I've encountered different senses of 'nihilism'. It's a while since I read Nietzsche, but I seem to recall that he classed Christianity and other beliefs in transcendent meaning given "from above" as (at least) potentially nihilistic because such authoritarian systems annihilate the possibility of the individual human creation of meaning. The human creation of meaning is always individual because we, like all organisms are each unique.

Life is replete with meaning for all creatures, because all creatures have their own concerns, but there is no single overarching meaning, and any attempt to pursue such a chimera would seem to be potentially nihilistic. Think of Buddhism and its universalized notion that all life is suffering and is something to be escaped rather than embraced.

This is not to say that religions always make people miserable, though. Some people prefer to have their meanings spoon-fed to them and might be miserable without that assistance. I think it is also true that some find their creativity within religious systems. The essence of nihilism is to universalize and tar everyone with the same brush.

A perfect example of the difficulties with language: to impute dualism to actuality is metaphysically disastrous, re: whatever is just is, Aristotle’s A = A, but when actuality is qualified by “mind-independent”, a dualism is automatically given.

An overly-critical analyst might even go so far as to assert there is no such thing as “actuality” without an intelligence affected by it, the repercussion being non-dualism is impossible, from which follows A = whatever I think it is. — Mww

Yes, if we think of reality as mind-independnt dualism is a given—in our thinking. But then our thinking is inevitably dualistic anyway. I think it follows that our thinking cannot grasp reality. we can only, dualistically, grasp at it with our thinking, but it escapes from our mental hands like a puff of air.

I agree there is no such thing as a mind-independent "actuality", that can be grasped without an intelligence, or in other words there is no such thing as a grasping of actuality without an intelligence, and I think there really is no grasping of actuality at all —it is beyond the grasp of intelligence.

Respectfully, I submit that our intelligence is dualist in its logical structure, and language merely represents the expression of its employment, so our mindsets are at least that far apart. — Mww

Our conceptually mediated intelligence is dualist in its logical structure—I agree. I think even in animals there must be a proto-conceptual division between self and other, but it is underlying, not consciously articulated. But then that might just be my anthropomorphizing dualistic intelligence at work. Once anything is re-cognized, once it becomes a gestalt that stands out from its environment, perhps we have the beginnings of dualism.

Anyway….historically we’ve noticed between us the pitfalls of OLP, so in that respect, we’re not that far apart. — Mww

Yes, the intellectual poverty...!

I don't see how we could, but I realize others disagree. The law allows for mitigating circumstances, but it seems impossible to determine where to draw the line. I think there is no rational warrant for praise or blame with humans any more than there is with animals, but of course if determinism is true then no one who praises and blames can help praising and blaming.

I think our society would be better without praise and blame; it is necessary to restrain criminals but there seems to be no rational warrant for wanting to take revenge out on them. I think revenge-seeking is emotionally, not rationally driven.

:cool:

I know that but you also seemed to say that my contributions to chets boring model and your issues within this self-induced boredom you are experiencing does not help in that same sentence! — Kizzy

I don't know, perhaps I didn't read you closely enough, but to the extent that it seemed to me that you were indulging what I see as Chet's self-indulgent grandiosity it seemed to me a "wankfest" I don't know if you agreed with him or if you were just being polite to him, but if I misunderstood you, then I in turn apologize.

I basically agree with your "move forward peacefully" but I also don't mind a bit of conflict and confrontation and challenge in the process of examining one another's ideas. I never take anything personally on here.

No problem and no need to apologize, When I spoke of it being boring, tedious, vacuous I was referring specifically to Chet's unargued pontifications, not the whole thread. I always find value in trying to formulate and express my views, and all the more if someone can show that I have been misguided. I try to be open to alternative views, perhaps I don't always succeed, and no doubt I have my own scotomas.

