It seems we are an impasse here for the time being. I propose to park the conversation here and we can pick it up in some other thread, maybe by then we could understand each other better,

But I suspect we agree on something like 70% of the main topics, that is, if you still maintain some agreement with some version of Kant (albeit modified), if not then we may have drifted apart, which is fine.

I'll leave the proposal for you to decide. — Manuel

I thought we were in agreement. It's not clear to me where you think we are still not in agreement.

I do address them, and you object to my objections. I'm not lecturing you, just making my case. You don't like, fine. You can't say I don't make an effort. — Wayfarer

OK, I'll try one more time. You say the fact that have the same sense organs can explain why we can see the same details down to the smallest visible scale. The example I gave was the surface of a table—let's say it's a wooden table with little knots and patterns of figuration. We will agree on the exact locations of the knots and the patterns, and we can confirm this by pointing to them. Now if there were nothing there determining the positions of those details on what basis could we explain our precise agreement?

Don't say it is because we see things in the same way. As I already pointed out seeing things in the same way and seeing the particular things are not the same. We know we both see the particular things in their precise positions and patterns, and we know we see them roughly the same way in terms of colour, and tone and size, but we have no way of determining whether we see them in precisely the same way in terms of the latter qualities.

Don't give me a lecture about the history of ideas or Kant or Schopenhauer—just try to address tis simple point in your own words.

:roll:

There is no point lecturing me. I have no doubt I've read more Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Merleau Ponty than you. I think your interpretation of Kant is off the mark anyway.
You simply cannot address the objections I make to your position. You don't even try...you just keep intoning the same mantras and citing the same "authorities". I'm done with responding to you...it's a waste of time.

We have ideas of what we perceive. The things we perceive are not ideas.

OK cool it seems we agree. I think we and the other animals have access to the same basic structures.

Meaning, you can't have any idea of it. — Wayfarer

Why would that be? We experience matter in an almost infinite variety of forms including our own bodies—why would you say we can have no idea of what we experience?

Now, it's your turn to explain how you believe that "matter" signifies something other than an idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

'Matter' is an idea. If it signifies anything it signifies something that is not an idea.

I was not evaluating your comment, I was asking if this structure is what you think is the same for all creatures - as I did not understand your specific description. — Manuel

I thought you were asking me to speculate as to what the structures we perceive as objects might be. It seems animals will not conceptualize structures in the ways we do or even conceptualize them at all. Perhaps I don't understand your question.

You defer to science as the arbiter of reality, saying that anything that can't be known by science is a matter for faith. — Wayfarer

You are putting words in my mouth. I don't say that at all. Almost everything we know is known by direct observation and science is just an augmenting extension of that.

A number of others have already addressed that - we're equipped with the same senses and inhabit a world of shared definitions, so we tend to see things the same way. — Wayfarer

This does not explain the problem. Seeing things in the same way and seeing the same things are not the same. We can see the same things in different ways.

So, some microphysical thing? — Manuel

Why not a microphysical thing? Must the physical be different than the metaphysical other than definitionally?

Do you see the deficiencies of metaphysical Materialism (Energy is physical but immaterial), that are glossed-over in sensable
Naturalism? — Gnomon

Energy is physical and is not "immaterial" but is constitutive of the material. In what way is that "deficient"?

What are the implications of the fact that the characteristics of the microphysical do not accord with the characteristics of the macrophysical? I think that is unknowable. If it is ever to be known, it will be science that explains it. The point of my example is that what is to be explained is the fact that people see just the same things down to the smallest detail. The most plausible explanation I can think of is that there is something there independent of the human that we are all seeing. How would you explain that?

This is due to the fact that matter, or energy, whatever term you choose, signifies only an idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not a fact—a mere assumption.

If we take two people, point them to the horizon in a particular direction, in an active situation, and ask them to make a sentence about what they see, they will undoubtedly make different statements. — Metaphysician Undercover

That people notice different things in a vast or complex environment is no valid objection. If one notices something, ask the other if they also notice the same thing—that would be a proper test. Take two people and ask them to point to tiny marks or blemishes on the surface of a table, for example, and they will point to the same things.

I don't think so. I think his doubt is rhetorical. A way to doubt the teachings and authority of the Church by feigning to doubt everything. — Fooloso4

Do you think his conclusion—a kind of ontological argument for the existence of God—is also feigned? Or that his skepticism regarding the authority of the church extended to the 'holy book' itself?

