Public is a shared internal understanding of use, which is internal — schopenhauer1

Is that to say language gives the appearance of us sharing a world but we are actually stuck in an isolated theater of the individual mind?

And if that is the case, what is this "sharing" you speak of? It seems a lot more possible as something we can observe ourselves doing than to propose an unknown process designed to make us feel like it is happening.

Is that to say language gives the appearance of us sharing a world but we are actually stuck in an isolated theater of the individual mind? — Paine

In a way yeah. There is no "public space". When a "builder" says "slab", the language community of the builder, is "really" the individual understandings of slab that are in some connection with each other. But this connection and these individual understandings are an internal experiential form of knowledge. When the builder who yells "Slab!" gets his concrete block, it is his internal mental sense that the block was expected and confirmed the block was received. The person getting the block had their version of what was expected, etc. There is nothing outside the individual instantiations. The beetle's "use" can never be separated from the actual beetle in the box, in other words. Witt seems to think this can occur. But there is no "space" outside the individual self that this obtains. There is no Platonic thing that is "Public" that "use" is had outside each individual's private knowledge.

And if that is the case, what is this "sharing" you speak of? It seems a lot more possible as something we can observe ourselves doing than to propose an unknown process designed to make us feel like it is happening. — Paine

Not quite sure what you're saying, but it's alluding to what I am saying that there is no Platonic non-experiential "public sphere". It is all internal sensibilities.

And further, if we were to ever say that something akin to "use" can exist without a mental states, that is not meaning, but some sort of function. It's no more meaningful than some process in nature is meaningful.

This gets to other ideas.. pan-semiosis for example.. And actually feeds into the debates we continually have here for mistaking the map for the terrain.

There is nothing outside the individual instantiations. — schopenhauer1

There is no way to confirm this to be the case. There are models of why it seems to happen in the way you describe. It does not introduce a "Platonic thing" to observe that we can observe many things about our use of language without presupposing a model. I can imagine solipsism but doing that does not make it a fact. It cancels itself as something to be verified.

One thing the present discussion of what is "real" versus "ideal" poorly reflects is the extent Wittgenstein challenged the 'theoretical'. He questioned the way we seek universals but did not deliver an alternative model that explains what should happen instead. That would place him in the Behaviorist camp where language is a part of an organic system.

And further, if we were to ever say that something can exist without a mental states, that is not meaning, but some sort of function. It's no more meaningful than some process in nature is meaningful. — schopenhauer1

Is this not the kind of theory that Wittgenstein expressed skepticism about?

Is this not the kind of theory that Wittgenstein expressed skepticism about? — Paine

Not sure, it all kind of muddles together at the end...

He wants to say "use" which is something "definitive" but then say that language keeps us ever in possible "error" of what is meant or conveyed. It seems you can't have both. His own skepticism starts to dilute even something as simple as "use".

To be a mini-Witt:
Use to whom? Surely if you get me a slab, there is nothing beyond me finding it "normal" and you finding it "normal" to do X and X. But it is still just "me" and "you" and nothing beyond that. There is no unifying form of "use". You can't get beyond the skeptical mode that he starts himself. Saying it's "public" or it's "practice" doesn't get beyond this either.. He is stuck with the mental and private...

Sure, but this language game (the uses) learned from a community is not some Platonic "thing" but is rather the various instantiations of understanding in each individual (internally). ...Thus the beetle-box actually seems at odds with this, as if internal understanding doesn't count here. — schopenhauer1

I think this is a similar misunderstanding that @RussellA had (above) between "private" (as Witt uses it) and "personal". I take it you want to record the fact that it is me that is saying my take, my "understanding" (not determined, as it were, by something outside me); that I can say: "This is my understanding". But this is just one “use” of understanding.

“Use" is a made-up technical term for Wittgenstein; it is not any sense of the ordinary word. There couldn't be a more misunderstood term that Wittgenstein created than this one word (maybe “language games” or “forms of life”). This is not "use" as in: to operate, as if I "use" words; nor is it what I make come about, as if uses are up to me. Uses are an expression or activity’s "possibilities" (#90)—what it is capable of (and not). The purpose of Wittgenstein’s term “use” is not to explain anything, it is part of showing that even the same expressions and activities can have different implications, different criteria, different ways it works, which is to contrast with the skeptic’s desire to have things work one way, be judged to have met one criteria.

The use depends on the context. I can “know” New York, which is the sense (use) that I know my way about. I can “know” your phone number, the criteria for which is my getting it right. I can “know” that you are angry, which is the use that I acknowledge it, recognize and accept it, grant that it should be taken into consideration or not. These are the criteria for judging in these instances, the “uses” of knowledge—how knowledge works (not the word).

