That's an example of non-cognitivism.

I provide a different explanation of the difference between objectivity and subjectivity here.

It's a complex issue. It cannot simply be addressed with aphorisms.

World 3 would would pretty quickly stop being a world. With no morality there is more of a chance people would kill babies but maybe not to the extent that the species would cease to exist. — I like sushi

I don't think that this is accurate. Consider the possible worlds again:

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

What is the practical difference between these worlds?

It seems to me that only moral beliefs matter. Whether or not the beliefs are true has no practical relevance.

All very good questions. Have you any answers? — Banno

I don't, but I can set out an argument to properly lay out the options:

If moral sentences are truth-apt then either some moral sentence is true or it is not wrong to eat babies.

If it is wrong to eat babies then either it would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so or it would be wrong to eat babies even if everyone were to say otherwise.

So we have:

1. Moral sentences are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism), or
2. It is not wrong to eat babies (error theory), or
3. It would not be wrong to eat babies if everyone were to say so (subjectivism), or
4. It would be wrong to eat babies even if everyone were to say otherwise (realism)

There seems to be the presumption that if evidence or reasoning cannot be provided in support of (4) then either (2) or (3) should be accepted by default. I think that this presumption should itself be questioned.

All moral truths are true. — Banno

Yes, but this can be examined in more detail:

1. “One ought not X” is true if everyone says so
2. “One ought not Y” is true even if everyone says otherwise

Is (2) the case for some Y, and if so how do we know? Can it be proved with empirical evidence and/or reasoned argument? Is it an intuition? Is it unknowable?

Or is (2) never the case? Is every moral truth a case of (1)?

So some moral truths are true even if everyone says otherwise?

I’ll phrase it another way:

Some things are true if everyone says so and some things are true even if everyone says otherwise.

Which of these is the case for moral truths?

We can do away with the term and still address the substance of the disagreement. The article I referenced offered an example:

1. The diamond is made of carbon
2. The diamond is worth $1,000

We can all be wrong about (1) but can't all be wrong about (2). (2) is true because of social conventions/intersubjective agreement, etc. whereas (1) is true even if we all believe otherwise.

Are moral truths like (1) or like (2)?

I've said before I don't really care what you call it. the interesting bit is that moral statements have a truth value. — Banno

Many in this discussion believe that moral statements have a truth value. The main disagreement seems to be precisely on its objectivity.

Are they true because of social convention, or are they true even if everyone believed and behaved otherwise?

My objection would be that "objectively" does nothing here. Hence moral realism is that there are true moral statements. — Banno

It's not as simple as that.

Moral Anti-Realism

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists objectively. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but this existence is (in the relevant sense) non-objective. There are broadly two ways of endorsing (1): moral noncognitivism and moral error theory. Proponents of (2) may be variously thought of as moral non-objectivists, or idealists, or constructivists. So understood, moral anti-realism is the disjunction of three theses:

a) moral noncognitivism
b) moral error theory
c) moral non-objectivism

...

Moral noncognitivism holds that our moral judgments are not in the business of aiming at truth. So, for example, A.J. Ayer declared that when we say “Stealing money is wrong” we do not express a proposition that can be true or false, but rather it is as if we say “Stealing money!!” with the tone of voice indicating that a special feeling of disapproval is being expressed (Ayer [1936] 1971: 110). Note how the predicate “… is wrong” has disappeared in Ayer’s translation schema; thus the issues of whether the property of wrongness exists, and whether that existence is objective, also disappear.

The moral error theorist thinks that although our moral judgments aim at the truth, they systematically fail to secure it: the world simply doesn’t contain the relevant “stuff” to render our moral judgments true. For a more familiar analogy, compare what an atheist usually claims about religious judgments. On the face of it, religious discourse is cognitivist in nature: it would seem that when someone says “God exists” or “God loves you” they are usually asserting something that purports to be true. However, according to the atheist, the world isn’t furnished with the right kind of stuff (gods, afterlife, miracles, etc.) necessary to render these assertions true. The moral error theorist claims that when we say “Stealing is morally wrong” we are asserting that the act of stealing instantiates the property of moral wrongness, but in fact there is no such property, or at least nothing in the world instantiates it, and thus the utterance is untrue.

Non-objectivism (as it will be called here) allows that moral facts exist but holds that they are non-objective. The slogan version comes from Hamlet: “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” For a quick example of a non-objective fact, consider the different properties that a particular diamond might have. It is true that the diamond is made of carbon, and also true that the diamond is worth $1000, say. But the status of these facts seems different. That the diamond is carbon seems an objective fact: it doesn’t depend on what we think of the matter. (We could all be under the impression that it is not carbon, and all be wrong.) That the diamond is worth $1000, by contrast, seems to depend on us. If we all thought that it was worth more (or less), then it would be worth more (or less).