Although Descartes isolates himself in his room, as a thinking thing he is not isolated. As a thinking thing he is connected to thinking itself, that is to say, to what is thought not just by him but other thinking beings before and after him. The nature of thinking is something we do together, a joint project, something that occurs between human beings. The thinking self is not just the individual but thinking itself, which is by its nature public. — Fooloso4

Right I agree but surely to be consistent Descartes must have imagined that he had grounds for skepticism regarding the existence of those other thinkers.

Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards? — creativesoul

Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.

This, ↪Janus
, is Waif's strong doctrine. If you press it's logic, he will deny it, stepping back to some merely transcendental reality. — Banno

A transcendental reality which us poor sods, lacking the necessary insight, could not hope to understand. :wink:

What does "structure" cover for you? Does it cover the shape of a thing or it's qualia or what? That's a bit unclear to me. — Manuel

It's a general idea of form or configuration. Not qualia and shape is kind of abstract whereas structure suggest concreteness and boundedness (however loose). It could be thought of as a localised intensity of energetic bonding in a field that gives rise to chracteristic functions and interactions.

They don't bump into something. Cats "climb" something (as opposed to go up? or latching on?). Yeah, they surely do stand on something. We conceptualize it as a tree - we have that linguistic and alongside that, conceptual capacity to apply the label "tree" to this thing animals react to. — Manuel

In order to come to conceptualize ^tree^ we must first be able to see one. Then we can conceptualize all the others. Of course other animals don't think 'tree'. That is not the point at issue. Their behavior shows us that they see roughly the same structures that we do.

I keep emphasizing that there are two distinct meanings of 'mind-independent': a practical meaning and a metaphysical meaning, the latter corresponding to metaphysical realism. — Wayfarer

That is not a valid distinction in my view. It's a difference that makes no difference. Mere wordplay.

Can they? Do dogs see trees? — Manuel

They don't bump into them, and they lift their legs and pee on them They don't try to climb them although they may use them to stand on the back legs and look up to see what's up there making a sound they are intrigued by. Cats climb them and birds land and perch in them. The dog sees and chases the ball when I throw it. He doesn't attempt to walk through walls, and he climbs the stairs just as I do. bees go to flowers not to piles of dung and flies go to piles of dung, not to flowers. There is untold evidence that animals see the same environment we do, albeit not in exactly the same ways when it comes to smaller details like colour. There might be a universal mind of which we and the other animals are all part that determines all this, but unless that is posited idealism is utterly implausible as far as i can see. I'm open to other views if they are supported by convincing arguments. I am yet to encounter any.

That we all agree down to the smallest part on how objects appear to us, simply tells us we are all human beings. — Manuel

Nothing inside of us could determine the smallest details of what is seen. What is actually out there determines what is seen. Otherwise, you would have to posit that our minds are all somehow connected.

Now we know that there is such a thing as time and space absent us, which are quite different from our intuitive understanding of them. — Manuel

How do we know that and yet do not know that there are structured configurations of energy which appear to us as objects? Wayfarer won't agree with you about the human-independent existence of space and time by the way.

'If the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish; and as appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.' — Wayfarer

As I see it there is no evidence or logic to suggest such a thing. Those things would not be perceived to be sure, but it does not follow that they would vanish. You are conflating not being seen with not existing.

That is a point made from outside experience. It is viewing humans among other phenomena, as paleontology would do, or as anthropology would do. — Wayfarer

No, it is a point made from inside experience as all points are. I understand the arguments very well, I just don't happen to agree with them. In fact, I used to make the very same fallacious arguments myself, but I came to understand their fallaciousness. You don't seem to be able to understand that.

But apart from that, I think ordinary objects, so called, trees and apples and river and laptops, are mental constructions. And how much of science is a construction is tricky. — Manuel

This would be where we differ. I think the fact that we all see the same things and can agree down to the smallest detail as to what we see and that our observations show us that other animals see the same things we do, suggests very strongly that these things are not just mental constructions. I think the most plausible conclusion is that they are mind-independent ontic structures. That said I think the ways things are seen may well differ according to interspecies, and to a lesser extent intraspecies, variations in the designs of sense organs.

The basic and essential difference I see between the two ontological posits is that idealism proposes that mind/ consciousness/ experience is fundamental and materialism/ realism takes energy/ matter to be fundamental.

From this it follows that prior to the advent of mind nothing could have existed. Everything known to science seems to contradict this. But then the idealist will say that lived experience is prior to science, which of course for us it is. But it does not follow that experience is ontologically fundamental tout court, so I see that idealist conclusion as being based on flawed reasoning.

So what do we have to guide us in trying to decide what is ontologically fundamental apart from science? Our imaginations, intuitions, feelings, wishes? Or...?

