But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. At issue is the claim that organisms can be understood solely in terms of matter and energy, or physics and chemistry. But this is a contentious claim. What if there is something about even the very simplest forms of organic life that is not observable in inorganic matter? What if organism have attributes that are not reducible to physics and chemistry? — Wayfarer

There's not question being begged here. Doubt or skepticism alone does not refute what is known. Its the old "evil demon" argument Wayfarer. What if everything you know and understand is being manipulated by an evil demon? What if there's something we don't know?

That's always the case. What ifs, imagination, and maybe's are always second class citizens to known facts. Now if something legitimate is found, for example a new energy, matter, or substance, then of course we have a valid question to look into. You must ask the question, then provide something tangible to look into. Is there anything in the universe besides matter and energy? No.

The idea that life evolved naturally on the primitive Earth suggests that the first cells came into being by spontaneous chemical reactions, and this is equivalent to saying that there is no fundamental divide between life and matter. — What is Information?

Largely, there's only a slight difference between life and matter, its true. We have this human centric way of looking at things and sometimes forget we are not special or separate from the rest of reality. I've described life like this: Life is a set of chemical reactions and processes that actively acts to keep its processes going. Contrast this with baking soda and vinegar. The reaction doesn't seek out new baking soda or vinegar, it just reacts and is done. Life is a fantastic delicate balance of all these reactions that seek self-sustainment when the process is about to run out of energy.

The reason is that natural selection, the cornerstone of Darwinian evolution, does not exist in inanimate matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, furthermore, molecular biology uncovered two fundamental components of life — What is Information?

I'm ok with this definition. Once again though, DNA is just more matter and energy. I would argue this is organic life, as I believe we could create an inorganic system of life with AI. I have no issue with expanding the definition to be "matter and energy that can hold and process information".

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. — What is Information?

Nothing wrong with that either. We can define life as we see fit, then apply it across matter and energy. But it does not negate that life is still just matter and energy. Beyond the need to feel unique, there is no evidence of any kind that life is not matter and energy.

But this overlooks the role of the observer in physics. This shows that the act of observation and the establishment of measurement outcomes seem to play a fundamental role in determining the observed properties of the objects of the analysis, which are, purportedly, also the fundamental particles of physics. — Wayfarer

This is a largely misunderstood understanding of quantum physics. Our "observations" are bouncing light particles and photons off of other smaller particles. We read the "bounce" like we do with light, hearing, and everything else, but our actual measurement alters the course of the particles we are tracking. Depending on what we're trying to track with the bounce, we can know one state, but not the other state. It is not that fact that your eyeballs are in the direction of light that quantum outcomes are altered. Its fun science fiction, but not reality.

This is what gave rise to physicist John Wheeler's theory of the 'participatory universe', in which our participation as observers is as essential to the nature of the Universe as are the objects of analysis. So that torpedoes any neat separation of the objective and subjective poles. But that, in any case, is also called into question by 'enactivism', which shows that the organism and environment (or subject and object) are 'co-arising', such that it is impossible to draw an ultimate dividing line between one and the other. — Wayfarer

Now this I like! I agree with this entirely, but perhaps the conclusion may differ from what you're proposing. I wrote a paper that Bob Ross and I had a lengthy conversation over that does somewhat question the neat separation between objective and subjective, but salvages it. Too dense to go into here! At a very basic level, subjectivity is the ability to experience. We can create identities, then attempt to apply them to reality. Those identities that can co-exist without contradiction by reality become objective. Its too dense to get into here, so if you want to make a point, please go to that article, "A theory of knowledge".

Again, our mere presence of having ears and eyes does not alter reality, well beyond being in the way of light and sound like anything else. But, our active measurement can very well affect the reality of the situation then if we never measured it at all. In cases in which our measurement is relatively low mass and energy, the affect to the object being measured is negligible. But in the cases like the quantum realm, its like slinging a que ball at an eight ball.

Further, because we have the capability to identify, we can determine what type of matter and energy is important. Without an identifier, sheep, clouds, and grass would still exist. But there would never be an aspect of reality outside of those identities, that could identify them in a particular way. Our ability to identify, the existence of living brains, creates an interaction with reality that could not happen with a simple reacting object. We are most certainly not apart from reality, but one expression of matter and energy within it that causes a unique type of identity and interaction from anything else.

The properties of matter and energy are even farther removed from the characteristics of consciousness than liquid water from skyscrapers. At least water and skyscrapers are both physical objects, composed of primary particles. — Patterner

I've never understood this thinking. Every animal living thing is matter and energy. Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. Why deny what's in front of your eyes?

Well, I hope you're right. But I think we face a situation where a significant portion of the populace doesn't favor the law, and believes it shouldn't be enforced, in this case as to this individual. That anyone could accept him as credible or honorable mystifies me; he seems a kind of paragon of brazen deceit and selfishness. But there are those who do. — Ciceronianus

It is an easy mistake for good people to make, that they believe everyone else has a tendency towards trying to be a good person as well. This is not the case. People who support Trump generally know he's not a good man. They don't care. Its about self-interest. Trump gives them low taxes, and a sense of cultural superiority. If they have that, they don't care how it was obtained.

Democracy is not about creating good. Its about competing self-interests. We hash out those self-interests and if its difficult for one block to get everything it wants, generally everyone gets a little of their own self-interest and avoids extremism. But we should never attribute that people care about how they obtain their self-interest. Many wouldn't care if you murdered people they didn't particularly agree with. I feel that the Republican party understands this more than the Democratic party. Its why conspiracy theories and false narratives work. Its about selling to someone's self-interest, not their morality, intelligence, or higher human functions.

The question remains, though. In these sad times, no matter how clearly it is shown that the law has been violated, will it matter? What is or is not lawful doesn't seem to be a concern in our politics, nor does it seem to be a concern of many of our politician — Ciceronianus

That is why we have the law and courts. At the end of the day, if the courts conclude guilt, the opinion of the public does not matter. America in general might complain about rulings, but we abide by them. Trump will go to jail, many people will insist they don't believe it, but he will suffer the consequences under the law if found guilty. The court of opinion is always a biased rabble of logically inconsistent feelings and emotions struggling for power. Its irrelevant in the face of a country that solidly favors and enforces the law.

Definitions aren't enough, even if the "transgender community" accepted them, that doesn't mean they would accept your conclusions using these definitions — Judaka

Its not a matter of whether someone accepts the conclusions, its whether the conclusions are logical. People dismiss logical conclusions all the time, but objective society can dismiss those subjective conclusions in favor of the objective ones.

Nonetheless, my aim was to provide an explanation for why political discourse has strayed so far from how we might wish people would act, I hope you continue to conduct yourself as you have. — Judaka

Fair enough, and kind words Judaka, thanks.

To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.
— Philosophim
That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. — Patterner

Its all matter and energy Paterrner. I already covered that with Bob in my last reply, so feel free to sort through to that section. If my reply to Bob doesn't fully answer your question, feel free to ask again.

So let me try to use a more technical definition of ‘qualia’: ‘a mental event whereof there is something it is like to have such in and of itself’. — Bob Ross

I think this is a good approach and agree on this.

In these cases, there is still something it is like in and of itself to qualitatively experience (e.g., to see in the case of a blindsight person or to dream in the other case) and, thusly, they still have qualia. — Bob Ross

I like your separation of qualitative and qualia at first, but then you erase the distinction making qualitative experience just a subordinate of qualia. You didn't answer my question about the difference between conscious and unconscious either. In every normal case of those words, we would say that what is qualitative can be received unconsciously, but what is qualia is what is received consciously. Are we saying then an unconscious being has qualia? A P zombie would be completely qualitative right? It would have to see and act upon different stimuli. If you start to say that qualitative processing is also qualia, then is a P zombie a conscious being? Because we would be saying there is something it is like to have such in and of itself.

If qualitative experience is qualia, then it is a part of qualia. If I agreed with you, in our conversation then its pointless to note what is qualitative and what is not. My reasoning about qualia would still be "the experience from the subject", and you already said that we can match the brain to qualitative experience. Which means we've now associated brain states directly with subjective experience. If it can observe, identify, and this is confirmed in its actions, we just say its a qualitative analysis or objective consciousness that doesn't concern itself with any other type of qualia.

This is a very real problem you'll need to address Bob. If there's no difference between qualitative and qualia beyond qualitative being a specific type of qualia, then it doesn't disprove my argument. The "subjective consciousness" of higher qualia that you note would still just be qualia. If the qualitative is just a form of qualia, brain scans can explain qualitative actions, therefore qualia.

You switched the terminology mid-argument here: the first sentence is about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience—i.e., qualia—and the second was about mere observance/awareness. — Bob Ross

I don't think I switched terminology here. I divided consciousness between the subjective and objective, but they are descriptor of the totality of consciousness as it is generally used today. "Consciousness" as a whole contains both the subjective and objective aspects. Objective consciousness is the expression of the actions that something subjectively experiences. The objective is simply what we can scientifically observe and conclude, while the subjective is impossible to know.

If you are going to say we can evaluate “objective consciousness”, in the manner you have described, then you can’t equally claim that that gives us insight into “subjective consciousness” which is what you would need to prove “subjective consciousness” is caused by brain states. — Bob Ross

Objectively, subjective consciousness is explained by brain states. That we are certain of. Just go back to my brain surgery example. What we cannot know, is what that subjective experience is like from my viewpoint. Objectively, it doesn't matter exactly what the subject is experiencing from its perspective. If the person states they see a tree, we don't need to know exactly how they subjectively experience a tree to believe they see a tree right?

I'll give you another example, a car. We see that a car runs. When we look under the hood we see an engine. How does it move? Gas burns and some weird thing happens that turns the engine. Later we find out its the combustion of gas that leads to magnetism. How does magnetism work? Well... we don't fully know. Its kind of a mystery really. Does that negate that the truck is ultimately run by magnetism, even though we don't understand why exactly magnetism actually works? No.

What I mean by “cause” is the actual reductive explanation of phenomena and not necessarily a physical chain of impact. So, for me, “impact” and “cause” are two different things. — Bob Ross

Sure, lets for now say they don't need a physical impact. But in the case of the brain, it is physical, and it impacts consciousness. Therefore consciousness is caused by the physical brain. The clarification does not negate that. Now if you want to speculate that something else besides the brain causes the mind, we can look at that. I'm not saying the brain is necessarily the only cause.

My problem is that you seem to be claiming that “objective consciousness” and “subjective consciousness” are two sides of the same coin, and the side we see is just relative to our epistemic access — Bob Ross

Yes.

but by this “objective” observation of “consciousness” we gain absolutely no insight into the being also qualitatively experiencing — Bob Ross

Correct.

there is a disconnect there in your argument. When I refer to “consciousness”, I am talking about that private qualia that we definitely cannot empirically observe (which I think you are agreeing with me here) and this has no connection to an empirical merely observation of a being observing, identifying, and acting upon its environmen — Bob Ross

Incorrect, but by just a tweak of wording. Yes, the act of knowing what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious is unknowable. We can know what its like for ourselves of course. As I've noted, we are incredibly close on our analysis. I think its just a few syntax and definition differences.

We know that as subjectively conscious beings, there are certain actions which we can only do while conscious. So first we define consciousness. I noted it was the ability to observe/experience and identify. I cannot know what exactly another being subjectively experiences while its observing and identifying, so it cannot be part of my definition of consciousness in regards to other beings. But I can know that only a being which can experience and identify can make certain actions. If a being makes those particular actions that require it to observe and identify, then objectively, I can note they are conscious.

Subjective consciousness is for ourselves. It is our personal understanding that it is possible to have a state of experience subjectively. But objectively, no one can ever know that experience, and we cannot know theirs. Can we know they are conscious by their actions? Yes. That is objective consciousness. The analysis of subjective consciousness is a belief system. It is not objective.

Did you know some people cannot visualize in their mind Bob? Its just dark when they close their eyes. Unless they told you, you might never figure it out. Even then, I can't actually know what not being able to visualize is like. I can make conjectures and beliefs, but it is outside of my personal knowledge. Does that mean that I can know people claim they cannot visualize? Yes. Can we make objective tests that a person who can visualize would pass while a person who cannot visualize can fail? Yes.

Its like truth Bob. We can never know the truth. The truth is what is. But can we set up a logical system of deduction called knowledge that works for us in objective society? Of course. Does that fact that we cannot directly know the truth invalidate knowledge as a useful tool? No. Does the fact that we can never know what is true negate the knowledge of the identity of truth as a concept? No. Same with an objective consciousness and its relation to the subjective mind.

