Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?
— creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow.
— creativesoul

So what? — neomac

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field justified?

If you're not, then we're in agreement. If you are then now you know how to understand the following questions...

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.
— creativesoul

I agree with this. There's a question you don't include in your summary - whether Smith was justified in believing that Jones owned a Ford. Gettier's answer is that he was. That's the situation that generates the confusion that people feel about these cases. — Ludwig V

I agree that Smith's belief was justified. I deny that it was true, because I deny that the target proposition/disjunction is equivalent to Smith's belief at the time. Looking at what makes them true shines clear light on this accounting malpractice of confusing belief with a naked proposition.

I'm pointing out that Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford. It was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Thus, Smith's belief is justified, valid, and false. That poses no problem for JTB.

Case II has Gettier guilty of not getting Smith's belief right to begin with. Convention did not notice, because he followed all the rules of belief attribution/reporting practices. When we do get Smith's belief right, the 'problem' dissolves completely. As above, justified, valid, false belief is not a problem for JTB. Gettier was/is not alone. He merely followed the historical conventional practices of belief attribution based upon rendering all belief in propositional form. Convention still treats naked propositions as equivalent to belief when rendering an individuals' belief in propositional form. It manifests from the divorce/separation of truth and belief. That's the reason why Gettier's paper has persisted.

Another historical problem is the conventional mistake of treating belief as though it is equivalent to the naked proposition. It's not. We can know that by virtue of carefully comparing what it would take for the belief under consideration to be true with what it would take in order for the naked proposition to be true. They are not always the same. This is one such case. It's not the only one. Case I is yet another.


Smith's belief is not just that the disjunction is true. Rather, it is more about his knowing what makes the disjunction true. Think about what all it takes in order for an individual to do what Gettier suggests Smith does in his thought/belief formation process. Smith has to know enough to deliberately follow the S knows that P formula that Gettier was targeting. Gettier even goes so far as to openly claim that Smith knows the rules of disjunction as well as the rules of entailment, for it is the entailment that Gettier uses in order for him to claim that Smith knowingly deduced P or Q from P. Gettier even added that Smith was aware of the move, which presupposes that he intentionally and deliberately knowingly made it. Then he forgets all about that part. Odd, given he was supposed to be reporting Smith's belief.

Think about it in a way that's been sorely neglected. It's common sense.

If Smith believed that Jones owned a Ford, and he was adept enough to know that the rules of entailment would allow him to deduce "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" from his belief that Jones owned a Ford, then it only follows that he did not believe that the disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts. It was. To quite the contrary, he believed it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. It was not.

He only believed the disjunction was true because he believed Jones owned a Ford. He would never have uttered it otherwise. Belief that (P v Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account.

That is one historical accounting malpractice.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.
— creativesoul

But surely is one part of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunction is true. "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owned a Ford. Yes? Also "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Yes? That's all I'm saying. — Ludwig V

Yes. The disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts, contrary to Smith's belief that it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. Gettier admitted as much, but neglected to take that into consideration when reporting Smith's belief. Smith only deduced the disjunction as a result of his believing it was true because Jones owned a Ford.

Belief that the disjunction is true because of P is false when the disjunction is true as a result of Q.

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices.
— creativesoul

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by conventional or unconventional accounting practices. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V

No worries.

This post touches upon and/or skirts around that aspect a bit more. Happy to answer any questions.

Mistaking that particular cloth for a cow is to believe that that cloth is a cow. That's the beginning of this particular farmer's thought and/or belief formation process. It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. A case of mistaken identity grounds it.

The cottage industry cases completely neglect to include the beginning of the farmer's thought and/or belief formation process.

It does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow that one is justified in asserting/believing that "there is a cow in the field" is true.

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. Starting at "there is a cow in the field" completely neglects to assess the belief underwriting the exclamation. Those give rise to "there is a cow in the field".

Besides that, "that's a cow" would be the first thing the farmer thought/believed upon looking at the cloth. Then, he may deduce "there is a cow in the field". It makes no difference. Neither follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

...the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template — neomac

The cloth looked like a cow.

...plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit... — neomac

As if any judgment habit counts...

I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field" — neomac

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?

Whose distinction is a categorical error?

You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. Try this...

Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

I am using a variation of Kant’s definition of synthetic and analytic truths, one which is defined in terms of necessity and contingency and not containment and non-containment. — TheGreatArcanum

Does it escape Quine's deconstruction of that distinction in Two Dogmas?

