I find the focus on what counts as normativity as irrelevant to whether or not some utterances of ought are true. I'm open to be persuaded otherwise — creativesoul

See the distinction between meta ethics and normative ethics. The former addresses the meaning of moral sentences and what sort of things must obtain for them to be true (if they are indeed truth apt). The latter addresses which of them are true.

If you’re only interested in normative ethics then by all means ignore meta ethics. But I’m interested in meta ethics and so that is what my questions are trying to uncover.

And I think an answer to the questions of meta ethics is necessary to answer the questions of normative ethics, hence why I have repeatedly asked for how to verify or falsify a moral sentence. If you don’t know how to verify or falsify a moral sentence then how do you expect to determine whether or not some moral sentence is true? Is it simply a matter of faith?

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is. — creativesoul

It’s not about taxonomy. It’s about not understanding what it means for a moral sentence to be true and not understanding how to verify or falsify a moral sentence.

This makes them very unlike empirical and mathematical sentences.

If I can’t make sense of this then perhaps I ought abandon my dogma and either accept that all moral sentences are false or that no moral sentence is truth apt.

One of these is a duck. It swims, quacks, and avoids predators. The other is a p-zuck, which does none of that by definition. — noAxioms

Swimming, quacking, and avoiding predators are mechanical behaviours and so they are exactly what a p-duck does.

They throw out the babe with the bathwater, adopting convolute notions in order to avoid the simple fact that ought statements can be true. — Banno

So can mathematical statements, but surely you understand the distinction between mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism?

Which of the metaethical equivalents of mathematical realism and mathematical nominalism is correct?

I certainly don’t think that non-natural or abstract properties or objects exist, and Moore’s open question argument strongly suggests that any naturalist account of morality fails, so something equivalent to mathematical nominalism is most likely.

But with mathematical nominalism we can make sense of it as a kind of coherence theory. I’m not sure how we can make sense of something like “moral nominalism”?

Perhaps those who like substantive theories will be less amenable to ought statements having a truth value because of the execs baggage they attach to truth.

I'm not sure where Michael stands in this regard — Banno

Parfit’s non-realist cognitivism seems like it addresses this distinction.

Going further, the metaphysical non-naturalists believe that, when we make irreducibly normative claims, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties.

Non-metaphysical non-naturalists make no such claims, since they deny that irreducibly normative truths have any such ontologically weighty implications.

One such view in this light is non-realist cognitivism, in which there are some true claims which are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality.

The best analogy I think there is to this is the distinction between mathematical realists and mathematical nominalists. Both believe that there are mathematical truths but the former believe that these mathematical truths depend on the existence of non-natural (abstract) mathematical objects whereas the latter don’t.

So assuming that there are moral truths, do these moral truths depend on the existence of non-natural “moral” properties? This is the kind of substantive (“robust”) realism that many moral antirealists reject, and if one subscribes to physicalism then it certainly seems that one must reject this kind of realism.

But what of Parfit’s “non-realist cognitivism”? It’s difficult to make sense of what it means for a moral proposition to be true if not by accurately describing some non-natural moral property of the world.

I don't think there's any possibility SCOTUS will rule Trump ineligible, with or without that verdict. He's not charged with insurrection, so he can't be found guilty of that. I anticipate SCOTUS will probably base their decision on the lack of due process establishing he engaged in insurrection. — Relativist

https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-reports/past-14th-amendment-disqualifications/

Historical precedent also confirms that a criminal conviction is not required for an individual to be disqualified under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one who has been formally disqualified under Section 3 was charged under the criminal “rebellion or insurrection” statute (18 U.S.C. § 2383) or its predecessors. This fact is consistent with Section 3’s text, legislative history, and precedent, all of which make clear that a criminal conviction for any offense is not required for disqualification. Section 3 is not a criminal penalty, but rather is a qualification for holding public office in the United States that can be and has been enforced through civil lawsuits in state courts, among other means.

The precedent likewise confirms that one can “engage” in insurrection without personally committing violent acts. Neither Kenneth Worthy nor Couy Griffin were accused of engaging in violence, yet both were ruled to be disqualified because they knowingly and voluntarily aided violent insurrections.

Not that I expect the Supreme Court to follow precedent.

Interestingly the case referenced a decision Gorsuch made before joining the Supreme Court:

… a state’s legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and practical functioning of the political process … permits it to exclude from the ballot candidates who are constitutionally prohibited from assuming office.

Neither do I. I'm not sure what in my post made you think I did. — Dawnstorm

P-zombies are a collection of bones and muscles and blood and organs and a central nervous system, including a brain, that reacts to stimuli.

What part of the mechanical body and its internal or external motions does the word “belief” refer to? I say none of it. Not its bones, not its brain, not its limbs or lips moving. The word “belief” points to some non-mechanical aspect of our being, i.e some conscious activity that p-zombies by definition don’t have.

