I appreciate the responses and thank you for helping me see the crossed-wires and misconceptions (and I wish I was better at addressing those). Before going back to responding (I will), I thought I would try to gather the misconceptions we have discovered.

1.That OLP's subject is only language, rather than us, the world, communication, culture, politics, philosophy's issues in general...

2. By ordinary, OLP is using regular words, for ordinary ideas, (or anyone's opinion) compared to philosophy's complex problems;

3. "Concept", "ordinary", "grammar", "criteria", "context, "use", etc., can be assumed (presumed) to be understood at first glance or in an ordinary way or as other philosophy might, instead of as specific terminology.

4. That a "concept" is similar to an "idea" or other mental metaphysical "object" that corresponds to words or the world, instead of a general category of words that have criteria imbedded in them for the way they are used: generalizing, knowing, seeing, understanding, meaning, intending, i.e., the words philosophy appropriates and stripes of their criteria to create a picture of one theory of language.

5. That OLP is saying or showing that language is simple, or works simply, dismissing or not interested in, or applicable to, philosophy's honest concerns (skepticism, the problem of other, identity, etc.),

6. That OLP is simply an empirical popularity contest of what most people say or that OLP is merely pointing out what makes people act in certain ways, or is conservatively limiting what can be said philosophically, or dismissing philosophy with “common sense”.

7. That Witt blames philosophy's problems on language, rather than on:
a) philosophy's desire/need for language to meet its standard;
b). the possibility in language to allow us to bewitch ourselves in that way, its ability to seem uprooted (isolated words) and so appearing to need roots; and
c) ordinary criteria's inability to defend itself.

8. That OLP has a theory of langauge, meaning, rationality etc., (and one overarching all) rather than being a method for insight (that the process is the "argument"), yet also a style and attitude, in that it is not telling us so much as asking us if we see too, requiring us to look differently (thus includes philosophers such as Socrates, Nietszche, Emerson, Thoreau, later Heidegger, and a new wave interested in OLP's involvement in and lessons from: literature, film, education, politics...

9. That representation, etc. is wrong (and OLP right, on the same terms), rather than us being confused, blind to ourselves (the entire picture ignoring our real needs/desires);

10. That OLP is making statements about how language works, rather than claims which only need to be fleshed out better, finding a context where the criteria might be something more apt, i.e., I have an equal right as the philosopher.

Of course , properly speaking.... — Joshs

"Properly" speaking....... Was I speaking... Improperly?

...nowhere do we have evidence that the background that I draw from and the background that you draw from are the ‘same’ background. — Joshs

This reminds me of Witt's (and Cavell's) examination of philosophy's obsession with knowing whether the pain I have is the same as yours. Unless there is a need to address a confusion, there is no need to talk of difference--what evidence would prove that? All OLP has is examples of "confusion" and what a "difference" is in "our" "background". Sometimes communication fails fundamentally--that's not a reason to restructure everything as if it always does or could whenever, unless maybe you have a reason to, say, attack logocentrism to allow for different voices--shift power to the individual.

"there is no situation of communicating with another, such as what you and I are doing now , where you wouldn’t be in a better position to understand me by assuming that every word I use is not just the mark of a history of sedimented cultural contexts , but my own integral interpretation of that history of contexts as I interpreted them, just as you own contextual background is unique to your history." — Joshs

That sounds exhausting; most of the time we don't need to be that special, nor intentional (if at all), but, yes, some times it is appropriate to be deliberate (a speech), or to "speak your (individual) truth" as it were. Emerson will talk of aversion to conformity (as Thourea civilly disobeys), and of breathing life into words--making a specific distinction, or even pointing out something new, or taking a concept into a new or broader context. All of the discrete, specific examples of, say, excuses, are evidence of the expansive ways language falls apart, rights itself, expands, and is used by us in the ways it allows (or against them).

"I mean every word that I use in relation to that larger personal system of understanding that is unique to me" — Joshs

You "meaning" every word is the same as you "intending" every action. Maybe the example about accidents helps. We are not that powerful--we don't set meaning, nor mitigate understanding; again, we abandon ourselves to our words.

Antony Nickles ...and what is it I am looking for in these? — Banno

Solid question. The one on Witt might allow you to see him in a larger context, and the other one I thought you might just enjoy as a good defense/example of OLP--I particuarly think the MUST of meaning something said is something Austin would enjoy. Also, as evidence that, with Cavell, Cora Diamond, others, OLP is still relevant and has more to say.

If ordinary dialogue does not reflect ordinary content then I don't know what else would. This sounds like a discontinuity between means and ends.

Anyway, clearly this is a "special technical" usage which doesn't carry the force of meaning of "ordinary dialogue" as it really exists, so I'll leave it at that. Perhaps it should be called "Strawson's method" or "Wittgenstein's way" or the "epoche". — Pantagruel

Well, clearly I suck at explaining things--to the examples!! (I forgot actually that's the whole gig.) So the "dialogue" we would have is coming up with (seeing and describing Wiit says), and agreeing on, circumstances (the contexts) when we say, as an example (from Malcolm): "I know" and what those instances imply about our various criteria for knowledge (what we ordinarily imply (mean) when we say, here: I know).

One option ("sense" Witt says) is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept the claim their expression of pain makes on me.

Witt uses OLP to figure out the reason (spoiler: certainty in the face of skepticism) that metaphysics and positivism remove any context and replace our ordinary criteria. He does this by putting their claims/terms back into a context of when we say: "doubt" or "mean" or "mental picture". His other goal (and Austin's) is to show the variety of criteria for different concepts (the different ways concepts are meaningful, how differently they judge, what matters to us in their distinctions), and that each concept has their own ways they work (as opposed to word=world as Witt's nemesis, and that every statement is true/false for Austin).

So, to try this again, we are not using an ordinary dialogue or talking about ordinary (non-philosophical) content; that's fine it's just not analytical philosophy. We are examining what the ordinary criteria and context are when we say such-and-such philosophical claim. With "ordinary" maybe not as, conventional, so much as opposed to metaphysical abstract (absent) contexts and pre-determined criteria (the irony that Ordinary Language Philosophy has a weird version of ordinary is not lost on me--they didn't pick the name). Any "force of meaning" here is that if we can agree on the examples and the criteria, you might see what I see--see for yourself.

And from this is raised the question...how can the hidden, unexamined, unconscious criteria be called ordinary? If some embodiment is unavailable for examination, how can it be said to be ordinary? And if ordinary just stands for “not made up”, how is that not self-contradictory, if words are exactly that....made up in order to properly represent the objects to which they are meant to relate? — Mww

I hope the example above illustrates the criteria of different senses of a concept are not "hidden" nor "unavailable for examination". To examine them is exactly the point. Witt says something like: they are simply not usually examined--like, walking. And metaphysics makes up the criteria (for common words), though I would point out that the picture of meaning as: words represent objects (ideas, etc) is exactly the kind of thing that looking at examples (of representation) might help clarify why philosophers want to frame it this way (this is basically the main thrust of Witt's Philosophical Invetsigations). Maybe it helps to examine the disparities between your framing and Austin's above.

I accept there is a certain unconscious part of the system from which words arise, but I reject the words themselves can arise from unconscious criteria, or that they necessarily embody such unconscious criteria. Case in point....phenomena have no names, but subsequently cognized objects derived from them, do. — Mww

Edit: Witt gets into a lot of examples when the word and the world are not separate (see my mention of "accident" above)--say, that there is no space between my pain and its expression for knowledge. And "unconsious" is simply one way to put it. Another might be: most of the time we don't discuss criteria because they are wrapped up in everything we are already doing--we don't have to mean it, or intend it, or justify it, "think" about it, etc. The context is clear, the expression is uncontroversial--none of that comes up; though I could explain all that with the context: which sense based on what was pointed out, etc.--thus, the universality of the claim (you could make those claims, anyone could), and its powerlessness if I can't get you to see what I do.

Kant's... criteria is by no means hidden or unexamined, insofar as both concepts and the words which represent them in objective manifestation, arising from perceptions or from pure thought, are entirely present to conscious mental activity**. — Mww

This the philosopher's dream of power. As if they, or some rational process, created or perceives the (at its worst, singular) association of words with the world, and that they (and not "us") are privy to the whole landscape of our rationale so what they say actually matters (as judgment, etc.)--the difference may be clearer in that anyone can give examples of what we mean when we say "accident", but do we actually use the categorical imperative to decide what to do?