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices. From convention accounting practices' inability to properly render Smith's belief in both Gettier cases, to belief attribution practices(including but not limited to the de re/de dicto distinction) claiming that the farmer's belief statement is justified, when it is clearly not if we look carefully enough at what grounded that statement, to the practice of being far too strict with what ought only apply to some beliefs, and working from the presupposition/dogma that all belief ought be only rendered in terms amenable to belief as propositional attitude simply because openly espoused ones can.

There is a basic (mis)conception of meaningful human thought and belief in philosophy proper, and it's been there for a very long time. As a result of getting thought and belief wrong on such a basic level, we've gotten something basic wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered when offering a report about their origin.

It's no wonder that there are no notions of belief at work(that I'm aware of) that are rendered in terms easily amenable to evolutionary progression. With all the talk about consciouness, it doesn't look hopeful for this to be corrected, in small part at the very least, any time soon. You'll have that.

I'm very busy in real life everyday practical financially rewarding endeavors, and I'm very lucky to have been fortunate enough to be the one who's currently in my shoes, so to speak. That being said, there is something that I get from doing philosophy well, and listening to others who also do, that simply cannot be gotten any other way. So, sometimes I piddle...

I appreciate your responses thus far.

Very professional. Oh...

And you're more than welcome for the earlier reply. It was my pleasure.

I prefer to put Gettier's Case II in long form, for that's how those sorts of beliefs are best understood, and it's also much easier for the average Joe to register and/or otherwise understand the problem.

Smith believed that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because Jones owned a Ford. It was not. To quite contrary, it was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Smith's belief was false. The conventional accounting practices used by Gettier leave all that completely neglected. Hence, I find those practices to be lacking in explanatory power when it comes to correctly reporting(taking account of) Smith's belief.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.

Salva veritate.

"Report" implies that we are talking to someone other than the farmer. So we report in the first way. If we were talking to the farmer, he would obviously not recognize what we would say. But to repeat to him the words he would use would suggest that we share his belief, so I can't use those. Before I can say anything to him, I have to ensure that we both understand the reference of the sentence. I must correct his mistake. “You know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth” would do the trick. — Ludwig V

I understand the concerns with clarity, particularly when it comes to expressing one's views in a philosophical discussion with other philosophers. We can be a picky bunch. However, I no longer share any deep concerns at all over these matters we're currently discussing. To me, it is as plain and simple as the nose on my face. Gettier's Case I has everything to do with reference. That being said...

Sure, we could inform the farmer of his mistake by doing as you suggest or something similar. That would do the trick, if that amounts to allowing the farmer to become aware that he had false belief, unbeknownst to himself at time t1.

I'm afraid I'm one of those who people who see every sentence as a (potential) speech-act so the context, including the audience, always needs to be considered. — Ludwig V

Of course. That's a beneficial consequence stemming from your namesake's insistence upon looking at how we use language in order to ascertain the meaning. I do not foresee that as being a potential problem here.

I don't understand your diagnosis of Gettier's case 1. I think you've misremembered it. — Ludwig V

Well, that surprises me.

Okay. I just looked it up and you're completely right, I did misremember. My apologies, but the basic objection still stands. I just mixed up who Smith believed would get the job. Easy enough to correct. Thank you for pointing that out! Much better to report the Case correctly, especially given this discussion.

So, Smith justifiably believed that Jones would get the job, and he had counted the coins in Jones' pocket earlier. Gettier invoked the rules of entailment to have Smith go from "Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". Smith got the job instead of Jones, and unbeknownst to Smith he too had ten coins in his pocket, so "the man with ten coins in his pocket", which is what Gettier reports as Smith's belief, turns out to be true even though Jones did not get the job, and Smith believed that Jones would.

Treating Smith's belief as a naked proposition is to change what sorts of things would make Smith's belief true. Smith did not believe that he would get the job. He believed that Jones would get the job. So, in Smith's mind the person referred to by "the man with ten coins in his pocket" was Jones, and no one else. Smith got the job, contrary to his own belief.

The difference between Smith's belief and the proposition when treated as a naked one is clear. The proposition would be true if any man with ten coins in their pocket got the job. Smith's belief is not about any man. It is about Jones, and no one else. Smith's belief would have been true only if, only when, and only because Jones got the job.

If I understand you rightly (and I'm not sure I have), your diagnosis of Case 2 is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true iff P is true or Q is true. So, according to Gettier and me, if Smith believes that P, they are justified in believing that P or Q. But, as you say P is false, yet, as Gettier tells us, Q is true. Smith's justification relies on P and the truth relies on Q. It's that mismatch that creates the problem. My solution to this example is to point out that Smith's justification fails and so he cannot know P or Q, which can be summarized as "no false lemmas".

