virtue ethics tries to answer the question "how do we ought to be ?" while consequentialism, deontologism and other views on ethics tries to answer the question "what do we ought to do ?". — Hello Human

Perhaps what you do is who you are; in which case asking what you ought do is exactly asking who you should be. — Banno

Deontology is an asking of what I should do... in terms of best reason that can be brought to bear * * * I do not see ethics as identical with personal virtue or moral character. — tim wood

I would just add that we seem to agree that a moral moment is a particular situation, say, when we don't know what to do, at the end of the rules or customs, or when our lives conflict with our culture. It may help to say we make the best decision we can based on all the available information--the most rational decision; based on the best methods or highest standards for our conduct. Though a fear remains that our decision is individual or personal, seemingly arbitrary. I would say that in Nietzsche, Emerson, Wittgenstein, and more currently, Cavell, this is both an argument about what to do and our part in that. The decision is not Ought vs. Am, but a realization that I play a part. Not that the reasons I decide upon before acting stand by themselves against society ( as just interests, desires), but that I must be willing to stand behind my acts (or not). We define ourselves (as @Banno points out), but we do not rely on our independence. I am responsible to answer for what I have done, maybe even without fobbing off on a rule or justified value or personal superiority or rationality (though I may have rationale). Cavell puts this that my relation to the world is more than knowledge, Emerson says character is higher than intellect, Wittgenstein asks us to see someone as having a soul (instead of wanting to know it), Nietzsche expresses this as attaining the human (Cavell also speaks of our "voice"). All of this is surrounded by ethical admonitions to look closely at each case, in history, with a context, extended from our rules and concepts and culture, even while turning against it, being adverse to it, beyond it.

I never quite understood why logical positivism kinda faded out of existence and was taken over by a new methodology in science called fallibilism, so named after Popper established it as a better method than verification of conjectures or hypothesi.

In my opinion, it seems that when stating a hypothesis in science, we are guided by existing factual knowledge about the domain or field of study in question, and upon feeling quite confident that it is true with respect to existing knowledge, we attempt to design experiments that (and here I'm not sure) validate(?) or invalidate a hypothesis. — Shawn

I don't have the knowledge to talk much about science, but my reading of logical positivism comes down to the Tractatus and A.J. Ayer's book on language and logic, and J.L. Austin's essays in response and Wittgenstein's response to himself (and the Vienna Circle).

My understanding is that a referential or correspondence picture of language is not refuted by the later Witt nor Austin. The problem they both saw was that it is only a part of language and meaning. Austin will say there are more ways to be "true" than just a statement being true or false; Wittgenstein will discovery that there is a sense of logic (grammar) to every different part of our lives, not just one all-encompassing theory of meaning (as I believe @Seppo already pointed out).

However, even if we simply keep reference to a particular narrow area, there is still the motivation which drove LP, which I believe is alive and well (though in various forms). The certainty and universality; predictability and predetermination that we desire (to refute skepticism) is the criteria that drove LP. That ultimately limited it, but the desire remains as a constant temptation for philosophy (and humans). Wittgenstein attempts to tease out why we want this, but it still infects our understanding of communication, our politics, our vision of knowledge, and, I would think, our science (though, again, fuzzy there). All I can add to the science is something I read by Cavell in The Claim of Reason; he claims that the "factness" of a fact does not come from its correspondence with the "world". Its "sciencey-ness" of completeness, certainty, predictability, etc., comes from the method of science, how well it is done. Thus, we can have the solidity we imagine "the world" gives us, but still incorporate mistakes, changes in course, and even the kind of paradigm shifts which Kuhn discusses; "being wrong" does not crumble everything to the ground because the method of science is the constant thread.

Witt Rules 9/2

If you are talking about "what counts" in the concepts, then you are talking about the criteria of the concepts. — Luke

Yes I am, and I agree. Cavell says Kripke just takes Wittgenstein to be giving rules too much importance. The hard part here is that Witt does examine rule-following as an example (as he does with understanding, thinking), and he is not wrong about the concept, which makes it seem central. Also, it is tempting for rules to clear up our uneasiness with the uncertainty and unclarity of what we say.

I don't make, or intend for, words to have "a public, conventional use". They already have that without me. I only intend how I use them. — Luke

Intend them every time? Not just when we stop and consider how to use our words, but every word is intentional?

Again, how is using an expression "intentionally" not causal?
— Antony Nickles

It is causal. I cause my use of the expression.[/quote]

And this is where I couldn't help but wonder what is happening here. Colloquially perhaps this picture of causing amounts to the same thing when I frame it that we say something, express something, in that there is no evaluating it except against the external practice, in your case, along rules, in mine with criteria in conjunction with, to whom and the place and time in which it is said.

However, there can clearly be right and wrong ways of using these words (such as "dreaming" or "justice") — Luke

A word can be judged right or wrong when they are names or defined. This is also how words together can look like a sentence we understand, as "I am here" (#513), which in that sense cannot be judged as language incorrectly used, though neither can we say we know the importance of the expression from that determination alone. The picture of meaning solely within language does make judgment specific, recursive, and predictable, but an expression is a sentence in an event (in time and place) and criteria are what matters to us in our lives, what is meaningful to each actual thing. The uses of the word justice in its concept are what is just in our lives. Grammar is what is essential about a thing. (#371)

One ought to ask... how the word 'imagination' is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about the word "imagination" as my question is. — Witt, PI # 370

Part of the problem here I think is the method Witt uses. He is looking at or imagining what we say or would say, and he will call that “language” sometimes, so it may seem as if he is only talking about how language works. The method of making claims (they will look like statements) about the implications when we say X, is to, e.g., reveal how we judge that X is the case (grammar/criteria). An example (of an expression in time with a possible context) like when we say "Did you intend to shoot the mule or was it an accident?" (Austin) shows a use of the word "intend", but it also tells us something about (real-life) intention (it only comes up when something goes wrong). A lot of times these claims look like statement about what we can or cannot say: "If anyone says: "For the word 'pain' to have a meaning it is necessary that pain should be recognized as such when it occurs"—-one can reply: "It is not more necessary than that the absence of pain should be recognized." The point is not to explain how language works, but to feel out the limits and logic of the world (our lives in it). (#119)

If we can only know afterwards whether an expression is meaningful, then how can we teach (the meaningful uses of) language to anyone? What is it that gets taught in the teaching of a language? — Luke

It is only when there is a problem that we worry about where an expression fits into our concepts, how it is meaningful, which we learn as we grow up into our lives of actions and judgments and repercussions, etc. Our concept of a thing is absorbed with coming into our culture, being acculturated. I don't tell you (the grammar or rules or explanation of) how to choose something, it is part of our lives. We can, of course, examine what it means to be said to choose something (its grammar), or work out in a particular instance to what extent we could call something a choice, but neither of this is necessary before or after. Sometimes we just have to be an example, #208. #474.

Again:
— Luke

"...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”. — Witt, PI #201

A "way of grasping" that is not "an interpretation" is not meant to make a rule (and thus a word) fundamental, final, but to say that obeying a rule is not to interpret the rule, be an interpreting of it; it is simply the act (event) of applying it in a specific case. Since it is not an interpretation, it does not answer a conflict about a rule, nor eliminate the possibility of interpretation. Though interpretation is not involved at this point in this case, we still express a rule, interpret them by "substitution of one expression of a rule for another". Id. And you still (may) have to justify your action. (In this case, you could point to the rule, but you can have different justifications, as you do when rules are not involved). Of course, justifying how you obeyed the rule as you did may lead to a point where we run out of justifications.

I really don't understand your argument that language (or an expression) is not used. — Luke

I think there is an important difference between a persons's use of words following the rules of our practices or not, and the picture of something said and then resolving any confusion, justification of how it fits into (which use or sense of) a concept by means of its criteria and the situation, and where that leaves us afterwards. Rather than judging whether the use of a word correctly follows the rules for a practice (language), I am judging how an expression, something said, fits into a concept (it's possibilities) based on the concept's criteria, e.g. "How did you mean 'I know'? [what use of "I know" is this?]"

Cavell would say this is placing too much importance on rules, not seeing that rule-following is discussed and then moved on from to show how the grammar of other concepts differs.
— Antony Nickles

Why do you (or Cavell) think rule-following is discussed at all? — Luke

Part of the reason to discuss rules would be to draw a limit around how they differ from grammatical/logical rules. Grammar can logically differentiate between the identity of one thing from another, but they also tell us how something matters to us, what our interest in a concept is.

So I am inclined to distinguish between the essential and the inessential in a game too. The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point. — Witt, PI #564

There's also the grammar of understanding a sentence (#527), seeing as opposed to looking; pain (see index); seeing an aspect pp. 166-177.

can you provide a reference that W shows "how the grammar of other concepts differs"? — Luke

Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.) — Witt, PI #572

To say expectation is a state, is not a "rule"; nor is this a rule for using the word "expect". We do not follow a rule to expect something, but are said to be expecting (in that state). The judgment of that being the case is made by our criteria for expecting, how it differs from waiting, is similar to hoping, etc., we could say, necessarily, there must be the possibility of something going wrong, but this is a categorical requirement, not a rule.

But if the judgment is simply that my use is senseless (wrong), then that does not give us anything to do other than correction (re-conformity) or rejection.
— Antony Nickles

Why do you need something more to do? Nobody complains that breaking a rule of badminton "does not give us anything to do other than correction...or rejection". — Luke

There are some things people disagree about (justice, beauty, the limits of knowledge) where resolving them has to do with more than the application of a rule; though we can even disagree about the application of those, and our justifications possibly come to an end.

Expression is judged on criteria, not rules, and words are (nothing without) concepts.
— Antony Nickles

I think W would say you have it backwards; that concepts are nothing without (the use of) words. Concepts are ideas; mental contents. — Luke

Okay, you need words, yes. Witt's term "concept" is used in the sense of a classification for what we do: apologizing, understanding, knowing, seeing, etc. These are parts of our lives, so concepts are not abstract from that, nor individual nor arbitrary.

And to say, e.g., that "recognizing your fault" is a criteria for an apology does not mean that it is a rule of correctness. The apology may still come off (I may accept it), as you may acknowledge your blame but I may still not consider it an apology.
— Antony Nickles

Why would you not consider it an apology if you accept it as such? Or is your acceptance or rejection about something other than whether or not it meets the criteria of being an apology (i.e. the grammar of "apology")? (Consider PI 354-355 and PI 496-497) — Luke

You may acknowledge your transgression, but, yes, part of the grammar of an apology is that I can reject it. Now, you may be apologizing correctly, and I may be “wrong” in rejecting it, but that is all within what is acceptable, and I may have my own reasons (outside the criteria that identify an apology), only one of which may be that I do or do not feel you are sincere. In this way, I matter more than the rules.

Unless you can provide evidence to demonstrate that Wittgenstein is talking about morality in PI... then the evidence explicitly indicates that Wittgenstein's interest is limited only to grammar. He is not concerned with morality in PI. — Luke

I'm thinking your idea of morality is different. Let's call it the grammar of our ethical situations.

"What is internal is hidden from us."... If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me. — Witt, PI #572

"I cannot know what is going on in him" is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible. — Witt, PI p. 223

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. — Witt, PI p. 152

Examples of Witt pointing out that there is a limit to knowledge (as with apologizing). We do not know the other by knowing what is going on with them. The "reasons for the conviction" make up our moral stance toward the other. Our desire for certainty (that "picture") overshadows our grammatical position--of reacting or not--to someone writhing in pain. This is our human condition of having an "attitude" toward the other (not based solely on knowledge). Say, I treat them as if they have a soul.

I have also said he is setting out an ethical epistemology; that it matters the kind of search we do (that we can't start with a desire for mathematical criteria or a need for rules).

Not falling into the desire to penetrate phenomena (to get at a thing in itself with certainty) #90. Not requiring ideal "mathematical" criteria, but sticking to our ordinary criteria that each concept has. #107 And I believe you have minimized his advice not to take the straight road of purity and the ideal (#420) as that he is merely dispelling the idea of something internal. But the whole point of dispelling that picture is to make people aware of our human desire to want to have something fixed to hang our skeptical hat on (whether internal or external); to admonish us (emphatically, morally) to keep our head up and look around to see the perfect ordinary means of being confidently certain, rather than mathematically so (p.191).