From here, it is nothing but the domain of general employment given by common experiences, which sustains the notion of “ordinary”, and somehow or another this became sufficient causality for language philosophers to simply assign a different connotation to “ordinary”, but with insufficient explanatory methodology for doing so. — Mww

And this is exactly philosophy's dismissal of our ordinary criteria, as "common experience" (not phislosophy's special insight) and "general employment" (compared to philosophy's rarified uses). OLP does not claim a "causality" or a special place or "connotation" (though, yes, the method needs explaining, badly it appears). What it is trying to do is put the human, say, voice, back into the philosophical discussion by bringing up the contexts in which our concepts live.

So we arrive at: to whom is OLP actually directed, and why does to whomever it is directed, need it? — Mww

OLP was (initially) directed at traditional analytical philosophy and the metaphysics, representationalism, positivism, and descriptive falacy, etc., of philosophical theories or statements that, among other things: communication/rationality works in one universal or specific way, or towards a particular standard, that it is dependent more on individuals, and that we have more control in how it works. It's necessity is to breath new life into a tradition which has removed us from its considerations. We fear skepticism and ambiguity, so we mechanize our world and language and relations. The place of philosophy is now bright and shiny and hollow and no one is allowed to live there.

From his first book of essays (rather short):
Cavell on Witt's Phil. Inv.

On the categorical Must of concepts

...our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon-the most favoured alternative method.
— Austin [care of @Banno]

Sounds like a recipe for mediocrity. I wonder how much of that ‘common stock of words’ would remain if we removed the contributions of writers in innumerable fields of culture who thought them up in their armchairs(Plato, Freud, Shakespeare,etc). — Joshs

I believe Austin's point is the richness of what we ordinarily mean by what we say is the distinctions between one concept and another that are imbedded in their criteria for OLP to find that reflect what is worthy about that concept for us--what is meaningful about it to us: why it matters to draw that distinction, what counts for inclusion, why we would assume a connection to something else or between us, etc.

The important part here is not that they are common (ordinary) words (@Pantagruel); the point of OLP is that words "embody" the unconscious, unexamined ordinary criteria (not made-up, or philosophically-important criteria)--all of the richness that is buried in them of all the different ways we live.

He wants us to imagine the subtlety in how our ways of living are distinguished (not separate from the words, as Witt says too), and now compare this to Descartes. The armchair is a dead giveaway, but also he imagines his way into massive skeptical doubt and will only be satisfied with a standard of criteria he set by/for himself right then--neither subtle, nor connected to, nor worth anything but satisfying his fear.

I wouldn't say Austin understands skepticism (or cares about it) as Wittgenstein does (or Cavell), but he does qualify our entire reliance on "our common stock of words" to "all ordinary and reasonably practical matters" and so leaves it open that we might run out of words (what then?), or have to think more subtley, or because they are not always "sound"--though maybe just not as a start before looking at the richness of our existing concepts.

I'll just reserve "ordinary language philosophy" for those who were at Oxford in the twenty years from 1945, and place an emphasis on analysis of common word use. — Banno

I'll let the idea drop that the conflict, between what we ordinarily mean by what we say and what we'd like to mean philosophically, has not been happening since Socrates started asking random people questions on the street, if you'll check out Must We Mean What We Say by Cavell (a student of Austin) some time, and consider OLP didn't die in '65 and that it's reach might stretch a little further (and leave off that it came out in '58--the guy just died!).

Is a context a kind of frame within which events happen? Do things take place WITHIN a context? Do two people interact within a single context? Can i hold onto an intention over time within a single context? — Joshs

This is a lot, and, as Cavell says in the Abbrogation of Voice (the reading of Derrida reading Austin I mentioned), not much touches. I will only attempt to paraphrase his points. He says "context" does much more and "intention" does much less than Derrida wants. I also think the idea of time is getting in the way. As Witt's builders show: a lot of the context is already there ("written" Derrida might say)--our understanding of money, a transaction, private ownership, a question, on and on--for both of us to know, when I say to a grocer "Can I get that Apple?", that I want to buy it. The context also allows for concurrent misunderstanding (or inconclusive understanding), say, for the grocer to ask, "Just the one, or a pound?" Context can be shared, past and present (into the future), but we may find different parts significant (identity, capitalism) in running down any confusion.

Now how much of all the things that could be brought to bear, actually need to be, is determined by the possibilities in the concept and what questions if any remain. An "intention" can only be what it is in light of a concept, say an offense: "Did you intend to slight your mother-in-law by not serving her a drink? Or did you forget?" "I" have far less to do with this than Derrida, or positivism, would like. Intention is not the cause of action (or meaning); not every action is intended; nor does intention create or influence the context, nor affect the criteria of a concept (unless the concept allows for that). My "perspective" may only, if at all, come in (at the end, as it were) if there is a problem. Concepts already (before and outside of me) have significance, I only say them; and that "mark" doesn't secure or set the context (or the meaning). I give myself over to that expression (fate myself, Emerson says, to the concept). There are only certain ways to qualify it or excuse it--one of which might not be to say, "that's not what I intended!" (except as an expression of the desire to take back having said something). Derrida says I don't have to imagine my death to see the non-presence of context make my meaning already other then what I say (or intended), but I do not die. As Austin says, I am tethered to my words, which are my bond, to which I am shackled. Now I can understand Derrida politically wanting to get out from under the tyranny of our concepts, but he has sold out our responsibility to what we say in the process.

So I'm just, as always, not sure what to do with Derrida. The idea of a concept repeating through different contexts, or iterability, is in the same vain for me as a word tied to a meaning (stripped of any need for context), or a representation being true or false about the world (the bogeymen Austin takes on). I know they are meant to be different, but it's as if Derrida doesn't want his cake but still wants to eat it.

“Austin's procedure is rather remarkable and typical of that philosophical tradition with which he would like to have so few ties. It consists in recognizing that the possibility of the negative (in this case, of infelicities) is in fact a structural possibility, that failure is an essential risk of the operations under consideration; then, in a move which is almost immediately simultaneous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, it excludes that risk as accidental, exterior, one which teaches us nothing about the linguistic phenomenon being considered. This is all the more curious-and, strictly speaking, untenable-in view of Austin's ironic denunciation of the 'fet­ishized' opposition: valuelfact."
-Derrida (my emphasis)

In addition to the questions posed by a notion as historically sedimented as "convention," it should be noted at this point:

1) that Austin, at this juncture, appears to consider solely the conventionality constituting the circumstance of the utterance [monce], its contextual surround­ings, and not a certain conventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the speech act [locution] itself... — Joshs

My understanding is that Derrida confuses Austin as excluding the frailty of our concepts, but Austin was only setting it aside in the essay Derrida read because he had written a whole other essay about "Excuses" (to show how some speech acts fail)--so infelicity is not exterior or accidental. The Austin/Derrida/Searle interplay seems to fly by each other. As discussed above, Austin's whole point is to show that there is no "intrinsic" "constitution" of (every) speech act. To desire this is to fall prey to the same generality which created metaphysics, but to take it in a different direction.

Also, to call our criteria of concepts "conventions" is to give the false impression that they are the outcome of our agreement or that we somehow control them; we are not discussing "conventional" (nor "ordinary") language, but the anti-thesis of metaphysical criteria for our concepts to shed light on philosophical issues.

Moore skips over scepticism? No, he confronts it directly. — Banno

Yes, of course (poorly said). What I meant is that Moore ends up believing that he has solved skepticism, or shown it to be absurd, or incapable of being "thought" (my Moore is ancient). But only to contrast this with Wittgenstein and Cavell, who leave skepticism as an open threat, that there is a truth to it as Cavell says (our separateness, and responsibility for that). Austin will worry about identifying a Goldfinch, and show how it can be fake (thus what "real" is)--but he does not explicitly delve deeper into why we are tempted to worry whether the world is real, or whether you are (or I).

