Strictly speaking, your dog sees phenomena which he can't pass through, we call it a "WALL" or a "STEP". If the object can be moved by a certain motion and then pushed or pulled, we call that a DOOR. — Manuel

I agree that obviously the dog does not conceptualize walls or doors in just the ways we do due to our linguistic capacities, but the dog sees the door as an "affordance" and the wall as an obstruction. What we can conclude, though, from the dogs basic experience of walls and doors and balls as being pretty much the same as ours is that there are mind-independent attributes of the environment which are perceived or cognized in various similar ways by other animals as well as humans.

Granted, I am giving examples of deviation from the norm, but what I think this shows is animals react to stimulations, regardless of if the trigger is the one the animals thinks it is. — Manuel

I think what that shows, though, is that there are things there which resemble, in ways that we can understand because we also see resemblances, what the animals "think" they are responding to. I think the most plausible explanation is that there are real mind-independent "structures" that constrain the ways we perceive things. We can't say what they are completely "absent us", because anything we can say is not absent us.

:up:

Because people make that judgment as to what a mountain or a plain is, and we share the same cognition (as dogs do with other dogs and birds with other birds, etc.), so there is no reason why they should disagree.

In the world absent us, there is no differentiation, nature doesn't care. Or so it looks so to me. — Manuel

But it would seem there must be something in nature which reliably leads to the perceptions of humans and animals being of the same things. My dog sees the walls, doors and the steps in the house at the same locations I do, judging by the fact that I don't see him trying to walk through, or climb, the walls. When I throw the ball for him he obviously sees it going in the same direction as I do, since I don't see him running in other directions. So, It seems clear to me that our differentiation of objects cannot be arbitrary or entirely dependent on us.

I agree. I think the simple fact is that since the "evidence" that faith provides cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated, it ultimately reduces to mere personal opinion and thus cannot be used to rationally support such things as discrimination against gay people, other cultures or women.

Good point, I forgot a word, I should have said without 'good' evidence. — Tom Storm

Yes, but what constitutes "good" evidence is also a matter of opinion. In fact I would hazard to say that I doubt that anyone considers something evidence without simultaneously considering it to be good evidence (in kind at least if not in quantity).

I think we experience space and time, extension and duration, and we also experience materiality, simply in being embodied, So, they all presuppose one another; they are codependently arising, as the Buddhists say.

There is no reason to think that absent us, there is any difference between a mountain and a plain, yet we clearly distinguish these. — Manuel

If that were so, how would we explain the fact that, when in front of one or the other no one will disagree as to which they are looking at?

As in Hebrews 11: "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." If one has evidence, one doesn't require faith. — Tom Storm

As I read it, the meaning of the quoted passage is the opposite of what you are saying, though: it says that faith itself is the evidence of :things unseen". As I've often said, I disagree with the idea that faith is belief despite the lack of evidence or even more strongly belief despite the evidence, because people have different ideas about what constitutes evidence. I doubt that anyone believes anything without thinking they have evidence to support that belief.

:up:

But a scientist is not going to choose that way. They are going to believe that this line of research is more likely than that one. — Bylaw

Do you know that, or merely believe it? Do you really believe it or is there some doubt?

Like a salesman, what really are you selling? — Jackson

:up: Right, salesmen don't invariably believe in their products.

Do you know that or do you merely believe it?

Yet Mr. Trump believed. — Jackson

I wonder whether he really believed, or whether it just suited him to claim that he won.

If I choose what I think is a plausible argument or conclusion it does not mean I doubt it. You have contrasted belief and doubt. That makes no sense to me. — Bylaw

Exactly you may choose without either believing or doubting it.

Cheers, yeah it's worked out well. I love living on the land, where my neighbours are hidden from view, and cannot imagine going back to living on a little fenced plot with my neighbours right there.

All those are simply likelihoods. Sure you can say that we believe them to be likelihoods. All I'm advocating is that we call what is certain (in the sense that we can't imagine what its being false could look like) knowledge, and that we call what we feel certain about belief. If we don't feel certain about something then it is subject to a blend of belief that it is true and doubt that it is true.

Actually they do have to believe things. Or they would have little basis to focus their studies. Those not believing would be picking approaches, subjects and hypotheses at random, which would put them at a disadvantage in relation to anyone with a more practical approach. But the truth is they do believe things. That's the reality, if one uses the word in the ways it has been used — Bylaw

What seems most plausible, or likely to be fruitful, could be chosen, without any commitment to believing it is true; and that choice would not be "random", as I see it. I agree with you that you could say this is believing, if you are using the ambiguous range of common usages of the term as your criterion, but I have acknowledged that from the start, and explained that sloppy terminology is just what I am advocating against.