There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts. — Antony Nickles

Which concepts do not involve rules? — Luke

Hard to know how to take this. I don't mean to claim there are concepts that do not involve grammar at all (though see below). But the role of grammar as a gauge for identity, for a thing to be that thing, is judged by what is important in our lives and for our judgments, which cannot be entirely codified in advance in a particular structure (a "rule"), then generalized as part of all language. The grammar of concepts is more varied than simply (only) judging right and wrong (in accordance with a rule), such as what counts in the concepts of thinking, being in pain, seeing more than looking, mistaking, dreaming, guessing thoughts, understanding (as like a musical theme #527), not to mention the differences of the role (and limits) of grammar in the concepts of justice, beauty, virtue, progress, knowing the other's pain, illusion, fairy tales, nonsense poems (#282), etc.

However, even beyond a concept's grammatical requirements, a concept can be extended (#67, #209) into new contexts (because they are expressions of our interest #570), as we may claim something else/more to be essentially significant (as when our lives diverge from our concepts). The totality of conditions of a concept's grammar are not worked out ahead of time (#183). And concepts cannot all be taught by explaining rules, but in some cases only by giving/being an example or by practicing (#208).

It is not grammar that makes an expression "senseless", as if our "using" it wrong makes it not an expression at all (without "sense", as in: lacking "a meaning"). It just is an expression (as, an event), it is we that cannot make out where it fits, — Antony Nickles

To whom is it "senseless" if not we English-speakers? — Luke

The point is that an expression does not carry "sense" (or meaning) or "senselessness", as if within it, but that we make sense of it, or give up, call it "senseless", as in there is no sense of a concept with which we can associate it to see how it is meaningful, not that it is categorically without sense because it does not follow a rule.

But it still has an impact — Antony Nickles

Having an impact is not synonymous with having sense. — Luke

Even if we cannot make sense of an expression, place it within a sense of a concept--its grammar and criteria--a "sense" is not the only gauge or limit or result of an expression (you may just stare and gape #498).

How is the picture of us "using language" not a version of a mental act? — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein defines meaning in terms of use as an alternative to the commonplace picture that meaning is a mental act. You are questioning how use is not a mental act? If use is a mental act, and if 'meaning is use' as W says, then meaning must also be a mental act. This would defeat the purpose of Witt's definition of meaning in terms of use. — Luke

I'm not sure how this isn't entirely circular, but, yes, I am questioning "explaining" "meaning" (let's say, how it always works) as "using" words, as (the act of?) your "meaning" it, or "intending" a meaning, even if my "meaning" is judged by conformity to a practice or convention.

For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Witt, PI #43

Not sure we can have a universalized picture of "meaning is use" when we would only define it that way most of the time. If my use of language in accordance with the rules for a practice is not the only definition of "meaning", then what are the other cases and how can these coexist? My claim is that in determining what is meaningful about an expression, it fits into, or we figure out how it fits into, what is important in our lives, which is "its use" within a concept, i.e., "what is the meaning (of this expression)?" is to ask in which way is it to have significance (between two options of a concept), what implications are we to associate (as we are surprised you are willing to adopt those of the concept that appears to fit your expression), etc. If that is the definition in most cases, then other cases would be where there is no importance and no implications, as in the case of simply referring to an object. Here, "meaning which?" is just to connect a demonstrative (this, that) or point out which object. Another case would be the expression of a definition, such as "The meaning of X will be Y", which would be to say, the meaning is all given, set, decided in and by the expression. There are no questions of context in these cases. Another case would be in which we expect the expression to be intended, chosen, purposeful, as in art, or a speech, as we would then claim something about the speaker "They are meaning to say X".

I suppose I could ask you how using a hammer is not a mental act? — Luke

If the analogy is that an expression is used as a hammer is used (as a tool), it does not follow that all expressions are "used", even though I grant that we can choose what we say, and even can agree that some concepts are (can be) tools, they can do things (as Austin points out), like promising; and that we can even try to do something with an expression, if a concept allows, not as if intending, but subject to failure, though not based on adherence to a rule, but to the other's acknowledgement of its success, like apologizing; or that saying something correctly is not to necessarily cause anything, as when threatening or persuading or truth-telling. Also, a hammer can be a tool, under the concept of hammering, but then so can a rock, though, even if used to hammer, is not then a hammer; and a hammer can be a weapon, but then would we say we have "used it" wrong? broken the rules of hammering? one could say I adhered to the rules for hammering (though on a person), but that is both true and yet seems to completely miss the point, as if to want to determine the meaning by an intellectual act. Maybe the use of the hammer is a foregone conclusion rather than a discussion, but, even so, the judgment of whether it is hammering or bludgeoning would be clear without involving "your" use at all.

How does simply externalizing "meaning" make our part in this picture not still causal (#220)? — Antony Nickles

Because I can't make words mean whatever I want them to mean. But I can use them with the conventional uses/meanings that they have. And intentionally so. — Luke

I agree that we cannot "make words mean whatever we want them to mean", but we also cannot make words mean something they can mean (our want does not factor in). In this picture you are still "meaning" them--using them to (or making them) "mean" some specific thing (here, a public, conventional use). Again, how is using an expression "intentionally" not causal? To take the "sense" or "meaning" out of your head and put it in the world, still leaves you in control of which use is meant, whether done right or wrong. Whether associated with a private meaning or a public one, to use them or to intend them collapses into your "meaning" them--if this is not by some mental process, how? Again, we sometimes choose what we say, but we do not always do so, nor "intend" a use for what we say, as if our intention was always picking which use we wanted.

If you can agree this should not be the picture, I'm not sure why we are still struggling to see that Witt's concept of "use" is not determined, as in caused, by us (beforehand), but determined, as in (in the sense of) figured out in making a determination (afterwards, when necessary), by the criteria for its grammar. — Antony Nickles

How can we know the meaning/use afterwards if we don't know the meaning/use beforehand? — Luke

The use of "knowing", afterwards, is in the sense of figuring out ("Did you intend to shoot that mule?"); and before, that we are not aware ("I didn't know that was offensive!"), that we have not worked out (can not) all the issues that might come up ("It doesn't matter if you believe it's raining, you can't prove it."), we are not aware of all the implications, obligations that are involved. At neither point do we "know" a concept in its entirety, with certainty, in every application (context), even all of its possibilities. Sometimes there will be no issue, sometimes our speech will turn out empty, purposeless, sometimes we do not realize what we have said, sometimes what we say will need to change the world before it can be known, in the sense of taken in.

So our ability to "talk it out" is endless: justifying our acts, making excuses, weighing criteria to be applied in judgment, pointing out relevant context (ad infinitum), settling claims of the grammar of a concept. Those paths may close; the spade may be turned. But that does not end our relationship in continuing to resolve our differences (creating a new world--projecting a concept into a new context; standing in place of our words, whether mad or "before our time" or futility. — Antony Nickles

You're talking about what can happen in the future, as if a language-game or a game like chess is played according to all the rules over time that a game has had, does have, or will have in the past, present, and future. There might be conventional uses/meanings in the future which are not currently conventional uses/meanings, but that doesn't mean they have any meaning or use to us now. Should we postpone Wimbledon until we know what all the rules of tennis will be? Can we not decide whether or not a move in a game is legal (or makes sense) now? — Luke

I am not talking about the world (necessarily) changing after we say something, but that the discussion of how an expression is meaningful, if necessary, begins after something is said. The implication you assume is exactly the picture of rules for use that imagines we know all of the applications of a concept ahead of time, as if to resolve every discussion except whether we "used the expression" correctly. And there are games in which we can decide or agree to the legal rules beforehand, they just aren't all our varied life measured differently for each kind of thing (concept). Chess or tennis have rules, but those rules are not the grammar for their identity, but just, rules, for a game, that we agree on so we completely know what to expect with certainty. In this sense, they use (some of) the same criteria as "mathematical" rules. Basically, these example do not generalize to all concepts. Cavell would say this is placing too much importance on rules, not seeing that rule-following is discussed and then moved on from to show how the grammar of other concepts differs. But some people latch on to rules because they satisfy the desire for certainty and evaluation and prediction, etc.

If we imagine language as driven by rules, then, having broken one or gone beyond it, there is not a lack of the ability to make sense, but nothing; we have reached our end. — Antony Nickles

What's the difference in terms of language? — Luke

Maybe part of the problem here is the conviction that what we say does not create a relationship between the speaker and the listener, and, if so, I agree that it may not necessarily (most days there are no misunderstandings, or no one cares at least if there are). But if the judgment is simply that my use is senseless (wrong), then that does not give us anything to do other than correction (re-conformity) or rejection.

We may not know this ahead of time (be aware or have it worked out explicitly, as they are embedded in our lives). — Antony Nickles

You seem to be talking about the criteria of our concepts, while I am talking about the rules for the use of our words. — Luke

I'm arguing those are two competing pictures. Expression is judged on criteria, not rules, and words are (nothing without) concepts.

— Luke

[A criterion] is not part of a theory of meaning, but a modest instrument in the description of the ways in which words are used....‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’ (PI §580)... is a synopsis of grammatical rules that determine what we call ‘the inner’. [...] — Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'

The relegation of criteria to merely a description or synopsis is to overlook that they are the means by which we measure whether a thing is such a thing. They mark what counts, what is considered, what conditions need to be met; they allow for grammar itself. Criteria are not rules; we decide what sense an expression has by holding it up to our criteria for what counts in having said one thing rather than another.

— Luke

To explain the criteria for toothache, for joy or grief, intending, thinking or understanding is not to describe an empirical correlation that has been found to hold...To say that q is a criterion for W is to give a partial explanation of the meaning of ‘W’, and in that sense to give a rule for its correct use. — Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'

Again, hard to say whether B&H need a correlation or something else that "has [to be] found to hold" but, if so, Wittgenstein does not remove the possibility that nothing will hold (us together). And to say, e.g., that "recognizing your fault" is a criteria for an apology does not mean that it is a rule of correctness. The apology may still come off (I may accept it), as you may acknowledge your blame but I may still not consider it an apology. So to say my contrition is an "explanation of the meaning of" an apology is to discount or limit what is meaningful to me, or in this situation, in exchange for a rule that dictates to me, over, say, my authority; skipping over, me.

— Luke

Philosophical questions commonly concern the bounds of sense, and these are determined by the rules for the use of words, by what it makes sense to say in a language. This is the source of philosophy’s concern with grammatical rules. For by their clarification and arrangement, philosophical questions can be resolved, and philosophical confusions and paradoxes dissolved. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

This paints the picture that we can clarify and arrange the rules for what makes sense regarding our questions, then they will be resolved as confusions or dissolve. Again, this puts our agreement about expressions ahead of the occurrence of an expression, now, by me, here, to you. It may be nothing, or it may be a philosophical moment, where we do not know how to understand the other, continue with our conversation; it may be a moral moment, where what I do in response defines who I am. None of these things are possible in a world where everything is agreed to ahead of time and all our questions are already answered, or deemed senseless, or confused.

— Luke

That a person’s action is rule-governed, that he guides himself by reference to a rule, is manifest in the manner in which he uses rules

(3) The explanatory aspect: [...] An action is explained by giving the agent’s reason why he acted as he did, and the rule which the agent follows provides part or the whole of his reason [...] — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

Our justifications for acting only consist of pointing to rules to the extent a concept involves rules as part of its grammar. As they admit, even then a rule may only provide part of our rationale. We may also qualify our acts with excuses (mitigating our responsibility), extenuating circumstances (pointing to the context), etc. These are not judged as whether we rightly or wrongly followed a rule.