When you say, "I just see my hands, feel them, use them, so I know I have hands," you're giving an argument using a sensory justification. It seems to me it's just an enthymeme. I'm not sure why you would think that's not a justification. You're even using the word know epistemologically. — Sam26

I'm using the "know" of familiarity. I see my hands, feel my hands, use my hands, know my hands. I'm not justifying any belief, simply reporting the experience of having hands.

Because the reasoning you're using is based on the idea that life has to make sense, which I consider to be a belief. Can you tell me why it's not a belief? — Echogem222

Life does make sense to us, provided we don't ask incoherent questions. Of life didn't make sense we could not survive. We speak from present experience, not from barely imaginable possibilities.

Because tomorrow, for all we know life could suddenly stop making sense, logic that we once thought we understood so well could suddenly change, causing us to not understand how to make reasonable arguments anymore. — Echogem222

That is merely a vaguely imaginable scenario, not a serious consideration.

And JANUS gets nothing — Kizzy

Don't presume to speak for me...that would be a good start if you really want to engage.

I don't need to believe anything when I can simply see what the case is. I don't say all knowledge is not reliant on belief. So-called propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief, and I have no problem with that because I think, under a certain interpretation, that we can be said to know things we are not certain about.

Although the coherence of that idea turns on justification and it may not be entirely clear as to just what constitutes justification. There may be many cases where we believe such and such is the truth, and if we have good reason to believe what we do and if what we believe is the truth we may be said to have knowledge under that definition, even if we are not certain the belief is true, In that case we could be said to know, but not to know that we know.

This continues to be a pointless exchange.

You present a whole paragraph of seemingly irrelevant or incoherent questions, and then when I ask what you think the relevance to the issue is in what you wrote, you respond by saying there is no issue, and then asking how that seems like trolling?
The issue from the start is that @Chet Hawkins claims we do not know anything, and yet provides no argument for that claim, while speaking dogmatically in a way that suggests he think he knows a whole lot.
It's tedious and boring stuff, totally vacuous, and you haven't helped make it any more interesting...to me at least.

So, you're just trolling then?

I have no idea what relevance you think what you wrote has to the issue. Do you know anyone, or know how to do anything? When you are out and about, do you know whether it's raining or the sun is shining? If someone asks you, do you know where you live, what your address is?

s pretty obvious that the exact thing which you need to care about more than smoking, to stop smoking, is not-smoking. If you look into the scientific research on the subject, as my brother did when he quit smoking, you'll find that what has been proven as the best way to quit smoking is to have a strategy, a method, or procedure, and to adhere to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, but I don't disagree with that, and haven't said anything that should lead you to think I have. You will give up smoking if you care more about stopping than you do about smoking. You could have any number of reasons as to why you care more about stopping.

My point has only been that we care about what we care about, and we can't just magically decide to care more about something we previously cared less about—we need incentives to shift our concerns.

Attempting to discuss anything with you is usually an endless battle against strawmen. :roll:

Are you saying that looking at your hands (sensory observation) provides a justification for the belief that you have hands? — Sam26

No. I'm not thinking in terms of justification. I just see my hands, feel them, use them, so I know I have hands. Doubt about it is impossible unless I buy into some silly artificial possibility like "brain in a vat" or " evil demon.

. I agree with you that eliminating the word 'know' from the lexicon would make no difference. That said, I do think that people often take themselves to know things which they really don't.

My issue is that we do know many things, so eliminating the word 'know' would be impossible in any case, because then we could no longer speak accurately about our experiences.

The way you express this is jumbled. I DO NOT state ever that things are 'undecidable'. That is your word and very wrong. Everything is decidable, just always partly wrong. That is the nature of belief. — Chet Hawkins

This is confused, If something is undecidable then we cannot know the truth about it. We can know the truth about many things, and these are therefore decidable. It doesn't follow that people cannot decide to believe they know the truth about those things which are undecidable—this happens all the time.