So, with “understanding” there are various senses (uses, or versions is another way to think about it), which just means there are different criteria and workings then just the sense of "my understanding"; that "understanding" stands for different aspects of our lives at times. Consider your "understanding” me. I say something (or just run you through a process), and then I ask: "Do you understand?" and you say “yes”. But here, with this use of (version of, sense of) understanding, what you say is to extrapolate the implications of what I said or just to paraphrase it back to me. Now my judgment can disagree with your extrapolation, or miss something about your paraphrase, or balk at your prejudicial characterization, etc., but then it is just a matter of my responsibility to continue to explain and yours to try again, which, as we know, can go to ___ or all come to naught. The point being that your "understanding what I have said" has different mechanics than "your understanding" (your assessment); understanding in this use is a measurement of which I am the judge.

If that notion [my understanding] itself is missing, then there is no meaning had, even though, technically "use" can be still had in terms of how the word is being thrown around in the community of language users and acted upon. — schopenhauer1

But with some uses of “understand”, there is no “my” understanding, there is no room for it. “If you leave this base you will be courtmartialed. Got it?” “I understand [Yes, Sir!]” and here the criteria (of judgment) is that there will be consequences, whether you understand or even accept them. In fact, most times, when I say something to you in a particular context, there is no question about “your understanding”. It just doesn’t come up because there is nothing to interpret (as intention only comes up when something is weird).

The past criteria of judgement upon whether a word is correctly used (even if it is the individually learned collective wisdom of a community), and the judging itself, is had within a person's internal mental space. — schopenhauer1

I would offer that “…within a person’s internal mental space” in this context, is the same as: “I judge”. Now, in what situation do I (Witt will ask: what do I say when) I judge “whether a word is used correctly”? Don’t we just say something like “I don’t think that means what you think it means.” Now, yes, I am the one that is doing the judging, sure. But the criteria, the standard used to judge (the routes along which we measure) depends not only on the word, but the situation, and thus the version (use) of that word in that situation (part of that situation may be what sentence it is in, who you say it to, etc.); the criteria may not even be correctness (e.g., appropriateness, cleverness). And yes, I apply those criteria in judging. But I can be wrong, out of line, pedantic, etc.; one implication that it is “me” judging means it reflects on me and my judgment as well as whether the expression is “correct”.

How is it he is advocating for anything other than our inability to be accurate, or our ability to possibly be in error of what others are saying? It's more a "negative" (in the what is flawed) than positive (how to fix). — schopenhauer1

He calls what he is destroying a “house of cards” (#118), leaving behind what is important, which is that the ordinary criteria embodied in what we say in a situation make our language just as accurate, precise, capable of rigor, and able to communicate as “philosophy’s” abstract, universal, complete substitutions. The possibility of error does not make ordinary criteria inaccurate; our ordinary means of judgment show how errors between us can be reconciled (how to fix it). The pure logic Witt is worried about is built in an attempt to never err, to preempt misunderstanding entirely.

I've heard of Ordinary Language Philosophy, but I believe that came after... — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein’s method is Ordinary Language Philosophy! He is looking at what we say in situations to learn what matters to us about something, as shown in the criteria we judge it by. This is his philosophical data to learn about the issues of knowledge, thinking, understanding, intention, appearance, essence, etc., and, predominantly in the PI, why we want to run away from the fact that our criteria are based on our interest in them, to an abstract, “pure” place where we are removed from the calculation of precision. If you really want to get into OLP’s method, this is the thread. Heaven help us though.

If indeed everything is conflated to ordinary language and "Forms of Life", surely, to be a pedantic question-asker without providing any exposition would be abusive to the community of sympathetic listeners. You are always going to convince me this is the only way, and I am always going to say to you that you deem it more clever and necessary than it is. — schopenhauer1

Well I tire of your denigrating something just because you don’t understand it; frankly, it reflects more on you than Wittgenstein. Why are you here when you don’t care about it? It doesn’t seem like I can teach you anything.

@Richard B @RussellA @Banno @Fooloso4 @Corvus @Luke

Forgot to tag you all on my Discussion of Witt’s term “Use” above, if anyone still thinks we are getting anywhere (or can).

Sure, but this language game (the uses) learned from a community is not some Platonic "thing" but is rather the various instantiations of understanding in each individual (internally). Thus the beetle-box actually seems at odds with this, as if internal understanding doesn't count here. — schopenhauer1

Internal understanding counts to the extent that it can be demonstrated externally. We say that a person understands something to the extent that they are able to demonstrate their understanding. In fact, the external demonstration is all that we usually (non-philosophically) mean by "understanding". Whatever internal understanding there is "left over" that cannot be demonstrated, or that is not included in an external demonstration of understanding, is irrelevant to the meaning of "understanding". Like Wittgenstein's beetle, the internal aspect of understanding itself "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the meaning of the word "understanding". This is not to say that we don't have an internal understanding or an internal life or any feelings or thoughts or first-person perspective. Only that these private "inner" things do not determine the public meanings of our words.