Well, it doesn't seem to me that my diagnosis of Case II is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true if P or Q is true. Rather, that is precisely what makes the case.

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jone's owned a Ford(because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.

(P or Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account. Just like the first case, Smith's belief is not equivalent to the naked disjunction (Por Q). Rather, Smith believed that P or Q was true because P. Leaving out that last bit (because P) is to provide an accounting malpractice of Smith's belief. It is not equivalent to the naked proposition/disjunction.

the summary is altogether mistaken now
— creativesoul

@invizzy apparently he changed his views. — neomac

I changed how I present them.

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Okay.

Do we agree that at time t1, the farmer believed that the cloth in the field was a cow, but he does not know that?

We can discuss things more later. For now though...

Let's start at the beginning of this particular famer's thought and belief formation process. Let's talk about how he goes from seeing a cloth to "there is a cow in the field". Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?

My position on this has evolved a bit since our first conversation. Your summary to invizzy would be closer to what my position was back when you and I were discussing Jack. After much consideration, I've sharpened it up a bit, so the summary is altogether mistaken now.

I am not saying anything at all about going back and changing what S would say at the time.

Here is a more straightforward answer: we all learnt to report S’belief at t1 based on what S says at t1. That’s the practice. — neomac

Is that what counts as a valid reply/answer these days? That may count as an answer to some people, but others can plainly see that it does not answer the questions that it should.

With regard to your question...

Indeed, it is standard practice to report S's belief at time t1 based upon what S says at time t1. That is precisely the problem in certain cases like this particular farmer story. I've shown how that practice has been found wanting, lacking, and begging for truth about the farmer's belief at time t1.

Upon what ground do you accept the farmer's self-report at time t1, when he was wrong about what he saw and believed about that, and reject his report at time t2, when he is correct about what he saw and believed at time t1?

At time t2, would you argue with the farmer about what he believed at time t1, based upon standard accounting/belief attribution practices, in the same manner you've argued against me here?

I'm not doubting that you have not laid it all out. I'm rejecting using the notion of "necessary" as a means to discriminate between kinds of true statements.

It also seems like you're equivocating the term "necessary", at first blush anyway.

Here's how I see it...

Simply put:Our disagreements boil down to the differences between our notions of belief.

I was hopeful that there was a bridge when you mentioned "perceptual beliefs", but that notion turned out to be rather empty it seems. All belief is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological machinery), including those that are arrived at in the 'other' ways you mentioned. Thus, I found that rather unhelpful for adding any clarity.

However, that aspect, I think you called it "processing" or something similar, very well could be great material to build a bridge of mutual understanding.

That's why I asked that... first.

You cannot have one without the other. Earlier you spoke of necessary truths didn't you?

I remember. That's why I asked.

I cannot make head or tails out of that answer. except that it seemed to be some sort of critique of my approach. Strange answers to very straightforward questions.

That's where you balked last time too.

Yeah, I'm not keen on using "necessary" to discriminate between kinds of true statements. I prefer the way I set out in that OP. We may discuss the differences, or not.

The expression "perceptual belief", as I use it, it's simply pointing to the genesis of that belief. If a belief is processed out of perceptual evidences, it's perceptual, if it's processed out of other propositions through reasoning it can be deductive or inductive belief, if it's processed out of a communicative channel it's a transmitted belief, etc.
This is at least part of my background assumptions while thinking about justification. — neomac

I see.

Curious how you would answer the questions I posed to Ludwig.

You could always quote something from that link and discuss it.

Well surely you see that I'm rejecting that sense of "necessary"?

:wink:

In each and every case of causation there is a correlation between cause and effect/affect.

There certainly seems to be a problem about the farmer’s belief that a piece of cloth is a cow. You seem to be assuming that in reporting the farmer’s beliefs, you need to use words that he would have done, and he certainly wouldn’t have said that a piece of cloth was in the field. The tricky bit is that that is exactly how we would formulate his belief and we can’t say that there’s a cow in the field (unless we are referring to the cow that is in the field, which would be very misleading.)

First off, “see” is a factive verb. In reporting what people see, we need to report what they actually see, not what they think they see. When we report what they think they see, we have to make it clear, so we need to report, not that he sees a cow in the field, but that he believes he sees a cow in the field, or that he sees what he believes is a cow in the field.