I do not refuse to use the word 'know' as I have shown in many cases in this thread. I bet I wrote it more than anyone else did. — Chet Hawkins

You know perfectly well that I meant that you do not use the word to apply to yourself. Of course, you must use the word in order to refer to the idea so that you can reject it. Your thinking seems quite shallow, but I don't doubt that it is clouded by some dogma or other.

I'm familiar with the teachings of both Naranjo and Gurdjieff, I have participated in the Gurdjieff Foundation in Sydney and completed two of Naranjo's 'SAT' workshops. The enneagram typology has some interesting insights, but life and people are not so configured as to fit neatly into such systems.

To break an addiction is not a matter of deciding that there is something you care about more than the addiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say or imply that it is a matter of deciding anything and then making the feelings follow suit, in fact that is precisely what I have been denying. You simply come to care about something more than the addiction, and are thus able to let it go, or you do not come to care about something more than the addiction and are thus unable to let it go.

The point is that if you hadn't cared about something more than the addiction, then you wouldn't have given up smoking.

In the end, the principle that got me off it was Buddhist - I realised that cravings are transient. — Wayfarer

Right, so you cared more about Buddhism and its ideas than you did about smoking. I have no doubt that your advanced age and the sense of the increasing risk of something going wrong with your body if you continued smoking contributed to your desire to quit and enabled you to finally do it. When we are younger it is easier to tell ourselves that the risks of detrimental effects are far away. I have no doubt that if you hadn't cared about those things sufficiently you would have continued to smoke.

Experiences don’t exist in the brain, but the things the brain does, whatever that is, that makes it seem like experiences exist in the brain, exist in the brain. — Mww

Yes, that seems right.

In for a penny, why not in for a pound? Thinking and judging is just about the entire human conscious intellectual environment anyway, isn’t it?

At least now I have a better idea regarding your mindset, so, thanks for that. — Mww

It seems that language is dualistic in its logical structure, its grammar. If that is so, then all of our discourse will be dualistic also. But I don't want to go further and impute a dualistic structure to the mind-independent actuality.

I don't think our mindsets are that far apart.

How will we in Philosophy Forum notice the differences between you, in dialogue with us, and someone who uses know? — Bylaw

The irony is that @Chet Hawkins constantly talks about things which are undecidable, and hence mere matters of opinion, as though he knows the truth concerning them, while refusing to use the word "know".

Others addressing like questions will acknowledge they are just expressing their opinions and will reserve the word "know" only for those (countless) mundane cases where we actually do know.

I think the intellectual honesty belongs to the latter group.

Therefore, if to give up smoking, it is required that one cares about something else more than the person cares about smoking, this "something else" must necessarily be "not-smoking". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you accept that smoking is detrimental to your health, and you care more about maintaining good health than you do about gratifying your desire to smoke then you will give it up. if you care more about gratifying the urge to smoke you won't. The point is that you cannot simply decide by fiat what will be more important to you.

For me, he was a significant philosophical presence, and one of the most misrepresented modern thinkers. Some of those who criticize and even despise him, and I would be surprised if there were not many others I have not encountered, openly admit to not having even read his works.

This seems to support my claim rather than yours. Since you name a multitude of types of desires, and the human being must prioritize one over the other in many situations, this seems to support what I said, that we can choose what we want. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point is that we do not determine sui generis what is significant for us, what we care about, So what I have said does not support your claim at all.

The objects of all your mentioned desires, "food, warmth, shelter, sex," are very general. — Metaphysician Undercover

No they are not. The object of the desire for food is food, the object of the desire for warmth is warmth...and the same goes for shelter and sex. The fact that there are many sources, and kinds of sources, of food, warmth, shelter and sex is irrelevant, so I hope you are not trying to make that sophistical argument.

The effect is not the general "desire for food", it is the desire to eat something. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, you are trying to make that kind of sophistical argument...if the desire is merely for "something" to eat how is that different from the general desire for food? In any case the argument is not over whether our desires are general or specific, but over whether we are able to determine by fiat what we desire, and/or are able to determine by fiat whether we desire one thing more than another.