(4) The predictive aspect: The mastery of rule-governed techniques provides foundations for predictions. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

B&H's claim is ambiguous as to who is doing what, when, but let's take it that the foundation on which you or I make a prediction is "mastery of rule-governed techniques". One sense is that how correct I am at predicting you is how well I know the technique--that I am predicting whether you have mastered the technique. But this picture of the certainty of prediction is taken from science's ability to reproduce an outcome based on a fixed method. Wittgenstein has many examples and claims about predictions. At pp. 223-224 he is discussing guessing at thoughts, and claims "the prediction contained in my expression of intention (for example 'When it strikes five I am going home') need not come true, and someone else may know what will really happen.... my prediction (in my expression of intention) has not the same foundation as his prediction of what I shall do, and the conclusions to be drawn from these predictions are quite different." Here there are (at least) two foundations for prediction (even just of intentions). My prediction of what I will do is a hope, a goal, the foundation of which is in a sense a promise to you or myself. This goes wrong not because I don't know what intending or promising is, but that I may break that promise or be kept from it. Your prediction of my action is based on, at least, your familiarity with me ("They always say they'll leave but then they say goodbye to everyone") and/or my knowledge of the context ("They've got too much to do before five"). My "certainty" in this is not my knowledge of the practice of promising (though that may be the threshold, it is not determinate), nor, say, of "meeting a deadline", but that I am certain, as in: resolute, sure of myself, as confident as I am "of any fact", as in: "I would bet money that....", will hold to my conviction, shutting my eyes to anything else (p. 224).

(5) The justificative aspect: A rule is cited in justifying (and also in criticizing) an action — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

This is to want a rule to ensure the correctness of our acts (if we have prepared with mastery); to know we are doing the "right" thing because a rule is the kind of thing that justifies an act definitively, completely. A rule can be cited as justification for an action if the concept of the act allows ("I have freedom of speech!" (a law) or "Freeing Kuwait was a Just War" (based on Christian morality), but not all actions are associated with rules. Say, running into the street during traffic is an action, let's call it risking your life, but we do not have a rule to justify it, make it "wrong", unless that makes it simply frowned upon. We could say it is justified if we risked our life to save another, but that is not a rule, there is no foundation of a mastered technique.

(6) The evaluative aspect: Rules constitute standards of correctness against which to ‘measure’ conduct as right or wrong. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'

And this is full circle, which is either that if I have mastered the technique and follow the rule correctly and can ensure that I am right, or it is basic moralism, as, in breaking the rule, I have no other recourse, and so not, possibly misunderstood, but wrong. Nietszche is rolling over in his grave.

Beautiful prose, although I don’t understand all of the allusions. — Wayfarer

Well thank you. Though it's not very analytic of me, all the imagery made me think along those lines. I'm happy to draw out or cite any of the analogy/metaphors.

My feeling about The Enlightenment is that its aim is to bend the world to our will and to make ourselves the arbiter of truth, rather than seek a truth to which we must conform. — Wayfarer

I was mirroring that sentiment in saying, roughly, we impose the criteria for certainty on knowledge, such as universality, predictability, predetermination, abstraction, etc. I feel as if interpreting Plato's forms as metaphysical lost Socrates method, ambition, and aspiration for virtue rather than our modern idea of knowledge.

the spirit of our age is deeply inimical to his kind. We threw the baby of wisdom out with the bathwater of religion. — Wayfarer

I would offer that the culprit is the desire for the outcome (certainty) that science provides, that the same outcome can be reached by anyone, so not only does it have nothing to do with our interests and commitments, but the process does nothing to make us a better person.

If you type in a search for a book or author in Google and then add "Filetype: PDF" after it you will only get links to PDFs (for the most part).

here is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything. — Socrates

we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free — Socrates

liberation from [the ignorance that binds us to] the round of birth and death — Wayfarer

Socrates does speak of the “loosing”, or “setting free” (lysis, apolysis) of the soul — Apollodorus

These conflicting ideas: of the prohibition on ourself (our ego, which would urge us to act), by ourselves, that binds us, in chains, corrupted by our body (politic), or that traps us, in a cave, turned from our truth; and: of the freedom to act, but only if necessitated, from outside ourselves (beside ourselves Thoreau says; our next self Emerson echoes), as an attitude (a chosen position) to our expressions that keeps in mind the end (or death) of the passive reception of our open-ended intuition, because a word is a kind of violence, which kills (the other aspect) as much as it births, so we only speak if we must, if our duty requires it (that Arjuna kill his brother, that Emerson shun his mother and father). Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, definitively makes statements, seemingly factually. But there is also a feeling of extreme restraint, as if he is reluctant to speak (too humble to say "I know") unless he is absolutely certain. Now our understanding from at least the Enlightenment has been that knowledge is that of which we are logically, rationally, validly, emperically certain, but what if our soul is voiced (made "I am!") only when we are certain of ourselves, confident that we have settled the terms of our act, not ignoring its implications, but fated to its consequences, willing to be held responsible, to appear foolish or arrogant or insane, resolved to answer for our need to act, even with our death.

I think [that philosophers are no different than the ordinary person] is very true in a general sense. However, Socrates is advocating the institution of philosopher-kings as a ruling class. So he seems to believe that the philosophical citizen is in some ways better qualified (and therefore entitled to authority) than the nonphilosophical. — Apollodorus

I always saw The Republic not (at least, not just) about how a city should be put together and ruled, but as an analogy for us, individually. Socrates is helping us learn about our practices and ideals. He wants us to be a better person. So the book is about what we are made of, how we ought to rule ourselves (claim authority over our self), what virtuous conduct is in the search for wisdom.

Stanley Cavell makes an interesting case that Socrates is not claiming to have a special or different kind of knowledge. The Apology begins, not with a boast (claim) of Socrates, but that “ 'not mine is the story' that I will tell; rather, I will refer it to a speaker trustworthy to you. Of my wisdom, if indeed it is wisdom of any kind, and what sort of thing it is, I will offer for you as witness the god in Delphi.... Chaerephon... asked [the oracle] whether there was anyone wiser than I. The Pythia replied that no one was wiser."

Cavell takes this as saying that Socrates is not claiming a better position than us. Socrates does not know anything that anyone else cannot see for themselves. The philosopher is not different than the ordinary person; we all have equal authority to make and accept claims. He has nothing better to tell than any other, such as an all-convincing explanation (with the authority of knowledge/logic/science); he is a barren midwife, unable to conceive. The point is that we must all see for ourselves whether a claim has merit; come to it ourselves. We reflect on our practices (remembering he will call it) and draw out the implications of examples (much as J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein did), and, in the process, we become aware of the terms and conditions upon which we speak and act, and, in the process, know ourselves better, are better people for it.

So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with the picture of acting/speaking "in accordance with the meanings that they have" which is manifest from that same desire to have the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).
— Antony Nickles

I think this is confused. Language does have rules (grammar) even though it is not "everywhere bounded by rules"; even though the rules are not "complete". — Luke

I think we're just pulling loose threads now, but I am not saying that the picture of language controlled by rules, is that they are necessarily bounded and complete; that is the "mathematical" desire for rules (the ideal). It is that desire that creates the picture of our "meaning" expressions. There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts.

The rules of language (that we are taught when we learn language-games) include how to use words "in accordance with the meanings that they have". And there are right and wrong ways to use them, otherwise any combination of words would make sense and none could be senseless (i.e. otherwise there is no grammar). PI 500 indicates this is not the case. — Luke

It is not grammar that makes an expression "senseless", as if our "using" it wrong makes it not an expression at all (without "sense", as in: lacking "a meaning"). It just is an expression (as, an event), it is we that cannot make out where it fits, with which sense of a concept (a different idea of "sense"). But it still has an impact (#498--imagine modern art which is yet to be understand because its context is too new, there is no known form of the art so the grammar of art comes to an end--but is it then "wrong"?). It is us drawing the boundary(#499), perhaps excluding the other or the expression--not automatically for not following a rule, but purposefully--(#500), as we are inclined to (possibly) leave the student with the exasperation of "This is simply what I do." (#217), or not abandon them.

'Meaning is use' views meaning in the "right light", rather than thinking of meaning as a mental act, — Luke

How is the picture of us "using language" not a version of a mental act? How does simply externalizing "meaning" make our part in this picture not still causal (#220)? (If you are "using language", where/how is the "using" process happening?) If you can agree this should not be the picture, I'm not sure why we are still struggling to see that Witt's concept of "use" is not determined, as in caused, by us (beforehand), but determined, as in (in the sense of) figured out in making a determination (afterwards, when necessary), by the criteria for its grammar. Other than this sticking point of realizing "the use" is not our "using" (either causing or choosing), the only other thing hanging us up would be, in a sense, the timing (ruling before, or judging after) which affects the process of judgment. (Baker and Hacker do not appear to address the final paragraph of #81 (merely suggesting we compare the regular use of language with the ideal). In that last bit, Witt says that we must get clear about our picture of "meaning" to see why that leads to the idea of operating a calculus.)

What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?
— Antony Nickles

If you're talking about beyond the rules of language, then the answer can't be "more language" or "let's talk it out", because there is no sense beyond the rules of language (i.e. grammar). Grammar is the bounds of sense. — Luke

I will grant that a concept's grammar is where/how we begin our process of judgment, but they are not determinative, pre-determined bounds. It is us that may not know what to do with an expression (what sense it may have), still us that decides if we continue past the logic of grammar. Grammar does not justify or limit our expressions (see above). So our ability to "talk it out" is endless: justifying our acts, making excuses, weighing criteria to be applied in judgment, pointing out relevant context (ad infinitum), settling claims of the grammar of a concept. Those paths may close; the spade may be turned. But that does not end our relationship in continuing to resolve our differences (creating a new world--projecting a concept into a new context; standing in place of our words, whether mad or "before our time" or futily. We may court rejection or irrationality, but we are not doomed to it. This is exactly the point of the essay. If we imagine language as driven by rules, then, having broken one or gone beyond it, there is not a lack of the ability to make sense, but nothing; we have reached our end.

"The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is fixed in advance, so, not like rules.
— Antony Nickles

You seem intent on talking about criteria instead of rules. Are you talking about ordinary rules or ordinary criteria? — Luke

When Witt refers to the ordinary he means all the criteria that are not "mathematical" (except for "mathematical" concepts). Mathematical criteria would be complete, universal, certain. etc. Criteria is a part of grammar; they are the measure of our judgments about a certain concept: whether we have made an excuse, the things that count in being said to have an opinion (#573), making a mistake (#51), reading (#159), recognizing you have raised your arm (#625)--roughly, of having satisfied what is essential to us about a concept (its grammar). We may not know this ahead of time (be aware or have it worked out explicitly, as they are imbedded in our lives).

But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as a moral obligation.
— Antony Nickles

Do you have a reference? — Witt, PI 520

All the talk of the sublime, logic, wanting to know another's pain (with certainty); basically the entire struggle with the Interlocutor and the reason we need to look and see the individual grammar of something rather than give in to our desire to have a generalized understanding.

I'm not sure I would call that "reading between the lines" so much as the big picture. Witt does not say things directly because they won't matter unless you see it, come to it, yourself. There are tons of backwards, hinted statements and questions left to be answered by us. He is also the writer of the Tractatus, so he still will not allow himself to say something he is unsure of, so that leaves a lot of ground covered only about how we go wrong, removing generalized explanations, but where we go from there is wide open, left unconstrained.

There is also the implications of his discussion of aspect blindness and that knowledge is not our only relation to the world.
— Antony Nickles

How is aspect blindness related, and do you have a reference for the knowledge part? — Witt, PI 520

Getting into this is for another time, but, if you're interested: If we cannot see something as something (p. 213), then we may want to "know" (be convinced) that someone is in pain (p. 223), rather than react to them as a person in pain (one aspect of the same thing skipped over by another; here, us). We may not treat them (have an attitude towards them) as someone who has a soul, in wanting to have knowledge that they do (proof for our opinion)(p. 179). That our eyes are shut (p. 224) by our conviction for certainty (p. 223).

The philosophical realization is that our lives involve what interests us, what matters to us, what our justifications look like, what obligations we have, how we judge, are accused, make excuses, etc. What careens us from "objective" to "subjective" is the fear of the fact that there is nothing stopping us from disagreeing about moral issues. Wittgenstein threads the needle with a few things. One being the solidity of us all being human, our culture, our language, etc., which people could intellectually pick apart if it were a moral theory, but Witt shows that every little thing (say, that I listed) has its own criteria, own ways of being rational; and, because of that variety and specificity, if and when we disagree, there is some mutual history to extend from (not manifest from thin air) and we have ways of working out our differences (which may be personal, but rarely secret--apart from anyone). Finally, that when we express ourselves, or judge the other, we are doing it, each separately, we are responsible, we define ourselves in that act, we are answerable, we stand for something. So we may end up disagreeing, but we at least have the ability to develop what our rationale are and what our position will mean for who we will be in saying it, and thus we have the possibility to respect the other for taking their position even though we disagree.

e.