Even your quote from a different article continued with "... (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way)."

Who thinks this is realism? What anti-realist would say that?

@Michael @Leontiskos
Are you agreeing with this?? — hypericin

1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism)
2a. All moral propositions are false (error theory)
2b. Some moral propositions are true and these are subjectively true (moral subjectivism)
2c. Some moral propositions are true and these are objectively true (moral realism)

Moral anti-realism encompasses 1, 2a, and 2b.

1. You've got the positions backwards, but i imagine that was just haste. No guff. Naturalism is what I take issue with. — AmadeusD

And I have been explaining non-naturalism so now I don’t understand the relevance of your comments.

If it were proved to you, then you would eat babies. If you refuse to eat babies, then the argument simply hasn't convinced you — Leontiskos

How so? I don’t see a problem with knowing that I ought to do one thing but choosing to do another because, say, it’s in my self interest.

Davidson offered an account that tried to account for weakness of the will in an otherwise rational mind, with I think some success. Have you read ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’ — Banno

I’m not sure what it has to do with weakness? I’m questioning the extent to which moral obligations are a sufficient motivator.

Merely, that the claim of a ethical naturalist isn't tenable. — AmadeusD

You’re arguing that ethical non-naturalism isn’t tenable because it disagrees with your ethical naturalism. That’s not a rebuttal, it’s begging the question.

Again, whether i'm correct or not, this is a rebuttal to ethical naturalism. — AmadeusD

For it to be a rebuttal you must prove that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms. You must prove that "one ought not kick puppies for fun because it hurts the puppy" is true.

As you haven't proven it, only asserted it, it begs the question.

But those deeper facts remain in existence, and do, in fact, support the claim.

This is quite different from your version of the hypothetical exchange. In yours, I offer no explanation of my claim. In my version, I offer a precise and specifically relevant rebuttal to the claim that there are no deeper facts.

So yeah, it's a rebuttal. — AmadeusD

You have claimed that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. The ethical non-naturalist, being a non-naturalist, rejects this connection. You are begging the question and assuming ethical naturalism.

The ethical non-naturalist might refer to Hume: one cannot derive an ought from an is.

Sorry, I don't understand how pointing out a fatal flaw in a claim isn't a rebuttal? Deny facts that exist is surely a fatal flaw in a posiiton? — AmadeusD

John says that God exists.
Jane says that John's claim is fatally flawed because God doesn't exist.

Jane says that God doesn't exist.
John says that Jane's claim is fatally flawed because God does exist.

Michael says that moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.
AmadeusD says that Michael's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.

AmadeusD says that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.
Michael says that AmadeusD's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.

None of these are rebuttals. They're just two people stating their conflicting beliefs.

I'm aware that is the naturalist position - but my position is that: that is factually wrong. There are further explanations available and to just ignore them doesn't constitute it being impossible. Unsure if i can clarify that further. — AmadeusD

Then you're simply stating your disagreement with ethical non-naturalism (and moral realism). That's fine, but it doesn't constitute a rebuttal of their position.

And as I said, that's ethical naturalism. Those kinds of explanations are impossible for ethical non-naturalism.

According to ethical non-naturalism, moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms, so arguing that ethical non-naturalism is false because it cannot explain moral facts in non-moral terms is begging the question.

What "deep facts"?

Because that position is ignorant of the deeper facts related to any moral claim. — AmadeusD

All you seem to be saying here is that moral realism is incorrect.

Obviously this is begging the question.

Yes. I am pointing out the flaw in that notion. — AmadeusD

Why is it a flaw? If infinitism is incorrect then there are, necessarily, brute physical facts. If there are brute physical facts then why can't there be brute moral facts?

You've not at all understood what i actually said - which is that there are further explanations that they choose not to engage.

"One ought not kick puppies for fun"

Why?

"Because it hurts the puppy"

And then there's a further conversation. — AmadeusD

That's ethical naturalism. Ethical non-naturalism, by definition, cannot offer this kind of explanation.

If ethical non-naturalism is correct then either:

1) "one ought not X" is a brute fact, or
2) "one ought not X" is true because "one ought not Y" is true, and "one ought not Y" is a brute fact.

It seemed to me to be asking why we ought to do what we ought to do. — Banno

The question is one about motivation. Knowing that I ought to do something isn't always enough to convince me to do it. Sometimes I do things I know I ought not do.