Use to whom? Surely if you get me a slab, there is nothing beyond me finding it "normal" and you finding it "normal" to do X and X. But it is still just "me" and "you" and nothing beyond that. There is no unifying form of "use". — schopenhauer1

Our finding it "normal" or customary to "do X" is the unifying form of "use". The way "slab" is used in the builder's language game is that one person calls out "slab!" and another person brings them a slab. The same applies to all words, that is, we are trained in their use; we master the (techniques of) language. Whether or not we understand the language is demonstrated by our actions, which may be appropriate/natural or which may demonstrate that we don't understand what was said or that we don't speak the language.

You keep conflating the builder's language with other language games. — Fooloso4

Even the builder has different language games.

All the assistant needs to know is to bring a slab when the builder calls "Slab!". The builder needs to know how to build with slabs, but there are no words for instructing the builder. His knowledge is not based on a language that consists only of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. — Fooloso4

True.

He will not be an assistant unless or until he learns the language. — Fooloso4

You haven't visited the UK.

How do I know that you are pointing to running rather than the runner? — Fooloso4

Certainly not from one example of running, but numerous example of running, all of which have some family resemblance.

The sensation of pain is only accessible to the owner of the sensation. Therefore the observer of the other person's pain doesn't know if it is pain or pretention of pain. The observer can only guess. Meanings learnt from guessings are bound to be empty and unreal — Corvus

This is the reality of life.

Folk have been at pains to try to get you to understand that language games involve both the world and words. It's not one or the other, but both. — Banno

We both accept that there is a "world" in the Investigations, but you're refusing to give your opinion as to where this "world" of Wittgenstein exists.

For the Indirect Realist, it exists only within language and thought, not outside.

For the Direct Realist, the world exists outside of language and thought and is perceived immediately and directly within language and thought.

My understanding is that the Investigations does not give an opinion. There is nothing wrong with this, but it does affect how people read the Investigations.

:wink:

Do you want my opinion or Wittgenstein's?

In those simple terms, I think the better approach is direct realism, after Austin - Many of the words we use refer directly to things in the world. It's a very misunderstood topic. I don't think your characterisation here at all accurate. As for "you're refusing to give your opinion" - I've provided pages and pages of explanation, over many, many years.

But Wittgenstein - the better interpretation is that he shows the realist/idealist division is flawed. That's why anscombe's paper is so careful. But you can find people that put him in either camp.

Idealism is pretty well irrelevant. Wittgenstein to a large extent set up the discussion of realism/antirealism in the nineties and noughties.

This is the reality of life. — RussellA

My point was that Wittgenstein's view on meaning is that, when you make meaningful use of language in your social environment, the language is meaningful.

Not the other way around. Your interpretations of Wittgenstein and PI seem to keep claiming that you must first learn the meanings of words by pointing at the objects in the world.  I didn't agree with that.

Therefore your previous statement and question in the post, that if the barmaid doesn't know what X is, "X me beer." wouldn't make the maid bring the beer to you, was absurd. 

This whole statement is not meaningful because no pub owner would hire a person who doesn't understand the meaning of the word "Bring"as a barmaid for his pub.   You made a senseless statement using an impossible scenario in your and my social world.

Before reading Wittgenstein, I would never have known this type of fallacy. Since reading him, I seem to be able to spot the fallacies like this in daily conversations and posts in the forums.  I find Wittgenstein's philosophy and methodology practical and useful. :D

Even the builder has different language games. — RussellA

No. The builder has one language game. The one described by Wittgenstein. It is, as he said, a complete primitive language. (2)

I think we can agree here. I am not saying we have some a priori definitional understanding per se, just that we need some sort of mental experience for meaning to obtain, period. — schopenhauer1

Well, I wasn't agreeing that experience is required, just that we agree on the mental being experiences.

Before I said that there isn't really anything special about meaning or understanding since it is about "use" and "meaning" is just a specific case of "use" that we have singled out; for instance, saying "the word fish is spelled f-i-s-h" is arguably a use of the word fish which isn't really connected to what we would call the meaning of the word fish. But then the dividing line imo is blurry, constructed, weak. Meaning isn't special, and insofar that it is functional I don't see a reason why experience is required for those things.

When I interact with people, I don't need to know if they have experience or not to attribute to them understanding and things like meaning. Experience is redundant here, since a person with a functioning brain but hypothetically no experience (i.e. zombie, and i am not saying that this is necessarily possible) would behave in exactly the same way. The properties of their understanding comes from the functional neuronal interactions.