Can we doubt that when we know something, it isn't true? Of course. Does doubt alone negate knowledge? The idea that we are being manipulated by an evil demon or are brains in a vat? No, you know this. An objective consciousness is what is within our capability of knowledge. Same with the concept of a subjective consciousness. Does pointing out that because we cannot know what it is like for another being to be subjectively conscious change anything about our objective conclusions? No.

To negate the knowledge that the brain causes subjective consciousness Bob, you have to have more than a doubt. More than a, "But it doesn't quite answer everything." Doesn't matter. All of our knowledge that we hold can be criticized in this way. We may wonder at the mystery of magnetism on the quantum level, but we still use it objectively to power our cars. As well, your own assessment is not free of this criticism either. If you claim brain states do not cause subjective consciousness, you have to combat modern neuroscience and medicine, which holds this to be known. This requires a replacement.

What does your replacement offer? If brain states do not cause consciousness, then what have we been doing wrong all these years in medicine? It is not your notion that we cannot know exactly what it is like to be a subjective being that I disagree with. It is the idea that because we do not, we have to throw away all the other objective knowledge we've accumulated. This knowledge does not make claims about the exact subjective experience of an individual, so where is the logic in throwing it away?

There must be more than doubt, or skepticism, or the idea that our current knowledge cannot identify or understand certain aspects of reality. We must offer an alternative that gives us something better than the current system. I asked this a while back and I'll ask again. What do you hope to get out of your system? I can invent the idea that an evil demon controls all of our actions, but it cannot be proved, so what does it do for us in reality?

What you are referring to, I think, is our ability to affect consciousness with what looks like from our perceptions as physical objects (e.g., popping a pill to get rid of my headache, cutting part of a brain off and observing the person’s personality change, etc.). This doesn’t mean that we have a reductive, conceptual account of brain states producing mental states. Within my perspective, popping a pill is just an extrinsic representation of mentality: the pill doesn’t fundamentally exist as something physical. — Bob Ross

No, the pill is physical because it fits the terms of what physical means. The pill is an identity with a particular set of essential properties. It matches those properties in reality, therefore we know it as a pill. We use the identity of "physical" to represent reality, and our analysis of reality works. Everything is matter and energy, so far that's held. If someone pops a rock instead of a pill, it doesn't matter that they identified and believed the rock to be a pill, its not going to have the same effect. Again, this is general knowledge Bob. You can't come to it and start saying things like "it looks like from our perceptions". If we go that route, we don't have knowledge. And if we don't have knowledge, any system goes. And if any system goes, people are going to choose the system that works in reality, not yours.

"All of existence consists,it is claimed,solely of ideas—,emotions,perceptions,intuitions,imagination,etc.—even though not one’s personal ideas alone."

I did look up the paper, and wanted to point this summary out. Bob, we've already discussed knowledge before. This author is a person who clearly does not understand knowledge. Knowledge and personal experience consists of all of these things. Yet reality is ultimately what all of these are tested against. I can have a dream that I can fly, but when I awake and imagine myself flying, I can't do it in reality. We've discussed this at length in the past, so I do not feel the need to revisit it. His theory is a theory we can invent, but a theory that fails when tested against reality. I will not debate this point as a courtesy since we already have before. This may be a point in which we agree to disagree here. If this is a key point of difference between what is stated here, then we will not be able to continue the conversation. I still have full respect for your thought process, passion, and intelligence, it is just something we have already explored at length.

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one.

Not quite. Either the brain produces the mind, and thusly the mind is an emergent property thereof (and so they are not one and the same) or vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify then, a "living brain" and the mind are one. A dead brain of course produces nothing. But a living brain which fires synapses and has a subjective experience is the mind. Beyond the science of "death", You can do an experiment to confirm this. Note where your consciousness is in your body. Now move to a new location. Does your consciousness move with you? Can you by concentration extend your consciousness out past your body to where you were? I know I'm unable to. Therefore the only reasonable conclusion is that consciousness follows physical movement, and is therefore subject to physical reality. It is located at a particular physical location. With our scientific understanding of the brain, the only reasonable conclusion is that physical location is the brain. I am open to hearing reasonable alternatives.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally.

Something being logically consistent doesn’t make it true in metaphysics nor science: idealism and physicalism are both logically consistent. — Bob Ross

That's an avoidant answer Bob. I don't hold to idealism and physicalism because I often find they are summary identities that are not logically consistent when examined in detail. Unless you can show me why its not logical to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally, you do not have a logical argument yourself. You either need to present a logical alternative, which I have not seen so far, or demonstrate where my logical claim fails explicitly.

Being able to associate people’s mental activity with brain states doesn’t prove in itself that the latter causes (i.e., reductively explains) the former: you keep bringing up examples of this as if it does prove it. Why do you think it proves it? — Bob Ross

Its not "associate", its real claims of knowledge and science. If you deny this, then once again we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I've given plenty of examples in neuroscience and medicine. I have yet to hear any counters to them besides an insistence its just a correlation. You need to prove they are correlations, not causations, and you have not done so. Expressions of doubt just aren't enough.

Think of lower-life forms, like squirrels: they don’t self-reflectively know (cognitively) that there is something it is like to see from there eyes nor that they qualitatively experience in general. According to your definition, then, one would likewise have to have the over-and-above cognitive abilities to gain self-knowledge of one’s qualia, which is different than the qualia itself. — Bob Ross

According to our discussion of qualia, it is not simply self-reflectiveness. It is the experience of the subject itself. Self-knowledge of qualia is a higher consciousness, but unnecessary to be conscious. If a thing experiences and identifies, it has consciousness. You seem to be implying that only meta-consciousness is consciousness. But its not, its why we note "meta". A squirrel likely may not be able to evaluate its own qualia. That has nothing to do with being conscious at the most basic level.

But the cogitated “2+2=4” or “I am seeing the color red” are self-reflective notions of the qualia--they are not the qualia themselves. — Bob Ross

Self-reflection is also qualia. I don't understand how its not. You even noted that qualitative processing is qualia, so why is this all of the sudden not qualia? On your next pass, lets see if we can really clearly identify what qualia is as a unique identity that does not have these inconsistencies or questions.

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical"

This isn’t what metaphysics means: it is the “study of that which is beyond the possibility of all experience”. — Bob Ross

The word includes "meta", which essentially means, "about the subject", and the subject is physics, or the physical. Physical in later years has been replaced with "experience", but metaphysics always refers to what is real. It is about taking the real and identifying it in a way that we can logically process. For example, "Gravity pulls everything together", is a metaphysical description of the math and science of gravity. But it relies on there actually being the math and science of gravity. Metaphysics that does not rely on existence or reality isn't metaphysics. Studying what is beyond the possibility of reality is not metaphysics, but speculation and imagination.

Regardless of your definition, the underlying meaning is all that matters. I am discussing matters of experience. Anything that cannot be experienced, is outside of what can be known. Anything outside of what can be known is speculation, and while fun, is pointless to debate the veracity of any one speculation over another.

Finally,

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

What do you mean by “logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails”? Do you mean logical necessity?

I would say that objectivity is that which its truthity is will-independent.

Also, “a falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false” is a contradiction in terms. If it is falsifiable, then it is possible to shown to be false, whereas an unfalsifiable claim is something which cannot be shown to be false. — Bob Ross

Objectivity is deduction that is not contradicted by reality. Going back to a long ago conversation, applicable knowledge. if we don't want to go down that road again, the closest view would be scientific laws and tested theories.

As for falsifiable, all falsifiable means is that we can imagine a situation in which a claim could be false. For example, "I will be at a dinner at 2pm". Its falsifiable in the fact that there is a state in which I am not at the dinner at 2pm." But if I am indeed at a dinner at 2pm, my statement cannot be shown to be false. Apologies for the unclear sentences there.

A good deep dive again Bob! I now these replies are getting long again. I'll try to pare down the next reply.

What I am saying is that explaining the qualitative experience that drunk person has in terms of the brain functions, as opposed to those functions being the extrinsic representation of mental activity, has the explanatory gap of ‘I see how those functions impact consciousness, but how do those functions produce consciousness?’. — Bob Ross

Perhaps its the construction of your sentence I disagree with, and maybe not your underlying point. The problem is you keep saying "impact" as if its different from "cause". They aren't. Now, does that mean they are the entire cause? No one could say that. But you can't separate "impact" from "cause". They are essentially the same thing.

What I think you're trying to get at, as this is what the real problem of "consciousness" is, is that you cannot see the internal subjectiveness of a function. We see because light bounces off of objects. Measurement is essentially all done by bouncing something off another thing. But a subjective experience is the internal process of matter and energy. We cannot "bounce" off of the subjective internal. We can see the brain and its functions by bouncing off photons and other measuring tools, but those are inadequate to get inside the thing itself.

When you say “ The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk”, I feel as though you are somewhat agreeing with me but you still do not agree that the qualitative experience is different than our conceptual account of the brain functions. — Bob Ross

Perhaps the confusion is that I am talking about the external measurement of consciousness, not the internal. Regardless of the qualia one experiences, the brain states are the outside objective measurements of that creation. If an apple falls from a tree, gravity suddenly impacts the living cells. They react to it. Do we know what its like to experience that reaction internally as a cell or group of cells? No, its impossible. Does gravity still affect the apple and we can observe the reaction of the cells? Yes.

Seeing with a brain scanner that alcholol inhibits this and that doesn’t produce any conceptual explanation of how the brain functions (inhibited or still functional) are producing the qualitative experience (e.g., the drunk person’s experience of seeing the color red) of that person. That’s where the explanatory gap is. — Bob Ross

To be clear from my end: the brain scanner cannot measure the internal experience of what its like to have the qualia of being drunk. It can scan the brain and note that the individual is inebriated, and through testing, we can note that when the brain is in a particular state, inebriation of the subject occurs. Hands down Bob, alcohol changes the brain which causes drunkenness. That's not debatable. What you seem to think is that because we cannot measure the internal subjective experience of consciousness, that we can't say the brain causes consciousness. That doesn't work. Its illogical.

If you already hold that the brain produces consciousness, then, yes, I would expect you to try to explain the mental event as the wavelength interpretation: but whether one can actually give a conceptual reductive explanation of that is what is in question. — Bob Ross

Its not in question. We can give a conceptual reductive explanation of why alcohol inebriates a person. We cannot give a conceptual reductive explanation of what it is like to internally experience that inebriation. This is because we cannot measure the subjective with the tools we have. That does not mean the objective measurements of what we can measure, suddenly cannot make objective conclusions and measurements of consciousness by the beings actions and responses.

I think you may agree with me here insofar as you hold some aspect of our subjective experience as off limits (and thusly non-reducible to the brain), and, in that case, it is important to note that if you agree then I think you are conceding that you do not have an conceptual account of how a mind-independent brain allegedly produces consciousness and, thusly, you cannot prove it. I am not saying it is impossible nor that it isn’t the case: I am saying you cannot prove it if you cannot conceptually reduce mental states (such as seeing the color red) to brain states—and, no, as seen in the form of the argument, appealing to how functions impact consciousness says nothing about them producing consciousness. — Bob Ross

Again, I think the issue here is vocabulary. Functions cause consciousness. "Impact" is part of causality. If a cue ball impacts the eight ball, it causes it to fly in a particular direction. Cause is what produces an affect. If I touch a person's brain with an electrode at a particular location, scan the brain, and they say, I see a red car, I start to associate brain scans with their expression of what they consciously perceive. If we can repeat it every time and the person is being honest, then we see the brain causes the person to see the color red.

What we cannot see is the internal of being that brain stimulus. We can see the neuron's cascade. We can see they do it every time and produce a particular result. But that is all by external measurement. We cannot measure internally. We cannot measure existence as its subject. Our inability to do so does not mean that the external results of brain stimulation suddenly do not cause consciousness. Its proven. There's no gap here. The only gap is again, our inability to measure something as a subject itself.

Given what I have said hitherto, if you agree with me that we cannot gain insight into qualitative experience then you are equally conceding that we cannot reduce qualitative experience to brain states; which means you have no proof that the former really is from the latter. — Bob Ross

We're so close on agreement here Bob! The only problem is that we have reduced qualitative experience to brain states repeatedly in science and medicine for decades. I really feel at this point you're just using the wrong words to describe a situation. We can measure qaulitative brain states to measure levels of consciousness as an outside observer. we can never measure qualitative brain states to measure levels of conscousness as an inside observer, the subject itself.

Chalmer’s never said that consciousness (as qualitative experience) being explained through the brain is an easy problem, he said that awareness aspects of consciousness (such as the functions which you quoted later on) are easy problems. — Bob Ross

Agreed, this is what I meant.