I think I understand what you are getting at now with your distinction between "mathematical" and "ordinary" rules. Wittgenstein refers to these as "calculi with fixed rules" and "the rules of a game" respectively (see PI 81). — Luke

We're in the ballpark. "The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is not fixed in advance. There are of course other kinds of rules than “mathematical” ones — But it is the desire for rules like math that Cavell is saying leads to Kripke’s picture of a rule-driven language (a complete system).

We do not invent their meanings, we learn their meanings. And we learn to use them, and do use them, in accordance with the meanings that they have or can have. It is a mastery of a technique; a practice. — Luke

So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with the picture of acting/speaking "in accordance with the meanings that they have" which is manifest from that same desire to have the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also be clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Witt, PI # 81

Wittgenstein is saying that the picture that we "mean" sentences (use them) is what leads us to think language operates on definite rules. That picture of langauge comes from an aspiration for langauge to operate like math, sublimely.

We obviously do use words, and we use them to mean this or that. — Luke

Well, again, I agree we do choose words (sometimes) and we do say them (in a context), what else is happening? what else does "us using words" look like? if we are using words to mean something, are we always using them? "mean" them every time? does it really change anything if we simply move the same picture of "meaning" from some internal process to something external (rules)?

A game is "not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 100), but it is still a game "for all that" (PI 68). Wittgenstein repeatedly compares language to games, and speaks of language as having rules (e.g. PI 84, 100, 125, 133, 549, 558). — Luke

At least we see that a concept does not operate with a complete set of applications already worked out. The judgment that the game is tennis (in this case) is not made by rules (but by criteria), even though there are rules to tennis (which one has to be broken or removed for it to not be tennis?). And if we do not have a complete system of rules (#133), then how can rules be the (only) way language operates? What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?

Consider this analogy: in chess, no individual decides or determines the rules (the allowable moves; the grammar) of the game on their own, but individuals can and do decide the moves that they make from among all of the allowable/possible/meaningful moves. This is analogous to choosing/using one's words (to speak meaningfully). — Luke

emphasis added

Well, in chess we choose every move, we deliberate over it, we consider the consequences, etc. We do not have this self-consciousness with most things we say or do. Only when an expression or action is not straightforward in the context, is there a need afterwards to sort out what use of a concept applies--not beforehand by the rules, or in you "meaning" some use. Yes, we do not decide the grammar of a concept, but we also can not ensure which use our words will have. We may want to make a request for the salt, but our emotions, or ego, or my authority over you (and whatever else comes into play of the context) make my expression a command, despite and apart from my desires and intentions.

However, I still disagree that morality is a significant theme of PI. — Luke

Making the discussion about rules so important definitely makes any ethical or moral themes seem insignificant. But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as a moral obligation. The pursuit of knowledge of our lives through an investigation of our language, learning about ourselves, the other, can be done in an ethical manner, attending to each grammar for each different thing, or tainted by the desire for an all-inclusive answer.

e.

I think I understand what you are getting at now with your distinction between "mathematical" and "ordinary" rules. Wittgenstein refers to these as "calculi with fixed rules" and "the rules of a game" respectively (see PI 81). — Luke

We're in the ballpark. Yes, it is the desire for rules like math that Cavell is saying leads to Kripke’s picture of a rule-driven language (a complete system). "The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is not fixed in advance.

We do not invent their [ word's ] meanings, we learn their meanings. And we learn to use them, and do use them, in accordance with the meanings that they have or can have. It is a mastery of a technique; a practice. — Luke

So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with picturing acting/speaking as done "in accordance with the meanings that they have" because criteria are not rules; judgment is whether you have met them, not whether you followed them, the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).

quote="Witt, PI # 81"]All this [ impulse to the ideal ] , however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also be clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means orunderstands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.[/quote]

So the picture that we "mean" sentences (use them) leads us to think language operates on definite rules. And that picture of language comes from an aspiration for langauge to operate like math, sublimely. So we must attain greater clarity about meaning.

We obviously do use words, and we use them to mean this or that. — Luke

Well, again, I agree we do choose words (sometimes) and we do say them (in a context), but what else is happening? what else does "us using words" look like? if we are using words to mean something, are we always using them? "mean" them every time? isn't this simply to move the same picture of "meaning" from some internal process to something external (rule, practice)?

A game is "not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 100), but it is still a game "for all that" (PI 68). Wittgenstein repeatedly compares language to games, and speaks of language as having rules (e.g. PI 84, 100, 125, 133, 549, 558). — Luke

At least we see that a concept does not operate with a complete set of applications already worked out. The judgment that the game is tennis (in this case) is not made by rules (but by criteria), even though there are rules to tennis (which one has to be broken or removed for it to not be tennis?). And if we do not have a complete system of rules (#133), then how can rules be the (only) way language operates? What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?

Consider this analogy: in chess, no individual decides or determines the rules (the allowable moves; the grammar) of the game on their own, but individuals can and do decide the moves that they make from among all of the allowable/possible/meaningful moves. This is analogous to choosing/using one's words (to speak meaningfully). — Luke

emphasis added

Well, in chess we choose every move, we deliberate over it, we consider the consequences, etc. We do not have this self-consciousness with most things we say or do. And usually only when an expression or action is not straightforward in the context, is there a need (which comes afterwards) to sort out what use of a concept applies--not beforehand by the rules, or in you "meaning" some use. Yes, we do not decide the grammar of a concept, but we also cannot ensure which use our words will have. We may want to make a request for the salt, but our emotions, or ego, or my authority over you (and whatever else comes into play of the context) make my expression a command, despite and apart from my desires and intentions.

However, I still disagree that morality is a significant theme of PI. — Luke

Making the discussion about rules so important definitely makes any ethical or moral themes seem insignificant. But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as an epistemological obligation. The pursuit of knowledge of our lives through an investigation of our language, learning about ourselves, the other, can be done in an ethical manner, attending to each grammar for each different thing, or tainted by the desire for an all-inclusive answer. There is also the implications of his discussion of aspect blindness and that knowledge is not our only relation to the world.

#531 We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other.

#532 Then has "understanding" two different meanings here?—I would rather say that these kinds of use of "understanding" make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding. — Witt, PI excerpts, emphasis added

The concept of "understanding a sentence" is meaningful to us, it matters to us, in (at least) two uses/senses. One is the sense that we can rephrase it to say exactly the same thing. There is another sense--in the concept of "understanding a sentence" (in its grammar)--where we follow something even though there is no other way to express it, as it is said, here, now, to you.

So words have possible uses (senses, varieties, options), but we don't actually choose any of the uses/options? — Luke

Wittgenstein's realization is the first part; the second is a different concept. You seem to see the "possibilities" of a concept, it's uses. And yes we can choose our words ahead of time (as, for a speech, which might help in clarifying the use), and we do say words--express them--(or not say them), but we do not "use" words as in: do not "mean" words. You may understand it as when Wittgenstein realizes that the internal process of "meaning" vanishes, taking with it the picture of us putting "meaning" into what we say, i.e., "using" language. All of this is externalized, so the sense (or use) of an expression is in the expression and context, not coming from us.

An intention is embedded in a setting, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. To the extent that I do intend the construction of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak English. — Wittgenstein, PI # 337 emphasis added

(PI 337)

As Austin will say, intention is only something we ask about afterwards if something is out of place (phishy)--"Did you intend to run that stop light?" So the expectation (only apart from which we may be rightfully be asked what we intented) is in the context (embedded in a setting). Now you can choose ahead of time to fly in the face of convention, but that is the extent to which we intend, mean, cause, etc.

We do not always or necessarily even choose our words before we speak, though questions can be answered about what we said afterwards. To have "spoken thoughtlessly" is not to have chosen our words poorly, but not to have taken into consideration the use for which they will be taken. We are still held to the words we say, even if we only register that this is the kind of thing said here, never considering the use (the grammar of an expression, as we don't for walking).

To the extent we "say" something (can be said to have said something) is how much what we say meets all the varied, ordinary criteria for having said (or done) that thing. Not just the words we say, but in a contex as an event--as in there is an after, in which there may (or not) be questions, determinations, pointing out parts that meet our criteria to differentiate one concept from another, one use in that concept ("I know" in the sense of ("yeah, yeah, I got it") from another, excuses, adaptations, even, but not only, justifications, etc.

But our desire for "mathematical" certainty creates a picture of the power of (necessity for) judgments made previously (rules, moral imperatives) which threatens our ability to see we can continue, to wait, to try again, to listen, without which how can we teach anything new to anyone, try to tell someone something hard to hear, have any hope in a moral moment.

I'm not versed in Ponty, and all I really remember about Sartre was his character put a fork in his hand because he was worried it wasn't his (a different take than Moore). The worry of the other is worse than ours for ourselves. We cannot know them, so we project our uncertainty onto them, making them unknowable, something we can't see. These philosophers are attempting to solve this problem by putting us into a relation with the other, seen/judged, or pushed away from/connected to a body. But there is nothing ensuring the vision of, or connection with, the other. Wittgenstein say that we are separate from the other. Me in my body, you, yours. "The human body is the best picture of the human sole." This is not only to say we have no way in, but that our knowledge can only go so far in relation to the other; that we don't know the others pain, we accept or reject it--we treat them as if they have a soul.

Zoom and social media and useless forums may all "distance us" from each other, but they are nothing to the human power to blind ourselves to the other's humanity, perhaps to even blind their view of me.

...the point being that it doesn't have anything to do with "you".
— Antony Nickles

I didn't mean to emphasize the "I", and I don't know why you think I did. — Luke

I pointed it out for a reason, but not emphasizing "you" as apart from anyone else, but that the way a word has meaning doesn't have anything to do with us, in the way your picture describes.

...an expression can be used (e.g.) as an assertion or as a hypothesis, but which of those possibilities is actualised depends on what a speaker/writer actually does with it (how a speaker/writer actually uses it) in a given instance. — Luke

underline added

Your picture injects the speaker as "the user"; that the use of language depends on them. But "the" use (not "our" use) is a part of language (our lives), not in the speaker doing something, "using it".

#43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Witt, PI

That words are meaningful is not because of how I use a word (or expression), as in the way it is used by me. There is the whole of language, that is to say everything worth expressing or that matters in our lives, and this word has a role, a place. That is its use, not our using; the word's use, as in the word has a use, or uses; Witt will also call them senses (like varieties or options), which depend (mostly) on the context, not upon my intention or my "actualizing" it.

#531 We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other.

#532 Then has "understanding" two different meanings here?—I would rather say that these kinds of use of "understanding" make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding. — Witt, PI excerpts, emphasis added

There are two (at least) "understandings", and Wittgenstein is saying "in the sense of" to clarify/differentiate which grammar for this concept we are discussing. As Cavell discusses on p. 80, the classic idea of the "meaning" (what you also call the "sense") of a word, disappears completely, vanishes.

Of course if there is confusion [about which sense] we can ask: "What did you mean?", but the answer to this falls (usually) within a concept's grammar (its possible senses). Now this is different than saying there are rules and I "used the word" in accordance with its rules.
— Antony Nickles

How is it different? Language is the game and grammar is its rules. — Luke

This is one main part of this essay in understanding the impact of the desire for "mathematical" rules: that the first picture of how language works, the question is asked after, the second way, with rules, is with all applications thought to be completely known beforehand.

Thus, it is not a matter of simply judging whether a rule (aspiring to be mathematical) was followed (unless it is that kind of concept--math, chess, etc.), but understanding/teaching post-expression justifications; the usual context; the extension of the concept into new contexts; making explicit the grammar of this concept; finding out if we are missing something; adding/changing something because our lives have changed.

I think part of the motivation for misunderstanding here is that if we imagine language works on rules, than at the end of justifications for following them, we imagine there is nothing else to do because the point of the rule was to provide a foundation for a kind of certainty to our language, a bedrock. So, if what happens at the end of justifications turns on us, then it will seem our language is arbitrary, uncertain, individual, because of the ultimate contingency on me and you (not for a prior ground, but an ongoing reconciliation).

