Any such criteria would be liable to the same criticsm you put forth to begin with, because they would be set by a person.
You solve nothing by focusing on the external like that. — baker

That was exactly my point; that there is nothing "external'; nothing publicly shareable, to go by other than the internal, subjective feeling; which cannot be argued for because it is not inter-subjectively assessable.

That's the difference with philosophy; there things can be argued for on the basis of common experience, even if it is not as determinable as empirical science.

And it makes you feel all giddy inside to say this, doesn't it. — baker

So, you have nothing to say but to speculate about how I, someone you know very little about, feel?

Dude, this is a philosophy forum, even if this is a religion thread. Get your thinking straight. — baker

Now that's a powerful rebuttal! :roll:

I don't agree with Wittgenstein's idea that value is not in the world. I think the later Wuttgenstein would disagree with that idea as well. His later philosophy is more in line with Heidegger's, which rejects the abstracted, dualistic 'fact/ value' distinction. For Heidegger the fundamental element of dasein is 'Sorge; which translates as 'care'. The human world is suffused with value through and through; it is only an attenuated, 'display cabinet' view of the world that allows us to say that value must come from somewhere else.

We are not talking about some body of codified knowledge, but about transforming ourselves. The fact that there are a few traditions of transformative practice does not entail that there are not (perhaps very many) other possibilities. The possibilities are not limited to what Baker can imagine.

I believe that such delusion is not possible. — baker

Good for you. I think that in itself is a deluded belief.

Eh. For one, the number of people interested in this approach is, I think, very small. I am confident that those who actually do take that route, given how ardous it is, would not make the kind of mistake you talk about. And they would not seek the kind of lowly gratifications you suggest. I know such people, so I know what I'm talking about.



And I suppose you find satisfaction in doubting others the way you do, assuming very bad things about people. — baker

There are people who devote their lives to all kinds of gurus and religious leaders and arduous practices. That you believe the small subset you are familiar with must be the only authentic one says more about you than anything else.

This is strange in so many ways. The idea that there can be religiosity without a religious community is problematic in many ways, it deserves its own thread. — baker

Why would religiosity not be possible without a religious community? Religious communities are founded on religiosity that exists prior to their foundation, no? Or?

Also there is philosophy as a transformative practice; which necessitates no formal community, but involves an informal community of inquirers.

as per Buddhist doctrine, one can only know whether one has the correct understanding once one reaches what is called "stream entry". This can be described as a cognitive event at which one realizes that one has the correct understanding. — baker

And what if you believed with all your heart that you had reached "stream entry", but were deluding yourself? The possibility of that cannot be ruled out; which undermines the very notion that anyone could ever be infallibly correct, as opposed to merely subjectively certain, about that. Of course I don't deny that a feeling of absolute certainty might be gratifying enough to satisfy those who possess it; maybe that's all they are looking for.

You were asking as to what criteria to judge a spiritual teacher. I said the criteria are not objective, because what is objective is contingent, and the 'true good' is not contingent. — Wayfarer

So the "true good" is subjective, meaning it is a matter of opinion? I agree that science can only deal in contingent facts, but I can't see what that fact has to do with what we are discussing. Unless you are wanting to say that there is no fact of the matter as to whether someone is enlightened or not? If that is so, then it would just come down to a matter of opinion, wouldn't it?

The other possibility is that you are saying there is an absolute (non-contingent) fact of the matter as to whether someone is enlightened or not, in which case we are left with the problem as to how that absolute fact, granting that it might be such, could ever be determined by anyone.

It is on account of this problem that I see the question of someone's purported enlightenment to be a matter of faith, even for the one purportedly enlightened, because I think it is fantasy that any mere human could ever be infallible. That is why I deflate the notion of enlightenment from the idea of absolute knowledge to the more modest (and I believe realistic) idea of a liberated disposition. And liberated dispositions comes in degrees.

Right. But you don't know what they actually are about, just what you hope they're about. — Isaac

I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know (which compromise the bulk of statements I make about people) are not about actual people. If the statements I make are true, and the people they are made about are actual then the statements will be knowledgeable.

Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. — Janus


Sounds like a contradiction. How can it consist in 'true' beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold, without requiring certainty? The 'true' bit requires certainty. Things are not 'true' by us beliving them to be (on your account). Otherwise it's just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold' (a definition I entirely agree with). — Isaac

What do you mean by certainty? A feeling of certainty? How could our subjective feelings of certainty determine whether or not statements we make, or beliefs we hold, are true? That just isn't what truth is commonly understood to consists in. The truth is the truth regardless of whether we believe it, or feel certain about it.

It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. By your definition, the only correct answer to "do you know that?" is "no" (because we can't say if the belief is true).That seems to render the term useless. — Isaac

What we take to be knowledge is beliefs that we take ourselves to have good reasons to hold. But we might be wrong, in which case what we took to be knowledge turns out not to be. That beliefs must be true to constitute knowledge has nothing to do with subjective feelings of certainty.

The correct answer to "do you know that" (if you do take yourself to know that) is 'I have no reason to believe that I don't know that'. The acknowledgement that knowledge must be true belief held for true reasons carries with it a humility that acknowledges the possibility of being wrong (which would only be possible if our beliefs can be true or false, and we cannot attain absolute certainty about anything).

I can't determine just where the cause of your apparent confusion seems to originate on this point.

I think the absurdity of such claims highlights the fact he never could have believed them in the first place. — Ciceronianus

The point is Descartes did not believe he had no hands etc. He found himself capable of doubting he had hands etc, on the strength of the possibility that he might be dreaming, it might be a trick played on him by the ED and so on. He went through the process of identifying everything he could possibly doubt in order to see what he could not possibly doubt.

Beliefs cannot be real properties of brains, because the notion of epistemic-error is under-determined with respect to the neurological and physical facts of perception and action. — sime

I agree. It would be a category error to say that beliefs are properties of brains. beliefs are held by persons.

That depends on perspective. E.g, from my perspective, your perception of the moon and "the actual moon" are mostly unrelated concepts, even though I am forced to consider my perception of the moon as being in some sense fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon". — sime

Why would your perception of the moon be any more "fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon"" than mine though? While it seems true that the properties of the moon are perceived properties; I don't think it follows that the moon must be dependent for its existence on being perceived. The way it appears depends on being perceived, but that is not the same as the ways in which it could be perceived.

It seems as though you have misinterpreted what I said. In regard to processes of reasoning the important things is that the premises must be sound; what is deduced from those premises must be somehow implicitly "contained within them". We "see" that a premise entails its conclusion(s).

The question was as to how we "see" that. Is there a further process of reasoning which formally establishes it? But then how would we establish the validity of that further process of reasoning. And so on. But we short circuit all that by a kind of intuition; we just 'see'; and I am saying that "seeing" is a felt sense of 'rightness'. (Of course I am not suggesting it is infallible).

As for 'objectivity' as we've discussed there are criteria beyond the objective. Or put another way, what is truly excellent is more than what is just objectively the case. Objectivity is always conditional, if there is a true good, then its goodness is more than simply objective, it's transcendent (i.e. transcends conditions.) — Wayfarer

You're going off on a tangent it seems. What I mean is whether there are criteria whereby it could be determined that it is in fact the case that a spiritual teacher is worthy or not worthy, or whether it remains a matter of opinion, or faith if you prefer. The "transcendent" tells us nothing.

According to the phenomenologists, the very structure of the present itself is such that it intends, anticipates beyond itself. And the present is the fulfillment of a previous moment’s anticipating beyond itself. So one could say that to be in the moment is to experience a particular degree of intimacy with respect to one’s past and future. For the depressed person the present moment will appear as a disappointment of prior expectations as well as an anticipating of further disappointment. — Joshs

I agree with that view. The future and the past have no existence (for us at least) except in the present. That is pretty much just what I was trying to say.