If you hold that the brain produces consciousness, then the only logically consistent views available to you are physicalist accounts of the world: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross

Again, you'll have to explain what you mean by physicalist. Yes, the terms are great if everyone holds exactly to what they are and if we all agreed on what they meant. In experience for any serious discussion, I've found the person using the term must clearly explain what they mean as it is often a subjective use for them.

Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away

If by “objective” you mean “something which we can empirically observe”, then no metaphysical theory, including physicalism (including the view that the brain produces consciousness), “cares” about “objectivity”. — Bob Ross

No, objectivity is something that can be logically concluded to the point that any challenge against it fails. A falsifiable claim that cannot be shown to be false essentially.

I believe you define qualia as

Nowadays, I think it is recognized a lot more, by philosophers in philosophy of mind, as irreconcilable for physicalism. — Bob Ross

Would you mind linking to a philosopher who believes that mind does not come from the brain? I would like to read from one.

Philosophim, if you think that the brain produces consciousness and the brain (and the world) is mind-independent, then you are a physicalist. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind-independent". The brain and the mind are one. Mind is not independent of matter and energy, it is the internal result of matter and energy. We are not separated from matter and energy. We are matter and energy. Which tells us that matter and energy can be conscious in the right combination. If that makes me a physicalist or contradicts a physicalist view according to your view of physicalism, I don't care.

The point is it is logically consistent to hold that matter and energy can create consciousness internally. We can see evidence of this internal experience by our own experience, and the actions that an internal consciousness results in. But knowing what the subjective experience of matter and energy that is not ourselves, is currently impossible with our tools and understanding of reality.

So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

I would say that it is qualitative in the sense that it occurred at a timestamp within a steady flow of qualitative time, but it was non-spatial—so not qualitative pertaining to that. Likewise, I would also hold that the imagination is qualitative. I hold that our faculty of reason is a sense that takes perceptions in as its input and generates concepts of them. — Bob Ross

Then this disagrees with every notion of qualia I've ever known. If "you" are thinking, that's "your" qualia. Qualia is "you" experiencing something. I can observe and identify thoughts correct? I can consciously dream. This is a massive definition gap in the discussion, and if this is not agreed upon, we will simply talk past each other.

In my understanding of qualia, qualia is a base requirement for consciousness. Meaning that like all tigers are cats, all consciousness is qualia. It is possible to have qualia but not have consciousness. From my example, one could observe, but not attempt to identify. This is qualia. But if you are thinking, you are observing and identifying. Therefore that is consciousness.

Your proposal of qualia seems to imply a person can be conscious of something, but not have qualia of that something. That seems very contradictory to me. Can you try to give a logical reason why? Lets remove qualitative and spatial as I think these terms add nothing to the point. Nothing in your head is spatial, and any identification can be considered qualitative upon examination. "4" and "red" are just concepts that we give a limit to, but we're talking about the qualia of experiencing "4" and "red". You're a person thinking "2+2=4". Why is that any different from "I see the color red"?

However, I think it is important to note that you are making metaphysical claims, not just scientific ones. — Bob Ross

I view the term "metaphysical" as its most base definition. "Analysis of the physical". Put another way, its the interpretation of reality in a way that makes logically consistent assessments of that reality. All language is metaphysical. As such, I find the term not very useful. All that matters to me is if my definitions are consistent, logical, and accurate in assessing reality.

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness?

Through evolution, not all conscious beings have the same capabilities—e.g., my dog lacks the cognitive capabilities to abstract his perceptions as much (or at all) like I can. — Bob Ross

So really this is the ability for a being to be conscious of more abstracts than another. If that's the case I don't see how higher consciousness affects any of the points here. Its still consciousness, just more of it.

You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to

I believe so (if I am understanding you correctly). My mind’s ability to identify with or have self-knowledge of the qualitative experience is different than merely having it. He cannot “attend to it” because he isn’t meta-conscious or perhaps he simply can’t identify as “his self” having them (so it could be an ownership thing). — Bob Ross

Again, this is a unique view of consciousness to me. I have never heard of consciousness without qualia.

After thinking about the larger discussion, I believe I can summarize our differences down to a few points. We may have to simply agree to disagree on some of these points, but I think a conclusion one way or the other on these will bring the discussion to a close.

1. The definition of qualia

I define qualia as essentially "subjective experience". This subjective experience does not need to be identified, but a stream of sensations, emotions, etc. would be qualia. Anything that I do not subjectively experience, for example the blood pumping through my left leg, would not be qualia.

You seem to think that there is a subjective experience that is qualia, and and a subjective experience that is qualitative. A person can have a qualitative experience without having qualia. This seems a semantic difference from my above evaluation. However, our conclusions differ. You seem to imply that something quantitative that does not have qualia is conscious, while I would call that an unconscious event. To help clarify this issue, what would you define as unconscious?

2. You believe that because we cannot measure the subjective experience of being conscious, that this proves that we cannot claim that consciousness comes from brain states. I note that science and medicine has for years evaluated objective consciousness through medicine and has determined that brain states cause consciousness. I also note that we cannot measure the subjective experience of consciousness, but that it is irrelevant to the conclusion that brains cause consciousness as objective measures of consciousness aren't trying to evaluate subjective measures, just objective outcomes.

I hope that summary accurately depicts our current differences, as well as some similar stances we hold. I honestly believe that we're not very far from one another's view points, and it seems a few semantical differences are leading to two different conclusions. Thanks again Bob, I look forward to hearing from you.

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states.
— Philosophim
If we can, can you explain it? — Patterner

Sure, lets use a modern medical practice, anesthesia. If you've ever had a major surgery, they give you different types of chemicals with the sole purpose of knocking you unconscious. Here's a paper talking about anesthesia and unconsciousness if you're interested. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2743249/#:~:text=According%20to%20this%20framework%2C%20anesthetics,patterns%20available%20to%20cortical%20networks).

Let me also clarify what I mean. We cannot get inside of the subject of consciousness. Its impossible. No outside measurement will reveal what is inside. Subjective consciousness is inside. But can we measure brain states and find causality between a person's ability to express subjective consciousness? Absolutely. To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine.

You've interpreted gender as overriding sex, which it might be based on your perspective on gender & sex, what you think these words mean and based on what you consider "overriding" but that's where the subjectivity is. — Judaka

Its not interpretation. Its using the definitions provided in the OP which the transgender community accepts to come to a conclusion. Hopefully a logical conclusion, but that's what debate is for.

In politics, "Ten people who speak make more noise than ten thousand who are silent". The worst thing you can try to do is change the minds of those who staunchly disagree with you, a lot of effort with no payoff. Instead, convince people on the fence, or those who were slightly on your side to fully commit. — Judaka

There is wisdom in that, but if I wanted to discuss politics or try to change the political world, I wouldn't be on a philosophy forum. :) I was once deep into religion Judaka. I had a mother who was highly manipulative and used lies and half truths to get what she wanted. I know what its like to be emotionally manipulated into something that another person wants without regard to logic or an objective world view. I have no desire to do that to anyone else.

Logic and philosophy is not about convincing others to change. Its not about our own personal egos. Its about finding a logical conclusion that at the end of the day, can be discussed objectively. A person then chooses to change their life based on what they've read. Its not manipulation. There are people like me who need more than politics, religion, or a whole host of emotional sways. Sometimes we just need to think and wonder if our emotional impulses and cultural beliefs actually make sense. People like me reject the emotional manipulations of the world. Let others do that, that is their job in life.

Maybe there is someone else like me who is tired of manipulations as well. And if not? I got to think through it myself. Philosophy after all is not the love of debate or the love of politics, its is the love of wisdom.

We know where in the brain certain aspects of consciousness take place. But we don't know how. — Patterner

Its because we cannot measure from within a conscious state. All objective measurements are from "without". We bounce stuff off of things to detect features. Vibrations for sound, photons for light. But consciousness is subjective, which means it comes from within a state. We can't currently bounce something at a state to measure what its like to be within that state.

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states. Its only limited to an examination for consciousness as an observing being outside of the conscious state. We don't know "how" it is to be conscious from within the state, but we can know how it is conscious state outside, or the consequence of the actions of that inner state, work and function.

The problem with focusing on the "logic of the language" is that language, generally, but especially with the word "gender" is deeply influenced by one's views on the matter. — Judaka

I disagree. Logic allows you to question your views on the matter and offer a stable reason where bias and subjective opinion may have once been your influence. I do not say this as a matter of opinion, I say this as one who has lived it.

Even if that wasn't true, how a word is defined shouldn't compel anyone to think in any specific way. If the language around sex or gender didn't fit the logic that I thought was accurate or best, then I would simply use the words in the way I wanted instead, and that's 100% common practice. — Judaka

It is common practice, but it is not a practice that entails a solution that all parties can logically agree on. At that point its a power struggle of opinion and emotions. You will never get anyone to agree with you who does not share your emotional desires. If you can remove subjective prejudice and focus on the logic of the situation, I believe it is conclusive that a subjective identification of oneself should never override societies objective classification of biology. My conclusion is a logical conclusion even a transgender person cannot refute. It has nothing to do with how we feel about the situation.

You aren't even remotely neutral here, your political views are included in your interpretation of these concepts and ideas, and I say that as someone who pretty much agrees with you. — Judaka

Incorrect. I have attempted to look at both sides of the issue. I've attempted to take the definitions that the community has provided and largely agreed upon, and come to a logical conclusion. My feelings on the matter are irrelevant and unknown to you. A problem in trying to be a neutral party and discuss such things is that people rush to assumptions and political emotions that cloud the ability to judge accurately. This causes people to not think of the idea, but instead simply accept or reject the person. That is not thinking, that's just bias.

Though for me, the reason why separation by sex shouldn't be overridden by gender is that the reasons for separating people by sex are primarily physical and have nothing to do with gender. — Judaka

Agreed. The point of this OP was to analyze why that was at a deeper level. To explore that gender is entirely subjective, biology is objective, and even if there are slight overlaps in some areas, why those overlaps are not enough to override the biological divisions we've created. We need more conversations with each other instead of camps where we insult each other as "an other". Logic can break down such walls and remind each other we're both people who even if we cannot come to a common agreement, can discuss and hear another way of looking at the issue.

I was very glad to hear Josh's viewpoint on the matter. I very much considered his points, despite them not changing my mind. I am now aware of a viewpoint that I had not considered before, and I can take it with me in future conversations. If we had just yelled at each other, that never would have happened.

quote="Bob Ross;814253"]The point is that I don’t. It is not a scientific fact that brains produce consciousness.[/quote]

We may be at an impasse here Bob. I respect your view point, but I can't agree on this one. Being able to express doubt about a theory does not disprove a theory. A scientific theory is not like the layman's meaning of theory.

"The way that scientists use the word 'theory' is a little different than how it is commonly used in the lay public," said Jaime Tanner, a professor of biology at Emerson College in Boston. "Most people use the word 'theory' to mean an idea or hunch that someone has, but in science the word 'theory' refers to the way that we interpret facts." https://www.livescience.com/21491-what-is-a-scientific-theory-definition-of-theory.html

One way to think of it is all the science up till now points to the brain, in the case of people, being the source of consciousness in people. Its like evolution. Its not a scientific law for sure, but every single attempt at refuting it has come up short. This is why I asked you to give a counter. You need to take the scientific knowledge that we have at this time and demonstrate why it cannot come from the brain. A simple way to do this is provide an alternative that we can use.

This is why I always note a distinction, when discussing the hard problem, between awareness and experience: the former being “how a being has knowledge, be aware, of its environment” while the latter is “how a being has qualitative, subjective experience of its environment”. — Bob Ross

I'm having a hard time understanding the difference between those terms. If you have knowledge of something, you are aware. And if you are aware, that attention is qualia is it not? Can you give me example of something that you could be aware of that was not also qualia, or subjective experience? To me it appears you're comparing unconscious awareness with conscious awareness.

Explaining functions, for example, is an easy problem—e.g., a being can know that something is green by interpreting the wavelength of light reflected off of the object. However, explaining how those functions produce experience is a different story—e.g., why does the being also have a qualitative experience of the greenness of the object? — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's the right comparison. Its not "also have a qualitative experience", its "why is that a qualitative experience?" The interpretation of the wavelength by the brain is the qualia is it not? Perhaps with blindsight I can see it more to your viewpoint. The man sees something that he is not aware of. I suppose I would say his unconscious mind sees the object, but his conscious mind does not. So comparing that to your point, the unconscious mind would see green, while the conscious mind would not experience the qualia of green, but he would know that it was green. Is that a good comparison to what you're saying?

Does this also fit into your definition of awareness and experience? So in blindsight terms, we would say he is aware of the object in front of him, but he does not experience it in his qualia. Generally I would not use the term awareness for such a situation, but if that is your definition, and it fits this situation, then I think I understand your argument better. Please correct me here.