I think ultimately this is a difficult issue where someone like myself would more or less end up having to commit to the additional idea that a putative zombie should be attributed as having experiences / it is impossible for them not to have experiences / they are the same as us. But at face value, just by thinking about my characterization of what meaning and understanding is, experience does not seem necessary, purely because the hypothetical absence of experience has no effect.

Again though, I don't think there is anything special about meaning or understanding beyond "use". In this way, the difference in meaning and understanding between, say, me and one of those large language models is not some special, qualitative difference but rather just the extent of the functional capabilities. Im sure some A.I have better functional capabilities in some areas than us (e.g. how you can train A.I. to be exceptionally good at chess or go), but none of them have the functional capacities for the kinds of capabilities we think of as having true understanding of certain things, certainly not sentience. Obviously though this is a kind of continuous scale and as they get better, the divide between what we might call understanding and non-understanding becomes blurred, which is probably why there have been discussions recently about whether large language models have understanding - they are just getting better and better.

Public is a shared internal understanding of use, which is internal — schopenhauer1

Again, I think this is a bit tenuous if the internal drivers of public behavior are redundant. People can have different internal experiences driving the same public behaviour, which they have obviously partly learned publically.

I think there is different layers to "use" - there is the internal state transitions of experiences accessible to me where there is the meaning of pain to me in terms of how my internal experience of how pain experience relates to my own experiences of other behaviors, contexts, consequences, and is meaningless without them. That might include my personal meaning of the word pain. These have external consequences which are perceived through other persons experiences.

Because the word "pain" is learned and used socially and I cannot experience other people's experiences of pain; they could plausibly be different while generating the same behaviors which I perceive in other people and react to - I might even describe my pain to someone and they imagine it differently because of the unique nature of their own experiences (i guess their conceptualizations and assumptions that they learned aocially may even be different if they learn in a slightly different social context to me, though with some overlap).

The observable aspects then contain the bulk of the meaning in the public sphere and how we as communities or societies use this concept of pain. If its possible people have different experiences of pain then how can the word pain be pointing out or singling out some specific pain experience? Even in a single person this might be fuzzier than it seems since I am sure that different pain experiences induce similar reactions in particular contexts and perhaps similar pain experiences may induce different reactions depending on the context. I don't know if there is a one-to-one mapping between particular contexts and pain experiences; and at some point, there must be some generalization involved since we don't differentiate every slightly different pain experience.

I only really see your conceptualization here being tenable in a very sollipsistic way because everyone might have their own different personal meaning. I don't think thats necessarily wrong but maybe describing everything in such a sollipsistic manner seems a bit stunted.

Behaviorist camp where language is a part of an organic system. — Paine

I think behaviorist is quite a bad term imo. What causes behavior? Neurobiology. What are its consequences? On other parts of the physical world. Really, behaviorism is just physicsalism or natural-sciencesism, since an account if behavior and what it is doing is just woefully incomplete without the rest.

My point being is that anyone who is a behaviorist should be incorporating more into their analysis to make it complete (while still consistent with their attitude). If they do thid then they become no different from anyone who advocates for the utility of the natural sciences in explaining the world. Its certainly much easier to do this now when we know much more about neuroscience and related fieldd compared to the early twentieth century.

Uses are an expression or activity’s "possibilities" (#90)—what it is capable of (and not). The purpose of Wittgenstein’s term “use” is not to explain anything, it is part of showing that even the same expressions and activities can have different implications, different criteria, different ways it works, which is to contrast with the skeptic’s desire to have things work one way, be judged to have met one criteria. — Antony Nickles

Right, but see Witt can't get beyond his own dissolving acid. My premise is that WItt's PI has two points, one of which negates the other:

Point I: People's interpretation/understanding/sense of meaning can always be in trouble of being misinterpreted, of being in error. Of being mistaken.

Point II: If 1 is the case, then the best we can get is how the word is "used". But this too (as even you imply here) becomes subject for the dissolving acid. As, just like any other overriding theory of meaning (however deflated you want it to be for Witt vs a grandiose theory of certainty or whatnot), is still not going to get beyond being one's mere solipsistic (private) interpretation of meaning. Use should not even have been offered as a solution. His positive claim has already been wiped away by his negative claim. Use doesn't get a special pass either. The beetle-box does not explain away this phenomenon.

In other words, you can't have it both ways. If every other concept of an overriding theory of meaning gets dissolved, so does "use". You can't go back and say, "But doesn't it seem like use is the all there is?" Of course I can say, no it doesn't. Or perhaps I can say, "sure", but you could have said any concept there perhaps... Since there is no certainty, there is no default (such as "I guess it's just use then!!").