Your last paragraph is merely hand-waving. We are what we are and want what we want, and think what we think, and we cannot change any of that simply by fiat. Of course, people do change, but they only do so insofar as they have the capacity for change, and they cannot simply conjure up such a capacity if they don't already possess it.

For example, if you are addicted to tobacco, you won't be able to give it up unless you care about something else that contra-indicates smoking more than you care about smoking. You will either be able to do that, or you will not—we do not create ourselves from scratch.

The special set of concepts is Kant’s Table of Categories, which are taken mostly from Aristotle with a few revisions. — Kant, Metaphysics, Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy

This is bullshit. Of course there will inevitably be some categories that appear in both sets, but that would not be evidence that Kant "took" those that match from Aristotle. Reflection on possible predicates is sufficient to explain the matches. Do yourself a favour and put the two sets of categories side by side and you will see they are nowhere near the same.

Also true. There are continuities between Aristotle and Kant, after all, Kant adopted Aristotle's categories nearly unchanged. — Wayfarer

Not true. Do a little research.

It is obvious that your eyes see and that the objects are there, and are real. That's not where the uncertainty is. It's in this, my expression of that hypothetical event, and, with respect, it's in yours. We do not disagree that when we look we know and see that we have hands. As to what "your" or simply "knowledge" of that event is, that's where we differ. — ENOAH

It's not apparent to me just what your skepticism consists in with regard to the example. Can you explain?

If "my" skepticism about that must be relegated to "radical skepticism," so be it. — ENOAH

I don't see how your skepticism in this example could be radical or in other words global, I think it is possible to play at doubting, in the radical sense, anything, but I don't think it is possible to doubt everything at once or that such doubt based on merely imaginable alternative possibilities, whose only quality that could recommend them is that they are not logically contradictory, is significant or interesting. For example, I might claim to doubt I have hands by citing the possibility that I am a brain in vat or being deceived by a demon, but those possibilities depend on their being brains and vats or deceptive demons, so I can't at the same time doubt the existence of whichever of those I am using to support my radical skepticism.

Either way, your OP was perhaps more interesting to some than you might have intended/expected. Sincerely, Thank you. — ENOAH

I appreciate your kind words, but I can't take credit for the OP. It was Chet's suggestion to start a new thread in which to question his position if I wanted him to explain his ideas. I think he has failed to explain anything. Anyway, thank you for your interest and participation.

I should have added that radical or global skepticism can be entertained, but not without holding some things certain, from which it follows that such skepticism cannot ever be what it purports to be.

So, when I look at my hands I cannot but be certain that I have hands, and the kinds of 'evil demon' or 'brain in a vat' objections hold no water for me, I just can't take them seriously and I don't believe anyone bar possibly the mentally ill really does either.

Why not? I see no problem with a man choosing ones wants. That's what we learn how to do in moral training, mastering our habits. — Metaphysician Undercover

The first point is that what is significant to you, what is important to you, conditions your desires. We all have first order desires for pleasure, satisfaction, gratification, stimulation and so on. But in case those desires lead to habits that are unhealthy, they may be countermanded by stronger concerns like personal health, social harmony, or even simply by introjected moral prescriptions and proscriptions.

The second point is that what you desire in the first order sense; food, warmth, shelter, sex, and so on simply is what it is. You are thrown, so to speak, into the midst of these kinds of desires, and some people have stronger desires than others, or a different balance of desires. For example, food might be more important to you than sex. We are also thrown by our educations into the midst of our second order desires. We may be able to cultivate those desires and we each have different capacities for change, for re-inventing ourselves.

The third point is that each person's capacities just are that person's capacities—some are more capable than others at overcoming their compulsions or addictions. Some people simply don't and cannot, feel empathy, for example—they cannot force themselves to care for others, although is they are smart, they may at least be able to bring themselves to act as though they do.

To sum up we are free to act according to the dictates of our natures at any point in our lives, (and the dictates may change with or without our conscious intention) but we do not create ourselves, so the radical libertarian notion of free will and absolute moral responsibility is absurd.

