. For example, committing suicide when un-friended, or un-liked. Or withdrawing from participation and suffering a loss of self-esteem, or nervous breakdown, when they discover they hold a minority opinion. The enforcement of conformity is a significant social force which can be enacted in top-down and/or bottom-up fashion.

    Apparently, young Japanese males prefer to cultivate virtual relationships with "female" animations, rather than personal relationships with female human beings. This is setting their society up for collapse due to declining marriage and birth rates. Perhaps my information is dated. If so, how has Japan rectified this problem?

    Also, Emmanuel Levinas refers to the importance of face-to-face encounters in establishing moral responsibility.
  • Losing Games
    Imagine my surprise when some contributors don't even bother with a pretense of logical argument, but go straight for the psychodrama. — Srap Tasmaner

    If you want to talk about deception at the level of language games, that could be interesting and instructive.

    But foundational to that is deception at the level of narrative control. And that is the purpose of social media: narrative control, not philosophy.
  • Losing Games
    I believe if you are truly here, practicing the discipline of philosophy, there is an endless amount we can learn about ourselves and those around us. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

    Fact is: nobody is truly (or genuinely) here. Hello! It's an internet forum; where usually the only thing you learn from other members is:
    1) Who they want you to think they are, and
    2) What kind of games they like to play under a cloak of anonymity.

    For example, you seem to be very much into playing a Mommy game with me now, a hostess game with newcomers at other times, and a dispenser of awards for politically correct posts at other times.

    Hey! Whatever floats your boat, but don't kid yourself into thinking any of that has anything to do with practising the discipline of philosophy.

    As for your reply: I found it amusing, but definitely not worth reading.
    Take a Hike.
  • Losing Games
    There's a lot riding on some of the discussions on the forum. For me, it's about self-definition. How I see myself. My ideas are important to me...I may have to change my self-image.

    On the other hand, as I've said before, I think the level of competition on the forum has decreased significantly over the past few months and the level of civility has increased.

    Just a quick clarification. Seems like you're being a dick, but I wouldn't want to accuse you of being a dick if you aren't being a dick.     — T Clark

    How civil of you (that's what anonymity does). Would your reply have been different if a face-to-face encounter between us was a real possibility?

    To clarify: I would maintain in a face-to-face encounter between us that it is sad that your self-definition, -image, -esteem is dependent upon the posts in an internet forum.

    Hopefully I have helped you to test your idea(s) and your self (your stated purpose for participating in this forum). But in case I haven't, we are done playing this game.
  • Losing Games
    There's a lot riding on some of the discussions on the forum. For me, it's about self-definition. How I see myself. My ideas are important to me...I may have to change my self-image. — T Clark

    How sad.
    It's just an internet forum (i.e., an anonymous group of people playing all sorts of different games for all sorts of different reasons). Occassionally, someone writes something worth reading.
  • A "Timeless" Moral Code?
    For human beings, morality has subjective and intersubjective aspects. It cannot have an objective aspect, except when talking about a morality common to all living things (i.e., not just plant morality, squid morality, bee morality, etc). And this last statement presupposes that inanimate objects do not possess motivation and volition (i.e., a mind), hence; cannot be held responsible (morally or legally, and by whom or what?) for their "actions" (e.g., water freezing, melting, condensing, eroding shorelines, evaporating, raining, etc).

    Anthropologist Donald E. Brown has determined that morality is a human universal (Human Universals, 1991, cf. http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/BrownUniversalsDaedalus.pdf)

    So, I think human morality is an intersubjective (species-specific) consensus gentium based on human nature (genetic predisposition) which has many subjective (personal) and intersubjective (cultural) manifestations. Specifically, that it is implemented in the human mind through theory of mind, empathy, ethical knowledge, conscience, introspection, and self-judgement, as follows:

    1) Once theory of mind has been attained at 2-7 years of age (Piaget), ethical knowledge begins to be acquired by human beings through the operation of empathy (which has affective and cognitive aspects).

    2) A person's morality construct develops in parallel with mental maturation, personal experience, and social influences (cf., Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development).

    3) Moral action-behaviour is informed by the operation of conscience, and self-judgement is activated by introspection.
  • Emile Durkheim on Social Environment
    What are the forces then that he has mentioned that exist in our mind? — samay bin tahir

    Reactions to intersubjective mental representations and social context?
  • Actual Philosophy
    To some philosophy is a precursor to scientific investigation. In philosophy they came to understand and define truth. A point others seem stuck on, but for some they are able to move beyond that aspect which creates a natural path to science. Science is modern philosophy and philosophy is ancient science. Some do not see a division but see them as a single continuation. — Jeremiah

    Science and Philosophy can be complementary endeavours.

    Scientific conclusions which are not subjected to logical investigation can be just as false as Philosophical conclusions not based on relevant empirical investigation.

    The coherence which logical investigation imposes upon Scientific conclusions should serve as an effective guide for further empirical investigation (or lack thereof), and empirical facts should serve as a starting point for pragmatic Philosophical speculation.
  • Emile Durkheim on Social Environment
    ↪samay bin tahir

    I think he may be referring to the development of culture (the collective mindset and consequent products of a social group) through communication.
  • The idea that we don't have free will.
    ...does predestination permit free will/ the illusion of free will and how does judgement relate to ideas of free will? — Edmund

    The Augustinian and Calvinist concept of total depravity (congenial to Luther's "The Bondage of the Will") denies free will, but doesn't preclude the possibility of free will as illusion (re-defining free will as uncoerced choice). On this view, personal responsibility and judgement are contingent upon the presence or absence of coercion.

    As Locke might have said at the end of the century, if society shapes the individual what right has society to punish the individual it has created? — Edmund

    The same right whereby individuals shape society (including its norms).
  • Reason and Life
    I don't like "awareness", or "mind" as defining terms for life. What's wrong with "self"? Living things seem to have an inherent selfishness, whereby they separate themselves from what is other than themselves with some sort of boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

    I'm certainly open to the possibility of defining life in terms of self. Perhaps you could elaborate somewhat on your conception of self and/or provide an example of its use in a definition of life. I haven't given the notion of self much consideration outwith a sociological context, and as it pertains to experience, so I would be interested in your take on it to see if it is something I can work with. PM me if you like. Cheers.

    Otherwise, I'm outta here (too much of a reality disconnect from the OP for my taste). Perhaps the apparent intransigence is down to an attempt to see the world through Heideggerian-tinted glasses. Whatever it is; good luck with it.
  • Reason and Life
    But I rather suspect that what "mind" is depends on how it's defined, who's defining it, and for what purpose. How do you define it? — tim wood
    As above.
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