A good link to Chalmers. Let me point to these two paragraphs in section 2.

"The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does"

I've bolded that sentence explicitly. Chalmers agrees on the technical aspects of mind as brain within his easy problem explanation, so what is he saying here? He's not saying that we can't observe all of the processes that give rise to consciousness. He's asking, "Why is there subjective experience?" He's not saying, "Its impossible for the brain to produce subjective experience". He says it seems unreasonable, but it clearly does. We can simplify Chalmer's entire line of questioning to, "Since we cannot experience the subjective experience itself, how can we possibly reconcile subjective experience with the observable mechanics in front of us?"

The answer is of course, "We cant'." You and I agree on this entirely. We're only off by a slight understanding of what Chalmer's means here. Nothing we study about the brain will ever give us insight into its subjective experience. It is outside of our knowledge. That's why its a hard problem. The solution as I gave, is to work around it.

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain

I think you may be misunderstanding. Yes, the hard problem presumes, in order to even be a problem in the first place, that one is trying to explain consciousness by the standard reductive naturalist methodological approach. However, this is not the same thing as it being true. The hard problem is only such for physicalism, not other accounts such as substance dualism and idealism. — Bob Ross

According to Chalmer's here, it is not presumption. That is the easy problem. I do not care about physicalism, dualism, or idealism. I care about logical consistency, philosophical schools of thought be damned! :) To me its like I use a martial arts move that does not fit in with karate and someone berates me that it destroys karate. If the move is effective at defending oneself, what does it matter?

It is not that the hard problem comes about from physicalism, its that the hard problem is for our ability to understand the subjective nature of consciousness an an objective manner. Dualism and idealism are not objective, so of course the hard problem doesn't exist. When you don't care about objectivity, a lot of problems go away. I care about objectivity. Subjectivity has never interested me beyond some fun, "What ifs". Musing about the subjective without any objective basis is fantasy. While it is fun, it does not solve anything in reality.

Again, I am not claiming that the mind does not come from the brain but, rather, that we cannot prove (even theoretically in the future) because reductive physicalism affords no such answers—the methodology fails in this regard. — Bob Ross

Again, the fact that we cannot objectively experience the subjective experience of another brain itself, does not negate that the subjective experience is coming from the brain itself. Chalmers demonstrates that by the easy problem here:

"The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
the focus of attention;
the deliberate control of behavior;
the difference between wakefulness and sleep."

All of this is consciousness, and all of that comes from the brain. Chalmers never disputes this. Please show where he does if I am mistaken.

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness. — Bob Ross

No, there is not a conceptual gap between the biology and the experience. Get someone drunk and they become inebriated. This is due to how alcohol affects the brain. No one disputes this. The only gap is you don't know what the other person is subjectively experiencing while they are drunk. Objective consciousness vs subjective consciousness.

How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

From an ontological agnostic’s perspective, those fields are getting much better at understanding the relation between brain states and mental states but they say nothing about what consciousness fundamentally is. — Bob Ross

They can know what consciousness is objectively. They simply can't know what a consciousness experiences subjectively. Brain state A can be switched to state B, and every time they do, you see a Cat, then a Dog in your mind. You can tell them this, but no one knows what that experience you have of seeing a cat or dog is like.

Think of it like the video game analogy: if a character, Rose, hooks up another character, Billy, to a brain scanner and observes Billy qualitatively experiencing a green tree, she would be factually wrong to conclude that the Billy’s brain states were causing his mental experience of it because, in fact, the tree and his brain and body are fundamentally representations of 0s and 1s in a computer. We conflate our dashboard of experience with what reality fundamentally is—mentality. — Bob Ross

This just seems to be a language issue. The words I'm stating are not the subjective words in my head correct? When I type a sentence, you don't know everything I'm thinking. But that doesn't mean the words aren't an attempt to represent what I'm actually thinking right? The words that you are seeing are just a bunch of black pixels squiggled together. Without translation, someone who didn't speak English would have no clue that these squiggles mean anything.

So we can translate Billy's thoughts to comprehend that he is thinking of a tree, but of course we can't get to the actual subjective experience of Billy seeing a tree, because we're not the subject, or Billy in this case. If billy confirms he his seeing a tree after we hook up the computer, and every time the computer is hooked up, says Billy is thinking of a tree, and Billy then states, "I'm thinking of a tree", then we are on the road to causality. Current neuroscience is way past this simple example, and way past the point of possible correlation.

Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

If I could, then I would be proving myself wrong. The point is that science doesn’t afford an answer, so it would be contradictory of me to provide you with a scientific explanation, which is a reductive naturalistic approach, to afford an answer. — Bob Ross

Again, I think we're in agreement that it is impossible for science to ever know what it is like to subjectively experience from the subject's viewpoint. This in no way backs a claim that the brain does not produce a subjective experience.

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

I would say, in summary, that the extrinsic representation of qualitatively seeing a world, from the side of another being that is qualitatively seeing, is light entering the physical eyes and brain interpreting it—but this is just the representation of it on our dashboard of experience. — Bob Ross

Certainly, just like language is a representation of the thoughts I am trying to convey. It being a representation does not mean that language does not convey thoughts. It does not mean that I did not write them. It does not mean that I don't have thoughts. It just means you can never see my thoughts from my subjective viewpoint.

Meta-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s qualitative experience: I am not qualitatively experiencing my qualitative experience—I have one steady flow of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

See I view the consciousness of knowledge as qualia. Unconsciously knowing things would not be qualia, or subjective consciousness to me. I see qualia as the subjective experience of consciousness. it is that attentive awareness. So in your viewpoint, if I am actively thinking, "I know 2+2 equals 4", is that qualia? If not, what is it?

The point is that, under Analytic Idealism, you are still conscious when you are in a coma—you just have lost your meta-consciousness and other higher level aspects to consciousness (such as potentially the ability to cognize). — Bob Ross

So according to my definition of consciousness, a person in a coma could be considered objectively unconscious, but still subjectively conscious. Even then, perhaps there are still aspects of the brain that are still conscious. So for example, if we analyzed their brain and found that they were dreaming. Would we be able to know what that dreaming was like? No, but dreaming is observing and identifying.

Also, for my sake, instead of saying, under a philosophical theory x results, can you simply give me the logic why X results? My experience with people citing such theories is that everyone has a different viewpoint on what that theory means, so I want to understand what it means to you.

At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Let me ask you this: what about blindsight indicates, to you, that they don’t have qualia? Simply because they can no longer identify that they are seeing? — Bob Ross

Qualia to me is something you experience. While the unconscious portion of the brain is processing, your subjective awareness is not. Qualia is the requirement for subjective consciousness. Unconscious processing is not qualia, at least to my understanding of the general use of the word.

Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia?

No, that is an aspect, a ability, of higher conscious forms. — Bob Ross

What is higher consciousness? Why is higher consciousness different from lower consciousness? You seem to be implying that higher consciousness is the ability to remember what you just did, then analyze it. How is that any different from my definition of observing than identifying?

To me, perceptions are representations of the world, which are qualitative (and thusly are constituted of instances of qualia). — Bob Ross

Just trying to get the vocabulary down here. Perceptions are sensations which a mind processes into a representation of the world. So I could have the smell of a flower flow through my nostrils, but if I don't try to represent it as anything beyond the sensation of the smell itself, I don't have a perception. That is very similar to my observations/identity point. I have a feeling we're both off slightly with each other through semantics than a clash of ideology.

Sensations, on the other hand, are just the raw input which is also qualitative. — Bob Ross

I also agree with this. I think the difference is that if I am not attentive to the sensation, its an unconscious sensation. You seem to imply that our direct attentiveness to it is not required. So in the case of blindsight, the man is conscious of that which he cannot attend to. Does this capture your thoughts correctly?

So then are you advocating for epistemic solipsism? To me, this confirms that you can’t actually claim that objectively conscious beings are subjectively conscious and, thusly, we cannot know that there are other subjects but, rather, just that there are other observing beings. — Bob Ross

For an easily identifiable terminology, yes. We cannot know what another's subjective experience is, or even if they have it. Blindsight is proof of that. What we can do is have a cogent belief that others do. We can also analyze this objectively by looking for the consequence of having a subjective viewpoint. If I know that the ability to observe an identify is my subjective consciousness, then I can conclude that it allows me to do things that I could not if I were not an observing and identifying being. As a very simple test, I could put a puzzle in front of another being.

Lets take a crow for example. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGaUM_OngaY

In accordance to the definitions I've given, the crow is objectively conscious. Can we know what its like to be a conscious crow? No. Its impossible. Can we still objectively analyze its consciousness? Yes. Can we muse what it must feel like to be a crow? Of course, but its nothing we can know, just something we believe.

Finally, here's a link to a fairly good philosophy professor online who breaks down the hard problem. I'm posting it so that you know I understand the subject, and to also help clarify what I mean by the hard problem, and why we should just separate consciousness into objective and subjective branches. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaZbCctlll4

Thank you Bob for taking the time to really break down your methodology for me. This subject comes up every so often and I find most people are either unable or unwilling to really go into the details. Another long discussion already, but one that I am glad to explore!

I thought your definition of gender was whatever someone says it is, because your view of social construction is randomly assigned behavioral definitions by individuals, or groups who wield power over individuals to force them to act in certain ways. — Joshs

No, my definition of gender is clear, its simply a social construct. Of course that construct can be used for good, evil, power, pleasure, etc. Social constructs are tools, and humans use tools in every way possible.

The key notion I want to emphasize from this summary is that for Foucault socially constructed knowledge and values are not imposed on a community by an individual or group wielding power and desiring that the community act a certain way. Instead, they form an integrated pattern of understanding with its own internal ‘logic’ not imposed by anybody in particular, and not in top down fashion but disseminating itself through a culture from the bottom up , as a shared pattern of thinking and behaving. — Joshs

Certainly, there are groups of people who use gender exactly like Foucault states. Does everyone? Per my first set of comments, of course not.

The transgender view of gender is a consequence of gender being a social construct — Judaka

Yes, the transgender idea is that you can cross the culturally perceived gender barrier. The arguments you present are commonly known. However, if such arguments settled the issue, it would be done by now. I find there is a lot of vitriol between parties when the discussion is approached this way, and so this was an attempt to make the argument which sometimes has subtle notions of power and manipulation at play from both sides, and instead focus on the logic of the language.

Philosophy is best when it can look at a problem that people are stuck on, and find a new way of approaching it that can settle the issue. Philosophy should not care about the politics of the issue, and its intent should be a fair and equal logical conclusion for all parties involved.

This was that attempt. I simply find that the language of sex and gender, when taken to their logical conclusions, entail that separation by sex should never be overriden by gender. Its not political, personal, or intended to harm anyone. Its just what logically works best for all involved.

On a personal note, I do sympathize with people who feel the need to switch sex, know they are unable to truly do so, and so desperately cling onto gender as a lifeline to fulfil their fantasy or erase their distress. But, when you have to lie or hold illogical statements for emotional value, I have found this inevitably causes harm to yourself and those around you. It is not truth. And a life not lived true, is a far worse life than lived as a lie.

"Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing"

Objective consciousness is logical conclusion. How can it not be conscious? Logical conclusions don't think themselves. — Pantagruel

First, you cut off the rest of the quote which includes identification, and action. Second, your grammar is starting to fail. "is logical conclusion" "logical conclusions don't think themselves". This shows me you're not thinking about things, but putting out sloppy and quick replies.

I had to do a German translation for Unsinn. Why? I'm not German. And finally your point about the p-zombie shows me, again, that you have no idea what the definitions are that I've clearly described in the OP and in follow ups.

I've been more than patient, but its clear you're not taking this discussion seriously. Have a good day Pantagruel, we'll try again another time.

Except that you keep saying objective consciousness is not conscious. Ascribing these properties to objective consciousness contradicts this. — Pantagruel

I don't say that at all. The statement doesn't even make any sense. Please re-read the definition of objective consciousness, subjective consciousness and my explanations. Pull some quotes demonstrating where I've said this, as I don't understand how you're drawing that conclusion. I can't attempt to clarify for you until you give me my exact words that back your claim.

And even if I just ignore the self-contradictions of "objective consciousness," — Pantagruel

Please point out these self-contradictions. And quote me. At this point it is safe to say you have trouble reading and understanding the OP. This could be due to the lack of clarity in my terms or arguments. But I cannot know this if you do not cite.

there are senses in which we are co-conscious. Mirror-neurons function through identification with the observed cognitive state of others in certain circumstances. Empathy is a co-awareness of the subjective plight of another. And it is a critical developmental stage in conscious development. — Pantagruel

This has nothing to do with the definitions or topic here. Lets ensure that you first understand the definitions and arguments being made before you try adding new definitions like co-conscious.