Is that not, then dependant upon our definitions of certainty? Assume 100% is a fitting adjective. I.e., that there is absolutely no room for doubt or possibility. Still? I personally cannot see that anywhere — ENOAH

When I explore my environment I do not find any room for doubt that the things I perceive there are actually there.

claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part)
— https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0340.xml

The issue is that people will easily reject 3, many will reject 2, few will reject 1. — Lionino

I accept 1. and 2. With 3. it would depend on what is mean by the objects possessing all the features we perceive them to have. Imposing the caveat that at least some of those perceptible features are characteristic only of perceived objects, or objects insofar as they are perceived, makes it acceptable to me.

The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. If one maintains that he experiences things in the world, in conjunction with the implication his experiences are not in the brain, and, if he maintains all his experiences belong to him alone, then it is necessarily the case he himself is not in his own brain.

I’m sure you do not hold with that perfectly justified logical deduction, or at least its conclusion. So which is the false premise? — Mww

I'm not sure what you are asking me here. Are you asking if I agree that we are not in our own brains? If so, then the answer is yes.

What if we said our ideas of the self or our thoughts about ourselves are in our own brains? Well, perhaps we could reasonably say that, but I don't want to because I don't like to assign locations to things like ideas or experiences— I think that is an inaptitude. Of course, thoughts and even experiences are associated with the brain, but it doesn't seem to follow that they are in it.

So I don't even want to say that mental states are in the brain, but I will admit that neural activity is. I am no dualist, though, except when it comes to our thinking and judging. That would seem to make it hard to get our dualistic ideas to accord with a non-dual reality.

A neat pair of summations of the alternative views.

An interesting sidenote is that @Michael seems to take scientific knowledge to be definitively showing us that the indirect realist picture (as he understands and deploys it) represents the real situation, rather than being one possible interpretation of those scientific results.

When "they" were expectations, were they "belief." And now that your expectations have been affirmed, are they knowledge? — ENOAH

To expect something, to think it most likely, is not necessarily to believe it will happen. Of course you could say that it is a belief that it is most likely to happen. Once the expectations are met, and one observes that they have been met, then that would count as knowledge. I might expect that it will rain, and when it does rain, if I see it raining, or stand in the rain and get wet with it, I could say that I know it is raining.

Sorry, I regret any part I may have had in meeting your expectations. That was my lame attempt at returning to the root. — ENOAH

No need to apologize. We all follow our inclinations, and far be it from me to proscribe against such investigations. My characterization of "wankfest" is nothing more than the way I interpret the goings on; I'm not claiming there is any right or wrong, or fact of the matter there.

But never mind we cannot know with 100% certainty. That reveals another eerie fact about our experience. We cannot know truth period. — ENOAH

This is where we disagree—I think we can know many things with certainty.

Thanks for your response, but I'm afraid I don't get what you are driving at.

What does "presymbolic language" mean? Isn't all language by the meaning of "language", symbolic in some way? Adding "symbolic" to language, to say that human language is "symbolic language" is just redundancey. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the case of symbolic language symbols stand for something they don't physically resemble and they have no causal relationship with what they signify. A pictograph, for example, resembles what it stands for. Smoke indicates, is a sign for, fire. Animals may have language, that is they emit sounds or perform gestures that might be indicative of danger or an aggressive attitude or their desire to mate, and so on, but those sounds or gestures are signs, not symbols. It is with symbols that generalization and abstract thought becomes possible.

We have body language and musical language which are not symbolic. And in the visual language of painting, for example, the subjects do not symbolize what they resemble or evoke, but represent it.

We have good reason to believe in intelligibilities because it does not seem like they should spring up uncaused or be the sui generis results of a magical human power. We should believe in them particularly from a naturalist frame. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We know things are intelligible to us and to other animals. They need to be intelligible otherwise we and they could not survive. I see intelligibility as being primally and primarily dependent on pattern, on form. It's all about similarities and differences.