But with some uses of “understand”, there is no “my” understanding, there is no room for it. “If you leave this base you will be courtmartialed. Got it?” “I understand [Yes, Sir!]” and here the criteria (of judgment) is that there will be consequences, whether you understand or even accept them. In fact, most times, when I say something to you in a particular context, there is no question about “your understanding”. It just doesn’t come up because there is nothing to interpret (as intention only comes up when something is weird). — Antony Nickles

Two arguments going on here, so parsing it out:
1) There needs to be an internal aspect for meaning to obtain. If there is no mental aspect, meaning is not meaning. Meaning is something else (a function perhaps, like a program running). Meaning has to somehow have a point of view. Even knee-jerk commands and actions from those commands are had from a point of view.. a "feels like". If it doesn't "feel like" something, then it is not meaning-ful. Even if at some point there was an complete lack of mental-state during some speech-act, as long as later on, someone can look back at it, it has become meaning-ful. If that person lacked a mental state in perpetuity, then meaning was not had for that person. He basically behaved like a computer, he performed a function, he did not garner any "meaning". Actually, I am not even going to let myself get away with "function", because function mplies someone with ability for meaning, has programmed it. I am just going to say, "a state of affairs happened in the universe". I'll give myself enough charity there, but even then...

Ok that is issue 1 (really that was the issue you quoted there). However, I am also saying...

2) Possibly a more important point as to Witt's project... I see people throwing around the words "public" and "practice". But this is dangerously close to becoming Platonic. That is to say, it is proposing (inadvertently perhaps, or even covertly) an existence of something "public". There is no "public" though. There is no respite from the dissolving acid of personal meaning/perception of something. You can't get an escape hatch and say, "Ah, well it's okay, because we now have a public/communal/external/non-private meaning". No, if Witt's Point I is correct (as he constantly tries to demonstrate), then this too fails as a point of meaning. It is simply people acting upon their own perceptions. People can say, "You have heard me correctly. You have done the command I expected.etc", but that doesn't confer a certainty, any more than anything else. Use becomes use-less, because it's a vicious circle. The builder who is expecting the slab, might be pleased, my confirm, might have had expectations met or not met, but that is the builder and only the builder. It is his beetle. The other builder picks up the slab and gives it to the foreman calling out "Slab!". That is in turn "his beetle". What there isn't is "public use" of beetle whereby the boxes drop out, and "just use" becomes some overriding theory.

Wittgenstein’s method is Ordinary Language Philosophy! He is looking at what we say in situations to learn what matters to us about something, as shown in the criteria we judge it by. This is his philosophical data to learn about the issues of knowledge, thinking, understanding, intention, appearance, essence, etc., and, predominantly in the PI, why we want to run away from the fact that our criteria are based on our interest in them, to an abstract, “pure” place where we are removed from the calculation of precision. If you really want to get into OLP’s method, this is the thread. Heaven help us though. — Antony Nickles

Yes, but as I understand it, it was the next generation (like J.L. Austin) that really started that. It represents a positive (systemetized/construction) aspect of ordinary language. But how this itself doesn't then get dissolved by the critical parts, I am not sure.. Now you start having "overriding theories" of language, which starts to look like "ole philosophy" again with its need for certainty. Certain about its ordinary qualities.. but there is a "there" there.

Internal understanding counts to the extent that it can be demonstrated externally. We say that a person understands something to the extent that they are able to demonstrate their understanding. In fact, the external demonstration is all that we usually (non-philosophically) mean by "understanding". Whatever internal understanding there is "left over" that cannot be demonstrated, or that is not included in an external demonstration of understanding, is irrelevant to the meaning of "understanding". Like Wittgenstein's beetle, the internal aspect of understanding itself "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the meaning of the word "understanding". This is not to say that we don't have an internal understanding or an internal life or any feelings or thoughts or first-person perspective. Only that these private "inner" things do not determine the public meanings of our words. — Luke

And this is what I am trying to convey to @Antony Nickles, in my Point 2 above, there is no "external". That becomes each individual's "beetle" determining "what is public use".. Turtles all the way down, baby!

Use to whom? Surely if you get me a slab, there is nothing beyond me finding it "normal" and you finding it "normal" to do X and X. But it is still just "me" and "you" and nothing beyond that. There is no unifying form of "use".
— schopenhauer1

Our finding it "normal" or customary to "do X" is the unifying form of "use". The way "slab" is used in the builder's language game is that one person calls out "slab!" and another person brings them a slab. The same applies to all words, that is, we are trained in their use; we master the (techniques of) language. Whether or not we understand the language is demonstrated by our actions, which may be appropriate/natural or which may demonstrate that we don't understand what was said or that we don't speak the language.

All of these things are said as if there is a Platonic "public" judging this.. It is just people's internal "beetles" judging this.