If it is an observation and a logical conclusion then it is subjective consciousness. These are both elements of subjective consciousness. — Pantagruel

Correct. Meaning that if you are observing and identifying, that experience you are having of observing and identifying is your subjective consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness.
— Philosophim

Nevertheless, as I mentioned, you say objective consciousness should not "try to ascertain that it can know." Ascertaining and knowing are also operations of subjective consciousness. — Pantagruel

Please finish what I claimed.

"should not try to ascertain that it can know what another subjective consciousness is like"

You agreed with me on this. You cannot know what it is like for another being to be conscious. You cannot know another beings subjective consciousness. You can of course know your own subjective consciousness. But because I can never know your subjective consciousness, I cannot make any claims to the experience of your subjective consciousness objectively. I can't know what its like when you see green. You can't know what its like that I see green. We can objectively know that we both see the wavelength we call green. But we cannot objectively know what the subjective experience of seeing green is like.

I think we get into the same problems of stereotyping you pointed out in trying to distinguish objective from subjective with regard not only to gender but to the seemingly simple task of defining what it means to be attracted to someone on the basis of their ‘sex’. — Joshs

So that is a bit of a different subject. The terms at this time note attraction based on biological sex, but one could invent a word that notes attraction based on gender. The problem of course again, is that one's gender definitions are not universal across cultures, but are subjective and cultural themselves. I am not saying you shouldn't invent a language or go by gender in your personal culture. Do what you want. Its when we try to create clear terms that can be objectively identified and assessed across all cultures that we need to be more careful in our terms.

You might argue that it has been useful to offer legal protections for same-sex relations and partnerships because one is able to define and identify same-sex attraction objectively. — Joshs

I'm not arguing that though. I believe you can sexually commit to anyone you want as long as they are not a child, an animal, dead, or severely cognitively impaired. The reasons of course being the inability of the other party to make a clear decision on the matter. Two people who want to hook up and commit for life are all good.

But as I suggested, the lines are being blurred between what is subjective and what is objective in this arena. Many now argue that the concept of psychological gender is no more subjective that what labels like gay and lesbian supposedly refer to. — Joshs

Here we've discussed at length about clear lines and divisions. It doesn't matte what they say, it matters what's been discussed here. I've demonstrated, and you've confirmed, the problem with gender as a subjective, wishy-washy, line blurring definition. Its not that they aren't clear from the one's who invent and use them. When a person has a clear idea of what "feminine" is, they can list off all the features easily. The problem is that we can very easily find another person, ask them what feminine is, and they could easily list off a set of completely different and contrary points.

It may not be practical for a community to make political decisions protecting the rights of individuals to behave in ways that that community considers to be the result of private whim or compulsion on the part of the individual, and does appear to belong to a larger pattern, constellation or theme of personality that all of us possess, each in their own way. — Joshs

The practicality is irrelevant. The rights are already there to do so are they not? Do we not have free speech? Should we not have the right to act, wear, and dress as we wish within the privacy of our homes? I would love to say public places, but abuse, and not of the sexual sort, has long shown there needs to be some regulation to assure public safety and health. I would definitely argue that the limitations on dress and actions should be minimized, and only limited if real public harms can be demonstrated by their allowance.

my view of gender is actually much closer to the social constructionist approaches to gender of authors like Butler and Foucault than your cultural perspective is. Like me, they view gender in terms of a constellation of shared patterns of behaviors that bind communities. — Joshs

Of course, but that's in full agreement with my definition of gender as well. Gender is socially constructed, and gender is often used as a binding or enforcement tool for behaviors that the particular culture desires people to act on. That actually doesn't change the questions I've put forward.

I see you haven't addressed those questions directly, and if I had to guess, it is because you are concerned that this could somehow be used against sexuality itself. I assure you, it does not. Having spoken to several different people within the sexual variance community (I much prefer that term to the alphabet mix), I believe they agree in essence with what I'm stating, but are afraid that they will be seen as hypocritical in someway, or damage their own societal acceptance they have worked so hard to gain.

Such fear is often damaging, because this causes lies, half-truths, and evasive answers. But that is not the intention here. In philosophy we must be willing to examine issues at their core without fear of where people will try to go from there right? But I understand the fear. So don't answer my questions, its fine. I've ascertained enough at this point to hold to my original conclusions.

Objective consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify. — Philosophim

Ok, this is better Pantagruel.

You left out the next few sentences in the quote, which are important. You need to read more than a few sentences before making judgements. Sentences are part of an overall idea right? Don't read the sentences in isolation. Read the sentences to understand the idea.

Objective consciousness occurs when we can know that something that is not our subjective consciousness is also observing and identifying. The problem in knowing whether something is objectively conscious is that we cannot experience their subjective consciousness. So the only logical thing to do is to observe what an objective consciousness does that only an observing identifying thing could do.
"Objective consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify."
— Philosophim

Objective consciousness is not subjective consciousness. Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing and identifying things through their actions.
Subjective consciousness is the direct subjective experience of being conscious.

You clearly say that objective consciousness occurs in the observing subject as a function of the awareness of another conscious being. — Pantagruel

I want to break down your words here to make sure I understand. You use the word "occurs in" with regards to objective consciousness. Objective consciousness is observed and known by the observing a subjects actions. It does not assess the inner experience of the subject. It does not assess the inner experience of the self. So its a little odd to say objective consciousness occurs in something. Objective consciousness is an observation of consciousness that does not require understanding the inner subjectivity of that consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness.

Ok, yes, when I see something which I believe to be conscious, I am conscious of an object that I deem to be conscious. You are absolutely correct. And I don't experience the contents of other minds. For sure. — Pantagruel

To simplify this further:

When I see something that I believe to be conscious, I study its actions. If the actions of the being are actions that can only be done by something which can observe and identify, then objectively, it is conscious.

My own experience of being conscious, is subjective consciousness. My experience is only within my knowledge, no one else can know exactly what I am experiencing. I of course know what its like to be conscious from my point of view. But just like no one else can know what its like to be conscious from my point of view, I cannot know what its like for someone else to be conscious from their point of view.

Because subjective consciousness cannot be known by anyone besides the subject, it should be in a separate category than objective consciousness, which can be known and studied by everyone.

Pantagruel, you've pulled statements out of context, accused me of misleading, and apparently have not read the OP, or simply lack reading comprehension. I clearly defined what objective consciousness is in the OP. This is philosophy, the term and its definition is a proposal to be debated on that I did NOT mislead people about. I do not mind answering questions, clarifying issues, or addressing relevant critiques. I'm not interested in discussing with someone who is not making good faith efforts to address and understand the OP.

Isn't this whole idea of "objective consciousness" misleading? Aren't you just describing the external observation of consciousness? — Pantagruel

Mislead is a pretty bold accusation. Please point out where and how I'm misleading the reader if you're going to do so.

However, in that case, your statement, that minds emerge from brains " Its just what is considered fact at this time" is really either tautological or out of scope of your assumption. — Pantagruel

I've already clarified that your statement taken out of context was a misread. If you would like to contribute, start from the OP and take the definitions as given there. Here is a relevant paragraph for you.

Why the need for the separation?

The simple answer is because a subjective experience cannot be observed by someone who is not that subject. We can infer and believe that another being experiences a subjective consciousness, but it is beyond our knowledge of experience. Yet objective consciousness is clearly within the realm of experienced knowledge. This lets us also apply consciousness beyond humanity. We can examine other animals for objective consciousness, as well as plants and perhaps even things we may not consider life. Objective consciousness doesn't have to know what its like to be the subject within that consciousness, or even if there's something that we as humans would recognize as a subject at all. — Philosophim

Microbial colonies exhibit an awareness of and adaptation to their environment (eg. The Global Brain by Howard Bloom). Which demonstrates the most fundamental aspects of consciousness, perception and action. So the requirement isn't so much a "brain" as some form of physical medium. Ascribing consciousness to a brain is just anthropocentric prejudice. In which case, there is literally no limit to what could potentially instantiate a consciousness — Pantagruel

Yes, you misunderstand. I've expressed in the OP that consciousness is not limited to humans, and have noted that consciousness could exist in plants, and even AI elsewhere. In long form conversations that take time to write out, its much easier to rely on the context of the conversation. In the full context of Bob's conversation, I think its clear we're talking about human minds and human brains.

The problem word loaded into the question is ‘should’. — I like sushi

That's why its a question. I say no based on the reason's given. What do you say?

When the term ‘gay’ because popular, it was seen by the general public as strictly a description of same-sex attraction and nothing else. When I recognized myself as gay, the term meant much more to me than this. It referred to my gender, not in the way you mean gender as an arbitrary whim or compulsion to exhibit some behavior disconnected from any larger pattern, but gender as a constellation of behaviors caused by an inborn perceptual setpoint. — Joshs

Which is fine. But this agrees with my point. Gender is subjective. Its your personal viewpoint of what it means to be gay. Objectively, all that it means to be gay is that you are sexually attracted to members of the same sex. Anything more varies from person to person.

But the reason that I introduced to you my notion of perceptual setpoint was not at all to assign and lock in place a certain set of concepts , a laundry list of specific behaviors that we must then force all of us into (masculinity means THIS set of traits and femininity mean THAT set of traits).
What I was trying to demonstrate was that gender, like many other personality traits or dispositions, is inborn and, while it evolves in its expression as we mature, has a relative stability over the course of our lives. — Joshs

Or it could be taken that you have set personality points, and you have ascribed those points to the fact you are gay. Which is fine as a personal assessment. But that's all it is, a personal, subjective interpretation. You agree with me a straight man who acts in all the stereotypical gay ways, but ultimately does not find other men attractive, is not objectively gay. That's my point about objective language within society versus gendered language for ourselves or groups that we place ourselves in. When we try to take our personal or particular culture of understanding the world and attempt to tell everyone its now an objective fact, we step on others subjectivity without an established objectivity underlying our insistence.

In addition, while no two people share the same gender, there are close overlaps among elements of the larger community which make it possible for individuals with a particular gender to recognize themselves in a subcommunity and as a result feel a closeness to other members of thar subcommunity on the basis of overlapping gender behavior that they don’t feel with those outside of that subcommunity. — Joshs

My sister does not like dolls. She dissects dead bodies for a living. She does not paint her nails, use make up, or wear dresses. She's very pretty. She is married and a mother of two children.

She has absolutely nothing in common with "feminine" women. She likes other women who are intelligent, hard working, and are interested in the same things she is. My sister if very much a woman, and does not consider at all that her life and what she's interested in makes her any less of a woman.

The reality is we like people who are interested in some common things we are. Then we make the mistake of attributing that to aspects about them that really have nothing to do with it. Perhaps we do it to make identity easier, as its the brains way of lazily organizing things. I'm sure there are plenty of gay people who you have no interest in being with, and have personalities and actions that greatly differ from your own.

Your attraction or lack of attraction to a woman is based on her sex. I'm straight, and my same sex simply does not turn me on at all
— Philosophim

It ain’t that simple. Why and in what way the opposite turns you on is connected with your personal perceptual setpoint as well as cultural factors. — Joshs

So are you attracted to some women? You would objectively be considered bisexual then. Which is fine, sexuality is a spectrum. I'm on the far end of the spectrum as I have never found a member of my same sex sexually attractive. I have friends who are more fluid. The point is that the words gay, lesbian, bit, etc all mean objective things regardless of your subjective viewpoints or culture. We should not let subjective viewpoints or culture dictate objective viewpoints.

While I have many issues with the idea of allowing a biologically male body to compete among biological
female bodies, given the fact that you don’t appear to have a concept of psychological gender, I suspect this may limit your engagement on this issue. — Joshs

To clarify, of course you have a psychological gender. That's what gender is, a subjective viewpoint of how you think a sex should act, feel, etc. But a subjective viewpoint does not override objective definitions that apply universally regardless of your gender.

Good discussion btw! I appreciate your candidness and openness. I do feel we have each expressed our viewpoints at this juncture. So at this point lets see if we can wrap it. Should gender override objective sex division in society? Should a straight man be able to identify as gay even if they could never be attracted to another man? Should a man who wears a dress suddenly be recognized in society as a woman? Should be sister be labeled a man because she doesn't identify with what some people in America think a woman should be like?

I thought you were arguing that minds emerge from brains? Am I misunderstanding you? Or you are saying that the objective vs. subjective consciousness distinction is the out of scope of that claim? — Bob Ross

I'm not really arguing for it. Its just what is considered fact at this time. If you want to prove that minds do not come from the brain feel free, but you'll need to challenge modern day neuroscience, psychology, and medicine.