We focus too much, in these discussions, on what people say in reporting their own beliefs. But that is only one way that people show what they believe. Their beliefs also show in what they do and in other things that they say. That’s how we know that he believes that a piece of cloth is a cow. But I would use that way of putting it only to other people, not to the farmer himself. Curiously, if I was telling the farmer about his mistake, I would say “you know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” Or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth”. — Ludwig V

My apologies for not recognizing what all you've said here. It deserves better attention than I gave it earlier. Gestalt was in control, I suppose. I have no idea how I missed this. :smile: I wondered why you had not addressed my last reply to you, but after rereading through our exchanges, now I think I know exactly why. You had addressed my concerns(at least regarding the cottage industry cases) on a basic level here, and I somehow missed that completely, and instead summarized the basic points I've made without ever actually giving due attention to the ones you made here. Again, my apologies.

Regarding the above quote...


I completely agree that we need to report what people see. We need to report what they say. We also need to report what people believe, especially in the odd cases where they do not know what they see and/or believe about what they see. This is one such case. We seem to agree that the farmer believes that that particular piece of cloth is a cow. Where we seem to disagree is what we ought say in our report about what the farmer believes at the time. You seem to be agreeing with conventional belief attribution practices when you suggest that our report of the farmer's belief ought be what the farmer would likely say himself at that time in particular.

The farmer would not say that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow while looking at a piece of cloth that he believes is a cow. The farmer does not know that he is mistaken about what he's looking at. He does not know that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow. So, he certainly would not say that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow. That is a belief that is impossible to knowingly hold.

So, if we do as you seem to suggest here, which is in line with conventional accounting/belief attribution practices, we would not be reporting what the farmer believes. To quite the contrary, we would be going with what the farmer says at the time.

Everything can be identified under many descriptions. We use the one that is most appropriate for the context, including the method of identification that works for our audience. When we come to reporting the belief (and knowledge) of other people, we do not stick to the reference that they are using or would use; we use the reference that works for the audience we are reporting to. After all, the point is to enable our audience to understand.

It is complicated, so I hope this is reasonably clear.

Actually it's not. You've answered in what seems to be a very non-committal manner, as if straddling both side of a fence. This could be cleared up, however. I've a question for you...

Ought we report what the farmer believes(that a piece of cloth is a cow), or what the farmer would likely say at that particular time(that he believes a cow is in the field)?

A follow-up...

If we are going to go with what the farmer would say, upon what grounds are we claiming that the best time to do that(to go with what the farmer says) is when the farmer is wrong about their own belief, rather than when they become aware that they had once believed that a piece of cloth was a cow(rather than go with what the farmer would say when they're right about what they saw and what they believed about what they saw)?

Regarding cases of mistaken identity...

Gazing upon a field, seeing a piece of cloth, and believing it to be a cow does not entail "there is a cow in the field". It is also not the same belief. The farmer first believed that that particular piece of cloth was a cow.<----That's the beginning of an accurate analysis of this farmer's belief. That belief grounds this farmer's subsequent thought. It also marks the end of our analysis. Belief that there is a cow in the field does not follow from belief that a piece of cloth is a cow.

No more wondering whether or not that farmer's belief is justified.

They concern particular perceptual beliefs. — neomac

This presupposes that there is more than one kind of belief. I find that quite germane to the topic, given the B aspect.

The target proposition in the farmer example is "There is a cow in the field" and the story tells us that there is a cow in the field. How is that false? However, it is true that the farmer is not justified in believing it... — Ludwig V

Yes. My mistake there. I was irritated at the time by another posters' hubris, very tired, and was not thinking clearly. The target propositions are true, not false. The beliefs are all false, not true. The propositions are not equivalent to the beliefs. The basic point I'm making is that S's belief is not being properly taken into account by any Gettier case, and that's the fatal flaw of them all, despite the fact that there are remarkable differences between Gettier's paper and the cottage industry that followed.

...But Gettier has an argument that he is justified in believing it nonetheless, so you need to show that argument is invalid... — Ludwig V

That's not the only way to show how Gettier is mistaken. Gettier's logic is impeccable. However, an argument can be both impeccable and false. In Gettier's paper, the fatal flaw is treating Smith's beliefs as though they are equivalent to the naked propositions he discusses. They are not. I can and have shown how that is the case.

...You are advocating a version of the "no False Lemmas" reply, which I agree with. I'm not clear whether you agree with my argument for that reply and it would be interesting to know whether you agree or have a different argument to refute Gettier's argument. — Ludwig V

I'm not even sure that I understand the NFL objection. If my answer to Gettier cases counts as a version of the NFL, then it is by pure coincidence. I'll try to adequately summarize the individual cases in this post, because the crucial parts of my view have been sporadically littered throughout my replies here in a rather disparate looking fashion. Taking the cases one at a time should clear up any misunderstandings...



