So, above are two different ways to describe some of the beliefs under consideration. It seems that I am the only one around here who finds the bottom set to be more accurate and/or acceptable than the first. — creativesoul

Neither way of describing the beliefs is more accurate other than from their different appropriate perspectives.

For me the issue is undecidable as well and therefore interesting — Tobias

Right, I don't say that there has been no point exploring thinking about free will vs determinism; it's just that the topic has been so thoroughly explored, done to death, so to speak, that I doubt we could come up with any new ideas on the issue.

Sartre, as you say, in thinking the self as 'no-thing' posits absolute freedom of the will. But the self is subject, if to nothing else, then at least to the constraints of nature. In any case, it seems obvious to me that selves are subject to all kinds of psychological, cultural, social and political constraints.

It was your second post, you're right; but because it came before anyone had responded, it seemed to be part of the OP, albeit a kind of afterthought.

Yes, there are so many threads...for me the issue is undecidable, and thus of little interest. I only took it up because I thought the attempt to deny free will was somewhat lame; it is not freedom which is hard to understand, it is will.

One thing I am certain of is that here is no freedom without constraint, so there is no absolute freedom. The idea that my freedom trumps, and thus can cancel, yours is unjust; I don't think it's hard to see that.

So many here take it as a stepping stone to discuss free will. — Tobias

Banno introduced the issue of free will in the OP.

So, determining the nature of observed phenomena influences it, whereas describing it does not? I would have thought you have to determine the nature of something before you can describe it. Or else the description of the nature of something is its determination; but then that cannot be quite right, since description of determinable phenomena continue to abound long after the initial determination. I suppose if new descriptions add information then determinations becomes more complete, though.

So when I said this:

A definition that describes it would be a definition that determines it(s nature), would it not? — Janus

It should have been expanded: A definition that describes it would be a definition that (purports to) determine it(s nature), or is (purported to be) based on a prior determination of it(s nature) would it not?

I don't think will is something that seeks a definition that determines it. It seeks a definition that describes it. — god must be atheist

A definition that describes it would be a definition that determines it(s nature), would it not?

:up:

Yes, as I said, it depends on how you define 'will'. So, since the idea has no clearly definitive, unambiguous application I agree it is fraught.

I agree with you to this point, Janus, but when you are forced, you are given a choice too, and you will follow the path of what you will. — god must be atheist

I guess it depends on how you define 'will', gmba. There is a sense in which it might be thought that being a slave to the passions is not freedom. If one is threatened with death unless one does something against their will, then I would say they are not freely doing their will but acting under the constraint of fear.

No, I have acknowledged there is a sense in which we can say that. But the content of his belief is not that a broken clock is working. That's all I've been pointing out.

You have been levying charges against the claim. — creativesoul

What claim do you think I've been objecting to?

I'm not sure what possesses you to see this as problematic. — creativesoul

I am not saying it is problematic; you are. You were claiming that it had some problematic implication for the idea that beliefs can be expressed in propositional form.

Not a wedge, but a distinction between different orders of the will. This doesn't deny that one could be acting under the influence of introjected "shoulds", but would that be an example of coercion or willingly accepted values? I think all this shows that the idea of will is far from lucid. I don't think in terms of free will, but in terms of freedom, which just means freedom from constraint. Obviously we are never totally free; I might wish to fly, or visit Venus, for example. So, there are degrees of freedom, no total freedom.

I was just responding to this, which I don't need to read the article to do:

The first page or so brings out a strange little paradox for those who insist they have free will: Are you free to act against your own will?

Hence the "Oppression of the will". — Banno

So I was disagreeing with the idea, and saying why I disagree, that it is really "a strange little paradox". If you can't think of anything to counter what I've said, and so have to resort to trying to dismiss it as lacking cogency, that is your problem, not mine.

I haven't said that freedom is "living as you wish" or "doing what you like". My point was just that everything someone does, that is not coerced or forced, can be defined as acting in accordance with will.

For example, I might like to drink ten schooners of beer every night, but will not on account of the health consequences. Would you count that as an example of "acting against one's will" or would you say that the will to health is stronger in this case than the will to get pissed, and that it is thus an example of acting according to one's will?

If you are free to do your will, that counts as freedom in my book. The idea of being free to do other than your will is what might be thought as analogous to a square circle.

But some, apparently, call it "progress" .. — Apollodorus

I call it "diversity".

Yes, of course you can be forced, or coerced, to act against your will.

Are you free to act against your own will? — Banno

No, because any such act would be an act of will, whether free or not.

:lol: Yeah me too, but up until about several years ago I still believed in the possible intellectual intuition of metaphysical truths. Or more accurately, I had been conflicted over that issue for about 45 years, a conflict which has directed my reading interest to try to understand the alternative sides of the argument.

I also want to stress that I am not closed-minded to the idea of being convinced by intellectual intuitions of metaphysical ideas for the individual, but I have never seen any convincing argument that such intuitions could ever form the basis of any open and unbiased inter-subjective discourse.

Fair enough. For me most everything Wayfarer says is representative of views which I once held myself, so there is nothing much there for me to learn from. I am confident that those views do not hold water.