While Austin looks to set out the relations between concepts already found in our everyday language, Wittgenstein looks to set out the deeper logic found when that same discourse goes astray. * * *

These are not contrary methods, but complimentary. And certainly they are distinct. — Banno

I'll grant you that they work in different ways, on different material, for different goals, but I would say Wittgenstein (pushing against metaphysics and positivism) does not have a dissimilar "method" to Austin (pushing against the descriptive fallacy)--drawing out the ordinary criteria and grammar of a concept to show their variety in the face of a monopolizing singular theory of meaning (they have that much in common; I would say that's enough). Yes, Witt does go farther, though I would say it is still a contrast of ordinary criteria against philosophical ones, only that he asks why we want to do that (get ourselves into that pickle/picture).

Of course maybe it is less important to argue about who is practicing OLP, than to agree that OLP is relevant (to modern philosophy) and a sound (rigorous) methodology, and how it works (and what it is not--which still seems to be an issue in many of these other threads).

There must be both "poor" and "good" ordinary usages. You can't do such an analysis without some kind of normative dimension. — Pantagruel

Again, not about the "use" of language--especially whether it is used "well" or "poorly". The idea of "normative" is not the goal at all; OLP does not want to normalize language or what people are saying, or what problems philosophy should have. Now, this might be confusing because our criteria do have a sense of structure; or concepts a sense of exclusion/inclusion, and the idea of felicity does evoke the idea of the normative. But normative is a way of describing philosophy or language or rationality's constraint on our norms--but "we" do not have that power. To say the Grammar of an apology is normative for apologizing is not a function of the description of the criteria, it is the act (or failure) to apologize; i.e., there is no space for philosophy or language (ordinary or otherwise) to be "normative". Our concepts are our lives, which are our norms (among other criteria).

If you read Philosophical Investigations, it is full of open-ended questions
— Antony Nickles

You see, I don't think of those as rhetorical questions. — Ciceronianus the White

What I meant to say I guess was questions not answered (directly--"Imagine..." "Why do we wish to say..."; and open-ended claims (to the Grammar of something), for us to consider (rather than the statements people take them as).

And again, the claim of OLP is hyperbolic
— Antony Nickles

You mean it's exaggerated? Beyond reasonable? I think we're operating with different definitions. Also with "strident." I see nothing in OLP as being harsh, grating or unpleasantly forceful. The same with "extravagant." In what sense can OLP be described as lacking in restraint or absurd? — Ciceronianus the White

By "hyperbolic" I meant that it is claiming to speak for all of us, that it is submitting itself to acceptance (assent Kant says) for what it sees. If you don't see the moral urgency of Wittgenstein, or even Austin, I might try to look for some quotes, but I'm not sure it is important enough--perhaps you may see it now that you know to look for it? And "extravagant" was only meant to refer to the absurdity of the imaginary scenarios/contexts which they sometimes employ to flesh out what philosophy means in what it says (robots, Corsican brothers, etc.)--as if they needed to match philosophy's absurdities (appearances, impressions, etc.).

we are explicating and opening and expanding our ordinary criteria
— Antony Nickles

So, making them less ordinary? — Pantagruel

No, just brought out into the open, applied to various contexts (even new ones). Witt talks about how you know how to walk, but it's hard to explain. Criteria are not something people ordinarily get into, or see--the unconscious framework of our concepts.

The key characteristic of Austin's approach is the seeking of wisdom within our everyday language. — Banno

I put Austin in the analytic tradition squarely against positivism/representationalism--showing the variety of ways in which statements can have rational value without being true/false. If this is wisdom, it is not "everyday" wisdom.

Wittgenstein, in contrast, disdained how language misleads us into philosophical knots that are to be undone by careful and more formal analysis. — Banno

Disdain is a strong word; I would say he unravels the picture which language allows, only to show the desire (for certainty, universality, etc.) which leads us to picture language that way (singularly). Now Witt takes skepticism (the cause of the desire) seriously, i.e., he does not try to 'solve" it, while Austin (and Moore) either skip over it as nonsense or insignificant.

That they have different conclusions, goals, whatever, does not make the method different. They are not creating theories, just showing us ourselves.

but it's not style that counts here; it's method — Banno

Cavell makes an argument that the "style" of the Investigations (confession, the Interlocutor, the obfuscation) is as much a part of the method. Not to drag Nietzsche into it, but I would argue that he too could not make his point (get you to see what he sees) without saying it in the way he does.

Nietzsche renders the list too irregular — Banno

I concede, begrudgingly, just to stop talking about him (and let's not take up Socrates, etc. when we are still stuck on OLP being merely normal language use).

I will not budge, however, from the claim that Wittgenstein is fundamental to OLP.

...an ordinary langauge treatment of ethics; but too much Kant for him to be central or OLP — Banno

Not sure "him" is, but I will just throw out that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is ultimately an examination of ethics through (the epistemology of) OLP. And that Kant's "categories" are comparable to Witt's Concepts, just that each has it's own category, possibilities, conditions, etc.

I re-read Signature-Event-Context today, and my take on it is this. Derrida zeros in on the concept(s) of context, which is central to the argument of olp. He claims that Austin believes one can exhaustively determine a context of word uses such that no remainder is left over. — Joshs

Again, Derrida is jumping to conclusions maybe for his own reasons (if context is closed than the only option is difference?). A context only needs to be fleshed out to clarify any distinctions which are necessary for you and I to have no more concerns. If a concept is used generally, than the need for criteria and any context are simple to resolve. To quote myself from Emotions Matter: "The sky is blue." "Do you mean: we should go surfing? It's not going to rain? or are you just remarking on the brilliant color?" All these concerns of course may not need a much larger, more-detailed drawing out of a context to resolve (either to the Other or myself), but the context is endless if the need for distinctions remain. Context is not a means of (all) communication, it is a means of investigating our criteria of our concepts. One question would be: what context gives us an idea of the criteria a philosopher is relying on when saying "Surely I must know what I feel!" (Witt)

So what is ordinary then? — Pantagruel

Creating a context that shows us the ordinary criteria for a concept, not (regular, common) words

So does ordinary usage mean resolving more expansive universes of discourse down to less expansive, but therefore more universal, ones? — Pantagruel

We're not talking about ordinary "usage" (see above). We are not resolving, nor reducing--when we ask what we say when..., we are explicating and opening and expanding our ordinary criteria (though, yes, the claim is that these are universal, though not in there application to all contexts, but to every one of us).

From Derrida: “Austin was obliged to free the analysis of the performative from the author­ity of the truth value, from the true/false opposition, at least in its classical form, and to substitute for it at times the value of force, of difference of force (illocutio­nary or perlocutionary force). In this line of thought, which is nothing less than Nietzschean, this in particular strikes me as moving in the direction of Nietzsche himself, who often acknowledged a certain affinity for a vein of English thought.” — Joshs

I just read this last night. I would say taking Nietzsche as substituting truth for force (presumably, the will to power), is to miss his desire to insert the human (emphatically, which may be his downfall) back into the moral realm--in the history of, and after the limitations of, the moral; to give us that "power" (a place, as it were, "over"). @Ciceronianus the White

Also, my understanding is that Derrida misconstrues Austin's peripheral reference to "force" in one particular category (perlocutionary) to apply it as Austin's entire goal, and overlooks that Austin more generally is still claiming truth value (adequation to the world), but calls it "felicity" (aptness) to the criteria of a concept--if an apology is done correctly, it is not true, but felicitous (apt), rather than infelicitous (botched, I think is Austin's way of putting it once). This is not a "force" more than a rationality.

I look on OLP and analytic and linguistic philosophy (largely) as being a kind of tonic, serving to restore rigor to philosophical thought by disposing of faux problems arising from misuse of language... serving to purge philosophy of its extravagance. — Ciceronianus the White

Again, it's not that philosophy is "misusing" language, and OLP is arguing that it is using it correctly. The "rigor" of OLP is its attention to its examples and fleshing out of the context, but the point is not right/wrong but to shed light on what philosophy means by what it is saying, not in contrast to normal words, but in light of ordinary criteria (and their context)--not cure, but diagnose maybe. This is not to dispose of problems like skepticism, identity, justice, etc. but to expose what we actually (still) want from philosophy's questions. Sometimes finding the criteria for philosophical claims involves creating wildly fantastic scenarios; you want extravagance, you can't go further than Wittgenstein or Cavell, or Nietzsche. Austin, of course, is British, so he scaled it down a bit.

