-So why are you doing this? — Nickolasgaspar

Because the purpose of this discussion is to assess the evidence either for or against the neuroscientist's claim that consciousness can be exhaustively explained by brain activity (or other physical phenomena). It is perfectly correct not to beg the question and assume either materialism or dualism from the start.

You really do sound like some kind of evangelist. It seems @bert1 was right about you in the OP.

You say "if consciousness is non physical....". That statement can only be meaningful if non physical is considered to be an available option for the ontology of consciousness — Nickolasgaspar

No it doesn't.

If God is real then...
If ghosts are real then...
If magic is real then...
If parallel worlds are real then...

I'm not assuming anything about what's possible.

Obviously you are suggesting an option without even knowing if it is possible. — Nickolasgaspar

Correct.

I don't know if it's possible. I also don't know if it's impossible. Unlike you I'm not going to beg the question and assume that materialism is the case – that everything, including consciousness, is physical.

Maybe consciousness is physical. Maybe it's non-physical. And if it is non-physical then...

This isn't difficult Michael..You are suggesting an ontology. This ontology needs to be assumed by definition. The same is true of its qualities.
You can not escape from those underlying assumptions! — Nickolasgaspar

If you give me £1,000,000 then I will quit my job.

Am I assuming that you have given me £1,000,000? No. Am I assuming that you can give me £1,000,000? No. Am I assuming that someone has given or can give me £1,000,000? No (although, incidentally, there are people who can).

If consciousness is non-physical then there is no evidence that consciousness is physical.

Am I assuming that consciousness is non-physical? No. Am I assuming that consciousness can be non-physical? No. Am I assuming that something is or can be non-physical? No.

Do you just not understand what "if" means?

You state: " if an aspect of consciousness is non physical"
A.You assume that non physical things exist — Nickolasgaspar

No I don't.

you state:"science can not detect conscious experience because its non physical".

No I don't.

b. that consciousness can be a non physical

Given that I'm not begging the question, as you seem to be, and assuming from the start that consciousness cannot be non-physical, that is correct.

Although strictly speaking, my actual claim doesn't assume this.

Again too many ifs and assumptions. — Nickolasgaspar

You can keep repeating this, but it's still wrong. I haven't made any assumptions, and there's only one use of the term "if" in my claim.

If consciousness is non-physical then there is no evidence that consciousness is physical.

Again too many ifs and assumptions. — Nickolasgaspar

One if, no assumptions.

If your use of non-physical means a phenomena undetectable by any current or future scientific endeavour then is that not your own personal appeal to pseudo-science? — universeness

It's not pseudo-science because it doesn't claim to be scientific at all. It's just not-science.

Again to many assumptions, you need to assume that the phenomenon is non physical, that non physical phenomena CAN exist, and its interaction with the physical world shouldn't leave any traces....way to many. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not assuming that it's non-physical. I'm saying that if it is non-physical then...

No, you are dealing with way to many ifs to make it even meaningful! — Nickolasgaspar

There's just one if, and that is: if consciousness is non-physical then nothing is evidence that consciousness is physical.

as you have also accused a scientist who is well respected within the scientific community, of being a pseudo-scientist. — universeness

I'm just going by his Wikipedia article.

Alfred Rupert Sheldrake (born 28 June 1942) is an English author and parapsychology researcher. He proposed the concept of morphic resonance,[3][4] a conjecture which lacks mainstream acceptance and has been criticized as pseudoscience.[5][6][7][8][9]

Your "if" hiding in a safe space while wearing a falsifiability proof vest is already in trouble with zero philosophical value. — Nickolasgaspar

It has philosophical value if it's true.

Why not say that you are not familiar with Sheldrakes work, in your first response to me after I mentioned it? — universeness

My response was fine. You accused me of saying something about his work. Given that I never mentioned him or his work, your accusation was wrong, which was my response.

And no, I'm not going to watch a 2.5 hour video on a pseudoscientist.

If you are not willing to comment on 'theories,' that may evidence aspects of consciousness that exist outside of the physical borderlines of the human being/other lifeforms, then you come across as 'reluctant' to defend your own side of the debate. — universeness

I don't understand what his theory is, or what "morphic resonances" are. Are they a physical thing? Then it has nothing to do with what I am saying. Are they a non-physical thing? Then I wonder in what sense he can be said to have scientific evidence of it.

If you want me to address it then you're going to have to explain his theory in detail.

-Ok, it took me some time but I think get what your goal is.
You are not looking for statements that will allow you to understand the phenomenon. What you are doing is entertaining 'ifs' and you justify their "possibility" by pointing to things we currently don't know or lacking the means to observer directly?
Am I right? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm just pointing out the problem with Isaac's question (as I understood it).

It's like asking "what evidence would prove that a non-interventionist creator deity doesn't exist?" Well, nothing would.

And so by the same token, if consciousness is non-physical then no evidence can prove that consciousness is physical.