In Case I, Smith is justified in believing that he will get the job and he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket. Gettier uses this justified belief and the rules of entailment for Smith to go from "I will get the job and have ten coins in my pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". Unbeknownst to Smith, another man also has ten coins in his pocket. That other man got the job. Smith did not. So... the claim is that if Smith was justified in believing P, and P entails Q, then Smith is justified in deducing Q from P and thus justified in believing Q. Q turned out to be true when treated as a naked proposition. Q is not a naked proposition. Q is Smith's belief. The difference between Q as a naked proposition and Q as Smith's belief is paramount. When Smith believed "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" he was thinking about himself and no one else! The fatal flaw of the case is Gettier's failing to keep in mind Smith's belief. Smith was not justified in believing anyone other than himself would get the job. Smith was not justified in believing anyone other than himself had ten coins in their pocket. Someone else had ten coins in their pocket and someone else got the job, contrary to Smith's belief. Smith's belief turned out to be false despite the fact that "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" turned out to be true when treated as a naked proposition. The truth conditions of Smith's belief do not match the truth conditions of the naked proposition. Thus, to treat Smith's belief as a naked proposition is to engage in an accounting malpractice of Smith's belief.


In Case II, Smith is justified in believing Jones owns a Ford. Gettier uses that and the rules of disjunction for Smith to go from Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford to belief that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. Turns out that Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is in Barcelona, so again - like the first case - the disjunction is true when treated as a naked proposition/disjunction. The fatal flaw in that case is equal to the first case in that Gettier is misattributing belief to Smith by treating Smith's belief as a naked proposition when it is not. Smith believed that the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. Gettier did not render Smith's belief that way. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford. Rather, it was true because Brown was in Barcelona. So, Smith's belief was false. Thus, putting Smith's belief in terms of P or Q is treating Smith's belief as a naked proposition. The truth conditions of the naked proposition are not equivalent to the truth conditions of Smith's belief. Hence, to treat Smith's belief as though it is a naked proposition is to engage in an accounting malpractice of Smith's belief.


The cottage industry repeats the accounting malpractice, but not quite in the same way as Gettier. Those cases do not follow the S knows that P formulation that Gettier addresses in his paper. Gettier gets Smith's belief right to begin with, but then conflates naked propositions/disjunctions with Smith's belief. The cottage cases begin by not getting S's belief right to start with. So, the critique/refutation for them is slightly different than the critique of Gettier's two cases. Gettier and the cottage industry all get S's belief wrong, they just go about it in different ways.


Belief that a piece of cloth is a cow does not entail "a cow is in the field". Belief that a barn facade is a barn does not entail "a barn is in the field". Belief that Clarabelle is Daisy does not entail "Daisy is in the field". Belief that a broken clock is working does not entail "it is two o'clock". Etc.

Correctly stating S's belief in the beginning marks the end of the cottage cases.

Gettier's two cases are both justified false belief. All of the cottage industry cases present true statements that do not follow from S's belief. No Gettier case offers an accurate account of S's belief.

I suggest you read my posts in this thread. I'm not interested in continuing discussion with you, given the recent history.

It is tempting to think that when a flaw has been found in a bad argument, it is not necessary to pursue the matter further. But there is more than one problem with Gettier cases, and the expectation that they either meet the definition criteria or they do not is another one; the target proposition is always partly right and partly wrong. — Ludwig V

The target proposition is always false, one of which the believer cannot possibly be justified in believing. The target proposition is always an accounting malpractice of S's belief.

Shedding light on that pulls the rug out from under the entire project.

Which problem escapes this?

That particular farmer sees that particular piece of cloth in that particular field at that particular time, and mistakenly believes at that particular moment in time that that particular piece of cloth in that particular field is a cow or a sheep(which one does not matter).

Are you denying this?
— creativesoul

Read what has already been written and ye shall be enlightened:

He believed (erroneously) that he was looking at a cow, when he was actually looking at a piece of cloth.
— Janus — Janus

So, he was looking at a piece of cloth, believed that he was looking at a cow, but did not believe that that piece of cloth was a cow?

:roll:

There is no puzzle there of the kind that you seem to be attempting to nurture by virtue (or vice) of ambiguous usage of language (that is by substituting what we might say about the farmer's belief for how he would put his belief into words, to arrive at an absurd paradox, "believing that a piece of cloth is a cow", that might engender the illusion that it is of some significance, when it really is not). — Janus

It is humanly impossible to knowingly hold false belief. The farmer's belief is false. False belief cannot be true. The farmer reports a belief that can be true. The farmer is mistaken about his own belief.

Pace Moore...

We can know that a farmer believes that a piece of cloth is a cow or sheep even though the farmer cannot.