Nietzsche with his hyperbolic claims, often ending in exclamation points, mixed with rhetorical questions, and brimming with certainty, is more a philosophical rabble-rouser than physician. — Ciceronianus the White

If you read Philosophical Investigations, it is full of open-ended questions, and confusing statements to make you turn upon yourself to verify. This is due to OLP's call to have you answer for yourself whether the criteria is described clearly, fully enough. Cavell is so aggravating in this regard it's almost as if I'm supposed to write the other half of the book (he means for us to follow our own voice, our further interest). Emerson appropriates analytical philosophy into other contexts, and is on his tiptoes encouraging us to find what (criteria) matters to us in the sea of unexamined, universalized (conformed) concepts.

And again, the claim of OLP is hyperbolic, it is voiced to include everyone (though impossible), as if to move past resorting only to the individual and approaching a sense of the universal without erasing the context of the particular--Nietzsche will appear righteous and unabashedly anarchistic; Austin, contemptuous or condescending; and Wittgenstein, enigmatic, curt, presumptuous (as I've said elsewhere, the lion quote is used as an uncontested fact). These OLP claims can be strident (See what I see!!) because there is a moral urgency to bringing the human "voice", in a sense, back to our criteria, rather than lost to the inhuman, sterile theories that attempt to leapfrog our responsibility to our words.

I thought OLP was all about what words actually mean in everyday use. As opposed to artificially constructed types of contexts which create the problems which they then try to solve. — Pantagruel

Trying to unpack this a little, OLP is not trying to solve (all) the "problems" philosophy has (skepticism, moral disagreement, etc.), but, yes, one point is to show the constructed criteria (striped of context). Philosophy is not, however, being "opposed" to "what words actually mean" (my emphasis)--this idea of "meaning" as an independent thing (that could be "actual") is even one target of OLP. As part of their Grammar concepts have multiple (public) senses in which they can be meant; imagining a context clarifies which sense is being used (which criteria come into play--or even how concepts are extended), but the idea is not that words used in ordinary circumstances have a meaning which is a solution for (or normalizes) philosophy.

Habermas says that our communicative actions derive from a massively shared lifeworld (lebenswelt). This is a background set of assumptions so fundamental that they resist analysis. His observations on specialized languages are that the value of special theoretical domains can only be measured to the extent that they manage to re-integrate themselves into the universal community. Therefore, they must eventually find a way to communicate in everyday language. In fact, Habermas says that everyday language is the best meta-language. I'd agree. — Pantagruel

One point of OLP is that we are able to individually examine our concepts because they each have their own ways of being meaningful, so that one over-arching theory need not explain meaning universally, such as a representational theory or a pragmatic explanation of how language is used.

I think it is important to point out again that OLP is not investigating norms, nor arguing for what is normal (language). The goal is not to re-integrate philosophical language (they are, as @Banno points out, the same words) so much as see it in relief to ordinary criteria and the context in which they work, to provide a larger picture and reflect the context and criteria philosophy has perhaps created or abandoned; not that normal language is better or necessary for communicating philosophy--it is the criteria which are ordinary, given voice in a context to differentiate them.

[A.J Ayer's book] was a book I loved to hate — Wayfarer

Well you'll be happy to read Sense and Sensibilia. Austin basically just punches him in the face repeatedly. Logical positivism and the principal that only emperically-verifiable statements have the value of truth bear the brunt of Austin's wrath and they serve as the Interloctor in the later Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, so basically he is talking to himself--the earlier author of the Tractatus--who set up the path to positivism.

I had taken one of the starting-points for this approach to be Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism', and the subsequent tendency to reduce philosophy to what can always be rendered in crisp propositions. — Wayfarer

All of us at OLP deeply apologize for Moore's over-enthusiasm. Austin also did not take skepticism seriously enough, among other fallouts he just brushed over--"What's the point of all these examples again?"--though he is the best at stunning you with criterial distinctions: why do we ordinarily ask "how" you know something, but not usually "why" you know it?

one consequence often seems to me to try and cast every idea in philosophy in terms of what can easily be spoken or written, leaving aside the larger issue that philosophy often has to plumb difficult questions about the limits of language or of reason and the nature of truth. — Wayfarer

Again, as discussed above, easy is not the point. At times it will almost seems Austin or Wittgenstein are belaboring something instead of just telling us--this comes from OLP trying to get us to see the same thing from a different angle, the point being to reflect how you got to the old viewpoint in the first place (whew! Did I say not easy?) And OLP isn't avoiding the difficult questions, just trying to make it clearer what we are actually asking ourselves (and why).

And thank you for the encouragement. If you ever venture another try, may I suggest any of the essays by J.L. Austin, especially Sense and Sensibilia (along with reading Ayer's Truth, Language, and Logic), or any essay from Stanley Cavell's first set, Must We Mean What We Say (though maybe start with the one about later Wittgenstein).

I'm puzzled by your inclusion of the Great Moustache, — Banno

Nietzsche brought a historical (in that sense, a contextual) view to morality. He was investigating the metaphysical version of morals (deontology) and finding the place for the human voice. His aphorisms are not statements of fact or opinion (where people run into trouble believing they understand him), but claims to, or examples of, the actual workings of our moral concepts, to reflect against the single "ought" of moralism. It's also funny that OLP provides relief from Hegel, as I count Hegel as important to its development. He, like Nietzsche, brought historicity and context to philosophy, in tearing apart manufactured dichotomies with a method of investigating our concepts. He of course had the answers all worked out ahead of time rather than only seeking clarity from the evidence, but you take the good with the bad with most philosophers.

I think it is critical though to say (via-a-vis Hegel) that it is not important for OLP to be written in simple ("ordinary") language without terms (Cavell is fill-in-the-blank cryptic, Nietzsche openly defies understanding, and Wittgenstein has so many special terms it's all anyone believes he meant--only Austin is readable, but few remember what the point was because he hardly ever says it).

I also should say this is hardcore analytical philosophy, not meant for "ordinary" readers (like continental philosophy can be). It is strictly written in contrast to, or at least with a good understanding of, traditional analytic philosophy. Not that studying philosophy can't be useful to anyone, but just that this isn't a dumbed-down version to be understood with a quick glance, nor does getting the point stand apart from seeing its relation to the tradition.

The general theme was that ordinary language was both a blessing and a curse; on one side it brought clarity and perspective (Austin); on the other, many if not all philosophical problems derive from ordinary language's ambiguous structure (Wittgenstein). — Banno

The first trip-up I think is skepticism's desire (for certainty)--the seeming gap between us and the world--then (yes) language gives us the sense of an intellectual lack, then we (philosophers) try to fix language by removing its context and stripping its ordinary criteria (replaced with certainty, universalism, etc), and then we have to put those back to see the mess we got into. Unfortunately this is a desire created by our human condition so it happens over and over (eternally recurring as it were).

whatever your philosophical inclination, you will eventually have to make a place for ordinary language. — Banno

Just to be clear, this isn't to say: "you must listen to what OLP says is ordinary usage!" Wittgenstein says "Look at the use!" to get people to see how ordinary use reflects on philosophical issues. Nor is it to say that traditional philosophical concerns are nonsense or not important or not valid (well, some).

Neat Austin references in the OP, by the way - I wonder who saw them. — Banno

No one. No one saw them.

The only thing I would quibble with here is your characterization of Derrida as a relativist and/or a skeptic. — Joshs

Ah, the dangers of categorization (I suppose Hume is more of a skeptic). And my knowledge of Derrida is not even being able to get through his attempt to read Austin (in Signature Event Context); though I have read an account of it. My only grounds then for calling him relativistic/skeptical is his contrasting metaphysics with difference, as if we couldn't have a separate (ordinary) voice, but only a related one. As if we could tear down the old forms of philosophy, yet have the same satisfactions (maybe not seeing our part). Again, I don't say this out of an experience with reading Derrida so much as maybe holding a grudge from the effort of fending him off in literary theory class trying to hang on to structuralism (perhaps a more rigid equivalent of how Wittgenstein sees the ordinary criteria of our concepts). OLP has the sense of bringing the human voice back to philosophy without all the gymnastics, but I know Derrida is pretty spikey so I concede all ground.