Earlier on I referred to a book by Evan Thompson, 'Why I am not a Buddhist'. — Wayfarer

I read that book recently and one of the main reasons he is not a Buddhist seems to be because he dislikes modern Buddhist "exceptionalism"; the idea that Buddhism is superior to other religions insofar as it is believed to not be based on faith, but personal experience and "direct knowing". He rejects these ideas, and says that Buddhism is every bit as much based on faith as other religions.

He also rejects the absolutist notion of enlightenment, and says that it is very much a culturally mediated phenomenon. It seemed to me that his only argument with so-called "secular Buddhism" is that, without those traditional beliefs in karma and rebirth and the the ritual practices that attend those beliefs it cannot be rightly called Buddhism. I don't agree with this attitude, because Buddhism, if nothing else, has been one of the most syncretistic religions. It has adapted to the new cultures it has found itself in, and incorporated the foundational beliefs of those cultures.

And yet you have a retirement fund, don't you?

Also, some people feel burdened by ambition. Some don't. — baker

You are misunderstanding. I'm not saying there won't be anything in the future, but that when there is something it will be the present. Those who don't feel burdened by ambition must enjoy their striving for its own sake. Nothing wrong with that.

There are worthy people and unworthy people inside and outside all those traditions. — Wayfarer

Are you claiming there is a totally reliable objective standard of worthiness? If not, then what do you make of the fact that one's spiritual master is another's charlatan?

Right, so if I have understood you, you see reason as being fundamental. I see reason as relying on felt sense. How do I know that processes of inductive and abductive reasoning (creative hypothesizing) are sound? I'd say I just feel that they are or are not in the final analysis. It's true that deductive reasoning can be formally checked for validity, but deductive reasoning, on its own, doesn't tell us anything about anything beyond the form of its own validity.

So you don't know what your statements are about at the time you're making them? That's fine if that's your model. Seems perfectly consistent to me, but quite nonsensical. I prefer a model where I do know what I'm referring to in my expressions at the time I'm making them. — Isaac

You're conflating the idea of what statements are about tout court, with what they are intended to be about. If I think John exists and I make a statement about John, then it is intended to be about an actual John. So I know what my statements are intended to be about. But I am not infallible.

Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. So we can never know with absolute certainty that we possess knowledge.The possibility of being mistaken, however small it might be, is always there.

If you are uncomfortable with anything less than certainty, then you can opt for an impoverished understanding of knowledge, clinging to the illusory hope that you have thereby attained certainty. Personally I'm quite comfortable with uncertainty.

They seem to be two different descriptions of the one thing.

That which employs a method to understand, cannot itself be subjected to that same method.

Map/territory dilemma.

It can only be given as an irreducible and necessary condition, then subsequently shown that the method it uses is both possible, and non-contradictory.

A strange conception not in itself possible to understand, and stands as an irreducible given necessity, in humans at least, is reason. — Mww

I wonder what it could even mean to understand the mind, though. If we understood the workings of the brain completely, would that amount to understanding the mind? Not if you accept the coherency of the so-called "hard problem". So assuming that the question is as to how the physical brain can give rise to phenomenal experience, how could we, on the assumption that said experience is non-physical, possibly answer that by investigating neural processes?

We only think we have understood something if we can lay out a physical or a logical process to explain it. But these domains seem to be ineluctably incommensurable; two totally different kinds of description and explanation. We can already understand the mind in terms of concepts, meanings and reasons, but that tells us nothing about how it relates to the brain, even though we have every reason to think that it must. I think the difference is that we feel the mind and not the brain, whereas we can see and measure brain processes and not mental ones. So the mind is understood in terms of felt senses. How does a physical process become a felt sense? Perhaps we can never know, but that does not give us any reason to believe it is not possible, in fact we have every reason to think it is not only possible, but actual.

But if your point is merely that a hand cannot grasp itself, that too is readily understood. — unenlightened

There seem to be plenty of hands grasping another part around here. Could be the beginnings of a private language. :wink: On the other hand, cunning linguistics could be resorted to.

Challenges to American power - which at this point is abusive by definition - will not be tolerated. Anyone else who dares do similar things will be ruined and have their lives destroyed. — StreetlightX

:100: And our (Australian) gaggle of complicit idiots and shysters are not much better; all they lack is the degree of power.

