That's just begging the question. — Michael

:rofl:

Coming from one who assumes what's in question and admittedly does not have an argument.

If there is no color in the world, then rainbows and visible spectrums are colorless.

I'm not okay with that, because rainbows and visible spectrums are colorful. They may not exist without being looked at, which is fine, but they most certainly do while they are.

There are all sorts of things within one's experience that are not located just in the head. Color is one.

I miss Isaac in these discussions.

One need not have the artist on hand to hear their music. Their music is not 'in the recording'. We could transfer the recording from an album to an 8-track to a cassette to a cd to an ipod to whatever they have nowadays.

One could say they no longer need the artist. One could say that because the music is being experienced via using an ipod that the music is in the ipod and not the world...

One could say...

There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1). The distinction between these two different neural representations advances our understanding of visual neural coding.

The bolded portion needs unpacked.

The physical retinal image does not come from within the perceiver. It is not that image being recorded. Rather the physical retinal image is the recording. Color perception is being recorded.

Color requires both, colorful things(things capable of being seen as colorful by a creature so capable) and a creature so capable.

It's odd that Michael sees Searle as a friend, when Searle has spent so much effort in showing the intentional character of perception.

Searle eviscerates the Bad Argument - "that the existence of hallucinations and other arguments show you never see the real world, you just see your own sense data" - which looks to be the very case that @Michael is attempting to make, that we never see red, only ever percepts-of-red. — Banno

Cherry picking one liners as a means of putting forth a position. Doesn't work very well if the authors do not agree with one another.

I asked what the difference was between seeing red stuff, hallucinating red stuff, and dreaming red stuff, .

"Nothing" was your reply.

On this view you're advocating for, you're clearly stating that there is no difference between seeing, hallucinating, and dreaming.
— creativesoul

I didn’t say that. — Michael

What's the difference between seeing red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
— creativesoul

Nothing. — Michael

And what's the difference between hallucinating red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?

Or between dreaming red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
— creativesoul

Nothing. — Michael

Sigh.

Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.

This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael

He acknowledges and talks about both internal and external components of color vision and seeing color. He makes good points regarding the subjective aspects of color vision/seeing red as well as the objective ones.

Nothing here to support the presupposition that four different things are equivalent. That's what you've done. 

Newton: "For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain Power and Disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Colour."

Kim et al: "Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus."

Palmer: "Color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights."

Maxwell: "Color is a sensation." — Michael

The second and third are at odds.

You believe em both?

I edited this, so please keep this in mind.

You drew a hard equivalency between four separate things.

My "stance" is repeating what the scientists have said: — Michael

None of them did.

You should try quoting more carefully.

It does not follow that there are no differences between hallucinating, dreaming, and seeing red things.
— creativesoul

I haven't claimed that there is no difference. — Michael

Sir. You most certainly did.

You drew a hard fast equivalency between four different things. When I asked you what the differences were between them the answer was the same.

"Nothing"

That is most certainly to claim that there are no differences!

Fer fuck's sake!

We've been over this. They differ in what causes the mental percept.

Indeed we have. Very little attention has been payed to this. You've yet to have responded to the important parts. Ignoring issues does not make them go away.

Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.

This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael

Okay.

He acknowledges and talks about both internal and external components of color vision and seeing color. He makes good points regarding the subjective aspects of color vision/seeing red as well as the objective ones.

Nothing he says aligns with the mistake your entire philosophical edifice, informed stance, rests its laurels upon. See the top of this post.

It's not my conclusion; it's what the science says — Michael

No, it's not.

Science shows that certain biological structures are necessary for all perception. Makes perfect sense in my book.

It does not follow that there are no differences between hallucinating, dreaming, and seeing red things. Science does not say that. You do. Your arguments have recently led to absurd conclusions. I've thought of this more and more recently.



Well put.

Well said.

...my concern is with the nature of a tomato's appearance. — Michael

As is mine. I've no idea how you arrive at the notion that color is nothing but a mental percept, which is to say that biological machinery alone is enough. Brains in vats.

Neither objects nor lights are actually “colored” in anything like the way we experience them. Rather, color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights. The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these physical properties are different in important ways from the colors we perceive.

There's nothing in the science that contradicts what I've offered here. It takes more than just biological machinery doing its job... mindlessly.

Subjectivism and eliminativism are both philosophical positions, so to speak. So, this...

This combination of eliminativism—the view that physical objects do not have colors, at least in a crucial sense—and subjectivism—the view that color is a subjective quality—is not merely of historical interest. It is held by many contemporary experts and authorities on color,

... strikes me as a very odd combination. Dennett laid waste to the subjectivist notion/tenet of qualia(tastes, smells, colors, etc.) using physicalist eliminativism in "Quining Qualia".




What's bothering me about this thread is the fact that many of us agree about the biological machinery and the irrevocable role it plays in all veridical perception, hallucination, and dreams. I'm interested in how that all works, from an evolutionary progression standpoint.

I almost want to treat the autonomous biological machinery doing its work as if it were some sort of living recording.