I appreciate your resolve, but I believe I have addressed these concerns already. My point in all this was to shed light on the possibility of discussing art in a rational way. I have (Kant has) shown that there is more "objectivity" in aesthetics than most people would grant. Whatever you believe is excluded or constrained, I would only suggest that there is nothing left of that concept except the desire for the type of conclusions which created it.

Well, I could only make the case for the broader analytical implications because that's what I'm trained in. And, though Stanley Cavell is both a philosopher and an art critic, notably film and Shakespeare, he is not an artist. I don't know if reading art critiques at that level "enhance artistic creation"' however.

It is (human) reason itself that serves as the limitation. And it is our capacity to recognise and own this subjectivity that enables us to develop and refine rational y structures of relation to more closely approximate reality. * * * This is not, as I think Antony Nickles suggests, wanting to keep one’s own opinion (a passionate plea for individuality), but rather recognising that we only arbitrarily isolate both the artwork and aesthetic judgement from our subjective relation to it. In my view, it is awareness of the variability in our qualitative relation to knowledge such as criteria of the Form that orients it in the possibility of a rational ontological structure which could make claims to objectivity, and from which we can restructure and refine a more accurate epistemology. — Possibility

As this is not directed at me, it feels odd to cast in, but I believe focusing on my (Witt's) conjecture/speculation as to the motivation to hang on to any rational "subjective relation" to art and our aesthetic judgement, detracts from my greater point. Basically, I think maybe the disagreement comes down to a confusion in terms. I suggest that "human reason itself" is different than the rationality inherent in the forms of art. Cavell would call the Forms the structure of support of aesthetic claims--their rationality is not "arbitrarily isolate[d]" by us; they are categorically independent from us, wrapped up in the means of art; free, if not from our opinion, from our control (our "meaning"), from our arbitrariness, and our falling into taste or mere experience. Whatever the reason you want/need to maintain a "subjective relation" (not captured in the Pleasant and the Sublime) we do not have a "variable" "relation" to knowledge of the forms of art. When I speak of possibilities of the forms, it is not a possibility to be rational, it is the open-ended possibilities of their rationality. The possibility is for you to see for yourself the rationality I shine a light on, or not. And, again, this is not an "ontological" structure; there is no "object" in relation to the Beautiful (Witt's analogous "concepts" are not of a metaphysical or "objective" world). We do not make claims to "objectivity", we can make claims about art because of the rationality in their forms, claims that would speak for all of us, not just my reasons/relation--you seeing it on your own. A main point of mine is that there is rationality without the idea of "objectivity". In concert, our epistemology does not have to be more "accurate" (of/to something) so much as realize that knowledge in aesthetics does not ensure agreement, certainty, universality, etc. (what we philosophically have wanted from knowledge). This does not eat away at its sense of rationality as much as leave those things in our hands, up to our skills to evoke that rationality for all to see. Again, maybe this comes down to a misunderstanding that the rationality of the forms of art should not be confused with the critic giving us "reasons"--evidence, perspective, connections, etc.--to see the rationality inherent in the forms of art in the example of a work. We do not vary the structure, we vary in our capability or desire to discuss art in relation to its rational, formal structure.

p.s. @Jack Cummins obviously does not understand/value the desire for the aesthetic discussion, which is fine--everyone has their interests (philosophy is also powerless to prove its relevance); only to say, Cavell picks a point with Hume that if you presume taste you should have the discipline to account for it. I would, in trying to tempt anyone--controversially!--point out that the Forms of art are similar to Wittgenstein's Concepts, with their categorical identity and possibilities, the rationality of their criteria--their Grammar. And these concepts include ones that affect our moral moments; thus the "irrational", "emotional", "subjective" presumed about aesthetics is related to our dismissal of the rationality of our moral relation to each Other and our actions, etc. Also, the methodology of making a claim about the rationality of a form of art is structurely similar to the kind of claim used in Ordinary Langauge Philosophy in investigating what is said when..., or what we ordinarily say and do, as philosophical data.

The meaning of life simply exists: it is just a matter of finding it. — Rafaella Leon

I loved that book in school, and I enjoyed reading this; it made me think of the ways in which I understand these same (similar) things now. The approach reminds me of Emerson in that it is not synonymous with typical analytic philosophy, but it is relevant. If we say that a person exists if they find the meaning of their life, then others have not yet, in a sense, come to "exist". Without interest in, or attraction to, the world--if nothing is meaningful to them--there is nothing that would endure. When the means of the production of ourselves is forced upon us, we are alienated from our ability to find ourselves, Marx would say.

No man invents the meaning of his life: each one is, so to speak, surrounded and cornered by the meaning of his own life. — Rafaella Leon

Here I am reminded of Stanley Cavell's observation that the "will" is not active, but actually passive; not, say, that I am in perfect control of my body, but that I am in the perfect control of my body, even, as it were, the god within me. The world draws me if I would let it, Heiddeger would say, but in grasping for certainty/knowledge, I loose sight of what is meaningful to me.

But if the individual acts solely on the basis of an end, he is acting precisely on the inexistence of a world around him. With or without the world, he would act the same way. Acts then acquire a supra-temporal, supra-historical meaning, that is, eternally man should do so before the world exists or when it ceases to exist. Here action is taken as the direct expression of a divine quality that acts without the existence of the world. — Rafaella Leon

To say there is no world is maybe a way to say we should not be acting towards a goal or end--the Hindu idea of detachment from the fruits of our actions. Our actions being the expression of something higher in us is another way of saying our actions create us, complete us.

the meaning of the individual’s life, of the individual before his ultimate moral responsibility, something that is above the character, something that Humanity itself does not know. — Rafaella Leon

I have tried to explain (not as eloquently)--in my contributions to the post Freedom and Duty, and in my post on Wittgenstein's lion-quote--that responsibility, answerability, and duty, are beyond knowledge and above our "selves" (our ego, as it were). In that moral realm we are defined by our acts; we are responsible for the existence and composition of who we are either reflecting our interests and what is meaningful to us, or living in, as Emerson would say, conformity.

Well said.

the first being that I don’t mean to negate your contention regarding objectivity, but to challenge the limitations of your perspective, and work towards a synthesis. It seems natural in moments of disagreement to consolidate perspectives, but I’ve never been very good at debates. — Possibility

Well, I am not making a claim to "objectivity"--only rationality--as Kant's term is an out-dated concept (as is "subjectivity"--instead of the personal); and, again, I believe there is everything here that is desired in the idea of "objectivity" except the "object" and that there is no "approximation" of our personal opinions to the unknowable yet certain "thing-in-itself". And I will admit to "limitations", namely, that this is not to encapsulate the Sublime experience (immediately), or is not subject to degradation into mere opinion (taste) and personal experience (the Pleasant), and most importantly, that it is open and vulnerable to the discussion coming to an end. Though this is not a "synthesis" of, say, (beginning) perspectives--points-of-"view" (viewpoints); it is the rational distinction of one claim from another; that a claim is incorrect or wrong, subject to evidence and rational resolution or disagreement. Again, we are not "consolidating perspectives" because we are discussing something public based on the overt and explicit ways (criteria of the form) in which art makes its point, what methods are inherent in it, etc. You attribute this as well to our philosophical discussion, but, apart from getting clear about terms, realizing we simply have difference interests, or are talking about different (not-overlapping) points, etc. one of us can be wrong--that is rationality in the sense I am discussing; one of us must learn something correct from the other--we are not just swapping opinions. This, again, is not to say the conversation can not be cut short, frustrated, relinquished, not conceded, etc. As Cavell says, we are separate, but nothing separates us, so we are answerable for everything that comes between us.

sometimes we are just going to disagree: perhaps I feel you are wrong in your reading of the disowning of love in the opening scene of King Lear. You feel you have tried all you'd like to point to the text, tie it to other occurances in the play that echo it, etc. — Antony Nickles

This disagreement you’ve offered as an example is not a rational relation: it is a perception of difference from a centralised position, and a challenge to that position from a dissenting perspective. Each participant believes themselves wholly rational, and yet both judge this as a dead-end based on feeling. They are faced with the limitations of their own rationality, an event horizon beyond which all is deemed irrational, illogical, emotional. — Possibility

The use of the word "feeling" is misleading here. You skip over the rational claims that they have asserted; there I am only making the point that, at some point, I "feel" I have done all I can; though this endpoint/giving up is always my call, the reasons I have claimed are not my call (subject to my "feelings"). Witt's teacher hits bedrock with the student, but most people miss that the teacher is only "inclined" to shut the door on more discussion--this does not change our obligation to be answerable to the Other and ourselves, nor does it change the nature of the discussion. The two people in a sense meet on the same ground of the concept of the form of art; they don't "believe themselves wholly rational"; the Form is the rationality--we can, as I have said, make arguments not on that field (option, taste). The "event horizon" is a construction of Kant's to try to separate what is certain, universal, etc. from that which he believes can not be. Positivists (think Witt's first book) and others took this to the extreme to throw out everything else, including the aesthetic, and call it "irrational", "emotional". There are human reasons for this that I go over in my post on Wittgenstein's lion-quote.