What makes you talk about that if? — Nickolasgaspar

Because of Isaac's question to bert1. I understood it to be asking what would count as evidence that consciousness is entirely physical. I think his question is problematic, because if consciousness isn't entirely physical then nothing would count as evidence that it is entirely physical.

And what indications you have for non physical aspects existing in our cosmos. — Nickolasgaspar

It could be that I don't find any purely physical explanation of my first-person consciousness convincing. And if there is some non-physical aspect to my first-person consciousness then it isn't surprising that I'm unconvinced by a purely physical explanation.

If you are not willing to offer useful answers, to my main questions then there is nowhere to take this exchange between us. — universeness

You accused of something I didn't do. I'm not sure what kind of answer you expect from me.

Sure, but "ifs" need to be demonstrated not assumed. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not assuming anything. My argument is only that if there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness then there cannot be any physical evidence that this non-physical aspect doesn't exist.

I'm not arguing that there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness.

In that case that untraceable "something else" is indistinguishable from something that doesn't exist! — Nickolasgaspar

It doesn't then follow that it doesn't exist.

If it does exist then any explanation of consciousness that doesn't include this thing doesn't (exhaustively) explain consciousness at all.

In what way are you suggesting his evidence is not scientific? — universeness

I'm not suggesting anything about him or his theory.

Ok, that's fine, so we now need very strong evidence, that more than the brain is involved. As Carl Sagan said, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
What is the current proposal, that you personally, assign your highest credence level as 'vital,' to what we observe as the effects and affects of human consciousness. Do you for example, assign a high credence level to Rupert Sheldrakes morphic resonance and morphic fields? — universeness

I'm not arguing that something else involved. I'm only arguing that if something else is involved then we can't have scientific evidence of it (or against it).

First of all I don't know what you mean by the term "identical". Brain activity enables conscious experience and previous experiences with different biological setup enable the subjective quality of them.
Arguments from ignorance isn't the best way to understand something. We only know that the we can not share our mental experience on real time. That doesn't imply that brain activity is not responsible for it when we have already demonstrated its Necessary and Sufficient role — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not saying that brain activity isn't responsible for it. I'm only saying that if there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness then there can be no physical evidence of this non-physical aspect.

I would have thought this a quite obvious truism.

So, if you agree the brain is 'involved' then what do you find objectionable, when I claim that it's therefore valid and appropriate to use the label 'human consciousness,' to label the phenomena you exemplified? — universeness

Because there might be more to consciousness than just that brain activity.

But you just agreed that in your exemplar, the brain was involved. Was that a subjective opinion?
Your above quote, seems to be invoking a high personal credence level that you hold towards the above quote, but you have not provided much evidence to support it.
Do you think that's wise? — universeness

I don't understand your question. That the brain is involved isn't that only the brain is involved.

Only a specific aspect of it isn't accessible in real time. — Nickolasgaspar

And so that specific aspect of it isn't identical with brain activity, which is accessible in real time.

So no brain activity involved? — universeness

The brain is part of the body, so it's involved.

I have already analyzed the issues in that huge leap. Science use forensic reasoning and methods. Not having direct access to the end product of a process doesn't mean that we can not objectively study the phenomenon and verify its causal mechanisms.
Aspirin and dosage recommendations exist because we have ways to understand and study the subjective aspect of a conscious state.

It seems like (maybe I am wrong) that Philosophy is using the same practices with those used by religion and spiritual ideologies in an attempt protect their claims from science. — Nickolasgaspar

There is no huge leap.

If A is inaccessible and B is accessible then A isn't B. It's very straightforward logic.

If subjective experience is inaccessible and brain activity is accessible then subjective experience isn't brain activity.

I am not trying to straw-man you, only to understand your claim. — Nickolasgaspar

My claim is exactly what I've said: if the subjective aspect of consciousness is inaccessible to science then ipso facto the subjective aspect of consciousness isn't identical to brain activity, and so nothing could be evidence that the subjective aspect of consciousness is identical to brain activity.

What would you choose as your label for this phenomena, and all it's demonstrable variations? — universeness

Bodily behaviour?

So, for you, what is your example above, evidence of? — universeness

That stimulating certain nerves in certain ways causes the subject to flinch and say "that hurts".

We can change the stimuli, or the biological setup and observe changes in behavior, in brain patterns in blood metrics. We can create the experience by stimulating the suspected brain area and observe changes in our blood profile, behavior , brain patterns etc. — Nickolasgaspar

What does that have to do with consciousness? You can have evidence that stimulating certain nerves in certain ways causes the subject to flinch and say "that hurts", but that isn't prima facie evidence of consciousness, and certainly isn't evidence that consciousness just is some physical phenomena like brain activity.

Wow that is a huge leap you made there. — Nickolasgaspar

How so? If the subjective aspect of consciousness is inaccessible to science and brain activity is accessible to science then ipso facto the subjective aspect of consciousness isn't brain activity.

Whether our efforts point to physical mechanisms , that either means the phenomenon IS PHYSICAL or that we don't need to make up additional entities to explain it (parsimony).