Again though, I don't think there is anything special about meaning or understanding beyond "use". In this way, the difference in meaning and understanding between, say, me and one of those large language models is not some special, qualitative difference but rather just the extent of the functional capabilities. Im sure some A.I have better functional capabilities in some areas than us (e.g. how you can train A.I. to be exceptionally good at chess or go), but none of them have the functional capacities for the kinds of capabilities we think of as having true understanding of certain things, certainly not sentience. Obviously though this is a kind of continuous scale and as they get better, the divide between what we might call understanding and non-understanding becomes blurred, which is probably why there have been discussions recently about whether large language models have understanding - they are just getting better and better. — Apustimelogist

I mean this just goes back to the "map vs. terrain" debates that are perennial on this forum. A computer with the most advanced algorithms and computations, and even "error checking" mechanisms that are a kind of "self-check", gets nowhere closer to that thing having "meaning" (to itself), because nothing internal made it "meaning-ful". It is just a state of affairs happening. Functions (even ones where intended actions are to be performed and completed), are not meaningful. They are layers and layers of behavior behaving.

This whole statement is not meaningful because no pub owner would hire a person who doesn't understand the meaning of the word "Bring"as a barmaid for his pub. — Corvus

Very true. :up:

But Wittgenstein - the better interpretation is that he shows the realist/idealist division is flawed. That's why anscombe's paper is so careful. But you can find people that put him in either camp. Idealism is pretty well irrelevant. Wittgenstein to a large extent set up the discussion of realism/antirealism in the nineties and noughties. — Banno

Thanks for that. That's what I thought, in that the Investigations takes neither side in the realism/anti realism debate.

A computer with the most advanced algorithms and computations, and even "error checking" mechanisms that are a kind of "self-check", gets nowhere closer to that thing having "meaning" (to itself), because nothing internal made it "meaning-ful". — schopenhauer1

But a brain is just a type of computer working using algorithms in a way that is not qualitatively different to what goes on in machine learning.

I don't even know what "nothing internal made it "meaning-ful"" means when if these machine learning models had the architecture and inputs of a human brain, then they would trivially be capable of doing everything a human brain like you and I could do. They could have this conversation right now like we are about their own concepts of meaning and understanding.

Perhaps I am one of the few on the Forum that is not a ChatGPT. That would explain why words have conscious meanings to me. How can I ever know for sure! Could there be a test to know for sure?

I brought up behaviorism as an example of a kind of theory making that Wittgenstein is not doing. The skepticism applied to the use of universals is not to reduce them to a set of inputs which are sufficient for establishing causes.

Neither is W making an argument against behaviorism that Chomsky, for example, puts forth in his models.

There is a ventriloquism underway in the insistence that a model must be the goal of the enterprise. If only a 'family resemblance' can be discovered amongst different games, the arbitrary nature of chess can be contrasted with how language-games work within certain constraints. To insist that there must be a way they are equally arbitrary is to insist upon the universal set aside at the beginning.

...Witt can't get beyond his own dissolving acid. My premise is that WItt's PI has two points, one of which negates the other:

Point I: People's interpretation/understanding/sense of meaning can always be in trouble of being misinterpreted, of being in error. Of being mistaken. — schopenhauer1

Well, yes, communication can always end up frustrated. But this is not "a point" Wittgenstein is making; it's just the nature of communication, as well as a moral situation, etc. There is no fact or foundation ensuring these practices. But they go wrong in different ways. Apart from someone being "right" in a discussion, I might just give up because the other refuses to concede anything, not even acknowledge points of agreement. ;) That is to say, error is not the only measure, nor is mistake, but yes, things can go sideways, of course. I would think that the fact that things go badly is not a matter of contention.

Point II: If 1 is the case, then the best we can get is how the word is "used". — schopenhauer1

Saying the "best we can get" implies that our ordinary criteria are not sufficient, that they don't work in different but acceptable ways. The standard you are judging that we have not met ("this is as good as we can do compared to...") is a single standard (rather than varied) that Wittgenstein is pointing out is manufactured for a particular reason in the face of the fact of that our world fails, is not resolvable (as discussed above).

any... overriding theory of meaning ...is still not going to get beyond being one's mere solipsistic (private) interpretation of meaning. Use should not even have been offered as a solution. — schopenhauer1

Again, you misunderstand that "use" is not a solution to the problem of, let's call it, our human condition (its possibility of failure), it is not an answer to this truth the skeptic records (nor is it a dismissal, or a cure). It is just a term to point out that an expression can have different importance to our culture (thus different criteria) based on the situation.