Now, let’s say that one of them recognises this limitation, and humbly entertains the possibility that they might be disconnected from, or even ignorant of, certain qualitative aspects of the text which may be apparent to the other, perhaps owing to their personal experiences of love. Now we’re exploring an aspect of existence beyond what either would consider ‘rational’ from their limited perspective. There’s no rational criteria with which to navigate this relational ‘space’, and yet the difference is undeniable. — Possibility

The "distance" is manufactured by one's desire to have an "internal" experience that could also be "explored". Now, if someone wants to have a feeling or experience of love, of course that is fine; this is the experience of the Pleasant (or Sublime) in terms of the aesthetic. Why do we keep confusing the other categories and imagining that they somehow affect the rational discussion of the form of the Beautiful? Maybe it helps to point out that the expression of an inner experience is different than the desire for "knowledge" of it, and that the "space" between us is fundamentally (unless manufactured) between our separate bodies, so the difference is a moral moment defining one to the other--bridgeable in our reaction to the Other (again, I take this up in that other post).

As in my discussion with Joshs, this can lead us to a rational idea that we inaccurately perceive our own viewpoint as central to a normative understanding. — Possibility

Well, here, I will leave it to you and @Joshs; I take this mostly as a separate discussion. In relation to my point, we do not create the rational (our "ideas" are not--"perceived" to be: rational or just feelings); what is rational is the external criteria of the Form (from the method of the art). Also, the idea of "normative" is muddled and based on this misunderstanding of our own place and power (lack thereof) in and over language. The misconception of "reality" (say, Plato's forms, the "objective") leads to a sense of "qualitative relativity" when, if we remove ourselves from rationality and "meaning" (as if we create that, or that "words" are tied to "meanings"), how things relate to each other is much less swirled together (as if there was one problem of relativity, instead of each concept having its on world of criteria, which in each context, involves an ordinary rational discussion). Again, this is to confuse a discussion of coming to terms in each form of art, with imagining some abstract overarching rift and thus believing that everybody has their own starting point (them)--which I simply take as one wanting to keep their own opinion (making it unassailable, or unique), when that is simply a refusal to participate in the forms of rationality. As I have said, you MAY do this, but that refusal is your call, not a comment on the possibility of the rational discussion of our claims about the aesthetic.

...consider an alternative perspective... perceiving the relational structure in which an ‘event’ (itself consisting of relational structure) is open to variability. — Possibility

I am doing my best here to understand what you are saying (perhaps not well) but also, I'm not sure how you think this needs to negate my contention about the actual OP about "objectivity"--our how aesthetics holds any sense of "rationality" for Kant at all. In the end, I believe it appears we are talking about two different things, and then I would not deny that the Sublime has a separate relation to aesthetics (nature, awe, bigness, respect, etc.) and that it, along with the Beautiful, has a relation without an object—I would even grant it is a “faculty” though I don’t know what the implications of that are other than an ability to have that experience. However, "categorically" Kant says (Gramatically Witt would say) that relation is not a rational relation—it is without a concept/form (there is no “structure” in that sense) as similarly, with Taste and the Pleasant. And, as much as Witt's term "Concept" is similar to the idea of Kant's "Form", those two are both, "open to variability" (though I'm not sure of this as a term), even rationally (if only eventually). I brought up the continuation of the series to focus on the conceptual jump that can be made between teacher and student--outside of numbers--they are not "consolidating the concept"--it can be moved to a new context, broadened.

I feel I have connected the Beautiful to the Sublime in its role to creativity and inspiration but this is not a rational connection. The judgment of the Beautiful and the Form of art work together extend it into further possibilities (from itself) and, I believe, covers all the ground you need to have everything you want of the Sublime. Though I may not have pegged your claims correctly, I feel as if you are not allowing my claim all the consequences of its open-ended relation to art. So I feel an impasse that I believe is unnecessary—what is the fear that I am denying anything? Why must there be a separate rational relationship to aesthetics? Why and how is “variability” different/necessary? (I believe this would be a different post but I wonder if we aren’t floating into Derrida’s creation of “Metaphysical Presence” instead of addressing Logocentrism head on and in denying a concept's actual flexibility—“variability” being an excuse to open a separate door, or a justification to politically attack the whole idea of tradition, concepts, form, and language itself.)

[“Possibility;486311"]...this consolidated ‘touchstone’ is arbitrary - it is the viewer/critic who determines the ‘launching point’, not the art or artist.[/quote]

The clarification in your second paragraph is also well taken, thank you. I only point out that Forms (concepts) are not arbitrary, although, as you say, this is no constraint on the art or artist (when is painting not painting is also an open question for art—though still intelligible in contrast to the structure of the Form). To say that the possibility of misunderstanding is cause to assume individual “perspective” is to misunderstand that the forms of art are public. No one is reasoning from outside (completely apart) of the forms and context (without debasing the discussion to taste or personal experience). It feels like a desire for individuality; art can be a private language, however, until we find a way to discuss it in relation to how art works, it is simply the expression of the pleasant or sublime experience, or is valuable or not. Thus why art is close to madness sometimes.

I agree with the brief third, and the fourth, paragraphs. I think just after that when you discuss "misunderstanding"... "at the level of meaning", here I would say is an example of trying to step out of the rationality by imagining something individual. If you misunderstand what I meant, then you ask, "Did you mean the trope, or its analogous nature?" In other words, there are rational ways of clarifiying disagreement: collecting more evidence, clearing up terms, and sure I guess "increasing awareness, connection, and collaboration", but in none of this is a "broader relational structure" necessary (if even possible)--sometimes we are just going to disagree: perhaps I feel you are wrong in your reading of the disowning of love in the opening scene of King Lear. You feel you have tried all you'd like to point to the text, tie it to other occurances in the play that echo it, etc. This is not a "variability in... rational relation"--this a conversation coming to a dead-end. These aren't different "perspectives", they are different rational claims about the art; the "possibility of agreement" is not in "perspectives"; that is not rational, as is a reading connected to the Form, which can be "wrong", say, being simply conjecture, personal opinon (taste), lacking evidence, not accounting for history at all, etc. These things don't have anything to do with one's "perspective". And I would agree that we can have a non-judgemental relation to art; but would we call it rational (would Kant?). You can have your opinion and hold your words to yourself as a perspective, say, an observation, but no one can disagree with you in the way possible through the Form (concept). There is no "language" to use together, and we are left "talking at cross purposes", because your "purpose"--your perspective--is more important than being answerable to me and responsive (responsible) to the text (art).

I am notifying the following participants (and others that may have an interest), in the hope of rounding out @darthbarracuda 's PO with any other concerns: I would bring up again that my contention (in a nutshell but stated more accurately and clarified over this whole thread) is that all the qualities of "objectivity", including right and wrong, are possible in aesthetics apart from an "object", except agreement on a claim of judgement. @Moliere @Hanover @Thorongil @Tom1352 @Banno @Number2018

Here and above, @Possibility and I are having a discussion I would characterize as: the play between art (and our relation to it) and the judgement (rationality) of aesthetics; the possibility and totality of rationality without something other than (say, an idea), or beyond (say, a place), Kant's "forms" of aesthetics.