So, I have explained how I see it (which I've only bothered to do in order to clear up what I have seen as misunderstandings of what I've been saying), I don't think it is very important anyway, and it doesn't matter to me if others disagree.

Maybe but then again, pointing out that people still insist in using the same heuristics in their philosophy ~500 years AFTER the revolution of the Philosophy of Nature is a Description of a fact, not an conclusion based on unsound premises...... — Nickolasgaspar

No, it is an interpretation of an historical evolution of ideas.

That's interesting; I don't know anything much about his life story, but I had formed the impression (not based on anything much I guess) that he was very well-balanced and happy, so I'm kind of surprised to hear that he was anxious and depressive.,

Right, I don't deny that others find him philosophically interesting, and perhaps if I put the requisite effort in I might discover more there than I thought. It just doesn't seem likely to me at this stage, but I do allow for a change of attitude.

As 'rational' people, we ought to regard the warranted claims of others and justify our own. — igjugarjuk

But this only works in contexts, the empirical or the logical, where it is decidable just what being warranted or justified consists in, For me, philosophy is a matter of ideas and insights, not warranted or justifiable claims and propositions.

Excellent idea! I love it! An argumentum ad consequentiam is a fallacy they say...naaah! — Agent Smith

One man's fallacy is another man's phallus.

It's just not always easy to decide whether something is bullshit. — igjugarjuk

You first have to be able to decide what you think it means before deciding whether you think it is bullshit.

I feel the same way. I've tried reading Derrida and find his writing philosophically more or less impenetrable; i.e. it doesn't really seem to say anything of philosophical note and even the truisms in it are buried in thickets so dense that seem likely to lead nowhere, that the effort to cut pathways of understanding through them seems pointless.

And I say this as someone who finds value in Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Henry and even Zizek. I think reading Derrida can be enjoyed if it is read as a species of arcane literature. where it is his imaginative gymnastics that are being admired, but I don't take it seriously as philosophy.

No. Absent biasing factors the coin will not land at all. Some force has to cause it to land. That force will be biased to one side or the other. We just don't know which. — Isaac

I don't see how the biasing factor could be in the gravity that causes the coin to land, or in the toss, since the coin will start heads up or tails up randomly. It seems to make sense to me that the biasing factor will be in the coin since I find it impossible to believe that any coin could be absolutely perfect.

Why 100? If you want to reserve a special word for when one considers the probability 100%, why not another for 99%? One for 51%, one for 32%... What is it about 100% that warrants it's own word? I can't see the advantage of what you're advocating. — Isaac

I'm not advocating establishing percentages of certainty; I can't see how it would be possible. My point is that about any proposition which is not certain, we can feel certainty (believe) and uncertainty (doubt) to varying degrees. Scientists don't have to believe anything in order to practice science; they simply have to entertain provisional hypotheses and presuppositions.

...and a 'gut feeling' is different to a belief, how? — Isaac

A gut feeling is simply a feeling we can choose to go with or not. We don't need to believe that it is "true" one way or the other. If we did go with a feeling, and if that seemed to be the only possible guide in a context of uncertainty or undecidability, then I don't see that as being irrational.

Anyway, I've had about enough of repeating myself here: I know what I think about the best way to talk about these things; if you don't agree that's fine. All I've done is attempted to explain myself in response to questions about my ideas. So, I think we are done here.

we are one hundred percent certain... — Janus


...is always contradicted by...

if ...nothing biasing towards one or the other — Isaac

We are 100% certain that, absent biasing factors, there is a 50% chance of either outcome. Are you 100% certain that "is always contradicted"? The point there is that if one is sensible one does not believe there is actually a 50% of either outcome, and one really has no idea, other t5han that the probability is roughly 50 %.

I don't understand why you've disallowed 'quite certain of...', or 'a slight inclination toward...', or ' I'm not sure but I'm inclined to believe...' ... or any other such expression of moderated doubt. — Isaac

I don't disallow any of that, I just recommend a more nuanced way of speaking about what we are doing when our conviction is not 100%. For example if I say I believe God exists, I would mean that I have no doubt God exists. Or if I believe the butler did it then I would be 100% convinced that the butler did it, but if I was merely 100% convinced that it is most likely, to the point of being beyond reasonable doubt that the butler did it, then I would say I beleive the butler did, but that it most likely that he did, and so on.

'Likely to be true' is already a measure of uncertainty. So saying I'm 100% certain that it's 50% likely is just exactly the same as saying I'm 50% certain. — Isaac

Sure, 50 % certain of either outcome, but that contradicts nothing I've said.