@Banno help

for Wittgenstein, grammar is about the sense of the words "excuse", "apology", "threat", "pain", "learning", "reading", "talking", "lying", "seeing", etc. Our actions are obviously related to the use of these words, but grammar is not about the actions themselves (independently of the words/concepts). — Luke

Talking about what we imply when we say "I was only following the rule" is to talk about the act of making an excuse, how it works in our lives. To learn about a concept is to learn about the world (and ourselves in it); sometimes they are not aligned, or our words are dead to our culture, or sublimated, but I wouldn't say there is a necessary separation or disconnect, but, if there was one (the spade turned), we could bridge that gap.

What if someone breaks (or fails to learn) the rules of grammar (i.e. the bounds of sense)? This is a "depth" that language cannot "reach" or reconcile. — Luke

My phrasing was maybe too poetic. The point being we can not rely on blaming language for the breakdown. Language does not ensure it, but it makes it possible to reconcile (even to a new culture, an expression in a new context, beyond its usual senses) up to the point we give up. Your example does not foreclose that possibility/responsibility, but the picture of rules running language creates the picture of "bounds" because we want everything neatly applicable and predictable and universal, etc.

I hope you do not intend to argue against Wittgenstein's position, famously summarised as "meaning is use".. — Luke

Well if I understand you to say that: an expression is used, as in meant, by me, somehow related to the action or practice, and that the 'sense of the words' above is just another way of saying 'meaning', then I would say this misses Wittgenstein's radical re-conception of the way meaning works, and that the part that "use" plays is twisted because of that picture, but, no, I don't want to argue that with you.

I can wield/use the words "Pass the salt" as a command/request, for example. — Luke

Ergh, this seems so close, I can't help it. Yes. Here, the sense/use of what you are saying is closest to "I can [ say ] 'Pass the salt' as a command/request", but then what you call "using the words" is just, "saying". But this can also be seen as a grammatical claim: "The words 'Pass the salt' [ can be used ] as a command/request" You are here (almost**) making a claim about commanding and requesting (a difference or similarity); but the point being that it doesn't have anything to do with "you". (**I'm not sure what the grammatical point could be here with this example; maybe that they both involve influencing, here, the act of another.)

Moore's paradox can be put like this: the expression "I believe that this is the case" is used like the assertion "This is the case"; and yet the hypothesis that I believe this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that this is the case. — Wittgenstein PI Sec X emphasis added

The focus on "is used like" is on whether it is: as an assertion, or, as a hypothesis; not on the person "using" a word, but on the possibilities of the expression (the possible uses); you could call these different senses, but it is not the "sense" (meaning) of the expression. Here, part of the grammar of "belief" is its potential to be an assertion, here compared to the (grammatical) fact--or claim, here, really--that part of its makeup is that it can be a hypothesis. Now you can say: "I used belief as a hypothesis" but the focus is on differentiating between the uses that belief has, not that "your use" gave it, or related it to, the "meaning" that it has--you are merely clarifying among the limited options.

So, can you say "I used the word..."? sssuuuure, but that adds nothing to your merely expressing (saying) them (maybe not even choosing them). The uses, those senses, were already there and their meaningfulness doesn't have anything (much) to do with you (not to say they may not be important to you, you may have reasons, clarifications, etc.). Of course if there is confusion we can ask: "What did you mean?", but the answer to this falls (usually) within a concept's grammar (its possible senses). Now this is different than saying there are rules and I "used the word" in accordance with its rules.

That's the discussion I'm trying to have — schopenhauer1

Well we are definitely backing into this, and I still don't think we understand the subject we are actually talking about. The way I was taught to do philosophy is from the ground up, not setting conclusions, or terms, or conditions first. Now, I use examples, even imagined ones, but they have to be in the service of a claim to show something, not just a demand that it must mean something to us. As I said before, if we are talking about the concept of choosing, there are much better examples that tell us more about how that works. I would also think that if we were looking at how having no choice impacts justice, I would go with other examples also.

But if we are actually talking about how justice would function in terms of bringing a child into the world, I would think it is backwards to insist on highlighting the child's lack of choice, rather then simply starting with the parent's responsibility for bringing the child into this world--let's even call it: the willful act of forcing the child to come here, now. Does that exclude the fact that the child does not have a choice? To say it a different way, isn't the fact, that the child has no choice, already, in a sense, in there? and that specifically pointing it out adds, nothing? It, as it were, is not a moral consideration itself, but only a mere fact of the situation--part of what creates the context. Or maybe it is better to say that in a situation of responsibility, one upon which we can be judged (even later by the baby), there are particular moral considerations. Is this one of them? Not: the state of the world, our finances, the possibility of passing on an illness, that the baby may resent what is seen as a selfish act given our simple desire for a baby compared to the eventual impact on them, etc? A category of consideration for what it would mean to be just in this case seems to be: weighing having the child against our situation (including our desires and opinions). That someone asks the parents (or they ask themselves) "Why would you want to bring a child into this world?" Taking into consideration all that and more, if we say to the parents "But the baby has no choice!", what difference would it make? i.e., why say that?

The conditions of having choice (as any other condition, PERIOD), is from being born, so not sure about that underlined emphasis there — schopenhauer1

You are mixing together "condition" and "causality". We would say birth puts us in a condition, or position, but not that it determines or forces anything (or whatever you imagine causality to do).

So here's my big takeaway — schopenhauer1

You appear to be attempting to critique an imagined situation where people somehow see this unremarkable (everyday) event as an actual consideration (in what is unclear) and then "change the debate" and "glaringly skip over" a fact that sheds almost no light on either the concept of choice or the human condition.

If you actually wanted to make the case, say: how parents are responsible for the choice they make in bringing a child into the world, this world, their inadequate world, and the possible justifications and qualifications, this is currently not that discussion.

But your birth could never have been a choice you made. Is it just that that choice is made for you. There was no choice to opt out, and here is something more important possibly than any other decision and you could never have made it for yourself.

It brings up another question, just because all choices X are due to the condition of being born B. Does having choices X as a consequence of B, justify B which itself was a condition that did not even allow for choice? Is simply having the ability to make choices X override the first (possible) injustice of B (never having a choice for the whole course of life itself, which granted have subsequent choices one can make)? — schopenhauer1

Categorically, Kant would say; Grammatically, Wittgenstein would say: something you have no say in is simply not a choice. Can not BE a choice, considered as a part of a moral action, nor as part of what in our lives anyone would call or recognize as a choice--none of why it is a choice apply: there is no responsibility, there are no options, I have no authority, no one can rightly accuse me of the act (or not being able to act). There is force, oppression, servitude, etc., any number of things that make it so there is no possibility of it being a choice, including any number of fantasy situations which you want to create, say, I am completely paralyzed and no one knows, the entire world does not register my acts or speech, including "not being born".

Thus, your imposition (and continuing) idea of causality is manufactured as a backwards version of the part that responsibility plays in choice. If we take you seriously, the condition of being alive makes you responsible, as anyone is, but your choices are not caused by your birth. You are in the condition of answering for yourself (even if you do not choose); you may want to abdicate that responsibility, but then are you alive? are you (being) human?

the possibility of meaning something by a sign is dependent on the existence of a practice external to the individual meaner, and that what this individual means by a sign on any given occasion depends, at least in part, on this external practice. — frank

The answer to your question is that there is a desire for knowledge to take the place of acknowledging the other person. But the above explanation takes the same desire for looking inside someone to create a picture of how we express ourselves only moving "meaning" to something external.

"Behaviorism.. emphasized the outward behavioral aspects of thought and dismissed the inward experiential."

I could go down a rabbit-hole to try to correct everything wrong with these pictures of our relationship with language, only to say that Wittgenstein was trying to remove our fixation with "meaning" being a thing either inside or outside--our desire to know that; internally, to actually salvage our ability to be individual, personal, secret; and outside, to show how we are responsible for what we say and do.

I think this brand of externalism leads to behaviorism and a pending collapse in meaning of any kind anywhere. How can this be avoided? — frank

I think the sense of loss is the continuing desire for knowledge to contain our entire relationship to the other. The most powerful image I've come across is that we do not know the other person's pain, their pain makes a claim on us that we either accept or ignore. Our relationship to the world is more than (just) knowledge.

this methodological challenge to the scientific bona fides of consciousness (on behalf of empiricism) — frank

So we continue to search for a way (as it were into, or past, the other) that does not involve our actually engaging the other, and, in doing so, turn their actions into movements, their words into sounds. We are entirely separate, but still capable of expression, response; though our impulse is to find something to take our place.

This is the criteria that Cavell is describing as "mathematical", which he believes Kripke is aspiring to impose on the grammar of all concepts, any action.
— Antony Nickles

Grammar applies only to language use, not to "any action" - unless you have a reason to think otherwise? — Luke

Yes, that is literally the kind of claims he is making. That the structure of our language and that of our lives are (usually, for the most part) them same—this is carried from the Tractatus but a different kind of form for each thing, each type of act; and we are looking for its “logic” (on its terms) rather than imposing a fixed criteria. A grammar for excuses (Austin), for apologies, for a threat, for acknowledging pain, for treating someone as if they have a soul, for raising one's arm, for justifying or disagreeing. Grammatical comments highlight the criteria of a thing—what is essential for it to be that thing: learning, mistaking, reading, talking, lying, seeing, etc.

We are taught both how to wield words and how they are meaningful in our lives. — Luke

Our lives are meaningful, and we learn words (moreover, concepts) in coming into our culture, acting, failing, interacting, becoming part of everything everyone does. Again this picture of "meaning" is getting in the way. Our expressions, as our lives, don't have a "meaning" attached to them; part of the confusion Witt recognizes is that we believe that since we can give a definition ("meaning") for ever word, that this is how all language works (reference/correspondence).

...and that right and wrong are simply a matter of obeying the rules or not...
— Antony Nickles

But they are. Otherwise, there is no rule. — Luke

To obey a rule is to obey it correctly (do it right) or wrong (fail to obey it). Justifications can differ as to why we obeyed it, and we can argue about what it means to have (rightly) obeyed a particular rule, but what is right and what is wrong are not contained/decided by rules (unless they are set by us--laws, commandments, etc.). To have correctly apologized is not determined by the application of a rule, it is judged by those accepting the apology (at least most importantly), depending on the injustice and other criteria (sometimes or not, depending on the situation; though if it's threshold grammar is broken, I may not accept it as an apology at all).

So we do not have to be answerable for the action; we can point to the rule as the answer of why we did the action, abdicating our responsibility to be intelligible to the other, respond to their claims on us about what we have done.
— Antony Nickles

I do not understand how we "abdicat[e] our responsibility to be intelligible to the other" by following rules. — Luke

If I am following the rule, I may only have, "I was following the rule." And so cannot explain, detail, qualify, defend, make explicit, distinguish, or justify myself, except as to how I believe following the rule is done and that I did it.

Aren't we responsible both for following rules and for not following rules (that is, once we know the rules)? — Luke

You can hold me responsible for the act, and for my choice to follow the rule (though, in following the rule, if I judge the rule as irresponsible, I am not obeying it (#222)). And I can claim I was following the rule as an excuse from the guilt/wrong, but Kripke's society is judging my having followed the rule or not, not whether the rule itself is right/wrong (judged even for following it). But, again, the point is that the desire and temptation (the aspiration Cavell says) for a purity in our language/acts, is just the wish (particularly in philosophy) to remove ourselves (have action based on abstract universal reason or knowledge or rules, not on me).

In terms of intelligibility, I would say that following the rules (e.g. in chess) is what allows us to make ourselves (our moves) intelligible to our opponent — Luke

If I am behaving as expected there is no need to make myself intelligible (as we don’t ask after intention unless something phishy happens). If you have broken the rules of chess and I tell you, and you claim you did not, you must explain yourself if we are to go forward, together. For you to explain in what sense you intended, or so that you know what is at stake and have a chance to qualify what seems inexplicable from my position. This may come to our being unable to reconcile, however, as Cavell will say elsewhere about it: though we are endlessly separate, there is no depth to which langauge can not reach, and we are answerable for everything that comes between us.

You cannot select the option for no option. — schopenhauer1

If I take this seriously (not just as a trick question simply setting its own rules), literally (to mean what it is saying), as: a claim about how options work, how working with options works, what it means to choose between them, when we are free and when constrained, what context makes something an option, a choice, I feel it misses that, ordinarily, selecting no option is just part of what a choice involves. Depending what the options are (for whose judgment, under what authority, i.e., how optional), and, more importantly, why we are being given options, what is our goal? on this, and more, choosing no option may be the best option, or we can be in a place where there is no option, as when we have no choice (which can be an excuse).