You say that 'modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of art' - how do you think it does this, without pointing to an aspect that exists in a relational "space" beyond the criteria of the form? — Possibility

The evolution of art is an appropriate topic and this is well taken; in pushing too hard on the fact of rational judgement at all, I only peripherally addressed the way art changes, and thus changes its rationale. Wittgenstein would, roughly, refer to this as projecting a concept into a wider or new context (perhaps akin to your "space", without an aspect), and with the process of "continuing a series", there, with a student (see PI Index "Series - of numbers).

I would first point out that extenuation or expansion presupposes the actuality of the workings of art (reflected in the criteria of its form). The criteria of the form express (Witt's term) the means of art, are the launching point or touchstone; there is no "beyond" or "aspect" that they are pointing "to"; the form moves itself ahead drawing out, and on, the means of the work, without an end. "Purposefulness" is not to a purpose, but only to say that art has rational but open-ended ways of being meaningful. This is not capturing, or transcending to, an "aesthetic idea"; it is, as it were, on a path (cubism comes from portraiture) but without destination. Emerson says (roughly) we must live fuzzy in front (Wittgenstein talks of concepts with "blurred edges" #71). The context here is the painter, say, with their canvas blank and the means at their disposal; but are we denying history (even in revolutionizing)? And of course this is acknowledging that, if anywhere, art may break or defy or abandon any of its methods of meaning; ahead of its time, waiting to be explicated--yet to find its words, or voice, or audience.

This is how the work draws us in - through transcendence. A discussion which acknowledges this transcendence also acknowledges the nature of its approximation within the criteria of the form.... Those who do not allow for broader systems and structures of rationality (such as aesthetics) limit their ability to engage with the work, in the same way that “a discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for... different rationality than: criteria of a form.” — Possibility

I would, again, argue there is no "other" rationality in the judgement of aesthetics, no "broader systems and structures of rationality"; again, the discussion is not an "approximation", not (as that is defined by Webster's) "nearly" correct, as if the Sublime (or transcendent) were an eventual or separate correct destination to which we have a different rational relation.

For the rest of us, art actively draws us in (through transcendence) to a ‘space’ that challenges our capacity to rationally discuss what we perceive. — Possibility

And here I absolutely agree. I believe this is Kant's experience of the Sublime (though I believe in the value of trying to, and the ability to, meet that "challenge"). Though I am left with the impression you feel the need to defend that there is something more, greater, that you feel I am taking away, or denying. Maybe it helps to say, the rationality of the judgement of art does not take away from the transcendent experience or creation of art. This fear of denial reminds me of Wittgenstein's consolation to the metaphysical skeptic (my italics):

PI #305. But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place." -- What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?... The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of....

And here I want to end this quote instead with: the extension of the form (instead of "the use of the word remembering"). Witt talks of this picture (there, an inner process; here, an "aesthetic idea") getting in the way of seeing the use of the word "remembering" as it is (here, the rationality and progression of art's forms with the workings of the art, and their change). All this is to say, the desire to have a special access to aesthetics (say, to some idea of it) gets in the way of beginning a conversation. The fear that it might constrain, say, a desire to have some connection with art that is special, ineffable, is not to say discussion is not possible (however threatening, subject to philistines). Another way to look at it, again, is the fact we might end without agreement is not proof that we have no way to try (that art is unintelligible), or that there is some better way, or that the attempt is structurally flawed.

Would creative genius be content with inspiring critical assent? — Possibility

The work of criticism is separate but rooted in ("dependent" on), and in the service of, art (not parasitic to it, or indistinguishable thus irrational, as Derrida suggests); the artist, with hope, works for the art, and its creation--in and for its possibilities. Is art only that which criticism says it is? Of course not. But are we not discussing the rational judgment of aesthetics? The agreement (assent) is not between the artist and critic, but the critic and anyone who wishes to see more in art than their own feelings and their valuation/opinion, though the critic can be as degenerate as the viewer. Nevertheless, without the critic (or them within us), we (the viewers) are ignorant in a sense, blind, or at least without depth perception; unable to access the richness and fullness of the awe and wonder of art. Here I would suggest Stanley Cavell's essay Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy. In truth most of this is in that work, including the Kant. He starts by justifying the ability to paraphrase poetry, so you'll have something to chew on.

I thank you for your diligence and consideration.

If I reveal that my position in this discussion is as an artist, not a critic, would that change how you perceive my argument? — "Possibility

I can only say for sure that although the artist may understand the workings of the form as well or better than the critic, I would say the critic understands the explicit criteria, the history of the art form, and is more deliberate, thoughtful, and comprehensive in his investigation into a work (though of course the artist could do this too, but then: is he an artist? or a critic?). That's not to say there aren't sensationalist, or populist, or just bad critics, or that the good ones aren't sometimes wrong. But I don't put any stock necessarily in the artist's position--his goal or intention, etc.

When I argue that a logical, rational discussion of art is not ‘objective’, [I'm only saying] its claim to objectivity is limited. ...my view of Kant’s aesthetics abandons no ‘standards of objectivity’ to begin with, but rather strives towards the possibility of a more complete objectivity. — Possibility

Well "objective" gets used a lot without it being clear why. The "claim" of the discussion of art is not "limited" (it is, say, unguarded to the Other's rejection); it is not making a claim "to objectivity". Also not sure what a "standard of objectivity" is--certain, predictable, enforceable? Here Kant is saying we have a universal claim (acceptable by anyone) and impersonal criteria (though not certainty of agreement). How can we approach? Towards what? What would make this "more complete"? I would point out that the "more complete" a critique of art (the more evidence used, the more implications followed through, the more questions/objections addressed, etc.) its possible the more people may see it the same way, agree that all those determinations, the critique, are right/correct. Now, could we also deepen/broaden our criteria of a form? sure. Stanley Cavell's observations in "The World Viewed" about the nature of film bring to light criteria I don't think film critics even considered before; and Northrup Frye's "Anatomy of Criticism" is such a fundamental framework of the structure of literature, people call it the bible. (I will note that both of these works investigate the "forms" of these arts.)

This approximation...is a call...to engage in a shared relational ‘space’, in which differing systems and structures of rationality, logic or end-place can be understood and restructured in relation to others without consolidation or conflict based on significance. Without this approximation, which expresses an awareness of its incompleteness through aesthetics (whether intentional or not), how do we acknowledge and respond to the call in the first place? — Possibility

I like the idea of a call: the work draws us in, it speaks to us through the criteria of its form, and our critique beckons the Other for their assent. Are these all not "space" enough? A discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for "differing systems and structures of rationality", as in, different rationality than: criteria of a form. But we also don't create the criteria nor change them (arbitrarily; say, without the art form changing). Where is the need for an "end-place"? Modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of the art--it's become its own critic. The criteria are not "incomplete", or unfinished, or, as of yet, only of a lower order (only an approximation?). A discussion of them need not end or be resolved or bettered for the rational conversation of art to begin--the one is the means to the other. We will have no other, better ("objective"?) means, to, say, have a particular, better ("objective"?) end. The frailty of the possibility of agreement in a discussion of art is its triumph, not its lack.

[claiming objectivity is limited] is due in part to Thomas Nagel, and in part to my examining Kant in the ‘wrong’ order. — Possibility

Yes, we'll need a full accounting of this.

You or I might consider something beautiful, but it's not true beauty, according to the conceptions of Kant. — Mijin

I get what you're saying; Kant can be esoteric. I usually work from ordinary language (its ordinary criteria), but, if you let go of the personal use of the words as terms, the categories of judgement themselves regarding aesthetics are part of our world, just the names don't line up. In other words, don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. The criteria aren't Kant's opinions or "conceptions", these are categories he is observing; he isn't making this stuff up (except, of course, that is, the names).

That is to say, you can consider something whatever you want ("beautiful"), but it's just your feeling or opinion until we have some external criteria to agree or disagree about it over. And we are not discussing whether something is actually beautiful, but discussing the categories of judging (say, how it is determined to be beautiful). And true and false do not come into an aesthetic discussion, i.e., "true" beauty (the claims aren't propositional statements).