As for the hard problem, I still think you misunderstand it. " Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present. This is the hard problem." -Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy
https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/#:~:text=The%20hard%20problem%20of%20consciousness%20is%20the%20problem%20of%20explaining,directly%20appear%20to%20the%20subject.

The hard problem even admits that consciousness is explained through the brain. The question is how does consciousness explicitly form from that process, and can we scientifically demonstrate what it is like to be that conscious being. Essentially consciousness is personal to the brain, it is not something we can observe from the outside.

"This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. All these factors make the hard problem hard."

My solution to this is to just simply note that referring to the experience of the conscious subject itself is "subjective consciousness". Knowing what it is like to be the subject of any one conscious being besides ourselves is currently impossible.

I don’t know why you would say that it is given: that sounds awfully dogmatic. I figured you would have a proof for it, are you saying you just assume that is the case? Am I understanding you correctly? — Bob Ross

The only people questioning that mind comes from the brain are philosophers. To my knowledge, every other factual aspect of the world knows that the mind comes from the brain. The hard problem does Mind coming from the brain is like oxygen theory, while the idea it does not is like phlogiston theory. Oxygen theory does not have to prove itself, phlogiston theory does at this point in time. I am open to hearing arguments that the mind does not come from the brain, but I don't feel the need to prove the scientific default. The discussion I'm trying to hold is more equivalent to the science of launching a rocket. Having to pivot to prove that mind comes from the brain is like then debating that fuel and oxygen is what causes the rocket combustion instead of phlogiston leakage.

It may be a large enough subject to address elsewhere. I can hop back into your original thread when it dies down if you would like! But feel free to prove here first that the mind does not come from the brain and lets see where that takes us.

Likewise, whether the brain produces consciousness is widely recognized as a matter of philosophy of mind which is metaphysics and not science. Yes, most scientists are physicalists, but that isn’t a scientific consensus—that’s scientists having a consensus. — Bob Ross

While this is an interesting thought, is this something you can demonstrate? How do you explain modern day neuroscience? Medical Psychiatry? Brain surgery?

Firstly, yes it absolutely is disputed: not every scientist is a physicalist. Secondly, science doesn’t tell us whether the brain produces consciousness. — Bob Ross

First, like you noted, just because you're an atheist scientist, it doesn't mean that science concludes atheism. What is the currently agreed upon consensus in science? Finding a few here and there who disagree is easy to find; 1-10 dentists don't believe that brushing your teeth helps prevent tooth decay for example.

Second, the easy problem confirms that yes, science knows that the brain produces consciousness. Please find me a reputable neuroscience paper that shows that the brain most certainly does not produce consciousness, and then also provides evidence of what is.

Here are a few interesting videos to check out. This is from 11 years ago:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FsH7RK1S2E

This is from five years ago:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ecvv-EvOj8M (Start at 6:00)

Finally, just as an aside, how do you explain the mind seeing? The eyes connect through the optic nerve straight to your brain. It has no where else to go.

Consciousness : qualitative experience.
Qualia: instances of qualitative experience (e.g., seeing a car, feeling a pillow, tasting an apple, etc.).
Meta-consciousness: self-knowledge: ability to acquire knowledge of one’s consciousness (e.g., I not only taste the apple, but I am aware of my tasting of the apple: I can gain knowledge of my own qualitative experience). — Bob Ross

This would seem to me that meta-consciousness is "qualitative experience of qualitative experience". In which case, is this a useful term? At the least, I don't see how it counters my point about Blindsight. The person does not have any qualia, or consciousness, of seeing what is in front of their eyes.

Lets bring it out of blindsight for a minute. Right now are you conscious of everything your senses are processing right now? Aren't there smells, sounds, and even sights in the corner of your eyes, that you are not conscious of? Isn't it the attention to these, the conscious experience of them, that is qualia? I suppose I'm looking for a separation between the meaning of qualia and perception or senses. Generally I've understood qualia to be that conscious experience of sensations or perceptions, not the mere flooding of light or sound into one's body.

Back to blindsight, it seems much like the inability to give a conscious focus to what one is perceiving. Which seems to me to be something that the person does not subjectively experience, even though the objective observation of their actions implies that they do. Here they are accurately assessing where something is, actively looking at it, then claiming they do not see it. Can you explain how your definitions counter this?

I do believe that qualia requires consciousness, but you refer to things that aren’t qualitatively experiencing as conscious; so under your terms, yes, I do think you are arguing that there could be a being which doesn’t have qualitative experience (or at least we don’t know if they do) but yet we can decipher that they are observing, identifying, and acting upon their environment (which meets your definition of consciousness). — Bob Ross

Let me clarify what I'm stating. Qualia is the subjective experience of the thing which is observed to be objectively conscious. Qualia is not necessary for us to conclude something is objectively conscious. The reason for this, is we cannot objectively assess qualia. We cannot prove what a conscious being is experiencing, or not experiencing at a subjective level. Therefore we do not consider it objectively, but can only consider it from their subjective viewpoint.

Blindsight is a clear example that a person can have an objective consciousness about something, but not have any subjective consciousness, or personal experience of seeing the object needed to make the correct conscious decision.

This is getting too long, and I think the above has addressed most of your points. One more!

I don’t claim that there is something else besides mind, some other third substance, that producing mind but, rather, that mind is fundamental. Mind is affecting mind: ontologically there are ideas in a mind. — Bob Ross

How is this any different from magic then Bob? Even if you could get such a model to work, which I don't want to go into all the potential problems at this time, what would you hope to get out of it? How would this be useful to humanity?

Thank you again Bob for your clear and deep thoughts on the subject!

No more use have I for 'schools of philosophy' - Some philosophers had some good ideas; some philosophers seem to have had mostly crappy ideas; some had a mix of good and bad ideas; nearly all - in my unapologetic, unhumble estimation - blew a lot of hot air into the spaces between ideas, to inflate their opinions into systems of thought. — Vera Mont

Wise words.

I read through the article and, long story short, I do not think that the author provided a resolution (nor a partial resolution nor a method to providing a resolution) to the hard problem of consciousness — Bob Ross

My intention was not to address the hard problem of consciousness. From the argument I've presented, you can see there is no hard problem to address.

Of course, a person who lacks the ability to associate their qualia with themselves is going to say that they aren’t seeing anything when, in fact, they obviously are. This is no different than people who lose all sense of self: they don’t thereby lose their qualitative experience but, rather, their ability to identify it as theirs. — Bob Ross

Isn't this then an example of an objectively conscious being that lacks subjective consciousness? This is actually a limited example of a P-zombie.

I want to ask you what you mean by qualia Bob. Qualia to my knowledge, is almost always identified as the experience one has. Qualia is seeing the color green as only you see it. If someone was not conscious of seeing the color green, most would not mark that as qualia. If you believe qualia does not require consciousness, then what is special about the word qualia at all? At that point, a p-zombie has qualia, they are just not conscious of it. And if that is the case, then my point that subjective consciousness can be separated from objective consciousness stands does it not?

I heard a fascinating story of a woman who suffered from complete loss of self; and during childbirth, she kept frantically asking “who’s having the child?”. Does the fact that she can’t associate herself with her own childbirth prove (or even suggest) that she isn’t giving birth to a child? Of course not! — Bob Ross

No, but how is that relevant? I'm not claiming that you need subjective consciousness for someone to claim you have objective consciousness. This example once again supports the division I'm noting.

Thirdly, throughout the article the author, despite recognizing their work as pertaining to the hard problem, didn’t give any solution to it other than vague notions of evolutionary processes: — Bob Ross

Again, I'm not interested in the hard problem, just objective and subjective consciousness.

Although, I'm once again surprised to hear from you that you don't believe qualia comes from brain states. That's the assumed knowledge of science, psychology, and medicine. Its nothing I have to prove, its a given Bob. Can you prove that qualia does not come from brain states? As I mentioned in your last OP, it is not in dispute by anyone within these fields that the mind comes from your brain. I feel analyzing this will assist in the objective subjective separation of consciousness.

Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

I agree, but I want to clarify some things. Firstly, I don’t see how you can prove that a being is having qualitative experience (under your view)--not just how they are experiencing it themselves. — Bob Ross

We can't under my view. We can believe them. We can observe the objective conscious actions they take and assume they must be experiencing qualia. But no, we can't prove. It is always at best an inductive reason, never deduced knowledge.

Another important clarification I think we need is that knowing that something affects something else does not entail, in itself, that it causes it. — Bob Ross

To clarify, we can't say its the entire cause. When something affects another, that result of that affectation is part of the chain of causality.

You can certainly prove that quantitative processes affect qualia, but not that the former produces the latter: these are two different claims. — Bob Ross

Agreed. But we can certainly say that it has an influence in producing mind, therefore is part of the cause of qualia. To claim that there is something else besides brain states would require an example of something besides a brain state affecting qualia. Do you have an example? For example, if I drop a penny, it falls because of gravity. But the penny wobbles in a state that we cannot attribute to gravity alone. Air resistance also affects the fall of the penny. Thus the speed of something dropping is determined not only by gravity, but by any resistance against gravity as well. In what way does the brain have a qualitative state that cannot be explained by the brain alone? Do you have any example of something else besides the brain which would affect the mind?

We know by abductive argumentation: I have evidence of my qualia, and, on the other “side” of it, I am a physical organism which operates the exact same (just with more superior functionality) to a dog—so the best explanation is that the dog is also qualitatively experiencing. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is an induction. This is something we cannot deduce, or actually know. That is why such discussions would be under subjective consciousness, while objective consciousness would not concern itself with something that does not have objective certainty.

For instance, does being schizophrenic mean you have to speak in word salad, or be a catatonic, or have paranoid delusions? Of course not. Does this mean that schizophrenia is purely a social construct, that each behavior associated with it is unique to an individual and there is no common explanatory brain process to tie together the constellation of potential behaviors connected with it, that there is no community of schizophrenics with an overlap of behaviors? — Joshs

Your analogy does not match. You can be schizophrenic and you can be gay. These are objective medical identifiers. Now, if I believe that a gay person should act a particular way that has nothing to do with the definition of being gay, that's gender based on my culture. If I believe a schizophrenic should act a different way that has nothing to do with the definition of being shizophrenic, that's comparable to gender.

For example, "If you're gay, you should like Lady Ga Ga." "If you're shizophrenic, you should be violent and dangerous." Someone then comes along to a gay person who does not like Lady Ga Ga and states, "I guess you're not gay." Someone comes along to a shizophrenic person who isn't violent or dangerous and says, "I guess you're not shizophrenic".

This is the exact comparison with sex and gender. To be gay, you must be a male who finds other men sexually attractive. That's it. Whether you like Lady Ga Ga or not is irrelevant. Whether someone believes that to be gay, you must like Lady Ga Ga or not is irrelevant. People's beliefs in how you should act, dress, etc as a gay man do not alter the fact you are a gay man.

Same with sex. It does not matter if you dress or act like someone believes a woman should dress and act. They are still a woman, or not a woman, based on their sex.

What you are advocating for is that someone's stereotypes, be it racism, sexism, classism, etc, should be the sole decider of one's objective identification. That is ludicrous. Its wrong and evil. As a gay person who I'm sure has experienced such discrimination, I'm sure you would agree with me.

Many gay men have a perceptual setpoint somewhere between the aggressive masculine and the gradual feminine. This means they don’t crave softness and yieldingness from their sexual partner because they already posses these traits themselves. As a result, many gay sexual relationships are based more on a kind of ‘twinning’ than a yin and yang. What attracts each sexually is the mix of masculine and feminine in the other. Many gay men will tell you they are repulsed by the thought of playing the role of decisive commanding male to a soft yielding female. — Joshs

Again, this is sexist. Plenty of men do not want to be a decisive commanding male to a soft yielding female. Your attraction or lack of attraction to a woman is based on her sex. I'm straight, and my same sex simply does not turn me on at all. Doesn't matter about the behavior. If you are gay without being bi, behavior isn't going to matter either.

Physical differences between men and women fail utterly and completely as an explanation of a pattern of dominance of men over women repeated around the globe for millennia. It is the difference in perceptual setpoint between the masculine and the feminine brain that explains this behavior. — Joshs

You're going to need to counter my points to demonstrate they "fail utterly and completely". Men in general are overall stronger than women and are not burdoned by the inconvenience of reproduction near to the level of women. Most of the world for most of humanity did not have effective birth control, sterile birthing areas, formula, of modern mentrual management. To just dismiss them without demonstrating why they could not have an impact is wrong.