Hallucination and dreams are to veridical experience as a video recording is to experience. Sticking with that analogy renders some folk hereabouts wanting to equate the experience with the record thereof. I don't know if that's a great analogy, as they all fail when pushed far enough, but hopefully that makes some sort of sense.






You're making a number of excellent points. I appreciate the patience and willingness to do so. I'm sure I'm not alone.

It does not follow that no pain is located in limbs.
— creativesoul

Yes, it does actually. — AmadeusD

Care to shoulder that burden?

Edit: Nevermind, I see you just claimed that hallucinations of red pens include red pens.

To place the idea in an image: someone in Michael's group might claim that, via the scientific findings of a microscope, they have proved that the human eye does not perceive reality. But without the legitimacy of the human eye the findings of a microscope have no value, for the microscope presupposes the human eye. More subtle iterations of this idea are percolating throughout this thread. — Leontiskos

Exactly. Unspoken necessary presuppositions. Collinwood comes to mind.

...This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain.
— Hanover

This poor argument is at the bottom of so much confusion on TPF. — Leontiskos

It strikes me as a performative contradiction, given the fact those purportedly holding the first claim as true have been incessantly making claims about the constitution of the stimulus.

...one does not require perfect certainty in order to have knowledge. — Leontiskos

Yup. As far as I'm concerned, one need not be certain at all in many cases. Certitude is confidence. Knowledge is not. One can be unshakably certain and wrong just as one can be very hesitant and right, to put it roughly.

I like AJ Ayers answers to radical skepticism given the awareness of our own fallibility. It does not follow from the fact that we have been wrong about some things that we've been wrong about everything. It does not follow from the fact that we cannot know everything about something that we cannot know anything about it.

Oh, and there are no colorless rainbows, nor colorless visible spectrums.
— creativesoul

These are aspects of visual world of a perceiver. If you're suggesting, in these terms, that colour inheres in the Rainbow... hehe. Nope. Try changing your terms around to be idependent of perception. Could make some headway.. — AmadeusD

Nice red herring, strawman, non sequitur, etc...

I made the case a few posts back. See for yourself.

That para honestly felt like trolling... Is it? — AmadeusD

Pots and kettles.

'Felt like'???

Or projection, perhaps.

I can't make you pay attention to the whole post. Hallucinations of red pens never include red pens. The pain feels like it's coming from where the limb used to be for the reasons already explained in the parts you edited out. The phantom pain is the result of having already had pain in the limb. It's what is happening when the neurological structures are acting as if there is pain in the limb.

It does not follow that no pain is located in limbs.

Oh, and there are no colorless rainbows, nor colorless visible spectrums.

:zip:

Phantom limb pain works exactly like hallucination does as it pertains to the existential dependency aspect between limb pain and phantom limb pain. The biological machinery behaves as it does when there is a pain in the limb. If there were never a limb, there could never be a phantom pain.

The pain is in the limb, not the brain. The brain plays a role, but not as the location of the pain. It is the locus of one's awareness of the pain. Hence, after having already evolved the neurological pathways of having experienced pain in the limb, they are primed to act that way again, despite no longer having a physical extremity located where the pain seems to be coming from. It's akin to neurological muscle memory. Biological structures acting as they do... mindlessly.

I'm reporting what the science says. — Michael

Well, you're reporting what the writer says. If the author is a scientist, then you're reporting what a scientist says. And they... and we... are theorizing from observation/experiment. Not all scientists agree on the theoretical extrapolations you're presenting. Theoretical physics is philosophy. So, it seems to me that you're reporting on both, the experiments, and the philosophical explanations thereof. Those are flawed as well, as I'll address shortly.

First...

Here's what I'm saying: The biological machinery under consideration - in complete and total absence of external stimulus - is inherently incapable of seeing, dreaming, or hallucinating anything at all, colors notwithstanding. Seeing, dreaming, and hallucinating colors takes more than just the biological structures.

Second...

I'm not disagreeing that hallucinations and dreams happen even though there is no typical external stimulus present. I mean, hallucinating and dreaming red pens, never includes a red pen. It is only after one has seen color, that can one hallucinate and/or dream that color. It is during dreams and hallucinations that the same biological structures behave as if they were seeing a red pen, not the other way around. There is an existential dependency at hand here. It's important.

Third...

If there were no cake, then there could have never been anyone smelling one. If no one ever smelled a cake, there could never have been anyone dreaming or hallucinating cake smells. Likewise, if there is no creature capable of smelling cakes, there could have never been cake smelling, even if there were plenty of cakes being baked. It a complex process, replete with necessary elemental constituents.

So...

It takes more than just biological machinery. It also takes more than just cakes. Hence, to isolate only one necessary element in a complex process is to lose sight of and/or grossly neglect the fact that it's a process, and that process consists of different things, all of which are necessary for the emergence of seeing colors and smelling cakes.

You want to ignore the fact that dreams and hallucinations are existentially dependent upon veridical perception, excise the biological machinery from the rest of the process, and then claim that all three consist of only that machinery.

Depending upon one's notion of physiological sensory perception, it could sensibly and consistently be said that smell and color are both inherent in distal objects. Newton came close until positing "sensation". Colored things possess mind independent physical properties that are inherently capable of being seen as colored by a mind so capable. I think Searle holds something like that, but I'm sure his is more nuanced.