Well, I have no reason to suppose these conceptions are the correct framing; it's just a proposition that I either accept or reject. It can't be used as an argument to convince anyone of anything. — Mijin

I just gave a ton of reasons! Throughout this thread! And yes, just as with most claims to our shared criteria, you can, of course, reject my (Kant's) claim (again, not a proposition). You are, however, answerable for that rejection, the lack of depth of it**, the refusal to address the distinctions, the impatience with any standard/terms but your own, etc. Maybe you no longer care, maybe you're attacking the method because you don't want to accept the conclusions, I don't know (maybe I'm not sure I care anymore.) And here is where we may be at the end of the rope with any claim about our shared criteria (as Wittgenstein says), which is the same failure that can happen with an aesthetic claim of the judgement of the beautiful. But this end is our failure more than just the possibility for it in the nature of the judgement of the aesthetic (or the philosophical).

**I'm not sure it makes sense to say I "can't" use whatever it is you're saying; maybe you mean that Kant's argument is not going to convince "anyone" (no one? harsh) of "anything" (wow, none of it?); or maybe you mean necessarily convince, say, everyone--and when is that possible? / if ever a requirement? Ooooohhhh, wait! are we doing science?!

I'm still not sure I entirely follow, as you still have not provided a concrete example.... Is it your view that true beauty has to be based on rationality? — Mijin

Yes, Kant's judgement of the Beautiful is rational, and universal, in a sense. And I wanted to make clear that, according to Kant, any "object" can be an example for the judgement of the Pleasant (a pleasing feeling) or the Good (popular), so we could pick literally any thing. You've chosen a face. As an object it is categorically not a subject for Kant's judgement of the Beautiful--he uses ordinary words as terms, I know, it's annoying; let's call it pretty or attractive to make it easier. You say everyone is hard-wired to "like" symmetric faces, sure, fine. We could say it's the pleasing feeling of it ("oh, pretty!" the brain says), and we could try to call the feeling the "reason" we find it pretty, but, just as one point, is there any space for that reason/feeling to be mine? other than it is my body, or is the "reason" in the face?

Now we can judge a face (or faces) to be attractive ("I like that!"), but my valuing that face over another is my choice, i.e., any rationale would be "my" reasons, not universal, external (objective?) rationale. Even if we all value that face, does popularity lead to rationality? We could all have different reasons, or the exact same (say, the same feeling).

Now Kant's idea of the Beautiful is judged by the criteria of the form not the object, for example, an art form, say, literature. Above I explain and quote Kant's process and basis for the rationality of the Beautiful, but, roughly, I make a universal claim for all of us based on the external criteria of the form, though your assent to that claim is uncertain. Here, imagine literary criticism that rises above what is pleasant or popular to use the criteria of written story to try to get you to accept what I see is correct based on the textual evidence and ways in which stories work.

Again, above I argue against the popular but outdated objective/subjective distinction: is the feeling of the pleasant more, or less "objective" than the use of public criteria to reach agreement that I am right in what I see and say about the aesthetic? But if we will only accept certain, determined, necessary solutions beyond the human voice, then we could call the feeling of pleasure an "objective" judgment of the aesthetic--Oh, pretty! Yay!

Unless you knew people of my grandmother's generation, I don't really care what you think. — Athena

Well, I deeply apologize; I got an email that I thought was you replying to my post, but it was, instead, you replying to someone else's (a little new to this). I thought it was strange, but I made some poor assumptions, and I'm sorry that I offended you. If it helps, my mother lived through the war in England, and my grandmother the century before last.

I have no idea why some people appear to worship Nietzsche. — Athena

As I don't take this as a real desire to learn, I would only say that people who take Nietzsche as proposing "ideas" or social opinions, miss the point (which is to say everyone who has only read snippets of him, or think the "will to power" is a moral theory.) His mission was to show the historical and contextual quality missing from Kantian and deontological morals, along with the additional point I am making about our human condition (I think it important to say, though, that he did not believe we are always living beyond morals; only that they have a life and a limit).

This is not quick judgment... — Athena

Again, my sincere apologies. As a token of peace, I offer that you might (if you can forgive him for basically being a Nazi) find Heidegger's essay “The Question Concerning Technology” interesting. He has a very dark view of the influence of technology, roughly, "enframing" (narrowing) our view of humanity and nature as only a means (echoing Marx).

["[Antony's argument] that we can bypass ['the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment'] and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action"] would be highly dependent on our culture, associations, and the books we read. Social animals have what some call a pre-morality. They are wired for group behavior.... we are not born with [cultural/thinking] language, nor are we born knowing the concepts essential to moral thinking and we aren't born knowing the high order thinking skills. Any "personal moral decision bound to reasonable action" is dependant on what we learn and because our circumstances are different, our sense of morality can be different.

This is where the higher-order thinking skills come in. That is the learned ability to reason through our choices and make decisions. ...Morality based on how we feel instead of how we think, leads to power struggles not a high standard of morality. — Athena

I agree that "higher-order thinking skills" embetters us and our society, not only with knowledge of the criteria of our morals, but also our understanding of our obligation to ourselves (and others) to the ethical consideration of a moral moment. I would only say that the idea of "dependent" and "different" does not affect the human condition between (any) morals and when they leave us turned upon ourselves without further guidance. Our "culture" and our "circumstances" and even our "morals" can be different, but the responsibility (among other things) that we have is universal, as you say, "to reason through our choices and make decisions", though I wouldn't call this a "learned ability" so much as a human obligation (categorically, as it were), say, our moral duty.

I would only else say that we are not born with moral/cultural/language, we are born into them. They are there before us and apart from us. We do not (always) "learn" these (as rules, laws), as much as we pick them up in going along and becoming a part of society (an unconscious social contract by osmosis as it were); they are wrapped up in what our society cares about and the way things count in the world (this is Wittgenstein's Grammar and Criteria)--they are not "knowledge" and we don't "agree" on them. But, yes, we can renounce them, be ignorant of them, contradict them, but also, become conscious of them, reform them, extend them (into new contexts), etc. We do not need nor have a "higher standard". It is not a dichotomy between feeling and knowledge--we/the world already have ordinary criteria for morals, etc. The criteria may be forgotten, or unexamined, but that does not mean we don't live by them (are left to our "feelings") or can't explain them if asked (by Socrates, Austin, etc.).

Whoops, responded to a response that was not to my post.

I quibble on the word "epistemology." If you mean methods by which we know, I agree, — tim wood

Method is basically what I am talking about, though I would say that we do gain something. "Knowledge" is a loaded word in ethics, but we do gain insight (even, of ourselves), a larger perspective, and, say, an understanding of the criteria of our concepts and the context we find ourselves in, etc.

I suggest we are always lost and never not lost, anything else is mere illusion propped up by a seeming regularity: we think we know, and for a while win some of our bets, but our knowledge is spurious. — tim wood

Although we might not always know the criteria for something (what is indicative of "walking" is one example Wittgenstein gives"), it might be a little cynical to say we are "always lost". This is only to say though that not everything is a moral moment, the same as to say not every motion is an action, or every action is "intended". We normally go along saying things and doing things, and only when something is fishy (Austin/Cavell say) do we ask "What did you mean?" or "Did you intend to do that?" The things we do and say being, not illusion, but merely not usually conceptually investigated (looking at their criteria and use). And I would claim knowledge is not so much false, as limited--it comes to an end, say, with respect to the separate Other (which I take up in my examination of Wittgenstein's lion quote).

Our duty then to be informed and self-informed as best we can be, reason being our best and only true navigational aid. And it seems to me Kant finds morality in reason, at least as much as with reason. — tim wood

I agree that what I am suggesting is both an examination of the world, and learning about ourself. And also agree that Kant is trying to find morality in and with reason, but my argument here is that his is still an effort to solve the moral problem beforehand. It is also to deny the human contribution (thrown out with the desire to remove emotion, inclination, etc. (the "subjective") from moral decision-making); seeing the partial role of rational rules and criteria is to acknowledge the human standing up for what matters to them (or not), subject to the consequences to their identity, character, answerability, etc.--completing the circle Emerson would say.

And this is precisely what the mariner does, not just in storm but always. He reads his moment, the vibration of the wind in his lines, the colour of the sky, and what experience tells him. His decision then at that moment being always and forever correct, notwithstanding what comes over the horizon at him. — tim wood

You may enjoy Stanley Cavell's essay in "The Quest for the Ordinary", in which he uses The Rime of the Ancient Mariner to investigate the loss caused by the line Kant draws between us and the thing-in-itself.