Cf four noble truths Life is suffering — Ennui Elucidator

You forgot the other three: to wit:

" Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering.

Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the origin of suffering: it is this craving [taṇhā, "thirst"] which leads to re-becoming, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there; that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for becoming, craving for disbecoming.

Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering: it is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it.

Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering: it is this noble eightfold path; that is, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration."

Of course, if you don't believe in karma or rebirth, you might conclude than easier way to end suffering would be to commit suicide.

BTW, i haven't read the entire thread, but I haven't noticed anyone mentioning the issue of the suffering caused if you commit suicide to those who might care about you. Of course, if no one cares,,,

Yeah, right, I know...

You might not be fucking them now, but you already fucked the Japanese once or twice, and you still need to save face for that crime. Perhaps the Chinese are next?

Yes, there is prayer (contemplation) and then there is petitionary prayer; a very different animal.

Perhaps not; but you desperately need to save face. Problem is you're going about it in entirely the wrong way.

EDIT: since I understnd that "save face" can be taken in two different senses: to redeem yourself, and to appear to redeem yourself, I want to note that I meant the former, which should subsume the latter. The latter, however does not necessarily, or even often, include the former.

As you say, the notion that there should be 1:1 translation is absurd. I don't think one needs to speak more than one language to appreciate this. I've studied some German . French and Spanish, but I'm no where near fluent. However I have read various translations of Plato, some German and French philosophers, and Spanish and Italian poets, and it's easy to see, by comparing translations, that interpretation is heavily involved, that translation is "flexible" and "dynamic" as you say.

Add to this, in the case of Buddhism, that the Suttas were written around 150-200 years after the death of Gotama, and were based on a verbal tradition that, knowing human nature, would have been variously embellished, changed, added to and subtracted from, plus the fact of the proliferation of schools that have evolved to this day, and it is clear that there is no one consistent Buddhism. In any case it doesn't matter because only ideas that makes sense to you and that you can use for your own practice of living are of any relevance. It doesn't matter where they originated, or how close you might be convinced that they are to Gotama's original teachings. It wouldn't even matter if Gotama turned out to be a mythical figure..

The most I claim is that if my interlocutor was familiar enough with certain texts they would see what I'm seeing. — baker

Since any text is subject to interpretation; why would you think that? When it comes to the Pali Canon or Plato, for example, if you are not fully conversant with Pali or Ancient Greek, respectively, then you are reading something which has already been interpreted by the translator.

For many people, this means that they are facing the prospect of not accomplishing much and dying miserable. Hardly something to look forward to. — baker

The irony is that if you don't let go of that vision, and of the need to "accomplish much" you will likely "die miserable". If you "look forward" honestly you will see that there is nothing to be had in the future, All you have and all you are is what you have and are now, and this will equally be so in the future. If you can live fully now, then you will likely not die miserable, and that alone would be a singular.and sufficient achievement.

Yes, I believe that is what it is about. Assange poked the eye of the sleeping giant, and the sleeping giant is embarrassed and angry, and wants to punish Julian Assange to save face, and show that you disturb its dogmatic slumber at your peril.

OK. So how do you personally resolve the issue I've outlined in my argument above.

At T1 you say "John is a bachelor" - you want to say that this statement is not about your beliefs but rather that it's about John, the man.

At T2 you disover that there's no such person, you were deceived (a hallucination, or a trick). — Isaac

I don't see the problem. If there is no actual John, but only an imagined John, then I believed the statement was a about an actual John, but subsequently discovered I was mistaken, and that it was about an imagined or fictive John.

Unless the representation is the knowledge, in which case there is no unknowable.The representation becomes a presentation, in that case. — Goldyluck

Yes, and things presenting themselves is exactly what we do know in the primary sense of knowing. The secondary sensing of 'knowing that' or propositional knowledge consists in beliefs expressed as true statements about the things which present themselves.

For me it makes no sense to speak of our perception as representation, it is better understood as presentation. It might make sense to speak of propositional knowledge as representation; that is propositional representation of the facts or actualities that are presented to us.