1)There needs to be an internal aspect for meaning to obtain. If there is no mental aspect, meaning is not meaning. — schopenhauer1

Maybe we can see that the reason you are digging your heels in here about an "internal aspect" is to record that I have a personal relation to our shared criteria; I can defy our shared expectations, extend them into a new context, court madness, call for revolution, etc. That I matter (me personally, individually). The takeaway of the variety of our ordinary criteria, even that they have different implications (uses, versions) in different situations, is the realization that society’s shared judgments and interests (what has been meaningful in our culture, our lives) are captured and embodied in our ordinary criteria. Usually there is no reason for a conflict with ordinary criteria to come up (there is no need** for "me"), but, as one example, when communication falls apart, it turns on how much these shared criteria matter to me, whether I am willing to be responsible for them, to them--that they do or don't speak for me; whether they are meaningful to me.
**That your picture of "meaning" "needs to be" always present (even when "knee-jerk") is the interlocutor's need, their insistence, which Wittgenstein is investigating.

He basically behaved like a computer, he performed a function, he did not garner any "meaning". — schopenhauer1

The fact that I am responsible for what I say does not require that at every moment I "mean" what I do or say (or "intend" it), as if I always "cause" it, or even that there was anything about it that was personal or individual. Things usually go smoothly; most times no one has to clarify, or dispute, or ask "What?". However, when something strange happens, or we defy those expectations, then our culture’s criteria and the assumed uses of our shared activities (e.g., imploring, apologizing, threatening, etc.) are how we judge what you said, and judge you, at which point you can: clear up the "intention" (from their confused inference), or apologize, or make excuses, or clarify (from how they took it; or under which criteria it should be taken, thus how its meaningfulness should be considered, under which "use"). If we look at responsibility as the duty to respond (be judged) for what we say based on the ordinary criteria of a situation, then the event of my saying it (part of why "expression" is important) simply creates a context of public criteria and the circumstances in which clearing things up is possible (but not guaranteed, assured, certain).

There is no "public" though. There is no respite from the dissolving acid of personal meaning/perception of something." — schopenhauer1

Yes, but this is not a matter of a certain picture ("public", "private"), but of your personal responsibility to be intelligible to me, to put what you expressed within or against our culture’s ordinary criteria. The duty is not a lack of transmission of something within you, it is your responsiveness (you responding) to a confusion in a particular situation. "What did you mean?" is asked because you said something I didn't expect, which is resolved between the situational implications and expectations, not by you looking farther into yourself for a "personal meaning", but that expressions records the fact that you can defy or stretch those criteria.

...as I understand it, it was the next generation (like J.L. Austin) that really started [Ordinary Language Philosophy]. It represents a positive (systematized/construction) aspect of ordinary language. — schopenhauer1

Moore and Austin were doing their thing at roughly the same time as Wittgenstein (Moore published Defense of Common Sense in 1925; the Investigations were published in 1953; Austin published How To Do Things With Words in 1955). Austin and Wittgenstein did not know of each other's work. Wittgenstein clarified Moore's version of OLP by seeing that it is not a matter that "common sense" or the common person's understanding is a better explanation of philosophical issues. He also sees that skepticism (the temptation of it) is an ongoing part of the human condition, where Austin didn't take it seriously.

Apart from someone being "right" in a discussion, I might just give up because the other refuses to concede anything, not even acknowledge points of agreement. ;) That is to say, error is not the only measure, nor is mistake, but yes, things can go sideways, of course. I would think that the fact that things go badly is not a matter of contention. — Antony Nickles

Oh this is like philosophical gaslighting. Most of PI is devoted to ambiguities, misunderstandings, and errors :lol:. It certainly matters to him to demonstrate this as a point, not as an aside.

Again, you misunderstand that "use" is not a solution to the problem of, let's call it, our human condition (its possibility of failure), it is not an answer to this truth the skeptic records (nor is it a dismissal, or a cure). It is just a term to point out that an expression can have different importance to our culture (thus different criteria) based on the situation. — Antony Nickles

There you are again, sneaking in some externality. "Culture" is now used instead of "public" and "practice". Culture is an individual's perception of something. For all I know, what you read from me, is monkey gibberish but accords with your sensibilities somehow and you read it as English. Whatever it is, you can't say that your criteria is from "culture" because that too falls out and is dissolved away... It's only your understanding of culture. And if you want to rant and rave about it and say "rubbish" with incredulity.. go take it up with your prophet-philosopher. You can't get gold by squeezing coal long enough. You can't get to a foundation by appealing to a public sphere of agreement. It is all individuals agreeing, there is no public.

Maybe we can see that the reason you are digging your heels in here about an "internal aspect" is to record that I have a personal relation to our shared criteria; I can defy our shared expectations, extend them into a new context, court madness, call for revolution, etc. That I matter (me personally, individually). The takeaway of the variety of our criteria, even that they have different implications (uses, versions) in different situations, is the realization that our shared judgments and interests (what is meaningful in our culture) are captured and embodied in our ordinary criteria. Usually there is no reason for a conflict with our criteria to come up (there is no need** for "me"), but, as one example, when communication falls apart, it turns on how much these shared criteria matter to me, whether I am willing to be responsible for them, to them--that they do or don't speak for me; whether they are meaningful to me.
**That your picture of "meaning" "needs to be" always present (even when "knee-jerk") is the interlocutor's need, their insistence, which Wittgenstein is investigating. — Antony Nickles

Ok, but the whole "shared criteria" is not a thing. You can't dissolve and then say, "oh no but, ya know, ordinary stuff doesn't dissolve, that is meaning. Just keep the individual meaning part. Again, this isn't my theory. I am just holding Witt to his own standards.