If it exists but isn't physical then any theory that reduces the mental to the physical is wrong and doesn't explain consciousness at all.

I don't know why you find it so important not to be able to replay from a first person view. Why do you think this is a problem? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not saying it's important or a problem. I'm just saying that if the subjective aspect of consciousness is inaccessible to science then nothing would count as evidence that the subjective aspect of consciousness is reducible to some physical phenomena like brain activity.

Scientific evidence for what? — Nickolasgaspar

For the inaccessible aspect of consciousness.

By first person consciousness you refer to the subjective content of a conscious experience and because we can not share the exact same experience, your claim is that it makes it inaccessible to science. — Nickolasgaspar

Not exactly. I'm only saying that if it is inaccessible to science then there cannot be any scientific evidence of it.

Apparently he won't be getting a mugshot (and won't be handcuffed).

Ex-Presidents get special treatment.

Consciousness is basically a behavior. — T Clark

That's one theory. I wouldn't take it as a given.

We see the results of it in other people all the time, in their public behavior and communication. — T Clark

I can think things and yet not tell you or anyone else what I am thinking. There's more to consciousness than just public behaviour.

That consciousness drives behaviour isn't that consciousness is behaviour.

I'm not seeing how that follows. I can see how, if a thing were inherently and unassailably private we couldn't publicly discuss what is is, but I don't see how we couldn't publicly discuss how it came about or what purpose it might serve.

If there were some completely secret contents of a black box but if every time I added a coin to that box it spat out a can of beer, I don't need to know what's in the box to have a reasonable scientific theory that the box is designed (evolved, if natural) to vend beer, and that it does so in response to money being placed in it. I could experiment with different coinage, different currencies. See if there's a relationship between coin and beer type... I could develop a dozen perfectly valid, sound theories about this box, how and why it works, all without having a clue what's in it. — Isaac

You asked for evidence, not theories. So assume you have two theories to explain how and why it works. What evidence would prove which one is correct, assuming you can never look inside the box, and that both always correctly predict the box's response?

I don't see how we couldn't publicly discuss how it came about or what purpose it might serve.

We might be able to do that, but I read bert1 as arguing that neuroscience fails in any attempt to show that consciousness just is brain activity.

So it might be that we can explain how consciousness came to be, and the purpose it might serve, but also that consciousness is some non-physical supervenient phenomena which, like the contents of your black box, cannot be directly measured (except by the person whose consciousness it is).

Right. so if it's not a property of external world objects, then what's your theory as to why we sense it? And how do you justify undermining the current paradigm that the brain senses external states in order to predict the results of interaction with them? — Isaac

I don't understand the issue. Pain isn't a property of external world objects. I feel pain. There's no problem here. Colours aren't a property of external world objects. I see colours. Suddenly there's a problem?

When our nerves are stimulated in certain ways, we feel pain. That pain, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

When our temperature is lowered sufficiently, we feel cold. That cold, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

When our eyes are stimulated in certain ways, we see red. That red, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.

what's the evolutionary advantage of a system where the brain spends time detecting the state of other parts of itself?

I'm not saying that the brain "detects" the state of other parts of itself. I'm saying that external stimulation triggers brain activity, and that this brain activity is either identical to or causes "the feeling of pain", and that this pain isn't a property of the external stimulation but is a property of that brain activity (or some supervenient mental phenomena, if there is such a thing). The same with feeling cold and seeing red.

So what's the sort of thing you'd be satisfied with? If I went into my lab tomorrow, had a really good look at some brains, and came back to and said "Brain activity requires consciousness because..." What would you accept? — Isaac

The potential problem here is that if there is such a thing as first person consciousness, and if first person consciousness is essentially private, then by necessity there can’t be any sort of public, scientific evidence of or explanation for it.

Now you seem to be going back to semantics. — Isaac

And that's all semantic direct realism is: semantics.

The epistemological problem of perception that gave rise to the distinction between the direct and indirect realist concerns the relationship between the phenomenology of experience and the mind-independent properties of external world objects. That has nothing to do with the choice to describe our experience as "feeling pain" or as "feeling the fire", which is irrelevant to the substance of the disagreement, because it's not the case that either one or the other is "correct". They're just different ways of talking that emphasise different aspects of perception.

When I talk about seeing red I mean it in the same sort of sense as when I talk about feeling pain, and the red I see, like the pain I feel, isn't a property of external world objects. This is the indirect realist’s claim contra the (phenomenological) direct (naive) realist’s.

Where is this 'pain' and what sensory nodes to you use to 'feel' it? — Isaac

The question is mistaken. Ironically Searle explains it well:

It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

So it is not the case that "feeling" is one thing, that "pain" is another thing, and that the former is "done" to the latter; it is just the case that "feeling pain" is a single (possibly private) thing. The same with feeling cold and seeing red.

You don't feel pain — Isaac

Then we're at an impasse. Nothing you say can convince me that I don't feel pain. Headaches are real.