The rhetoric is trite.

The farmer certainly did not believe that a piece of cloth was a cow; how could he, since he didn't know it was a piece of cloth, and if he had known it was a piece of cloth, then how could he believe it to be a cow? He believed (erroneously) that he was looking at a cow, when he was actually looking at a piece of cloth. — Janus

We cross posted. My last post did not take the above into consideration.

That particular farmer sees that particular piece of cloth in that particular field at that particular time, and mistakenly believes at that particular moment in time that that particular piece of cloth in that particular field is a cow or a sheep(which one does not matter).

Are you denying this?

The problem is basic. The farmer believes that a piece of cloth is a sheep. That belief is false. False belief cannot be true. The farmer, should they openly assert that they believe a sheep is in the field, would be asserting a belief that can be true. False belief cannot be true. The farmer's belief is false. "There is a sheep in the field" can be true. The farmer's belief cannot. The farmer's belief cannot be "there is a sheep in the field". The farmer is mistaken about their own belief, unbeknownst to themselves.

This all makes perfect sense when we keep in mind that we cannot knowingly hold false belief. The farmer believed that a piece of cloth was a sheep.

There certainly seems to be a problem about the farmer’s belief that a piece of cloth is a cow. You seem to be assuming that in reporting the farmer’s beliefs, you need to use words that he would have done, and he certainly wouldn’t have said that a piece of cloth was in the field. — Ludwig V

I'm afraid I've been unclear.

I'm arguing against using words that the farmer would have used at the time, for he did not know that he believed a piece of cloth was a cow... pace Moore's paradox. Nevertheless, the farmer most certainly believed that a piece of cloth was a cow.

I'm further bringing to light that the farmer's belief does not entail belief that a cow is in the field. So, the farmer, if they inferred there was a cow in the field from their belief that a piece of cloth was a cow, made an invalid inference. The same is true of an author who claims the farmer concluded that a cow was in the field from belief that a piece of cloth was a cow.

My last post explained all the problems with attributing belief that could be true to the farmer - who had false belief. We know that. The farmer does not.

If the farmer claims to believe that a cow is in the field, they are wrong about the content of their own belief.( this may tie into things you've said) They are mistaken in their own report. That particular belief - the one reported by the farmer at the time - is one that could be true. The farmer's belief cannot. The farmer does not know that he believes a piece of cloth is a cow. He is mistaken about his own belief. Any author who then uses what the farmer would claim at that time is following the farmer off the cliff, so to speak. It's worse for the storyteller though, for we all know that the farmer does not know that they believe a piece of cloth is a cow. Using the farmer's self report as though it is accurate when it is not perpetuates the farmer's own mistake(repeat a belief that the farmer could not have) and prove oneself to have not learned the lesson from Moore.

Each and every case is an accounting malpractice.

That's the end of all the hoopla. That's it. It's that simple.

...psychiatry definitely does have an aura of evilness about it which is hard to define. — introbert

History is chock full of examples, whether fact or fiction, about people using other people's thoughts and beliefs against them. If there are experts, who know what makes people tick better than the people themselves, and those experts have ill will, well...

This is more or less a typical Gettier case because the conclusion is an existential claim that is true in virtue of the existence of some particular: it is true that there is a cow in the field because this particular cow, let's call her Alice, is in the field. — Srap Tasmaner

Still granting too much to begin with.

Attributing "there is a cow in the field" to a farmer that believes that a piece of cloth is a cow is an accounting malpractice. At that particular moment in time, in that particular set of circumstances, that particular farmer believes that a piece of cloth is a cow.

The farmer's belief is false. False belief cannot be true. Belief that there is a cow in the field can be true. The farmer's belief cannot be true. Belief that there is a cow in the field cannot be the farmer's belief.




Regarding rendering the farmer's belief as belief that p...

It does not follow from the fact that the farmer's belief can be rendered in terms of propositional attitude that the farmer's belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude. In this particular case, rendering the farmer's belief in terms of an attitude towards the proposition "there is a cow in the field" such that they take that to be true is to completely change what it takes in order for the farmer's belief to be true. That's a big problem.

The farmer's belief is false. False belief cannot be true. The farmer's belief cannot be true. "There is a cow in the field" can be true. "There is a cow in the field" cannot be the farmer's belief.

My way of putting this raises some issues though: in what sense is the farmer's belief about Alice? This doesn't look good at all. Since Alice played no role in the farmer's belief formation, it's pretty clear Alice is no part of the content of the farmer's belief. Alice does play a part in the existential claim; Alice is what makes that claim true. — Srap Tasmaner

So...