I personally reject the idea that color exists at all in the complete absence of both/either colored things and/or creatures capable of seeing color.

You're contradicting yourself at nearly every turn, in addition to the fact that your 'argument' leads to the absurdity of you claiming out loud, for everyone to see, that you do not conclude anything about stimulus from your experience all the while insisting that there is no color in stimulus.

There is a clear distinction between wavelengths of light and the corresponding colour... — Michael

Colors corresponding to wavelengths of light...

Are there colorless rainbows?

Your naive projection has long since been refuted by physics and neuroscience. — Michael

Strawdogs and ad homs... wonderful.

The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. — Hanover

And yet... you and Michael are doing exactly that.

If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.
— creativesoul

Light exposure influences the biological machinery to do different things... mindlessly. This includes the eyes, when looking at the infamous image of the dress.
— creativesoul

These comments are inconsistent. — Hanover

The first paragraph shows the consequences of adding Michael's earlier claims to known fact.

The second paragraph is also known fact. It makes no difference to me whatsoever which one counts as "direct realism" or which one counts as "indirect". I'm neither. At least, I reject the idea of color as a biologically independent entity.

The homogeneal Light and Rays which appear red, or rather make Objects appear so, I call Rubrifick or Red-making; those which make Objects appear yellow, green, blue, and violet, I call Yellow-making, Green-making, Blue-making, Violet-making, and so of the rest. And if at any time I speak of Light and Rays as coloured or endued with Colours, I would be understood to...

Be equivocating.

Are you saying that there are colorless rainbows?
— creativesoul

It's not clear what you mean by the question — Michael

It follows from what you wrote. I showed that.

Light is unlike chemicals.

The light without color?

Earlier you forwarded the claim "there is no color in light". The visible spectrum is light. If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.

Yet you offer a rainbow called the visible spectrum.

Colorless rainbows.
— creativesoul

Light is just electromagnetic radiation. When it stimulates the eyes this causes neurological activity in the visual cortex, producing colour percepts. Just like chemicals stimulating the tongue cause neurological activity in the gustatory cortex, producing taste percepts. Colours are no more "in" light than tastes are "in" sugar. — Michael

Are you saying that there are colorless rainbows?

Light exposure influences the biological machinery to do different things... mindlessly. This includes the eyes, when looking at the infamous image of the dress.

Here's the visible spectrum. — Michael

The light without color?

Earlier you forwarded the claim "there is no color in light". The visible spectrum is light. If there is no color in light, and the visible spectrum is light, then it only follows that there is no color in the visible spectrum.

Yet you offer a rainbow called the visible spectrum.



Colorless rainbows. Earlier I was pointing out that possible unacceptable logical consequence. Here it is in it's glory.

They look that way because they reflect that wavelength of light, and our biology just happens to be such that objects which reflect that wavelength of light look to have that colour. That's all there is to it.

But the colour just is that mental percept — Michael

:yikes:

Colors are not simple entities. Nor are they equivalent to the biological machinery doing it's job... mindlessly.

The when and how it is caused to occur is then what distinguishes dreams, hallucinations, and non-hallucinatory waking experiences. It's a dream when it occurs when we're asleep, it's an hallucination when it occurs when we're awake and in response to something like drugs, and it's a non-hallucinatory waking experience when it occurs when we're awake and in response to light stimulating the eyes. — Michael

You've no ground to speak in such ways. The consequences of your claims - if true - is that you cannot further discriminate between those four things. What is the difference?

Nothing.



The experiences consist of mental percept. They also consist of auditory functioning. We do not conflate hearing a sound with the sound. We ought not conflate seeing red with red, dreaming red with red, and/or hallucinating red with red.

Those are very different in the constitution. They are existentially dependent upon one another.

Seeing red pens is an experience that always includes red pens, whereas dreaming and hallucinating them does not - cannot. That's one elemental difference. The pen.

There is no red pen while dreaming and hallucinating red pens.

I also asked what the difference was between the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur and seeing red, and dreaming red.

You claimed "nothing" as an answer to all three questions. If there is no difference between four things, then they are the same.

They're all experiences.
— creativesoul

The red part of hallucinating red, dreaming red, and seeing red are all the same thing... — Michael

Well, that remains a contentious matter. The 'red part', huh?

:brow:

There are common elements within each. The mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur is but one. It does not follow that seeing red, dreaming red, and hallucinating red are equivalent in every way. There is no distinction between four different 'things' according to what you've argued(claimed and reaffirmed when later asked).

It does not follow from the fact that seeing, dreaming, and hallucinating red all involve the mental percept that 620-750 light ordinarily causes to occur that there is no difference between seeing red and the percept under consideration.

There are physical, non-physical, subjective, objective, internal, external, private, public, meaningful and meaningless elements. All three kinds of experience differ from one another in their elemental constitution.

I am being very explicit with what I mean by the word "red", which is the opposite of equivocation. — Michael

No. The opposite of equivocation is using one and only one sense of a key term in a logical argument about the ontology of our referent(s).