But this could be said to try to capture the sense that, even if we do not choose an option, if we do nothing, we may still be subject to judgment. Now to ask if it is just when we are forced to make choices, I feel we would mostly say no (I'm sure there are), but whether it is just to be held responsible for the options we choose, even responsible for not choosing, is a matter of our being answerable to the other, which I would say we would almost always see as at least a possibility (except perhaps the personal, secret). Of course, judgment on options on a menu are different than those which reflect who you are and/or what someone else might think of you/do to you. We could say unjust judgment here ranges from rude to guilty without proof. We may not have consented to be answerable, or at least to you. The judgment may be moralized; decided before the choice. But injustice may also be done by the chooser even in not choosing, if only to oneself.

I will say that we are born into a world of already-existing options, history, judgments, freedoms, consequences. There is no option out of this other than to abandon human responsibility entirely (which is all too human).

I have a question which has puzzled me for a long time. Why does Nietszche dislike Socrates so much. He criticizes him for setting Western thought on the wrong path. Nietszche preferred the presocratics. Isn't there a little bit of similarity between the two of them in the sense that both are skeptical of system and theory building in philosophy and neither are propounding any doctrine. I think Socrates method is a very good one , the idea that philosophy should be lived, that it takes place in the discourse between people, not an academic pursuit — Ross Campbell

I don't remember in reading Nietszche of any specific animus, but the ways in which Socrates questioned a person to have them characterize, say, the good, led to drawing out what ordinary ways we consider it, the criteria that count in judging it. This investigation and its goal of our betterment would be what Nietszche admired about Socrates. Walter Kaufmann claims that Nietszche held Socrates in so high regard he had to differentiate himself. I can conjecture based on his reacting to Kant that Nietszche put, at least Plato, in the same category of desiring a foundational certainty for our claims of knowledge. And this goal was what caused Socrates to ultimately discount, in most cases, the answers given, as they did not meet his criteria. Nietszche would take this dismissive attitude toward our ordinary criteria as a rejection of the human in preference to something that does not include our interests, our possibility of failure, our history, the circumstances. His examples and imagined histories give something like Socrates' universal generalized forms, a context in our lives. Now Nietszche's style is to inject a motive and personalize an intellectual disagreement, I suppose in the same way he wants to humanize our epistimology with a greater sense of knowledge than what is true or false; to include our interests and our temptations and hopes and fears into our approach to morality. So he would admire Socrates' method but not the effect of his prejudice for a certain goal.

In the extension of non-mathematical concepts we do not have the ability to say " 'and so on', in order to reach infinity."
— Antony Nickles

what does it mean for rules to be "all-encompassing" and "justified to begin with"? — Luke

This is the criteria that Cavell is describing as "mathematical", which he believes Kripke is aspiring to impose on the grammar of all concepts, any action. As if rules are all that matter; that every application (of a concept) is already taken into consideration (into infinity--as in math). That we learn rules, instead of having lives, and that right and wrong are simply a matter of obeying the rules or not (what is right is worked out ahead of time; this is similar to Nietszche's critique of Kant's deontological morals).

Wittgenstein's intent with these remarks is not to demonstrate that it is impossible to "nail everything down for all time", although this kind of "preconception of crystalline purity" is one of his targets in the book. §143 deals with understanding, rule following, being guided by a rule, and normal/abnormal reactions. — Luke

It is this purity (what Cavell is calling "mathematical") that is the pivot-point between the two views of what happens when we get stuck. Cavell takes Kripke's view of rules as "more skeptical than the skeptic", meaning that the desire for purity (certainty, pre-determination, simple enforcement) is satisfied by making rules central to our agreement (then we can teach the rule, rather than the student, rather than agree in our lives). The rule removes us: the partial (our partiality), fallible, limited, separate, finite, impure (of the flesh; feet of clay).

you say we teach how to "use" words, but that seems different than Witt's point that, in teaching meaning, we teach the use of a word in the language
— Antony Nickles

I say that we teach how to use words, but [you say] Witt's point is that we teach how to use words in the language? — Luke

I said "we teach the use of a word in the language" (and by "language" here, the difference between our language and our lives only comes up before we reach the point where we are stuck--we ask questions and seek justifications to align our words with our lives). A word (expression) has a use(s). The distinction hinges on the difference between words as used (as if, by rules) and seeing that there are different things an expression, for example, can do: be a threat, an invitation, etc. That it would not be an accusation (except in Kripke's world): "You used that word wrong!" but a question: "What use (variety of sense) of "I know" are you talking about?"

I don't know what you mean by "I give over my responsibility to the rule". What responsibility? — Luke

Obeying a rule is not a matter of "confidence" or "assurance". It is, categorically, to obey the rule rather than follow your inclination (something internal as you say). So we do not have to be answerable for the action; we can point to the rule as the answer of why we did the action, abdicating our responsibility to be intelligible to the other, respond to their claims on us about what we have done.

The larger point, of Wittgenstein's, is that concepts are still "usable" (and, thereforefter mistaken , teachable) even if they have "blurred edges" (see §69). W's point at §77 seems to me to be that some concepts are simply resistant to sharper definition. — Luke

Maybe it helps to point out the difference here is that Kripke takes rules to be fundamental to the point of PI, and Cavell wants to claim that criteria shape the grammar of every act separately--the grammar of math (which happens to be rules), the grammar of obeying rules (which is not judged by rules), and the grammar of other concepts, such as apologies, justice, knowing, etc.

[quote="Luke;578536"And the way we measure whether a concept's grammar has been met is through criteria for having done them, not rules
— Antony Nickles

When are criteria not rules?[/quote]

Criteria are our means of judgment, not grounds of certainty (as rules are, thus merely judging if you followed the rule). Criteria outline what will count toward a thing's having a particular status or value (along with context, history, etc.) Certain criteria will be already articulated (dog shows) some more organic and loose (what counts as a game), some closed (chess) some open for further specification/rationale--part of the investigation is what will count as evidence, partly we find out what type of thing something is through explicating its criteria, partly what distinguishes this from that. Cavell’s claim is that Witt is comparing rules to ordinary (not instituted) criteria (see the PI index: having a dream, remembering right, mistaking, talking to oneself), so we are not just deciding true or false compared to something we have found certain (or which aspires to a mathematical rule).

This is where Cavell's student and teacher begin.
— Antony Nickles

But this is where Wittgenstein's student and teacher end. Likewise, Wittgenstein's turned spade is not an invitation for further explanation (see §87 again). — Luke

Well here we are back at the beginning with Cavell's claim that when the teacher is inclined to give up, they do not have to. Our judgment of the other (their act) is not based on a rule they either obeyed or not (except when it is, say, the law), but a matter for us to find out how this type of action (each its own) is justified, how those justifications fail, and how they rmay be brought back to matter for us, where new justifications may come from. All this after mistaken claims, contingencies of circumstances, and all the myriad things that in all instances are not covered by rules. And, yes, justifications run out, come to an end; we no longer can speak for each other, are enigmas to the other (p. 223); we are different, separate. But at least in learning about ourselves in making our criteria explicit, we rationally understand our differences; must account for/to the other before coming to an end with them (or be held responsible for having not). In Wittgenstein's world, the rule is not broken, the community is; we becomes us and them.

It's just that in the TLP Witt is limiting the breadth of the world to what meets a certain criteria of logic
— Antony Nickles

What needs to be understood is... why he is attempting to draw the limits of what can be thought. He wants to point to what is beyond those limits, to what can be seen but not said. — Fooloso4

I agree the most interesting parts are when he comes to a point where he feels something can only be, or is, shown. The question I'm attempting to answer is why he draws this line (as Kant has a reason to draw a line). I find this unspeakable structure, mirrored in the logic of the form, exhibited by propositions (4.121) and shown in their application (3.262), to be the edge of the work itself; the stepping-off point for his later work. But what is it about the limits he sees that makes them possible to go beyond?

I would say he realized two things: that the sense of "cannot" here is drawn by the criteria he has for a form of expression being "logical" only in the sense that it is a proposition that is either true or false. Anything past that is subject to dispute or disagreement and so cannot be a part of the "logical form" of what he is defining as "reality".

Also, he claims that the "logical form" "which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent". The form of representation (2.172), how things stand (4.022), the logical form (4.12), what is not expressed (3.262) all seem to refer to the implications of our language (or its negation); what criteria apply to decide how/when a particular thing is expressed, what counts as something being the form of the thing it is. We see this in asking about the application of the sign (its use) (3.262), exhibited in the form of the expression (4.121)("what we mean [imply]when we say X", Austin will say).

I would argue there is a sense where "That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language." does not exclude us from discussing the form, or sense, or the picture, or what is concealed, i.e., "What can be shown" (4.1212). Witt takes the need for us out of the equation by only considering true/false propositions--what is "said" is only that which is certain. Everything else is either nonsense or individual. "In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct...That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world." (5.62) We just do not regularly need to discuss these things because "my world" and your world are the same--for the most part our words agree with each other's lives. Only sometimes do we ask "Did you intend to do that?", "Do you know what you did?", "Why do you call this modern art; it does not appear self-referential at all?" I do not need to discuss logical propositions with you because their criteria involve neither you nor I. If I wish to make a claim about (my understanding of) the ordinary criteria for the form or standing of our shared lives (or what is concealed by it, for me, personally) than I am without the authority, justification, and necessity of the propositions of the TLP, but I am not without the ability, the possibility. And so Witt's "cannot" here is basically categorical; you can speak of these things, but you cannot say you speak with the authority and certainty of logic, and so, in that world, you do not speak at all.

That is an interesting description. — Valentinus

I should note that the idea is from Stanley Cavell in The Availability of the Later Wittgenstein.

why is it that Socrates gets so much credit for this approach to philosophy, ie The Socratic method is named after him. — Ross Campbell

I think Socrates rightly deserves credit for the method. I think the modern philosophy that builds on that is just less well known. Also, the connection is methodological but not reflected in exactly the same style. The fact that Nietzsche and Austin and Heidegger are relying on the answers from the reader make it hard to see it as the same investigation where we see where the other (us) goes (in conversation with Socrates). And, even with his "Interlocutor" Wittgenstein seems to be talking to himself. Socrates is, in a sense, both playing the other side (the other side is part of his own thoughts) and involving the reader to question the discussion themselves.

You were saying that Socrates knew the answer to the questions he asked , is that really true. He called himself a metaphorical midwife , because he was "giving birth" to new ideas, then I don't see how he could already have known the answer. Didn't Socrates famously say "I don't know anything". — Ross Campbell

It is a good point to bring up the midwife analogy. He does say he is "barren", but also too old to conceive; not pregnant with the desire of those he engages. In other words, he has nothing to tell--to add as new or better than the other--and that he has no dog in the hunt (both of which Plato hedges). He is not trying to convince you of anything he feels strongly about, but only claims that examining a subject will make you a better person. This goes hand-in-hand with the oracle's answer (which is not Socrates' statement of himself) in the Apology, which begins “ 'not mine is the story' that I will tell; rather, I will refer it to a speaker trustworthy to you. Of my wisdom, if indeed it is wisdom of any kind, and what sort of thing it is, I will offer for you as witness the god in Delphi... Chaerephon.. asked [the oracle] whether there was anyone wiser than I. The Pythia replied that no one was wiser."

I take the point to be (as does Cavell), that no one is in a better position than Socrates. That the philosopher is not wiser than the ordinary person (he does not even claim or tell us this himself). Socrates does not know anything that anyone else cannot see for themselves; that in fact the point is that we must all see for ourselves whether a claim has merit; come to it ourselves. That we all have equal authority to make and accept claims.

Socrates will say we already have the answer in that we were born with the idea of the forms; that acquiring knowledge is simply remembering them (as will Heidegger). In Austin and Wittgenstein's terms, we can each provide examples that shed light on our practices. In one example, Witt points out that we can all walk, but we would have to bring up what counts as walking, compared to other things we do on two human legs. That we already have an intuition of how, say, an apology or an excuse works, and that we just need to make it explicit (Emerson will say into tuition). We can each remember the implications of saying "I know" or correct another when making that claim. That I know my phone number; I know New York; I know you are in pain; each are different claims with different types of justifications. This makes us a better person in the way Socrates promises in that if we are aware of the terms upon which we speak, we, in a sense, know ourselves better, can better understand what we are getting ourselves into, how it will reflect who we will become.