Alice plays no role in the farmer's belief, but does play a role in the existential claim. Seems to me that the only conclusion to draw is that the existential claim is not the farmer's belief.

...he might have seen Alice and mistaken Alice for a bit of cloth flapping in the breeze — so not seen that Alice is a cow — and formed the mistaken belief that there's a bit of cloth in the field, which might also be Gettierly true. — Srap Tasmaner

Belief that Alice is a bit of cloth flapping in the breeze is false. The farmer's belief is false. False belief cannot be true. The farmer's belief cannot be true. Belief that there's a bit of cloth in the field can be true. Belief that there's a bit of cloth in the field cannot be the farmer's belief.

...I don't think there is a remaining problem with the existential generalization after all because we can just enumerate it: if Alice, Bobbie, Clarabelle, and Dixie are the cows in the field, then the truth of such an existential claim as we're concerned with is a truth about at least one of those: one of those four ought to play a causal role in the farmer's belief, expressed as an existential generality...

...Suppose the farmer thinks the cow he's seeing is Clarabelle, when it's Alice, even though Clarabelle is out there in the dark. — Srap Tasmaner

Belief that Alice is Clarabelle is false. The farmer's belief is false. False belief cannot be true. Belief that Alice, Bobbie, Clarabelle, and Dixie are the cows in the field can be true. The farmer's belief cannot be. Belief that Alice, Bobbie, Clarabelle, and Dixie are cows in the field cannot be the farmer's belief.

@creativesoul, I think some of your concerns are addressed above. — Srap Tasmaner

Doesn't seem like it. I'm not at all fond of the 'causal' language. Seems totally unnecessary and more of a distraction from the problem than a solution.

The only part I have not addressed is the mention of disjunctive belief/knowledge. Do you have an example that does not succumb to the critique of Gettier's Case II? Belief that either this or that is true is always based upon belief that this or that is true. To neglect to take this into account is to provide an accounting malpractice of S's belief. Putting S's belief in terms of belief that P or Q is an accounting malpractice.

If it is P that is believed, and S asserts P or Q, then S's belief that P or Q is true is better rendered as belief that P or Q is true because P. If Q, then S's belief is better rendered as belief that P or Q is true because Q.

If P or Q is true because P, and the farmer believes it's true because Q, then the farmer's belief is false, and vice versa. Rendering the farmer's belief in terms of P or Q is to treat the proposition(disjunction) as a naked one, which changes the truth conditions of S's belief.

Belief that [P or Q is true because P] is false if P or Q is true because Q. False belief cannot be true. Belief that P or Q can be true because Q is. The farmer's belief is false. Belief that P or Q cannot be the farmer's belief.

Accounting malpractices. All of them.

Gettier's two cases are similar to the cottage industry that followed with the barn facade and the cloth examples because they are al claim to stipulate situations when S satisfies the JTB conditions but does not have knowledge.

The general issue at hand is the inherently inadequate notion of belief at work. You will not find much of that in the literature... yet. This applies to Gettier's two cases, the cottage industry that followed, Moore's paradox, and Russell's clock as well as all sorts of other philosophical topics in which meaningful human thought and belief are of major importance(the scope is daunting). However, the consequences of employing the emaciated conventional (mis)conception(s) of belief differ depending upon the particulars.

With regard to the topic at hand and the context of our discussion thus far...

Granting the cottage industry's claim that S believes that there is a sheep in the field after seeing a piece of cloth is granting far too much to begin with. It ignores the mistake altogether. S believes that a particular piece of cloth is a sheep. That belief is false.

"There is a sheep in the field" is not entailed by belief that a piece of cloth is a sheep. "There is a sheep in the field" does not follow from belief that a piece of cloth is a sheep.

The attribution of that belief to S by the author is unjustified. The same critique holds good in all cottage industry cases I've been fortunate enough to have read as well as Russell's clock.

Gettier's two cases are different. In the first, Gettier uses entailment to describe Smith as going from "I am going to get the job, and I have ten coins in my pocket" to "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". The man with ten coins in his pocket - you know the one Smith is thinking about - is Smith himself. Smith did not believe anyone else would get the job. Smith was not justified in believing anyone else would get the job. Someone else got the job, contrary to Smith's belief.

In the second case, Gettier uses the rules of disjunction to attempt to claim that Smith's belief that either Jones owned a Ford or Brown was in Barcelona was true as a result of Brown's being in Barcelona. Brown's being in Barcelona does indeed make the disjunction true, if we treat it as a naked proposition. However, it is not a naked proposition. Rather, it is supposed to be an account of Smith's belief. Now, Smith believed that the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford.