I agree, which is why I included 'random' in there too. I don't think either case is common though. — Isaac

It might be random, or it might be based on a gut feeling, or just a preference, or wishful thinking. I agree that it is not rational in the sense of 'measured..

What about ‘spacial extent?’ Is space itself made of a substance? I have always envisaged the Big Bang singularity to be an ‘incredibly small concentration of energy,’ mass or matter came later.
@Clarky, Wayfarer
So is the fundamental substance in the physicalist universe not ‘energy?’ And is there not also a ‘container?’ An extent, we call ‘space?.’ — universeness

I don't have an opinion about such things.

What a pointless comment!

That's not how probability works. If I'm 100% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 50% chance. If I'm 80% certain there's a 50% chance, then there's a 40% chance (depending on the exclusivity of the other options). Probability is already a measure of uncertainty, you can't have uncertainty about the probability as being some kind of separate measure. — Isaac

That's not what I was saying though. I said that we are one hundred percent certain that there would be a fifty percent chance of the coin landing on heads ( or tails) because it is analytic that if there are two possible outcomes and nothing biasing towards one or the other then there is a fifty percent chance of either outcome.

Unless she's acting randomly, then betting money one way indicates a belief in the likelihood of that outcome. Obviously, people might act randomly, but it's hardly the normal case, and very difficult to prove in any case. — Isaac

I don't agree. She may have no idea whether inflation will continue to rise or not, but simply decides to bet one way or the other. That is not irrational because the chances may be incalculable, in which case it would be rational to suspend belief.

My whole argument has simply been that the term 'belief' is commonly used to refer to a range of different phenomena, which makes it ambiguous. I also think there is a logic to believing that says that if you really believe something then you are convinced of it. You can't both doubt and believe
at the same time regarding the same thing.

if they don't feel sure that it's true and only believe it's likely to be true, then they don't believe it's true — Janus


Indeed. They believe it to some degree of certainty below 100%. The most common case. A belief with 100% certainty is rare. — Isaac

Yes, but they may believe one hundred percent that its likely to be true; if they don't believe that then what would you say they believe? Note; of course I'm allowing that people may across time vacillate between belief (defined as feeling certain) and doubt (feeling uncertain).

they don't even have to believe it's likely to be true to bet on its being true or to act as if it's true. — Janus


No indeed. They could act randomly or irrationally. It's not common though. — Isaac

As I said above I don't think it is always irrational to act without believing anything in particular. In cases where we have no idea what is more or less likely (and there are very many of those) it is rational to simply guess, or to "think with your gut" as to what seems or "feels" most likely and go with that.

What a pointless comment!

So, let me try to understand where the line is for you.

"I believe there is a God" is a statement of belief, right?

What about "I believe there's a 50% chance the coin will land on heads"? That's not a belief, according to you, right? (working on your example above - holding there to be a greater than 50% chance of inflation is not a belief)

What about "I believe there is a 99.999999999% chance there is a God"? Still not a belief? Or have we crossed into belief territory yet? — Isaac

Of course ""I believe there is a God" is a statement of belief. You don't believe, you know, that there is a 50% chance, statistically speaking and assuming a perfect coin, that the coin will land on heads. It's true by definition.

I haven't said that, in the example, the speculator holds anything definite to be the case about the likelihood that inflation will continue to rise, but merely that she bets on that since inflation is currently rising, and she goes with the idea that it will continue..

I'm not claiming that belief is impossible, or that there is no such thing as belief. All I've been saying is that if someone believes something to be true, then it follows that they feel sure that its true. On the other hand if they don't feel sure that it's true and only believe it's likely to be true, then they don't believe it's true, and they don't even have to believe it's likely to be true to bet on its being true or to act as if it's true..

A prediction is a belief. — Isaac

Not necessarily. I might predict (in the sense of bet on) inflation will continuing to rise based on that seeming to be, at a guess, the most likely of three possibilities, without believing that it will rise, but just taking a punt.

Unfortunately, I can find nothing to disagree with.

That's in conflict with one of my favorite quotes from my favorite scientist, Stephen Jay Gould - In science, “fact” can only mean “confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent. — Clarky

Nice one!