And it's navigating the world and doing its job effectively, and it's doing all this without knowing anything??? How does that work, exactly? — RogueAI

External stimuli such as light and sound stimulate its sense receptors, these signals are sent to the brain which then responds by sending signals to the muscles causing it to move in the manner appropriate to navigate the stimulus.

Me and the p-zombie should then act the same way, only the zombie is dead inside. If all the variables are identical, there should be no divergence between us as we go about our business, right? I go to work, it goes to work. It does my job as well as I do. — RogueAI

Yes

Does the p-zombie have knowledge? — RogueAI

No

I think there’s a lot of confusion about the p-zombie argument. The argument is that:

1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness
2. P-zombies are not a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is non-physical
4. Therefore either physicalism is false or nothing is conscious
5. We are conscious
6. Therefore physicalism is false

The p-zombie argument is a thought experience that intends to show that either substance or property dualism is correct. It isn’t a skeptical argument that suggests that p-zombies might actually exist.

If they do have beliefs, what do you think of the point I made a post ago? — RogueAI

If they do have beliefs then they’re conscious and so not p zombies.

If it doesn't believe it's in pain, the I and the p-zombie are no longer acting the same way, since we now have different beliefs. — RogueAI

The p-zombie doesn’t believe anything. It just burns its finger and cries out “that hurts”.

So a p-zombie can believe things as far as brain-activity is involved — Dawnstorm

I don’t think the meaning of the word “belief” can be reduced to an explanation of brain states, just as I don’t think the meaning of the phrase “phenomenal subjective experience” can be reduced to an explanation of brain states.

If we are p-zombies then we don’t have phenomenal subjective experiences and we don’t have beliefs. We just react to stimuli.

We might spend the rest of our life's allotment of time on this forum going back and forth with noAxioms and still not definitively figure out whether he is a p-zombie or not. — hypericin

I agree. If he were to just to say “I am a p-zombie” then I would accept that it’s possibly true. I am simply explaining that “I believe that I am a p-zombie” is false if he is a p-zombie and irrational if he’s not.

and the exact metaphysical status of possibility — Pantagruel

That’s a slightly different question.

The word "metaphysically" originated from metaphysics, and therefore the fact that you used the word necessitates its existence. It is a logical truth. :) — Corvus

Firstly, you claimed before that non-existence is logically possible but metaphysically impossible. Now you seem to be saying that it’s logically impossible.

Secondly, that something is true isn’t that it is necessarily true. P ⊨ □P is invalid.

You might as well argue that because the phrase “metaphysical necessity” is an English phrase then the existence of the English language (or at least the phrase “metaphysical necessity”) is a metaphysical (and logical) necessity. This is very obviously wrong.

The moment that you uttered the statement "X is impossible metaphysically" is doing metaphysics. — Corvus

So because intelligent life with an appropriately expressive language is required to “do” metaphysics then the existence of intelligent life with an appropriately expressive language is a metaphysical necessity?

I disagree.

It is metaphysically possible for intelligent life to not exist.

But logically, how can do you Metaphysics, if Metaphysics didn't exist? — Corvus

What do you mean by “doing” metaphysics?

Yes, iff X is not Metaphysics. — Corvus

You’re saying that the existence of metaphysics is a metaphysical necessity?

I don’t even know what this means. Are you arguing for the metaphysical necessity of Platonism?

A world where nothing exists (not even Metaphysics) is impossible Metaphysically, because without Metaphysics, Metaphysics is impossible. — Corvus

Then it must be that for at least one object X it is metaphysically impossible that at some future time T that object no longer exists.

Some object X’s existence is a metaphysical necessity. What is this object?

In this case we are talking about an object X(not a world), and it is possible for X to become non-existence through time T. — Corvus

So for each object that exists in some world it is metaphysically possible that at some future time T that object no longer exists.

Then it is metaphysically possible that at some future time T no object exists in that world because everything that once existed no longer exists.

Therefore it is metaphysically possible for there to be a world in which nothing exists.

It depends on what "destroying" means. — Corvus

To go from a state of existence to non-existence.

Are you saying that if some object X exists then it is metaphysically impossible that at some future time T object X no longer exists (unless some new object Y takes its place)?

It would still say "Well prove how spirits could be destroyed in a spiritual way." or "By its nature, spirits have no capability or property for destroying." Therefore nothing is destroyed. — Corvus

So you’re saying it’s metaphysically impossible for something to be destroyed (without creating something new in its place)?

Or, to phrase it a different way; is the law of conservation of energy a metaphysical necessity? If not then it’s metaphysically possible that there is a world of physical objects that can be properly annihilated without producing new particles and in such a world if all physical objects were to be annihilated then it would be a world in which nothing exists.