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't.

is that it may not be the case that there is no explanation — AmadeusD

There are three possible options:

1. There are no moral facts (error theory)
2. There are moral facts that can be explained by non-moral facts (ethical naturalism)
3. There are moral facts that cannot be explained by non-moral facts (ethical non-naturalism)

If ethical non-naturalism is correct then moral facts cannot be explained by physics or mathematics or anything non-moral. So what sort of explanation do you expect from then?

The thing is, there are areas of research pointing to there being explanations beyond mere brute fact. See Jon Haidt's The Rightous Mind. There is value in understanding one's tendencies to moral judgement in order to deal with those tendencies skillfully. — wonderer1

You seem to be confusing metaethics with descriptive ethics. Moral facts, as per moral realism, are independent from our moral judgements.

How do you know they are brute facts? By your inability to explain them? — hypericin

If moral facts are not reducible to non-moral facts (whether physical or mathematical or magical) then they must be brute.

Whereas here, the moral realists seem to use the notion of brute facts to excuse them from offering any explanations whatsoever. — hypericin

If moral facts are brute facts then there is no explanation.

Has your position on this remained the same over the intervening years? — Leontiskos

Yes.

Its you realists that struggle, that are throw up your hands and say "whelp, its a brute fact, what else can I say! Explanation's gotta stop somewhere!" — hypericin

It's either that or infinitism.

Brute facts seem more reasonable to me than an infinite regress.

How are moral facts discovered? — bert1

Kant said through pure practical reason. Others say via ethical intuition.

Also, of they contradict ones own values, how does one choose what to do? — bert1

I asked this question myself several years ago.

In a universe consisting of nothing, would 1 + 1 = 2? — hypericin

Yes.

It would not be empirically verifiable. — hypericin

Does that matter? Does something need to be empirically verifiable for it to be true? Are you an antirealist about truth in general?

I don't understand how metaethics can be so neatly separated from normative ethics.
All ethics are, by their nature, normative, that's the point of ethics. How can there be any talk about ethics that is not normative? — baker

There's a simple description of the distinction on the Wikipedia page for normative ethics:

Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics in that the former examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, whereas the latter studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts.

Metaethics:
1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism)
3. All moral propositions are false (error theory)
4. Some moral propositions are objectively true (moral realism)
5. Some moral propositions are subjectively true (moral subjectivism)

Normative ethics:
1. Pleasure is good (hedonism)
2. Maximising happiness and well-being is good (utilitarianism)
3. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (categorical imperative)

Can you name any other such brute fact about something that doesn't exist? — hypericin

1 + 1 = 2.

I have to say, I feel that the NY civil case against Trump Corp's valuation practises is on very shaky ground and will get tossed on appeal. As Trump keeps saying, valuation is a subjective process, and furthermore none of the banks who accepted his inflated valuations brought a complaint about them or apparently lost any money. Neither did the IRS with respect to valuations quoted for tax purposes. (And boy do I hate it when Trump is right about something.) — Wayfarer

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1344

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1)to defraud a financial institution; or
(2)to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ...

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1014

Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action ...

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6662

(a)Imposition of penalty
If this section applies to any portion of an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which this section applies.

(b)Portion of underpayment to which section applies

This section shall apply to the portion of any underpayment which is attributable to 1 or more of the following:

...

(3) Any substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1.

The law is pretty clear. You can't just decide for yourself that your property is worth $10,000,000 when asking for a loan but worth $1,000 when paying your taxes. One or both are clearly, criminally, fraudulent.

So in a world without minds, would a complete taxonomy of this world included oughts and values? — hypericin

In the counterfactual sense that "if there were minds then those minds ought not..." would be true.

Much like the counterfactual sentence "if the Tyrannosaurus rex still lived then it would be the largest living land animal on Earth" is true.

There can be objective truths about things that don't exist.

"Ham objectively and absolutely tastes better than chicken": taste is subjective and provisional by nature, the statement is internally contradictory and therefore not truth-apt. Or, self-falsifying. — hypericin

I wouldn’t say that it’s internally contradictory, just that it’s factually incorrect.

A good example is that of colour. It’s not internally contradictory to claim that grass is objectively and absolutely green, but given that I’m not a colour realist I would argue that this is factually incorrect. Colour is “in the head” (like taste). Obviously colour realists argue otherwise.

The same disagreement applies in meta ethics. Moral realism may be factually incorrect, but I don’t think it’s internally contradictory.

Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. — hypericin

Well that’s just where moral realists disagree.

And indeed any such "brute moral fact" might necessarily be false, or not truth apt. — hypericin

If it’s false then it’s not a brute fact. If it’s a brute fact then it’s true.

Yes. Moral sentences are truth-apt but all false.