"4.023...The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true. One can draw conclusions from a false proposition."

Whether a proposition is true or false is determined by reality, by what is the case, a state of affairs, the facts. — Fooloso4

I'm not arguing that the TLP is logically inconsistent. Or arguing that language does not work (at all) by correspondence or representation, but that, if a proposition is simply true or false, we only see the features that are logical. The structure of truth and falsity determines the extent of our world.

The structure of language is also the structure of the world:

What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality. (2.18) — Fooloso4

Again, I don't disagree that the world has form. It's just that in the TLP Witt is limiting the breadth of the world to what meets a certain criteria of logic. But to watch him write only what he knows to be absolutely true with such knowing restraint; you can feel his reaching but also never stepping beyond that discipline, so every statement captures his mind frame perfectly.

The sense of "reality" is created by Witt's imposed criteria of logic.
— Antony Nickles

It is not imposed criteria, logic is what he took to be the underlying structure of language and the world. — Fooloso4

Imposed is too intentional; expected, desired; "what he took to be", not that it was something other than what he took it for, but that was all he took; narrowing our world to only a logic that could allay our fear of uncertainty.

@Banno (your thoughts as well, please)

For a particular meaning/use of the word [justice], yes. It is both possible for the teacher to know "all there is about justice" and for the definition that is taught to contain "all there is". See §75, for instance. — Luke

The concept of justice was picked as an example of when sometimes we don't/won't know how a concept will matter, what criteria will have what importance and to whom--its criteria make its grammar a different type than concepts with mathematical criteria. When the (grammatical) edges are so blurred that "Anything--and nothing--is right. This is the position you are in if you look for a definition corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics and ethics." #77. That this is different then the certainty (lack of disagreement) we have in math. p. 192. And asking if my knowledge is completely expressed by the explanations I could give (#75), describes that my unconscious familiarity can be made exhaustively explicit, but does not say that a concept is finite, complete in advance, learned by saying X (#75 is not about definitions, but explanations); and there is no limit to the explanations that I might have to give (to the student), and it is I who might become exhausted, our relation break down, rather than we have tidy all-encompassing rules justified to begin with, and the student is either right or wrong.

A concept can also be brought into new, unexpected contexts, extended Witt will say at #67, or he uses the analogy of continuing a series. As in "being inclined" in our beginning quote, when making a mistake in continuing a series, we are tempted to say that the student has understood wrong #143, as Kripke's society would judge, as if we have a complete list of how things can go wrong. But we say only that the student has "mastered the system" (#145) "followed the series as I do" But "we cannot state a limit" on when we have a right to say that. "Our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end." #143. This is my claim that it is "impossible" to nail everything down for all time in any situation. In the extension of non-mathematical concepts we do not have the ability to say " 'and so on', in order to reach infinity." #229 But "we expect this, and are surprised by that. But the chain of reasons has an end." This is where Cavell's student and teacher begin.

[="Luke;576556"]Yes, obviously we teach how to use words. How else do we learn their meanings?
Its sense is its meaning, and "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (§43).[/quote]

Well, I don't want to get lost in the weeds on a sub-topic, but you say we teach how to "use" words, but that seems different than Witt's point that, in teaching meaning, we teach the use of a word in the language (it's sense/place in a concept)--we "teach" how to apologize (mostly indirectly, in living--just through seeing examples and taking correction) and than an expression can be an apology, though it can also be (at the same) in its use as self-aggrandizing, claiming to be a victim. We don't show how to, say, wield the word, but show the word's place(s) in our world, how it is meaningful in our lives. So teaching is not about conveying a fixed "meaning" (which vanishes; Cavell p. 80; PI #118) through definitions and explanations, but connecting our world, in all its distinctions and patterns, with the senses in which a word is used e.g.: knowing as facts, knowing as acknowledging the other, knowing as having a skill--the uses of "I know", which are the possibilities of how concepts (their expressions) can be meaningful.

[="Luke;576556"]We do follow the rule blindly, in the sense that we follow it with complete confidence and without reflection.

‘I am bound in my judgement about what is in accord with the rule and what not’ (RFM 328f.). Hence, if I want to follow the rule, ‘then only doing this will correspond to it’ (RFM 332). So I follow the rule blindly: not like a machine, but with the blindness of complete assurance."
— Baker and Hacker[/quote]

This idea of blindness as being completely "assured" or "confident" of being right harkens back to pp. 69-70 of the Cavell essay, where Kripke says we follow our "confident inclination". I was trying to point out that, if we are to have been said to have obeyed a rule, then not choosing any further and continuing blindly is a logical distinction of how it plays out once we have chosen to submit ourselves to the rule. Cavell, p. 71.

[="Luke;576556"]§223 is not about learning the rule, but assumes the rule has already been learnt.[/quote]

Sure, but learning the rule does not ensure correctness, nor that, even if correct, that there would be the same justification (if any need for one). I am not unreflectively "confident" or "assured" of following the rule correctly (granting myself authority); I give over my responsibility to the rule, no longer needing to make anymore decisions (further steps--a myth is not a lie or wrong; the picture, though not literal, still strikes: see p. 180). In obeying the rule (not myself) I can be "blind" to the consequences, not responsible. I do not "judge" as Hacker claims (#222). The justifications for obeying the rule are different than the explanation (afterwards) for having followed it incorrectly.

[="Luke;576556"]the line does not nod, or whisper, or tell us (#223); that we do not follow along it as a path "on tenterhooks", anxious each second about society's moral judgment (our intention, what we "mean").
— Antony Nickles

I don't know why you bring "society's moral judgment" into it. This is simply another description to reinforce the point that rules are not privately determined.[/quote]

Cavell is claiming Witt goes farther than enforcing the public nature of our lives which inform our grammar, their criteria; to ask why (see below). Additionally, if an actor's "confidence" is part of their act, as Hacker claims, they can be anxious; their "complete assurance" is subject to uncertainty. And if they are acting from an internal/individual assessment (their "judgment") of what is in accord ("right")(even if that was as you claim, only in learning it), they are subject to the correction of society when they are wrong--their fear of exclusion is their desire for criteria (a rule I can know, be assured of) that will ensure that does not happen.

[="Luke;576556"]This is simply another description to reinforce the point that rules are not privately determined.
— Luke

-can't we even grant that Witt learns why we want them to be? - Atony Nickles

"Witt learns why we want" what to be what?[/quote]

He is investigating why we want "obeying rules" (meaning; knowledge of the other) to be "privately determined", reliant on us individually (say, our confidence). Why he keeps trying to make sense of the interlocutor's obsession, fixation. This is not just an argument for a different picture (or a confusion to be alleviated), it is an investigation into the human condition, our desire to not have to rely on the human.

[="Luke;576556"]I still don't know what you mean by the "grammar" of (or "for") these things. (The grammar for sitting in a chair?) It remains to be shown that there can be grammar without rules.[/quote]

Well I got confused saying an example was sitting in a chair (I think I was thinking of Cavell's discussion of sitting at a table, p. 93; part of the criteria of a table is that we sit at it in certain ways). Anyway, the type of grammar of an action/concept will differ depending on the concept. And the way we measure whether a concept's grammar has been met is through criteria for having done them, not rules--though, as I said before, some criteria involve being said to have followed rules; math being one. Sometimes the criteria are categorical, definitive of identity, as to whether you have an opinion #573; some are looser, such as having been said to remember right #56 or having offered an excuse (Austin)--the criteria for a game being all over the place, the criteria for justice being subject to disagreement; these are the ways (the grammar) in which we see what matters to us in each concept. Thus the criteria is the expression of what is important to us (essential) for a concept to be a certain type of thing. #371 #373 Mathematical criteria makes the grammar (rules) of those concepts categorically different than the grammar of concepts with ordinary (non-mathematical) criteria.

Noted. — Cheshire

Thank you.

In fairness if I was claiming to possess important insight that defies summary I'd be laughed out of the room. — Cheshire

Philosophy has to resort to defiance of convention sometimes. I would put Plato's images, Witt's examples in the PI, Nietszche whole bravado, Emerson's sacrilege, and Heidegger in general in this column. Sometimes philosophy is about changing your mind, not about knowledge, but, thinking in an entirely different way--that's hard to tell someone to do, or get there by just saying things that are right.

It appears as if some one thought they could be vague enough they would overcome the unattended baggage sold with a lexicon, but instead of realizing this wasn't the case; it was concluded that things can't be communicated. — Cheshire

I've said elsewhere in this discussion that if you look at it right you can see that he was starting with a hope that he could have a standard of logical structure that corresponded to the world, only to find out that a lot of the world doesn't fit into that kind of logic. This does not make us unable to talk about the rest, just that the discussion doesn't meet his standards. It is a very earnest example of trying to force things to be certain, predictable, predetermined, complete, abstract, etc.

Talk to yourself anyway you like, but not to me like that.

take the criteria of logic and create a "world" from just that
— Antony Nickles
— Fooloso4

His argument... is about the transcendental conditions and a priori structure of the world and language and what is beyond them. — Fooloso4

"4.023...The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding"

But he is not stating the "structure of the world" (a priori or otherwise), he is dictating the terms for the structure of language. "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." (1.1; Ogden) This is not to make a statement that is either true or false; it is setting the bar of what he wants the criteria of "the world" to be--not "things" (in themselves), but only the totality of what he sees as a fact. He does not consider anything we do not find to be logical, to be. The world "is"=X. This is not a finding; it is a forced definition, in the second line; he starts there, it is not a conclusion.

The sense of "reality" is created by Witt's imposed criteria of logic. Like Kant, with the imposition of a standard as part of his "a priori" structure, we lose the "thing-in-itself". We are distanced from "reality" with picturing (4.06) a model (2.12) reaching out for a link (2.1511) applying a scale (2.1512) just touching (2.1515) as the logical form of a picture (2.17-18) a depiction of possibility (2.201) a sense of reality (2.222) made to agree (4.023) compared to (2.223; 4.05) an expression (4.121) bound from, limited (5.5561).

"4.023... one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true."

But this sense of truth is a phantasm. As he will say later in PI, what we say is true or false, but this is not an opinion (knowledge) of the world (#244). Witt in a sense pulls back his ambition as he sees that his criteria for logic is folding in on itself and limiting more and more what he can talk about that will meet that criteria. It is not that we only act or show after that, but that he can not talk about it because of his standard for what he will listen to.

As with "exist"; something like: that you are not aware of, that does not/can not matter to you.
— Antony Nickles

Do you mean that it does not "exist" if you are not aware of it or it does not matter to you, that what exists is what does matter to you, what you are aware of? In that case, as I said, the baby's world does exist, even though it is pre-linguistic and more limited. Its hunger matters, the fact that its hunger can be satisfied matters. — Fooloso4

I was saying that in the sense that it does not register, as, say, knowledge. Now you can hang on tight to the idea that "existence" and "reality" are qualities; that there is an "outside" world. But in the TLP, Witt has no way to get at it; no way to make it exist for us, as in: in any meaningful way, except that it meets his logical criteria. His requirement for language kills the world before we can get to it.

being "seen" does not make the world "exist" in the way that Wittgenstein is talking about here
— Antony Nickles

It is not clear to me what way you think he is talking about. It is not that being seen makes the world exist but that the world must exist to be seen. — Fooloso4

Again, this is not about competing opinions, between you and Witt or you and me. Your assertion that the "world must exist" is not "wrong"; it is just different in kind (scientific, empirical, etc.) then what Witt is doing in trying to take the criteria of logic and create a "world" from just that, as Kant did in a sense. To see what philosophical world we have when we start with those assumptions. I'm not saying he is right in doing that, but he would never have gotten to where he does in PI if he didn't develop this vision from this desire.

So this is not an "argument" about what "the" world and existence "are", it is a fantasy, a picturing to find what we can be certain of. All of these "statements" are only what he is certain he can say within the constraints he imposes on himself--taking a requirement and pushing it around to see how it fills out. Your definitions of "the world" and "existence" are stopping you from trying to learn anything before you even begin.