Well, Metaphysical enquiry would say, sorry mate, you cannot destroy non-physical existence in physical way — Corvus

I’m not saying that they’d be destroyed in a physical way. If they’re spirits then they’d be destroyed in a spiritual way. If they’re magic then they’d be destroyed in a magical way. Either way they’d be destroyed leaving nothing left.

So if we have some world within which exists only non-physical things, and if those non-physical things are destroyed (and in being non-physical are not subject to the law of conservation of energy), then what is left? I say that nothing is left.

It seems that either nothingness is metaphysically possible or (complete) destruction is metaphysically impossible.

https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-hitler-comparisons-doubles-down-1234932630/

Donald Trump accused immigrants of “destroying the blood of our country” during a campaign rally in Iowa Tuesday, repeating hateful rhetoric echoing white supremacists and genocidal Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler.

“They’re destroying the blood of our country. That’s what they’re doing. They’re destroying our country. They don’t like it when I said that — and I never read Mein Kampf,” said Trump, referencing Hitler’s manifesto. “They could be healthy, they could be very unhealthy, they could bring in disease that’s going to catch on in our country, but they do bring in crime, but they have them coming from all over the world,” the former president continued. “And they’re destroying the blood of our country. They’re destroying the fabric of our country.”

Hitler, who repeatedly compared Jewish people to a blood poison within German society, wrote in Mein Kampf that “all great cultures of the past perished only because the originally creative race died out from blood poisoning,” and blamed Jews and other “undesirable” groups for said contamination.

It is possible that nothing physical to exist metaphysically such as mind, spirit, concepts ...etc. — Corvus

Is it metaphysically possible for something that exists to be destroyed?

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics. — Corvus

Is it metaphysically possible for nothing physical to exist?

My problem is that if the word-forms conveyed meaning, we’d know what they meant by reading them. It is precisely because they do not convey meaning that we do not understand them, not unless some Rosetta Stone or human being is able to supply them with meaning. The drift of meaning over time suggests much the same. — NOS4A2

On the other hand, if they didn’t convey meaning then how could I learn something new by reading?

Yes, but a second ruling would be needed for that, although it’s almost certain that they’d rule the same way (unless one or more justice dies or retires and is replaced by then).

It should be noted that this ruling only applies to the Republican primary:

In this appeal from a district court proceeding under the Colorado Election Code, the supreme court considers whether former President Donald J. Trump may appear on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot in 2024. A majority of the court holds that President Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because he is disqualified, it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Colorado Secretary of State to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot.

It should also be noted that this case was brought by “both registered Republican and unaffiliated voters”, not by Democrats.

Are you saying that the "Disqualification from office for insurrection or rebellion" section of the 14th Amendment doesn't exist?

Or are you saying that this section doesn't apply to the Presidency?

Or are you saying that this section doesn't apply to Trump because he did not "[engage] in insurrection or rebellion against the [Constitution of the United States], or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof"?

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that that section of the 14th Amendment does exist, that it applies to the Presidency, and that Trump engaged in insurrection. If each of these is true then it follows that Trump is constitutionally ineligible to run for President.

Here's a really rubbish AI:


It doesn't seem at all appropriate to say that it believes or accepts or considers anything. That would be a very obvious misuse of language.

ChatGPT and p-zombies are just very complicated versions of the above, with p-zombies having a meat suit.

The relevant definition in Webster's is "something that is accepted, considered to be true, or held as an opinion". This to me doesn't entail subjective state. — hypericin

What does it mean to "accept", "consider", or "hold as an opinion"? Again, these aren't terms that it makes sense to attribute to a p-zombie. A p-zombie is just a machine that responds to stimulation. It's an organic clockwork-like body that moves and makes sound.

It's quite ironic that you're anthropomorphising p-zombies.

The democrats refusing to enforce the laws of the country is poisoning the blood of the country. That’s what they’ve done. — NOS4A2

At best you can say that they're allowing the country to be poisoned, but the poison itself, according to Trump, is the illegal immigrants.

He has a problem with the foreign nationals who are coming into the country (illegally).

Are you saying that illegal immigrants have let people into the country? — NOS4A2

I'm saying that Trump said "ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS POISONING THE BLOOD OF OUR NATION".

Illegal immigration is "the migration of people into a country in violation of that country's immigration laws".

Therefore, Trump was saying that the migration of people into the U.S. in violation of U.S. immigration laws is poisoning the blood of the U.S.

Illegal immigration is a process, an act, not a group of people. — NOS4A2

It's an act done by a group of people.

He was talking about Biden and his croneys. They are the direct cause of illegal immigration. — NOS4A2

He was talking about illegal immigrants. His Truth Social post makes that clear. You are misinterpreting his words at the rally.