I'm pretty sure that the sound of the cars outside is no illusion. — Goldyluck

Why would you refer to the sound of the cars as a quale, though? You hear the cars, to be sure, does it make sense to say you are hearing a quale?

I don't see it that way. I think "John is a bachelor" means that John is a bachelor. Of course it could be wrong, or it could be right, that is true or false. That is true of any proposition. If 'John is a bachelor" meant "John is a man who I believe is a bachelor" then the sentence could not be false, unless you were a liar, or didn't actually know what you believed, but that would make it too much about you and not enough about John; the actual subject of the sentence. It would, in effect, by implication, make you the subject of the sentence, and not John.

Doesn't 'John is a bachelor' mean, by implication 'John is a man who has not participated in the kind of series of events that are generically referred to as "getting wed"'?

Yep. a description of the steps necessary to achieve a state is not the same as an investigation into the meaning of the word. If it were philology and science would be the same topic. — Isaac

You're still off the point; which was simply that there are actual events that distinguish a bachelor from a non-bachelor; meaning it's not merely that a bachelor is someone who the linguistic community refers to as such.

:up: The idea that he has committed a crime of espionage is absurd. And as far as the claim that he endangered the lives of thousands of US agents; even if true it wasn't intentional.

In any case, has any one of those agents died due to the publication of the documents? If you do something that might cause someone's death and someone dies then it might at most be a manslaughter charge. If no one dies then there would be no charge.

Next time I have a fat guy on the stretcher having a heart attack I will make sure to let him know that Banno says he should have hit the gym and eaten more salad; now accept the responsibility of your choices fatty, and die with dignity. Same with the alcoholics, people that get in car accidents if they were driving too fast... — Book273

Not a good analogy; overeating and alcoholism are addictions, and driving too fast is due to overconfidence in one's abilities. Not getting vaccinated, though, is a choice not to do something that has little attendant risk, based on either, or some combination of, believing stupid conspiracy theories, paranoia, or just bloody-minded refusal to do what you are told you should.

Those who believe stupid conspiracy theories may be able to be educated, those who are paranoid may not be able to overcome their paranoia, it's those who are just bloodymindedly recalcitrant who most of all should be expected take responsibility for their decisions. Of course they won't because they think it is wrong that they should be told what they should do.

What I see no justification for is publicly arguing against vaccination since it flies in the face of all the evidence. Also arguing against businesses mandating vaccination, when all they are doing is protecting themselves against being held responsible if someone becomes infected in the workplace (as well as simply protecting their employees, customers and associates) is just absurd in a time when occupational health and safety, and litigation for failure to comply with the requirements is so prevalent.

Neither are what you claimed. You gave us a list of behaviours which would lead to being a bachelor, that's not that same thing a a definition of what the word means. A series of biophysical changes are necessary for a seed to be a tree, they're not what the word 'tree' means. — Isaac

It's exactly what I claimed; a man who has not been wed is a man who has not participated in the series of events involved in being wed, just as I said earlier.

Yeah but "over here" and "over there" are just as much mental attributions as colours are.

A different thing, in that it likely applies to the external world, are some aspects of mathematics. — Manuel

I see mathematics (in part) as consisting in precise quantification of distance. So, I see 'over there' and 'over here' as being expressions of physical distance, not merely mental attributions.

That's not the same use of 'means' as in "bachelor means and unmarried man" where 'means' is telling us how to use the word. — Isaac

It's the same. "Bachelor' means an unmarried man' is the same as "Bachelor' means a man who has not been wed' since 'unmarried man' means 'a man who has not been wed'. Divorcees are not usually referred to as bachelors. Of course no definition is ironclad, there is nothing to prevent a male divorcee from being referred to as a bachelor, but that doesn't matter because it is not the common usage.

Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos p35

I agree that the Galilean view of science may suck all the life out of living, inasmuch as it sees everything of any importance as being quantifiable. Importance itself is not quantifiable, though. There is nothing wrong with science per se, and the mathematical approach does nothing per se to undermine the value of life. We create the value of things by valuing them.