The fact that I am responsible for what I say does not require that at every moment I "mean" what I do or say (or "intend" it), as if I always "cause" it, or even that there was anything about it that was internal (personal or individual). Things usually go smoothly; most times no one has to clarify, or dispute, or ask "What?". However, when something strange happens, or we defy those expectations, then our ordinary criteria and the assumed uses of our activities (e.g., imploring, apologizing, threatening, etc.) are how we judge what you said, and judge you, at which point you can: clear up the "intention" (from their confused inference), or apologize, or make excuses, or clarify (from how they took it; or under which criteria it should be taken, thus how its meaningfulness should be considered, under which "use"). If we look at responsibility as the duty to respond (be judged) for what we say based on the ordinary criteria of a situation, then the event of my saying it (part of why "expression" is important) simply creates a context of criteria and circumstances in which clearing things up is possible (but not guaranteed, assured, certain). — Antony Nickles

I'd bring in ideas of broken tools, but then we are getting into continental philosophy...

But you (Witt) can't hide behind the fact that many times we have no problems and everything goes smoothly. As long as that means nothing about anything we are good. In other words, that can't indicate a grander theory because that would be intimating some sort of path to a "certainty", something that cannot be known.

The duty is not a lack of transmission of something within you, it is a responsiveness to a confusion in a particular situation. "What did you mean?" is asked because you said something I didn't expect, which is resolved between the situational implications and expectations, not by you looking farther into yourself for a "personal meaning", but that records that the fact that you can defy or stretch those criteria. — Antony Nickles

Responsibility for what? What is it an appeal to? We can always be wrong... Common Sense needs to be explained, but it ain't, Blanche! Schopenhauer had a theory of compassion being the basis for ethics.. But that would be a type of "certainty" cause it's a theory foundational. Witt cannot rely on that, now. He's all alone in Solipsistic land. Your attempts are in vain... Appealing to WHAT responsibility? To WHOM? Now you are getting an ought from an is.. a terrible thing for a Witty.. You can't claim no certainty and then appeal to incredulity/common sense and especially not responsibility! Sorry, you claimed uncertainty... you cannot now posit positive statements (we MUST be responsible to understand each other). That would be a foundation!!

Moore and Austin were doing their thing at roughly the same time as Wittgenstein (Moore published Defense of Common Sense in 1925; the Investigations were published in 1953; Austin published How To Do Things With Words in 1955). Austin and Wittgenstein did not know of each other's work. Wittgenstein clarified Moore's version of OLP by seeing that it is not a matter that "common sense" or the common person's understanding is a better explanation of philosophical issues. He also sees that skepticism (the temptation of it) is an ongoing part of the human condition, where Austin didn't take it seriously. — Antony Nickles

Sounds like the main point I had right though.. Witt's own dissolving acid can't be resolved by other OLD systems that are more "constructive" or "foundationalist".



Edit;: Oh and you can't appeal to some reified "public" who will make you an outcast pariah, and "that" becomes the de facto foundation. That is still solipsistic self feeling the affects of whatever is affecting him/her. In other words, I don't dispute the affects (someone is indeed affected by a decision), just that those affects are derived from some ontological entity called "the public". Beetles all the way down, there is no external Platonic thing of "use" even "use in context of a community" or "community". Again, not my ideas, just taking Witt where Point I takes it, despite his assertion of Point II which is negated by Point I.


TL;DR: A full on skeptic can't make the magic move to any appeals to community, common sense, and especially responsibility.

Thanks for that. That's what I thought, in that the Investigations takes neither side in the realism/anti realism debate. — RussellA

Well, that debate occurred long after it was written, so that's to be expected. Trying to understand him in those terms is putting the cart before the horse.

Rather, he dissolves the divergence between idealism and realism. See §402.

Worthy of actually being quoted:

Whereas we are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way than by that man's not having pains. As if the form of expression were saying something false even when the proposition faute de mieux asserted something true. For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. — ibid. 402

I have questioned a lot of your interpretations regarding these topics but I have to agree with this observation.

What's sad is, this thread has spent so much time on the first hundred remarks, but there is so much of great interest in the last hundred that remains unaddressed.

I have been traveling for the last few weeks, and while I read your comments, other things stole my attention. IS there something in particular we might re-visit?

That is a generous invitation.
I will think about it.