But as I say I don't think the question even really matters for human life, unless you are religious and believe in the possibility of some kind of salvation/ redemption which must involve belief in a life beyond this one in order to make any sense at all. I believe that is often the unacknowledged premise.

Dogs want to please and they understand when you are displeased and are even able to anticipate that. I once had a Jack Russell terrier called Jimi and I decided to get some hens. He killed a hen and I scolded him. Some time after that my partner called me at work and told me Jimi had killed another and that the dead bird was on the floor near the front door. She asked me what she should do with the dead chook and I said she should leave it. When I opened the front door Jimi was sitting next to the dead bird shaking. He knew he had done the wrong thing. He never bothered another hen.

Could it be that, rather than my not addressing your questions, that you don't understand the responses? — Wayfarer

No I understand the responses very well and in fact once thought very much as you do. Now I find the arguments for idealism unconvincing. I'm not really a realist either. In fact, I think the whole dichotomy is wrongheaded.

Isn't this the case with most of us? We have a certain view and after having read and thought a lot about something, we choose an option. We will tend to defend that view, unless a very strong reason is given as to why one's view is flawed. — Manuel

Sure, and I have changed my views over the years. And several times at that. Previously I did tend towards idealism, now I tend more to realism and materialism. I am open to changing my mind again if I encounter a good argument. I am yet to encounter one. So, in my exchanges with @Wayfarer I have been just honestly explaining why I don't think the arguments for idealism are well-founded. He prefers to think that I don't understand them. Oh well...

I argue about it only to clarify by presenting my views and seeing where they might disagree with yours and others. It doesn't bother me that you disagree. As I see it you very often fail to address my objections, but apparently you either cannot see that or simply don't want to. I have to say I find that puzzling.

The general impression I get from you is that you have decided the ways things are and are only interested in hearing what supports your forgone conclusions. I know you won't agree, but that is my honest view, and I don't really mind what your views are anyway. In the final analysis I just don't think it is of much importance. So, no irony.

It's coherent to say 'it is true that the planet will still exist when humanity has become extinct'.
— Janus

Then you're saying that there will be a truth without minds, if you think there are no non-human minds. — Leontiskos

No I'm not. I'll try one last time. We can say it is true now or we can now say it is true that the planet will still exist when humanity is gone. There will be nobody to speak the truth when humanity is gone. There will be no truth or falsity then if truth is a property of propositions or judgements and there is then no mind to propose or judge.

Existence on the other hand does not depend on minds, propositions or judgements.

You still haven't given any explanation of how one can make true statements about the future without claiming that something will be true in the future. These are the same unaddressed issues we faced at the very beginning of the conversation. — Leontiskos

I have given an explanation, so the issues have been addressed. You. apparently don't want to hear the explanation and continue to conflate existence with truth.

:up:

So you are saying thinking is the something that exists that is thinking, doubting and feeling? Saying that the "who" is Descartes really tells me nothing at all.

Dogs can know when they have done something they shouldn't have, just as humans can.

If deciding whether reality is 'physical' or 'mental' requires a leap of faith, then realism is in no better position than idealism. — Wayfarer

Exactly! However, I personally find realism the more plausible. Since there is no definitive criterion of plausibility, I admit that it is, in the final analysis, still a matter of faith. I have faith in my own sense of what is the more plausible given what I know about science whereas I consider personal intuitions and experiences of altered states (of which I have enjoyed many) to be devoid of any reliable discursive justifications for ontological or metaphysical claims. In other words, if there is anything that could give grounds for such claims, in my opinion it is science.

That said, of course i don't believe science can ever explain everything about human life and experience. I think that is a separate question altogether. I also don't think the question is of much importance, and I bother myself with it only in the interest of conceptual clarity—it's a personal foible.

I thought you were saying that because I think it is a matter of faith we don't merely disagree about that but that I'm definitely wrong in that I don't get the point...meaning I don't understand the argument.

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting. — Fooloso4

Thinking and doubting and feeling is going on therefore something exists. What is that something?

When it comes to justification, I think you are missing the distinction between there being beliefs which are felt to be justifiable based on personal experience and the foundational requirement in the empirical context that justification be somehow definitively intersubjectively corroborable, at least in principle.

For example, you might understandably feel justified in believing in God based on powerful mystical experiences, but those experiences of yours can never constitute justification for anyone else to believe in God, even if the telling of them is powerful and compelling enough to convince others of the existence of God.

I don't think constructivism denies that, nor do I in the OP - as I said I acknowledge there are objects unseen by any eye. — Wayfarer

That is not the question, though—the question is whether there are is anything independent of the mind, which determines what we see—the things we refer to as "objects"—and in affective interaction with our sensory setups, how we see them.