I agree that we should understand them from a naturalistic perspective, the whole notion of real, independent transcendent forms or essences is most plausibly a fantasy, I think.

That may be so, but it doesn't follow that experience is in the brain.You are courting solipsism.

I think you're misleading yourself by claiming that experience exists within the brain. I don't know about you, but I experience things out in the world, not in my brain.

Where have I said that? — Wayfarer

You haven't. That is why I wrote "unspoken premise". It is also why I wrote that if you don't hold that unpsoken premise, then we have nothing to argue about. You don't seem to be a very close reader.

All that said, the impression I have had from years of reading your posts is that you do believe in a spiritual reality and even hierarchy (which would, if it were actual. amount to a supernatural influence).

I agree that h. sapiens evolved and that language also evolved but my argument is that we've crossed an evolutionary threshold which sets us apart from other animals. We are able, among many other things, to interrogate the nature of being through philosophy, or the size and age of the Universe, through science. — Wayfarer

All of that is just on account of symbolic language, and no one with half a brain would deny that we do those things that other animals don't. But I believe you want to infer from that a supernatural influence, and that is really the unspoken premise in your complaints about modern culture.

If you are not wanting to infer a supernatural influence, then we have nothing to disagree about. And note, I'm not outright denying the possibility of a supernatural influence, I'm just saying we have no valid warrant for such an inference, and that we have no way of making discursive sense of the idea.

So it really comes down to how you feel about it, it comes down to your intuitions or what "feels right" to you, and that is not a basis for argument at all, because it is a personal matter.

Are you referencing the problem of induction? — Michael

No, I'm not talking about inferences to the explanations for observed phenomena, I'm talking about observed phenomena. Things are experienced and that is how we comes to know their characteristics and attributes. If we were not able to observe, interact with, act upon and be acted upon by things we would know nothing about them. But that is not the case, things are experienced by us, and we do know things about them.

So it seems absurd to say that things are not constituents of our experience. This is the only salient issue, not the pointless debate about preferred parlances between 'direct' and 'indirect', either of which can be rendered as a coherent way of speaking about what we know about perception (and if we didn't know anything about distal objects, we would not know anything about perception). It all just depends on context.

Ontology is concerned with classification of types, not the enumeration of all the different kinds of things. — Wayfarer

As I understand it ontology is concerned with the nature of being and with the different kinds of entities. — Janus

How is "classification of types" not equivalent to being concerned with the different kinds of entities?

That while h. sapiens is clearly descended from a common ancestory with simians, reason, language, self-consciousness, and so on, make us different from other animals. Why this point has to be laboured, why it is controversial or needs argument, I confess that I don't understand. — Wayfarer

I believe other animals are capable of reasoning and presymbolic language. The only difference I see is the advent of symbolic language with humans. I also think this is pretty much the standard view, so I'm not sure why you seem to think it isn't the standard view.

The other point is that all kinds of animals are different to the other kinds, more or less. Human ability to use symbolic language does make us unique, but I see no reason to think that signals any kind of supernatural influence, if that is what you think is missing in the modern view.

I would have thought an obvious difference between humans and animals, is that we're capable of moral choice (unless you accept determinism, which I don't.) — Wayfarer

Symbolic language allows us to reflect on our experiences, actions, lives and deaths. This is where the idea of moral responsibility comes into play. I see no reason to believe in any libertarian idea of free will—as Schopenhauer puts it " "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants", which I take to mean that, apart from external constraints, you are free to do whatever you want but you are not free to choose what it is that you want.

.

As I said, it is as I expected it would be. So, the expectations were neither flawed nor optimistic.

:up:

I didn't say that we don't have reliable knowledge. I said that we don't have direct knowledge. — Michael

How could we have reliable knowledge of objects if they were not experienced by us?

This is all just hand-waving and insinuation. When you present an actual argument I'll address it.