"Perceptual setpoint" is just a sexist generality as to how a man or woman should act. If you could show that only biological men or only biological women exist certain behaviors, then you could note these are tied directly to sex. The fact that many of your behaviors are widely shared among straight men negates this idea that your thought process is somehow more feminine because of sex differences. Straight and gay men can feel and act in the same way in many ways, but cultural differences often times prevent or encourage certain behaviors within particular societies.

No logically sustainable argument has been made been at this point that gender should override division which has been done by sex. Its been an interesting aside, but I would like to refocus the point back on this topic. Lets take a perfectly normal XY man who wants to dress up like a woman and play sports competitively with them for fame, glory, and money, and give me a valid reason why they should be able to based on acting like what they believe a woman should act like.

A terrible story Michael. But unless it applies somehow to the OP, I don't see the point in putting it here.

In the way I am defining gender in terms of an inborn perceptual-affective style, this pattern is not simply binary (what sex are they), but a spectrum that goes from hyper masculinity to hyper femininity. — Joshs

Then you agree with me. Gender is a social construct. It doesn't have a set objective pattern and can vary wildly between cultures.

... like throwing like a girl...My brother’s nickname for me was ‘fairy’, and this was before he had a concept of homosexuality. — Joshs

Right, so you behaved in ways that are stereotypically associated with women in American culture. What about the straight boys who also throw like girls? Or adult men who do, but don't dare show it to anyone over fear of being mocked? Finally, does being gay mean you have to throw like a girl? Of course not. There are plenty of gay people who don't act stereotypically gay as well.

The question then comes in the form of freedom as well. Many straight men might feel like acting a particular way that others would view as feminine, but refuse to out of fear of judgement. Being gay may help free you from this restriction, because you're already challenging the social structure as it is, and a large part of "male" culture is about fear of being seen as a woman.

But honestly, that last paragraph is just musing and nothing substantial. The point related to the OP is that despite these behavior differences, all are men by sex. Behavior, or expected behavior that does not change you from one sex to the other. You are a gay or a straight man. You could have a gay or straight gender, but again, these are cultural stereotypes and expectations of how gay or straight men should act. As such, gender should not be considered in places in which people are divided by sex.

And how on earth would you explain thousand of years of discriminatory behavior towards women on the part of men if not by reference to robust inborn behavioral differences that become culturally stereotyped? — Joshs

Oh, stereotypes definitely do not form in a vacuum. Lets just look at the thousands of years there wasn't any birth control or modern medicine. Men never had to menstruate or give birth. As such, they had to do the harder physical jobs that took them away from the house. Can you imagine being a judge for a small community when there was likely only one judgeship available, and it was a woman who had to excuse herself every month to avoid bleeding in public? Or being pregnant nine months or more out of the year?

The very real physical differences between the sexes meant certain outcomes for societal organization, and thus expectations, were more likely to happen. Most of the world lived in what we would consider abject poverty today. It was about surviving, and so you did what was best suited for yourself for you and family to survive.

So I'm not saying stereotypes don't exist, or that people don't innately want to dress, do, or act a particular way. But what I'm saying is that none of that does not violate the objectivity of sex, nor should gender override societal divisions by sex, when they are divided by sex and not gender.

Consciousness is simply a bad word as it has come to build in a set of wrong beliefs about the architecture of mind. — apokrisis

I wouldn't say its a bad word, its just a misapplied word. Consciousness is at its core, built on the subjective sense of self. When people ask, "What is consciousness", I think they're really asking how we have a sense of self, what is it, and how it fits into the larger understanding of the brain.

quote="Janus;813294"]I would say that subjective consciousness may not be what we naively or intuitively think it is, and that. maybe (I'd have to think further on this) there is no substantive distinction between objective and subjective consciousness, but that the distinction is an artefact of our dualistic mode of thinking.[/quote]

We agree that there is no substantive difference between the objective and subjective. They are merely different aspects of the same reality. The objective is the reality of another beings consciousness that we can objectively know. The subjective is the reality of the conscious thing from its perspective that no one else can know. One does not negate the other.

I'm wondering if our experience of perception of the spectrum is different from the electric eye's. — Patterner

Its interesting isn't it? We don't even have to go to the electric eye, we can go to a fly's eyes. Flies have numerous eyes without pupils. This allows them to see the world in a near 360 viewpoint. Birds have eyes on the side of their head and cannot see directly in front of them because of it. How do they process that way of sight? What would it be like to experience that? From a physical standpoint, the experience is most certainly different from ours.

I don't think it's merely a matter of semantics. I'm not claiming that you can see the world from my perspective. I'm saying that we don't experience our subjectivity; rather 'subjectivity' is how seeing the world from a perspective is defined, so subjectivity is thought post hoc, not experienced. Thinking that subjectivity is experienced is a kind of reification, and I think the same goes for qualia. This reification of the self as substantive entity is the source of much confusion, Descartes being a notable example. — Janus

I think this is ok. How would you apply this in relation to the OP's point?

Does the electric eye that distinguishes frequencies of the spectrum that we perceive with our eyes have the same subjective experience of colors that we have? Does it have a different subjective experience of colors than we have? Is light hitting its sensor, and its circuits distinguishing one frequency from another, a subjective experience? — Patterner

The point is we cannot know what it experiences. However, I should make something implicit explicit now. When I speak of the ability to identify this includes the capability to create identity. An electric eye that records and shunts light off to pre-programmed areas isn't conscious. An eye which can observe, then create identify within what it observes (this combination of beams of light represents something new , like a cloud) would be conscious. Of course, conscious of only that.

But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion

Beliefs are behavioral attitudes towards things which are objective and, as such, absolutely pertain to objective inquiry. I don’t think you can name a single field of study which isn’t predicated on beliefs—not even science. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. Its not that we cannot start with beliefs. But beliefs must become hypotheses and be tested. Everything has a cause is known, because anytime we've tried to prove something doesn't have a cause, we fail. Its plausible that one day we will encounter something that doesn't have a prior cause, but it is currently something that we have never encountered before, so its not in the realm of possibility.

This isn’t true: you can’t account for qualia, which you do know exists because you have it, by looking at the quantitative processes of the brain. We can account for a camera simply by its quantitative processes and parts that produce those quantified measurements. I don’t see any contradiction here. — Bob Ross

I can account for that. But only me. In brain surgery they keep you conscious. They'll stimulate certain portions of your brain and ask you to respond. In this case, they'll ask you what you're feeling, or your qualia. Now can the surgeon know what its like when you say, "I'm thinking of a tree"? Of course not. There's no way to objectively measure that you are seeing a tree, or what that tree looks like exactly. They have to believe that you're giving them a close enough picture to what you're experiencing. But if they stimulate that brain state, they can cause you to think and feel things that you had no intent of thinking or feeling.

But lets go even simpler, alcohol or anesthesia. We know that when these chemicals enter your blood stream and hit your brain, your consciousness diminishes and can be blacked out entirely. Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

If it is the case that we can use quantitative processes to change our own qualia, then the argument I made stands and you're still holding a contradiction.

Fair enough! Let me re-phrase it: it is important if you are claiming that there is a mind-independent world which has mind-independent brains that produce qualia. — Bob Ross

From my point of view there is a mind independent world, but I do not believe brains are fully independent from our minds. Our minds are a portion of our brain, and the part of the brain that is conscious.

The idea that a dog has qualia is logically consistent and concurs with reality; but yet you said we cannot ‘prove’ it: why? The belief that a dog has qualia is a reasonable, cogent, and evidence based claim which meets your definition of proof. — Bob Ross

Where is the evidence of qualia? If I operate on a dog and open up the brain, do I see the image and smell the smells the dog is experiencing? No. Thus we run into the philosophical zombie example.

"A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience.[1]

For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would behave exactly the way any conscious human would."
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Some debate has been done over the meaning of this, but I am keen to observe one fact we can all agree on: No one can prove that a philosophical zombie can't exist. In fact, there's evidence for it in a well diagnosed issue with some animals: Blindsight.

I'm citing Luke's post here which then sights a post on Blindsight. I think its a fascinating read. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14286/a-potential-solution-to-the-hard-problem/p1

Here's an excerpt:
"In the blind area, DB himself maintained that he had no visual awareness. Nonetheless, Weiskrantz asked him to guess the location and shape of an object that lay in this area. To everyone’s surprise, he consistently guessed correctly. To DB himself, his success in guessing seemed quite unreasonable. So far as he was concerned, he wasn’t the source of his perceptual judgments, his sight had nothing to do with him. Weiskrantz named this capacity ‘blindsight’: visual perception in the absence of any felt visual sensations."
https://aeon.co/essays/how-blindsight-answers-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness

So here we have a being that is objectively conscious, but does not have subjective qualia to experience the location and shape he's obviously observing and identifying. We could say, "Well maybe he's lying." That's true, perhaps he's a very convincing liar. We can't know, because we can't experience consciousness from that person's subjective viewpoint. We can't prove that they have it, and we can't prove that they don't have it.

Now I do want to throw a caveat out there. It is not that we cannot come to a cogent set of beliefs that work consistently well enough for communication or evaluation in tandem with objective assessment. But it is only that, cogent beliefs. I can objectively state that when anesthesia is applied to a person, they black out. But I cannot objectively state what is it like for that person to black out.

That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable.

Under your view, how is this undeniable? I thought you are claiming that we can’t know. — Bob Ross

My apologies, that was me being unclear. My own subjective experience is what I have, and is undeniable. Whether a something beyond myself does, or does not have a subjective experience is undeniable from its own viewpoint. What is a belief and not knowledge, is that I can claim what that subjective experience from the view point of that being is like, or even that it has, or does not have any all.

Although you are correct that “I like the color blue” is subjective, it doesn’t follow that no one can invalidate that claim. If it turns out, unbeknownst to you, that you don’t like the color blue, then your proclamation of “I like the color blue” is in fact false. A proposition being subjective just means that the truthity is indexical (i.e., relative to the subject at hand), not that the subject is 100% correct pertaining thereto. — Bob Ross

Agreed! What we can claim though is that when you claimed that you liked the color blue, you saw the color blue and you identified it as a color you liked at that moment. Its not whether something is a fact which is qualia, it is the experience of observing and identifying. Whether that is correct, or incorrect does not deny the subjective experience of that action itself.

Fantastic viewpoints as always Bob!

Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject. — Janus

What if I said that the viewpoint of the subject is thought, not experienced? The subject perceives (experiences) things from some perspective (viewpoint) but does not experience the viewpoint itself. Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject.

I think subjective experience is often conflated with and counted as the experience of subjectivity. — Janus

I think we might be talking semantics here. How do you subjectively view the world? I can't know. You do. Go with that. That is your subjective consciousness.

It is about about an inborn perceptual-affective schema of organizing sensory experience. I have in mind in particular the example of a gay man who was born with a ‘ feminine’ perceptual-affective style that they had no control over. — Joshs

The problem is you're first attributing that behavior to what a woman does. And yet many women do not act "feminine". Does this mean they aren't women? Is a woman who acts masculine a man? The point of the dog article was to show that in non-sexual behaviors, it can be difficult to really tell what sex a dog is. Same with humans.

I've known plenty of men who speak "feminine" like, yet are straight. They are men, not women. There are plenty of gay men who do not exhibit "feminine" (or a cultural stereotype of a woman) behavior. This is because there is nothing inherent in being the male that necessitates that you lift weights and strut around in a room. You can have a very pretty, agile and soft spoken male, and they are still men.

It’s ok if you don’t want to call this inborn style of perceptual
organization ‘gender’. I’m more interested in whether you accept that people are born with such global organizing structures that dictate feminine or masculine behavior that form a large constellation of features all belonging to a single causal pattern. — Joshs

No, its not gender. Its just personality differences. The problem is you're assuming your version of "feminine" is some objective measure. But that measure is based on your culture and background, not biological fact.

I'll give you an example. I taught in inner city schools with mostly blacks and latinos. I'm white. Let me preface this by saying I found no difference between races besides over all culture. You have your jocks, your nerds, and everything in an American white school. TV and movies paint a different picture, and its false. Yet I'm sure some people believe that being black entails that you act or dress a particular way. Its just like gender. Its a subjective stereotype.

One thing I did notice was that young black males at one of my schools tended to act more like stereotypical American women. Black girls tended to be more aggressive and get in far more physical fights than black boys. Why? Culture. A surprising amount of young blacks in that area did not have father's in their lives. So the women ended up having to be the bread winner and fight for success. Being demure was not an option. On the flip side, boys patterned their speech and gestures after the main parent who gave them everything in life, their mother.

Now are these young men and women suddenly different sexes because they don't fit into the stereotypical middle or upper class American view of how a man and woman should act? No. The problem is your idea of "feminine" vs "masculine" is cultural. Your gay friend was compelled to act and express themself a particular way, so they should have done so without reprisal. They are a man by sex, no question, that simply acted differently.