In both cases, Smith's belief was justified false belief.

I agree that
It is humanly impossible to knowingly be mistaken(to knowingly hold false belief).
— creativesoul
But I don't quite understand why you say it is humanly impossible. — Ludwig V

Well, I say it because it seems pretty clear to me that in each and every instance - at the precise moment in time - when we become aware of the fact that and/or come to know that... something is not true or that something is not the case... it is quite literally impossible for us to believe otherwise.

It seems to me self-contradictory to assert "I believe that p and it is not the case that p". It is equivalent to "p is true and p is false." (Moore's paradox, of course.)

Seems pretty clear to myself also that asserting "I believe that p and it is not the case that p" is self-contradictory. That's just an inevitable consequence of what the words mean(how they're most commonly used). I'm also inclined to agree that it is very often(perhaps most often) semantically equivalent to asserting "p is true and p is false". The exceptions do not matter here.



I'm glad Moore's paradox has been mentioned...

Moore's paradox has him wondering why we can say something about someone else that we cannot also say about ourselves. He offers an example of our knowing when someone else holds false belief and then pointing it out while they still hold it. He asks, "why can we not do that with ourselves?" or words to that effect/affect. The reason why we can say "It's raining outside, but they do not believe it", but we cannot say the same thing about ourselves is because we are completely unaware of holding false beliefs while holding them, but we can be aware of others' while they hold them.

And I don't understand what you mean when you say
Beliefs are not equivalent to propositional attitudes.

Honestly, I'm not at all surprised by any hesitation. It's well-founded, especially if you're unfamiliar with my position on the relevant matters. The worldview I argue for - what makes the most sense to me - is uniquely my own; a frankenstein's monster of sorts, built from globally sourced parts. Epicurus, Xeno, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Heidegger, Witt, Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Searle, Austin, and Dennett were all influencial to my view. I'm certain there are many more. That was right off the top of my head, which happens to mirror exactly how I prefer to practice this discipline.

I take serious issue with how academic convention has been taking account of meaningful human thought and belief.

I've yet to have seen a school of thought practicing a conception of meaningful thought and/or belief, consciousness, or any other sort of meaningful experience that is simple but adequate enough to be able to take account of the initial emergence, and yet rich enough in potential to be able to also account for the complexity that complex written language use has facilitated, such as the metacognitive endeavors we're currently engaged in here.

I've yet to have seen one capable of bridging the gap between language less creatures and language users in terms that are easily amenable to evolutionary progression.

I was under the impression that belief was one of the paradigmatic propositional attitudes.

Indeed, it is! Rightly so, as well...

...when and if we're specifically discussing belief about propositions, assertions, statements, utterances, etc. Not all belief is about language use. It very often is however, and when that is the case, it makes perfect sense for us to say that if one has an attitude towards the proposition "there is a cow in the field" such that they hold that the proposition is true, then they have a particular belief that amounts to a propositional attitude. I'm in complete agreement with that much - on it's face,

However, and this is what's crucial to grasp, if one believes that a piece of cloth is a cow, they most certainly do not - cannot - have an attitude towards the proposition "a piece of cloth is a cow" such that they hold that that proposition is true. That belief is not equivalent to a propositional attitude.

"There is a cow in the field" is not entailed by belief that a piece of cloth is a cow. The same holds good with barn facades and stopped clocks.

Perhaps you are referring to your point that
Believing that a cloth is a cow is not equivalent to believing that "a cloth is a cow" is true.
— creativesoul
It is true that sometimes people explicitly verbalize a belief, whether to themselves or others and sometimes they don't - and of course, animals believe things, but clearly don't verbalize them. But I don't understand why that makes any difference here.

The point wasn't specifically about whether or not people explicitly verbalize a belief. The point is that we cannot explicitly verbalize some false belief while holding it, because we cannot know we hold them - at the time. As before...

We cannot knowingly believe a falsehood.

Verbalizing belief(false ones too!) requires knowing what you believe. We can believe that a piece of cloth is a cow. We can believe that a barn facade is a barn. We can believe that a stopped clock is working.

What we cannot believe is that "a piece of cloth is a cow", or "a barn facade is a barn", or "a stopped clock is working" are true statements/assertions/propositions/etc. If we do not know that we believe a piece of cloth is a cow, if we do not know that we believe a barn facade is a barn, if we do not know that we believe a stopped clock is working, then we cannot possibly explicitly verbalize it.

Our beliefs during such situations are not equivalent to propositional attitudes.

I suppose my position could be taken as rejecting the J, T, and B aspects of those candidates.