The problem with writing engineering solutions on toilet walls is that the bandwidth is so narrow, and you have to get into the right toilets in the first place. — Bitter Crank

Toilet walls are best reserved for toilet humour. I used to drive cabs night shift back in the early seventies, and one of the best bits of toilet poetry I ever saw was in the toilet of the taxi base. It read:

The modern cinematic emporium
is not just a super sensorium,
but a highly effectual,
heterosexual
mutual masturbatorium

There was about a 300 mm gap under the doors of the toilets, and on one of the other doors this was written:

Watch out for limbo dancers

We disagree right there; feeling certain does not require a justification (at least not an inter-subjective one), but being certain does. — Janus


See, this is where there is a miscommunication. What I said above does not imply that feeling certain does not require a justification. Knowing requires justification. And again, one can know something without feeling certain. — Banno

It's me, though, saying that feeling certain does not require a justification; insofar as justification is an inter-subjective requirement.That said, I also doubt that people generally feel certain about anything without thinking they have justification for their feeling of certainty.

I agree that knowing requires justification, in that knowing, in order to count as such, must be warranted by either observation, experience or logic. One can know things without knowing that they know, I guess, which would mean that one does not have to feel certain about it. But in order to know (reflectively) that you know, you must be certain that you know, and you can't be wrong about that or else you only think you know.

You are equating being certainty with knowing. That's not right. Knowing requiters having a justification. Certainty does not. — Banno

We disagree right there; feeling certain does not require a justification (at least not an inter-subjective one), but being certain does.

If you wish to use the word "belief" in this idiosyncratic way, be my guest. It doesn't fit withthe standard use of my community, nor with the standard use in philosophy. Take a look at the Stanford article:

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. — Banno

Taking something to be the case or regarding it as true is the same as feeling certain it is the case or that it is true.

See especially the section on Degree of Belief, which quite explicitly sets out how not all beliefs are certain. — Banno

I'll take a look; but I can say right off that I agree that not all beliefs are certain. In fact I don't think any beliefs are certain; if they were they would be better thought of as bits of knowledge, not beliefs. On the other hand all acts of believing are acts of feeling certain; and that is precisely the distinction you keep missing.

How it relates to the OP goes back to what I said in the beginning; that I can accept and entertain something as seeming to be the case, and act accordingly, without believing it is the case. The author of the OP seems to have agreed with what I've said and to have thought it to be germane to his thoughts, so I'm puzzled as to why you seem to be resisting what seems so obvious.

Isn't science people trying to understand the universe? Why would we do that if we didn't think the universe is comprehendible? Even if it might not be, I think we have to act as if it is just to proceed. I think that's a lot of what an absolute presupposition is - acting as if something is true even though it isn't proven and can't be proven. — Clarky

I think science is an extension of ordinary everyday lived understanding. The world is intelligible, "makes sense", to us, and to animals; if it weren't we could not survive. I think science is the endeavor to extend that basic comprehensibility.

We understand the world of natural events in terms of causes, and the world of (some) animal and human behavior in terms of reasons. It seems natural to try to extend the inquiry in terms of reasons to the cosmos, and that leads to religious understandings. Since there can be no empirical evidence for these kinds of metaphysical "why" questions, any answers to them remain faith-based.

I'll fall back on my premise of a materialistic/physicalist point of view. That would exclude God or a universal mind. — Clarky

I tend to agree; as soon as we try to make any positive assertions about God or universal mind, we descend into incoherency.

For me, and I think for Collingwood, this all comes back to the fact that we have and can only observe a very limited portion of the universe. — Clarky

I agree, but perhaps where I might disagree is that I think the metaphysical assumptions we make are based on our experience; for example the assumption of causation is based on our experience of ourselves as causal agents, and is further warranted by its success in making the world intelligible to us. We can only speak from our ( necessarily) limited experience.

I said "perhaps...,might disagree" because that may not disagree with the idea of absolute presuppositions; I guess it depends on where Collingwood (and you) think they find their genesis. I don't tend to think they have their genesis in some transcendental, Kantian, pre-given, rational a priori of the Intellect, but rather in the primordial logic of our embodiedness, and in the experience of "being-in-the-world"..

Yes, lots of things. Next. — Banno

OK, so regarding the distinction between feeling certain and being certain; we can be certain of some things, so they are the things we know. Of the things we cannot be certain, we can either feel certain or uncertain.

The former state I call believing; we believe something is the case even though we cannot be certain that it is so. meaning that we feel certain, even thought we cannot be certain. My point all along is that it is possible to act without believing; so I don't see the definition of belief as a tendency to act a certain way as being a very useful one.

To anticipate an objection; I am not claiming that someone who believes something necessarily feels certain about what they believe all the time; they may vacillate between belief and doubt. The point is that belief consists in feeling certain, so at times when doubt may creep in they are no longer believing.

And again, your distinction of "feels certain" from "is certain" does not make sense.

Wo else makes this distinction? Can you point to a source? — Banno

We are discussing this, so why attempt to bring others into it? Let's start with baby steps: do you think anything at all is certain?