I think he's a much better thinker that that, Janus. I'm an atheist and sometimes don't agree with Wayfarer either, but for my money he's well read, acute and serious about the subjects he studies. — Tom Storm

I think Wayfarer is well read in comparative religious studies, but not so much in philosophy. He shows this in misunderstanding my perspectives as positivist. I think this is understandable as it is a "bogeyman' for him, against which he constantly rails. Unfortunately it seems to be mostly a straw bogeyman, which feeds into his blindspots regarding positivism and materialism.

I see his thinking as based on the "perrennialist" tradition, which is really the basis of Theosophy and the New Age movement in general. I'm not saying there is nothing in all that either, since I have read extensively in theosophy, anthroposophy, Aurobindo, Ramana Maharshi, Osho, and so on; all of which has fed into modern "new-agism". There are more or less sophisticated thinkers within the New Age paradigms just as there are within religion and philosophy in general.

So, it's not really a matter of agreement or disagreement, or being well-read or not, but of subtle points of (mis)understanding.

They’re not dependent on the narrative in the same way, they comprise insight into a causal process. But of course you’re primed not to see that through your positivist spectacles. — Wayfarer

Of course Buddhist orthodoxy is dependent on the narrative of Gotama's perfect enlightenment, just as orthodox Christianity is dependent on the narrative of Christ's resurrection. But of course you're primed not to see that through your New Age spectacles.

As you suggest the term religion is gravid with meaning in the West, where you often hear, 'I'm spiritual but not religious'. — Tom Storm

I think it's the attempt to separate spirituality, in the sense of personal transformation, from belief systems which are not based on evidence. The interesting question is as to whether people can contemplate the parables of religion as such; not seen as as literal truths, but as poetic invocations to transformation of being.

But they’re tied to (some would say hostage to) a specific historical narrative and set of beliefs, many of which seem completely anachronistic to post-industrial culture. — Wayfarer

The historical narrative of Gotama's enlightenment is really no less apparently anachronistic, I would say.

A broken clock. — creativesoul

From Jack's point of view he doesn't believe anything about a broken clock, obviously, since he thinks the clock is not broken. Of course we can say that he believes of a broken clock that it is working. But so what; people entertain mistaken beliefs all the time?

Your idea of information is too broad for my taste... but to each their own, I guess.

Problem is you apparently have no idea how the purported duck walks. Can straw ducks even walk?

Revelation to my view was written in the peak state and conveys information about how to achieve the peak state - the state Maslow described 2000 or so years on. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I can see that Revelation may inspire religious feeling, but I can't see how it provides instruction as to "how to achieve the peak state". Anyway I did say earlier that if religious texts provide definite workable instruction for practice, then that would count as information. But that is not characteristic of most religious texts.

Ah, the 'labelmeister' strikes again. Dismission by labeling; so much easier than providing a counter argument. Also note, that I haven't said that non-informative kinds of ideas have no value, so no, not positivist at all. Wittgenstein also held that metaphysical ideas are "senseless", but he would not have said they lack any value.

You left out the verifati.

Not in the sense I mean. By information I mean 'definitive and demonstrable' in some sense. So observation of the natural world gives us information. And testable theories do also (even if they turn out to be incorrect). The closest thing in religious texts to information I can think of would be instructions regarding practice. Genesis, the story of the Flood, the Good Samaritan, etc., don't give us any demonstrable information. We don't know for sure if Jesus walked on water, raised Lazarus from the dead or was resurrected.

The Buddhist ideas of rebirth and karma are not information in the sense I meant, because we have no way to test them.

Is it informative or thought-provoking?

So, is it safe to say that - on your view - the content of Jack's belief is equivalent to Jack's belief and that Jack's belief is about something other than it's content? — creativesoul

I haven't thought about those specifics. Off the top of my head I'd say that Jack's belief is about a clock and it's condition of working, which begs the question as to whether the clock and its condition of working together form the content of the belief. What else could Jack's belief be about?

Are you still okay with that? — creativesoul

Yes it's pretty much what I had said.

What I had said that you responded to was this:

Religion, like poetry, in its own unique ways can be transformative; it cannot be informative; to think it can is a naive mistake. — Janus

If you think religious texts can be informative, give us an example. And of course the fact that people presumably believed what is written in religious texts is not an example of being informative in the terms I am asking for.

I could explain it to you, but I can't understand it for you. — Wayfarer

An explanation will do, I'll take care of the "understanding" part.

Are you saying that you believe that in all the reams of religious material which exists throughout the world, there is absolutely no information there? Have you read it all to confirm this, or is this just some prejudice of yours, moving your hands and writing this for you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Give me an example of some information that comes exclusively from a religious text. (And by 'information' I'm not talking about being informed about what was believed historically and so on, I'm specifically thinking about information about the nature of the world).

Which religion and which gods are you talking about? Should they all be taken literally?

It's the role of philosophy to ask just those kinds of questions, and it has a common boundary with religion - or always did have — Wayfarer

The connection between theology and philosophy was, for a while in the West, overbearing until the assumption of the literal truth of Christianity was, rightly, challenged and overcome.

Religious ideas are not to be taken literally; they are metaphors designed to inspire certain kinds of feelings and dispositions. The "role of philosophy" is diverse and ever-changing and is shown in the various domains of philosophy that have evolved, it is not something to be stipulated.

Religion, like poetry, in its own unique ways can be transformative; it cannot be informative; to think it can is a naive mistake. Those who think religion can be informative are fundamentalist; the worst scourge our society faces. That seems perfectly obvious to me and I can only hope that maybe one day you'll get it.