Contructivism's core idea is that knowledge is a construction created by the mind, based on experience and prior knowledge, which provides the conceptual framework into which experience is incorporated. — Wayfarer

You seem to be conflating knowledge with what we have knowledge of. I guess it depends on what you mean by "knowledge". Knowledge by aquainatance can be equated with bare perception, but discursive knowledge also incorporates judgement regarding what is perceived.

Radical constructivism stays neutral about the mind-independent world. It says, "We can't know reality as it is; we only know how we construct it." — Wayfarer

The truly radical position would be to admit that we cannot be certain about whether perception tells us anything about how things are in themselves because we have no way of comparing. We cannot be aware of the process of the coming-to-be-of-the-world-for-us. It simply appears, and we cannot "get behind" our perceptual experience to investigate what is really going on. We can only use our perception and prior knowledge to study our organs of perception and build a hopefully ever more coherent picture of how they function. That picture should be consistent and cohere with the rest of our scientific knowledge. It is the total body of coherent and consistent scientific knowledge that lends credibility to hypotheses, but we can never be certain.

So this is not a 'matter of faith', and I think the reason you keep saying that over and over again is because you're not seeing the point. — Wayfarer

LOL, it's not that I don't see the point, but that I disagree, and that is the point which you seem to be incapable of seeing. Have you considered the possibility that you may have a scotoma?

Incidentally I am seeing how this 'mind creates world' meme is proliferating on the Internet right now. In various substack and medium feeds, there are articles on it practically every day, some thought-provoking and sober, some entirely ridiculous. — Wayfarer

The problem I see with that, as with any unconsidered and simplistic meme, is that it may lead to a radical relativism and contribute to the post-truth chaos which seems to be growing every day.

That's right. We ought to do what is good. But determining what is good is not always easy.

evolutionary biology provides a kind of default basis for normativity, along the lines of what is 'advantageous for survival' — Wayfarer

When it comes to normativity it is not merely the survival (and flourishing) of individuals that counts, but the survival (and flourishing) of communities. Now we find ourselves in a dire situation where it is not merely the survival of individuals and communities which is at stake, but the survival and flourishing of the race itself.

He clearly states it. The fact that we all share many common elements of experience is not an argument against constructivism, because it simply means that we overall construct the world in the same way.
Constantly interpreting these questions as an ‘appeal to faith’ doesn’t do justice to them. Husserl was committed to a scientific approach. — Wayfarer

The fact that we and the animals all share the same world and see the same things at the same times and places shows that what we perceive is not only determined by the mind but is also constrained by the physical nature of the senses and what is "out there".

Constructivism applies to the ways in which we see things but not to what we see. The only way around that for any mind only constructivist thesis would be that all minds are somehow connected. If there are not things which are seen by all (albeit in different ways when it comes to interspecies comparisons) then how else to explain the fact that we will agree on the exact details of what is perceived?

The questions are matters of faith because there is no possibility of logical proof or empirical confirmation regarding the question of whether the world is fundamentally physical or mental. So we choose the view that seems most plausible to us individually, or else it may even come down to what we each want to believe for various reasons.

Which questions? — Wayfarer

The questions concerning whether consciousness is part of the natural world and the question about the existence of the external world.

From Websters Online Dictionary:

aporia
noun
apo·​ria ə-ˈpȯr-ē-ə
1
: an expression of real or pretended doubt or uncertainty especially for rhetorical effect
2
: a logical impasse or contradiction
especially : a radical contradiction in the import of a text or theory that is seen in deconstruction as inevitable

I wasn't thinking of the meaning in the context of rehtorical devices, but of the second definition,
from here:

1. What the sight of our eyes tells us is to be believed.

2. Sight tells us the stick is bent.

3. What the touch of our hand tells us is to be believed.

4. Touch tells us the stick is straight. (2)

The aporia, or "apory" of this syllogism lies in the fact that, while each of these assertions is individually conceivable, together they are inconsistent or impossible (i.e. they constitute a paradox). Rescher's study is indicative of the continuing presence of scholarly examinations of the concept of aporia and, furthermore, of the continuing attempts of scholars to translate the word, to describe its modern meaning.

I don’t think the passage I quoted considers that question. The key point for me was his objection to treating consciousness as part of the domain of naturalism. — Wayfarer

Seems to me those questions are closely related, even intertwined.

Very good!

I thought an aporia is a paradox and thus different to epoché. Do you think Husserl suspends judgement about the existence of an external world or denies it?

Hence, they cannot know better. — creativesoul

It seems you don't have much experience of dogs.