You are making an assumption based on having observed a very limited part of the universe. — Clarky

. As I acknowledge, we have only observed a very limited part of the universe, but I disagree in that we have (so far) found the universe to be comprehensible to us, so I don't see that as an assumption. Of course it doesn't follow that every part of the universe will be comprehensible to us, or that the universe will always be comprehensible to us, if we were to think those to be true then that would be an assumption, but, to repeat, we do know that the universe has been comprehensible to us, so I don't see that as an assumption.

Does that mean you agree it is a good example of an absolute presupposition? — Clarky

Maybe; I'm not sure. If we can't think of any other serious possibilities, maybe not, so I guess it comes down to whether we consider god and/or universal mind to be serious possibilities.

ME: Laws are formulated post hoc to codify the behavior of observed invariances. We know that the substances and parts of the universe that we have observed seem to behave invariantly. YOU: Again, we have observed a very limited amount of the universe. — Clarky

I think this is the same question as the first, so already answered.

There is a long debate about whether the mathematical behavior of the universe is discovered or projected by observers. I come down on the side of projection. — Clarky

Right, but the fact is we know we can express the laws mathematically and make very precise predictions which always seem to be observed, so whatever the explanation is, I think we can safely say that we know that we can express (at least some) of the laws (I would prefer to say invariances) of nature mathematically.

ME: I think this is more speculative, but it is bolstered by the apparent consistency and universality (within our science and regarding what we have actually observed) of the Laws of Thermodynamics.YOU: Are you saying it is an absolute presupposition or is not? — Clarky

I'd say it's universal applicability is an assumption based on what we have observed so far. I'm not sure if that would count as 'absolute'. Again, the caveat would be that we only know it applies to what we have observed, and any assertion beyond that would be an assumption, if not a presupposition.

Good OP!

As pointed out previously, here you seem to be vacillating between "is certain" and "is true", as you must do if you are to adopt a pragmatic theory of truth. Is that your goal? — Banno

Not at all; I think things may be true regardless of how certain we might feel, but anything we can be certain of must be true. I don't think any belief falls into that category; only what counts as knowledge does. "Is certain" means, for me, justified; and something is not really justified if our reasons for believing it are not sound..

Again I'm not clear what you mean by "is certain". Do you simply means 'feel certain' or something else?

[1] We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.
[2] The universe consists entirely of physical substances - matter and energy.
[3] These substances behave in accordance with scientific principles, laws.
[4] Scientific laws are mathematical in nature.
[5] The same scientific laws apply throughout the universe and at all times.
[6] The behaviors of substances are caused.
[7] Substances are indestructible, although they can change to something else.
[8] The universe is continuous. Between any two points there is at least one other point. — Clarky

[1] I don't think this is an absolute presupposition, insofar as we have found that the universe is fairly coherently and consistently understandable to us in scientific terms.

[2] There does not seem to be any other serious candidate for basic substance, unless God or Universal Mind is posited.

[3] Laws are formulated post hoc to codify the behavior of observed invariances. We know that the substances and parts of the universe that we have observed seem to behave invariantly.

[4] I think the fact that the so-called Laws of Nature can be expressed mathematically is something we have discovered, so not an absolute presupposition.

[5] This is an assumption based on us never having observed a counterexample. Of course we cannot observe anything but the most vanishingly tiny fraction of all places and times.

[6] Again this is based on the expectation that comes with habit and/or the fact that we are constituted such that we cannot comprehend events without thinking in terms of causation.

[7] I think this is more speculative, but it is bolstered by the apparent consistency and universality (within our science and regarding what we have actually observed) of the Laws of Thermodynamics.

[8]. This certainly seems to hold in an abstract, logical kind of sense. It is hard to know what it could even mean beyond that context.

Putting it roughly and briefly,

One believes some statement when one holds it to be true.
One is certain of some statement when one does not subject it to doubt.
One has faith in a statement when one believes it regardless of the evidence. — Banno

To my mind you have these wrong except the first. Re the second, if one believes some statement one does not subject it to doubt, so the second is the same in substance as the first if you mean "feels certain" .

So the problem is, you are again speaking ambiguously; by "is certain" did you mean "feels certain" or something like "has the certitude of common knowledge or assent"; the two are not the same. You need to speak with more clarity. Re the third, I would say no one believes anything without also believing they have evidence.

So again, here there is the ambiguity between feeling certain (thinking one has evidence) and being certain (having what would generally or commonly be counted as evidence). The latter is obviously much harder to establish, at least in many cases.

More nuance, Banno!