I'm not denying that people want to act and dress the way they want to act and dress. My point is that it is irrelevant to what sex you are, and thus irrelevant in cases of sexual separation in society. If a male suddenly starts behaving in a stereotypically feminine way in Texas, they do not suddenly become a woman and have access to female bathrooms or sports.

In terms of the distinction in epistemic access, I am understanding you to be claiming that we can only “know” of “objective aspects of consciousness”, where “knowledge” is perhaps restricted to what is empirically verifiable? Is that correct? — Bob Ross

Yes, with an addition just to be sure. A subjective consciousness can know its own qualia, no one else can.

I don’t think it matters if a being is actively displaying high-level bodily motions (i.e., actions). Maybe we can agree on that. — Bob Ross

Activity is not needed for subjective consciousness. It is just that activity is needed to objectively conclude that another being is conscious. Now, it may be the case that we can scan a brain and ascertain that the person is conscious, but unable to act. For an intro, this side exception seemed unneeded to ensure the initial idea was not overly complex.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, I very purposefully excluded anything that had to do with perception as a requirement for consciousness. Perception is often associated with the five senses. Observation does not preclude perception, but it does not necessitate it. If you are thinking about an image in your mind, you are observing something. When you identify that image, feeling, thought, etc, you are identifying. You can also observe perceptions, have sensibility, and know your environment while being conscious, but those can all be bundled under variations of observation and identity.

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

This is where I get a bit confused: are you saying that the exact same “observing” and “identifying” is occurring objectively and the only subjective aspect is the viewpoint of the subject which is objectively “observing” and “identifying”? Because then it sounds like you might be saying qualia are not subjective, but merely the viewpoint of a subject that is having them is. — Bob Ross

The viewpoint of the subject is what I mean by "subjective". It is formed by the viewer, and can only be experienced by the viewer. That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable. Subjective does not mean unreasonable, illogical, or unprovable. Subjective merely means that it is an experience that can only be known to the entity having it.

For example, I like the color blue. Its my favorite color. No one else can say objectively that its my favorite color, because there's no way of proving it. I could be lying. Only I know if blue is my favorite color. The fact that blue is my favorite color also does not objectively make blue the best color for everyone. The subjective conscious is simply the personal experience of being conscious, or qualia.

To me, your example argues a different point than your original claim (in that paragraph): the example is already conceding that “there is something to be like me” but that you can’t know what that is like, — Bob Ross

To clarify, the "something like me" would be the objectively observable nature of being a conscious being. I cannot say "subjectively like me". But I can observe a being and determine it is conscious by the actions in commits, because only a conscious being can observe, identify, and act on that combination.

Think about a fly. A fly can observe the smell of trash, then decide to land on it. Do we know if it thinks about it morally? If the fly wonders at its own existence? No. But what we can know is it scans the environment, identifies, and acts upon it. Do we need to know the flies experience of being a fly to objectively conclude it has a basic consciousness? No. Its beyond our knowledge, so we simply exclude it when evaluating what we can know.

Firstly, I just want to note that I do not think I need certainty to “know” things. Yes, I think that I can “know” you have qualitative experience insofar as it would be special pleading of me to think of myself as the only human being who has it. No I am not certain of it. — Bob Ross

You believe I have qualitative experience. Certainty does not give knowledge, logically correct identification from our observations do. You know that I'm conscious because of the actions I've done here. The words that I've written cannot be done without observation and identification. Do you know the feelings I had when I wrote them? No. Do you know all of the other thoughts whirling in my head that are not necessarily conveyed by the words that I wrote? No. Is it important that we know that I have a subjective qualia, or what that subjective qualia is for you to conclude I'm objectively conscious? Not at all.

Objectivity assumes a logic that stands despite subjective challenges to it. We cannot objectively note that everyone sees green as everyone else, but we can objectively note that if someone is observing the wavelength of green, they are at least perceiving a color we can all agree is green. So if you cannot objectively prove that I experience qualia, its not a matter of belief, its a matter of something you cannot know.

Secondly, I am be confident enough to say that a camera and an AI do not have qualitative experience because I can know what they are made of and there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all mechanical, quantitative operations. — Bob Ross

And yet that's not logical. I can look at a brain, know what it is made of and see that there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all chemical, quantitative operations. So according to your argument, you could confidently say that you know no human being has qualitative experience, including yourself. This is a contradiction, so we know it to be wrong.

I would like to note that it is very necessary to prove it if one is a reductive physicalist: the entire metaphysical theory is riding on it. — Bob Ross

Bob, I don't care about philosophical identities. They're useful as a digest to get into particular thoughts, but the identity itself is unimportant. What's important to me is whether arguments have consistent, logical applications that allow us to function in the world optimally. If my points blow through some type of philosophical ideology but meet the criteria I value, so be it.

Also, it seems like ‘proof’ to you implies certainty: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, proof would be a logically consistent belief that is concurrent with reality, (or "what is") and not denied by it. We can have incredible certainty in beliefs that are wrong. Its been a while, but just think back along the lines of my knowledge paper if you need details.

If I remember correctly, then the vast majority of your “knowledge” is cogency (i.e., inductions and abductions), right? — Bob Ross

No, the vast majority of what we hold are beliefs, and if we're logical, we attempt to hold onto the most cogent beliefs we can when we are unable to know whether that belief is right. It seems a cogent belief that other beings can experience qualia, but it cannot be known what that qualia is like for them. We can objectively know whether something has consciousness or not, regardless of what we personally believe.

To me, it seems as though you are claiming sometimes that we can’t know that other people have qualitative experience (viz., that there is something to be like them: they have qualia) and other times you are conceding that point, like the above paragraph, and saying just can’t know what it would be like to be like them. — Bob Ross

We cannot know, but we believe that others have qualia. But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion. It is not that we cannot speak or have further beliefs about subjective consciousness, it is simply a recognition that such discussions can at most only be beliefs, and not objective certainties.

Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Why would I need to prove it with full knowledge (and am assuming full certainty) for it to be worth believing (or claiming to know)? — Bob Ross

You can find worth in believing that I have qualia. But you cannot know it. Once again, this inability to know does not mean we cannot reasonably use cogency to think about the possibilities of qualia. Its just that we have to understand that such discussions can never be objective discussions. There will always be an uncertain belief. There is nothing wrong with this, as there are many many things that we cannot truly know yet we reasonably plan and work with. I don't know what tomorrow will bring or if I will even be alive, but I still plan with a general prediction of what will happen. Same with subjective consciousness.

Great post Joshs!

I view individual gender as a mixture of inborn and cultural features. — Joshs

But that is not what gender is. Gender is the expectation that a sex act or express themselves in a particular way. What you are noting is people wanting to act or express themselves a particular way. So if a man is born who wants to wear a dress, then he does. This is not gender. The expectation that a man should NOT wear a dress is gender. The expectation that a woman SHOULD wear a dress is gender. Can a man want to wear a dress and a woman not want to wear one? Of course. That desire does not change their actual sex of being male or female.

When it is no longer invisible to us , due to a sharp enough difference in our gendered behavior with respect to our same-sex peers, we are given an opportunity to notice the way that gender sweepingly affects human behavior in general. — Joshs

Yes, gender is essentially sexism. Men shouldn't cry and women are expected to be emotionally weak and scatterbrained. Does a man crying mean he isn't biologically a man? No. Does an emotionally strong women with a mind as sharp as a tack mean she's biologically a woman? No. Just because societies or individuals expect a sex to act a particular way, does not mean that they are not that sex if they don't. Same as if they act in stereotypical ways to the opposite sex. It does not make them the opposite sex either.

My second claim has to do with the embodied nature of physical sexual features. Embodied approaches within psychology reveal that such anatomical
manifestations of biological sexual expression such as genitalia can’t be understood in isolation from how they are used, how they are performed and enacted. — Joshs

This is not pyschological gender, but sexual orientation. Now people may have a gendered viewt of sexual orientation. "You're a man and you want to sleep with another man? Well you must not be a man then." Of course you're still a man, your biology hasn't changed. You just don't fit into what that particular society stereotypes or wants to force a man to act like.

Saying tv at our biological sexual parts are embodied and enacted via gender is quite a distance from talking about capability of pregnancy. — Joshs

So to clarify here, who you sleep with has nothing to do with your gender, which is simply a stereotype of what society or you believe a sex should act like. Sexual orientation is not gender.

Let us clear something up first. Most people with AIS have XY chromosomes. If you send their genome to a geneticist, he would tell you they are male, not that they have chromosomes different from men and women. Because according to genetic definitions of sex, they are male. Thus if we accept your objective scientific definition, people of biological male sex can have vaginas and give (surrogate) births.

Do we agree so far? — Jabberwock

First, I again ask you on your next reply to answer my questions to you. Is it fair that I'm the only one being asked questions in a discussion while mine go ignored and unanswered? No. That's not a discussion. What we're trying to do here is have a discussion between two people trying to figure out what makes logical sense in matters of sex and gender. Carving out only what you want to discuss when the other person takes their time to address everything you've asked is not a discussion, its a one sided attack. I don't think you're intentionally doing it as you seem like a bright individual, and I've really enjoyed your points so far. But please, take the time to answer my questions as well if I have spent the time and effort to answer yours.

Those with AIS are not able to birth kids or get other people pregnant. https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/androgen-insensitivity-syndrome/

Regardless, such a person is still a man, but with the caveat that they have a disorder that they are insensitive to androgens. Once puberty hits, the syndrome is first found when secondary sex characteristics begin to happen.

Lets say for fun however that male's could give birth. They would still be males. Male seahorses for example give birth. By sex, they are still males. Once again, having an exception to the norm does not change the norm, nor has your example shown me that sex is not objective.

Alright, with that please answer my previous points and questions before asking more of your own Jabberwock. I look forward to your answers!

I am currently addressing this here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14370/subjective-and-objective-consciousness if you want to join in. I don't want to spread the same topic to multiple threads out of respect to the forum.

Thank you Josh's fantastic contribution. I'm going to link some research on sex differences and behavior in dogs.

"Ethological studies also underline many behavioral sex differences in other animals [18]. Prominent observations related to reproductive behaviors, such as parental care, mating strategies, and courtship displays, are almost exclusively expressed by only one of the sexes. These traits have been tagged as real “sexual dimorphism” [19] or “qualitative differences” [18]. However, differences in behaviors not exclusive to reproduction are less obvious and may differ in magnitude between the sexes. Odor detection and stress responses, for example, fall in this category and are simply considered “sex differences” [19] or “quantitative differences” [18].

In some cases, both sexes appear to exhibit the same behavior; however, the underlying neural substrate differs between them such that, under particular conditions, one sex might display a different behavior (sex convergence and divergence, [19]). For example, Lighthall et al. [20] reported there were no significant sex differences in a human decision-making task; however, under the influence of a cold pressor stress, men showed a faster reward-related decision-making speed than females, thus indicating a clear sexual divergence in behavior. This effect was attributed to differential brain functions in the dorsal striatum and anterior insula, with an increased activation in men compared to women after the stress event. Finally, there may also be “population differences” in behavior, which indicates that the frequency of display varies between the sexes, although the pattern is consistent [18]. For example, in most social mammals, males tend to disperse more than females [21]."
-Behavioral and Perceptual Differences between Sexes in Dogs: An Overview
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6162565/

To sum up those weighty paragraphs, there are clear differences in behavior between the sexes in regards to sexual behavior, at least in the norm. After all there are gay dogs. But to drill down even further, obviously a female brain would need to handle menstruation, while a male brain would handle the male sex organ for procreation.

But what is important is while there can be a general sense of non-sexual behavior differences between the animals, its less obvious. Thus an agressive dog can be assumed to be male more often than not, but being aggressive does not make a dog male, nor is it limited to only males being aggressive.

This is a similar point in humans. In general, expected behavior in non-sexual interactions from a particular sex is gender. And gender expectations are not objective evaluations of how an actual sex should or must act. I've made the point further up to Jabberwock in a very good discussion that our current division by sex, is due to physical sex differences. To add to this, a consideration is the sexual behaviors between the sexes as well. Male sexual aggression is a strong consideration for why women have women's shelters and separate bathrooms.

What is not considered in these sexual separations are non-sexual actions that someone may assume a sex would have. In other words, gender is not a reason for the separation. Males may be seen as more aggressive, but an aggressive woman is not forced to use a male bathroom because she does not fit her gender role. My point is that even if there are non-sexual brain differences between men and women due to biological sex, it has not been, nor should be, a consideration in situations that are divided by sex.