I asked if someone could explain the statement and present a view that would invalidate my examples, which show that at least as it is, this statement cannot stand in real life. — Alkis Piskas

I just tried to explain to Foloso4 above that this is not an assertion of empirical knowledge. That "Witt is not "explaining"--he is not doing science here; these are not statements of fact--not statements."

all those who (correctly mentioned the need of "context") have not such a context ready but... This is not how it works, though. If the words themselves in a statement or even a short and direct explanation of it cannot show its truth then, wouldn't Wittgenstein himself say, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"? — Alkis Piskas

I would suggest this is a confusion that "meaning" is assigned to a word, so when we put words together, it is easy for you to see how they are supposed to be important, the point in saying them. But "this is not how it works". What this expression is doing is only able to be deciphered from the context of the text, the evidence of how it relates to the rest. This is the process of reading--it is not accomplished immediately, nor can it be simply explained, nor maybe told at all. So in a way, Witt had to write the whole book in order to write that sentence. There is no shortcut in philosophy or you end up with useless pithy meaningless statements. That being said, there is always the attempt; however, your ability to comprehend what anyone is telling you about this, presupposes that you already have some familiarity (even if mistaken) not simply taken from common sense, science, or your thoughts about it. And the last sentence you quote belies that we can speak about quite a bit, just not simply or just in statements. And, in the PI, Witt removes the logical criteria, and we find we can speak precisely about even more topics.

TW, what's your relation with Socrates? — Alkis Piskas

Right method, but, as with Witt in the TLP, the criteria pushed Plato to a forced conclusion.

Yes, that is what Witt is working from; the world does not exist for [ babies ] as yet.
— Antony Nickles

What can be said does not limit what can be seen. Language represents or pictures the world, it cannot do so if it is not seen. It does not begin to be seen only when one begins to say things. — Fooloso4

I would grant that you are right that what can be expressed does not limit what can be seen; that is not the point. Witt is not "explaining"--he is not doing science here; these are not statements of fact--not statements. So, being "seen" does not make the world "exist" in the way that Wittgenstein is talking about here--you are assuming what is meaningful in saying something "exists", or is "seen" (think of them as terms you do not understand right away). As an example, you may not exist to the extent you have not expressed anything to differentiate yourself--categorically (in the logic of living) you are "not alive" (living your life), to yourself or to us. To be expressed in the relevant logical way, limits what meets the criteria of existing: in the sense of being meaningful to us, worth our notice; "seen", not in an empirical way, but in a way that reflects our interests and cares. This desire/compulsion for this criteria is investigated in his later work. As is the theory that language "represents or pictures" or references the world. Again, this is not a matter of competing opinions for someone to be right about.

Why is it impossible for the teacher to know "all there is about justice"? Surely they can know enough to teach a student what the word "justice" means (i.e. how to use the word "justice"). After all, didn't someone teach you what "justice" means? And couldn't you teach the meaning of the word to someone else? — Luke

I can give a definition of justice, which I take as what you are referring to when you say "teach a student what the word 'justice' means", but does a definition contain "all there is"? You've also fallen back on teaching "how to use the word" justice, but do we teach how to use words? I will claim again that this a misunderstanding; that Witt would say there is a use of a concept, as in its sense (one among possible others). "What use of justice are we talking about?" morally right? lawful judgment? fairness? to appreciate properly? And that these are not "teachable" with a definition in the sense Witt is getting at with our aligned lives. We see examples of being fair, we experience injustice, we know the law, we do justice to our father's memory... Again, the "meaning" of a word is taken apart in PI, as a bit of knowledge, and turned about towards the grammar of a concept which shows us what is meaningful about one use compared to another, why we make such a distinction, yada yada.

I don't believe that #426 is typically regarded to be in the rule-following section of PI, but we could look at 218-221 instead.
* * *
That's all very possible; it's just not what I see as being the point of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, or anything he's actually talking about. — Luke

I think maybe I need more than not "typically regarded" or "just not what [you] see" to feel this is a rational critique rather than just feeling you've only gone as far as you want into the text.

You seem to think that Wittgenstein genuinely holds that "All the steps are really already taken" (219). I read him, instead, as saying that we should not become captivated by, or fear, this misleading picture. As he says at 221, this is "really a mythological description of the use of a rule." — Luke

To say that he should have said it strikes him that the "steps are taken" is not to say it's not true (nor saying that it is "mythological") that they are already taken, but just that they are not "steps", we don't "follow" the line the rule "traces". All of this stepping, following traces, is how things look (from our desire to be caused along the way) against the way we (logically) "blindly" follow a rule; we do not have our eyes open, looking, intending, choosing each step.

Even with all that, I think we agree that it is not an internal determination of the rule, which is all I mean to say: that rules are (logically, i.e., that's what they're for; they function) to be obeyed, but not all grammar functions in that way. Rules take "us" out of the equation (math pun intended), but our ordinary, non-mathematical, grammar for learning, justice, sitting in a chair, are not based on, to be understood as, rules.

that the line does not nod, or whisper, or tell us (#223); that we do not follow along it as a path "on tenterhooks", anxious each second about society's moral judgment (our intention, what we "mean").
— Antony Nickles

I don't know why you bring "society's moral judgment" into it. This is simply another description to reinforce the point that rules are not privately determined. — Luke

That's a small take-away; can't we even grant that Witt learns why we want them to be? Much less that if we imagine ourselves, as Kripke does, just confidently acting on rules we've been "taught", the only possibility is for correction because you didn't follow the rule (thus the anxiety).

I see [ #217 ] more in accordance with his remark at #1: "Explanations come to an end somewhere." — Luke

Yes, everything breaks down in the first paragraph, hmm. But maybe this statement is not easily-understood, is unclear, not straightforward, ambiguous; maybe we need the rest of the book to understand why? where do they end? where do they come from? does something else happen that may not end?

"[ No explanation ] stands in need of another — unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine." #87

Explanations avoid, remove, or prevent a certain type of misunderstanding. But there are other misunderstandings we could imagine, perhaps as examples in a book, that explanations cannot avoid, remove, or prevent. There are some misunderstanding we must face, stay with, allow, encourage, that we must resist our inclination to give up on.

I have recently been presented with Wittgenstein's statement-quote, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". — Alkis Piskas

Well, first, we cannot take one line out of context and imagine that we can understand it without projecting our own concerns. As Wittgenstein says, "We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough." (PI, p. 212; 3rd 1958)

From the Ogden translation, starting on p. 229 of the PDF from the link:

5.556
There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of the elementary propositions. Only that which we ourselves construct can we foresee.
5.5561
Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears again in the totality of elementary propositions. The hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.
* * *
5.6
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61
Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.
5.62
This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.
5.621
The world and life are one.
5.63
I am my world. (The microcosm.)
6.43
If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy. — Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus

one's reality (world) consists of much more than words (language). It also contains images, sounds, feelings, experiences — Alkis Piskas

I'm guessing when you say "much more than words", you would agree that Wittgenstein is not saying that there are ONLY words, but just that the limits are what can be EXPRESSED in language ("logic" here). I think we can also agree that the sense of the word "world" that you are using includes your claim that even what cannot be expressed in words is part of the "world" (more "exists"); some people call this non-verbal, or pre-linguistic, or even objective.

In the TLP, I don't take Witt as making statements, but that this is all a speculation, a thought-experiment, an imagining of a world if we set certain threshold criteria. So your sense is not the sense of "world" (or "existence") that Witt is using. I take Witt to be postulating that, if something cannot be expressed (further, in logic), it is not part of the "world" (does not "exist") for us. So "world" is a term for him--defined by this requirement, limitation. As with "exist"; something like: that you are not aware of, that does not/can not matter to you. If you do not have a way of expressing something in words, it can not be thought of by you. If you have a terrible vocabulary, then the delicacy and intricateness of the "diaphanous" nature of something is lost on you, to you.

1) Does it mean that a baby, for whom language does not even exist at all, has no world, i.e. nothing exists for him/her? No pleasure in sucking milk? No sense of the warmth of his/her mother hug? No intimate connection with her? No recognition of objects? And so on ... — Alkis Piskas

Yes, that is what Witt is working from; the world does not exist for them as yet. Witt is not discussing feelings or experiences, but facts "1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things." This is to also to close off "thoughts" as an internal state of affairs. He is requiring a criteria of logic--everything else is off the table, e.g. ethics, aesthetics, poetry, etc.

2) If I see an object for the first time and I don't know how it is called, does this mean that I have no reality at all about that object, i.e., the object doesn't exist for me? — Alkis Piskas

Sort of, yes--you would be able to express something about it, yes? This is not a claim about objects or making a claim to a fact about everything ("the world" as you are taking it)--that the object does not "exist" in the sense that it is nothing. So, yes, the inner workings of a computer or car also do not exist for that person. This is not to say that the world is dependent on the subject, but that he is pushing a different idea of the "world" and its "existence". Now, why? and do we disagree with that cause? are deeper questions than to fight with a philosopher from your own terms and understanding (beliefs/opinions).

I would argue, as I take Witt to turnabout in the PI, that the criteria he sets in the TLP of only what is logical, strips our language of its ordinary criteria (different for each thing), which is more precise and limber than his requirement here--thus, we are able to see more, deeper, with greater distinction and, in a sense, reason, particularly in the vast areas that Witt is ruling out in the TLP. He investigates the desire for that criteria, along with the desire for an internal "meaning" or mental states, in the PI.

I don't see why you view the rules of chess or the rules of mathematics differently to rules of grammar or road rules. — Luke

The point of all the examples of the different types of practices/concepts is to show that there is a different grammar for each one. There are not "rules of grammar" (that sounds like a sillogism) because each grammar is different, the criteria for their employment are different. Every practice is not bound by "rules" (not all grammar is rule-like) though there is a grammar to rules, and a different kind of grammar for different kinds of rules.

Do you believe that all moves (or all movements of a knight) in chess are circumscribed and predetermined? — Luke

Well, I think so... aren't they? I'm mean, strategically unexpected, but the criteria for the rules are complete, exact; this is the category of "mathematical" criteria. There is no creativity in the application of the rules of chess, that's part of the grammar of its rules, as there are extenuating circumstances (not all the possibilities foreseeable ahead of time) in the application of criminal law. (Though predetermined is the wrong word, especially in a philosophy discussion.)

Why is it impossible for the teacher to know "all there is about justice"? Surely they can know enough to teach a student what the word "justice" means (i.e. how to use the word "justice"). After all, didn't someone teach you what "justice" means? And couldn't you teach the meaning of the word to someone else? I don't believe that #426 is typically regarded to be in the rule-following section of PI, but we could look at 218-221 instead. — Luke

In the history of Western philosophy Socrates and Plato are amongst the few thinkers who conducted philosophy through dialogue. — Ross Campbell

I would point out that Plato laid out his theories (or not) after a fictionalized dialogue (with examples and mythological stories) between Socrates and whomever he was interrogating. We could take Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations as a modern version of that fictionalized (mythologized, example-ridden) back-and-forth. There are at least three voices in that dialogue. The Interlocutor (as he is commonly referred to), who asks questions and makes statements (confessions) basically from a metaphysical standpoint or as Witt's stand-in from the perspective of his younger self who was driven by the desire to find one theory of meaning in the Tractatus--the voice of temptation in reaction to skepticism; next would be the voice of correctness, which is commonly taken as common sense or as a solution to skepticism, but is only pointing out the grammar of our concepts for contrast; and Wittgenstein himself, only rarely (say #426; p. 192), with the attempts to learn the lessons in threading the needle between.

Where Socrates in a sense knew the answer to the question he was asking, I have found that Wittgenstein posed his questions to, say, these parts of himself, but sometimes left the questions unanswered, I think so that we might answer them for ourselves, that his description would hold no weight unless we could see it for ourselves. And if that is the case, then the lectures by Heidegger ("What is Called Thinking?") and J.L. Austin ("How to Do Things With Words") are also in the vein of open questions/questioning, at least to the extent they are asking us if we can see what they see, along with Stanley Cavell, who almost seems to be musing out loud, following his interest, allowing you to follow yours (to finish off an enquiry in a different direction). Also Nietszche writes is a style that is not telling or explaining but more storytelling, examples, analogies, mythologies (as Plato famously pictured with caves and chariots), that we must shift our perspective to/from.