The cow I see exists outside my head. My visual experience exists inside my head. Therefore, the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael

I think that that is a bewitchment of the mind by virtue of language use. It also shows the limitation of logic.

Validity alone does not warrant belief.

Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, — Michael

I think that there are better options...

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. — Michael

Interesting. Dennett is an eliminative materialist. The Churchlands are as well, I think. In "From Bacteria to Bach and Back" and "Kinds of Minds he employs an intentionalism stance in a manner that I find to be guilty of anthropomorphism, but the practice does seem capable of making a whole lot of sense of the evolutionary progression of minds.

So, shapes, colors, smells, and sounds are in your brain?

Qualia?

I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”. — Michael

No, it's not. False analogy. Red herring as well. Portraits are not equivalent to seeing cows(which is one kind of visual experience).

the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.
— Michael

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul

If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing.

the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

Do you see something that is not a constituent of your experience?

Is the field in your brain?

We don't directly see cows – according to the naive and indirect realist's meaning of "directly see"1 – but we do indirectly see cows.

Given that the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see", the phrases "I directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" do not mean the same thing. The phrase "I indirectly see a cow" entails "I see a cow" and so the phrases "I do not directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" are not contradictory.

1 A directly sees B iff B is a constituent of A's visual experience. — Michael

Blather.

Where is the cow you see?

...our ability to interpret what we perceive depends on our prior embodied experiences and conceptual repertoire. I couldn't see a duck as a duck if I had never encountered ducks before, either in person or through images. But these enabling conditions for interpretation do not stand between me and the duck when I perceive it. Rather, they are the background that allows me to make sense of my direct perceptual encounter with the duck itself. — Pierre-Normand

The most salient - but sorely neglected - point made thus far.

Experience exists within the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects do not exist within experience. — Michael

You keep saying that but refuse to directly address the inevitable consequence thereof. If distal objects exist outside the brain, and experience exists within the brain, and distal objects do not exist within experience, the either seeing is not part of experience or we do not see distal objects. Cows are distal objects. You claimed that we see cows. Incoherency at best. Self contradiction at worst. Equivocation either way.

It's odd to me that people using a computer to argue a very nuanced philosophical position, can be led to believe that the computer is not a necessary elemental constituent of doing that.

Sigh...

The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. — Mww

Or that experience is not the sort of thing that has a location.

Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2

I'm not speaking for Luke. He's far more eloquent and concise than I. That said...

That question presupposes the brain is somehow severed from the creature(brain in a vat anyone?). It is also guilty of the personification of the brain(anthropomorphism). As if brains are the sort of thing capable of presenting a representation of the world to their biological owner. Brains are necessary but insufficient for forming/formulating a representation of the world. The other biological structures are also necessary.

The representation, if there is one, is something that the creature forms, autonomously, by virtue of having physiological sensory perception. The quality of the representation is determined by how well it corresponds to the way things are. The scope is determined by the biological machinery involved. The greater the number of sensory structures the broader the scope of input. Sight and sound provide a different representation than either alone. Etc. To your question...

The seeing is the representation of a creature with only eyes. There is no such creature, but you get the point, I hope. The biological machinery results in representations of the world. Simple single celled organisms directly perceive, but do not seem to have what it takes to form(ulate) a 'representation' of the world.

Personally, I reject the notion of "representation" as it's commonly used in discourse about biological machinery doing its job. I certainly reject the anthropomorphizing of brains.

I don't like the idea that we have no direct access to the world. — AmadeusD

What does our biological machinery do then, if not directly connect us to the world? Sometimes the causal chain is longer than others, but it is a direct link between the creature and the world nonetheless.

Biological machinery interacts physically with distal objects.

The indirect realist uses knowledge of how biological machinery works as ground to deny that we directly perceive distal objects. If we adhere strictly to the preferred framing of folk like Michael and perhaps yourself(?), we would have to deny any and all physical contact between cows and eyes. If we extend that criterion to other senses, we would be forced to say that physically forcing our face into a pudding pie and withdrawing it would not count as directly perceiving the pie. Even if and when our eyes were/are open.

Think how much greater than five sigma confidence people would have to have in all those distal objects such as measurement instruments, computers, and a bunch of scientists, to have a reason to believe a five sigma level confidence for the Higgs Boson. — wonderer1

Yup. There's the performative contradiction Janus pointed at earlier.

Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both.
— creativesoul

Yes it can. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I see cows and I see colours. — Michael

Well, you're right about one thing, we can see both, but not in the way you're claiming. I've mentioned before about hallucinations and that they are existentially dependent upon earlier seeing the real thing(veridical experiences). What you're doing here is incoherent/self-contradictory.

Earlier you claimed that there are no distal objects in experience. By definition, nonetheless. There cannot be according to the notion of experience you've been arguing for/from.

Seeing is experience. Cows are distal objects. Fire is as well. We see constituents. Earlier you replaced distal objects with representations thereof.

How do you reconcile that?

If colours are the end result of a biological process that is existentially dependent upon the surface layers of distal objects as well as a creature capable of detecting light, then what sense does it make to say that colors are a mental phenomena that has no external constituent?

If hallucinations of color emerge only after having veridical experience, and are impossible without ever having those, then "mental phenomena" misses something pivotal about the nature of colour vision.

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael

Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both. Distal objects are not mental phenomena. On second thought, hallucinations are mental, so sometimes we see mental phenomena, other times we see distal objects.

Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. — Michael

Now, that looks like self-contradiction.

A [veridical experience] depends on a [distal object] but the [distal object] is not a constituent of the [veridical experience]. The constituents of the [veridical experience] are just [mental phenomena]. — Michael

:brow:

A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas. — Michael

Agreed, but false analogy with regard to what I'm arguing. That fits with what you're arguing about all perception, and what I'm arguing only regarding hallucinations/dreams. Replace the painter with distal objects.

They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case
— creativesoul

Which means what? — Michael

That distal objects are constituents in veridical perception and illusion, but not hallucinations.

I have been trying to explain that when naive realists claim that some distal object is (directly) perceived they mean that the object is a literal constituent of the experience and that when indirect realists claim that some distal object is not (directly) perceived they mean that the object is not a literal constituent of the experience. — Michael

Yup. Go back through my posts here, and it ought be obvious that what I'm arguing fits. However, by "literal" you mean physical, material, 'concrete' entities. I do not. By "constituent" I mean a necessary element constituent thereof. For example, a play requires actors, performance area, costumes, etc. All of those are necessary elemental constituents of a play. The same holds for seeing trees. For you seeing trees is an experience that cannot include anything external to the brain.

Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution
— creativesoul

That doesn’t follow. That X depends on Y is not that Y is a constituent of X. A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas.

You seem to be confusing constituent with cause. — Michael

No, I'm not. You've misunderstood. I didn't offer an argument for the conclusion you've misattributed. I agree with saying that X depends upon Y is not equivalent to Y is a constituent of X.

Hallucinations are examples, as I've already explained but you've neglected to discuss.

The indirect realist claims that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are (interpreted) mental phenomena, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the indirect realist, perhaps cumbersomely, says that we smell and taste and see mental phenomena. — Michael

Veridical perception, hallucination, and illusions. You claim they share the same constituents, and the difference is in their causes.

Can you set out the different causes?

The direct (naive) realist claims that we do have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are mind-independent properties of distal objects, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the direct realist says that we smell and taste and see mind-independent properties of distal objects. — Michael

There's the semantic hijacking. Odd coming from someone who has charged so many here, including myself, with strawmen. I consider myself a direct realist as I argue that distal objects are necessary for all three kinds of perception. They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case, but they're absent during hallucination(which is the biological machinery behaving as it has in past despite no distal object). Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution, although they are all three existentially dependent upon distal objects. Hallucinations arise from veridical experience. Whether or not I'm a 'naive' realist about perception/experience, I'll leave for others. I don't care about the label. I care about the accounting practices being used to characterize the evolutionary progression of biological machinery.

Coffee does not have an inherent property of taste. Cake does not have an inherent property of smell. Cups do not have an inherent property of color. We taste coffee. We smell cake. We see red cups. Tasting coffee is an experience. Smelling cake is an experience. Seeing red cups is an experience. Without coffee there can be no experience of tasting coffee. Without experience of tasting coffee there can be no hallucination thereof. Without cake there can be no experience of smelling cake. Without experience of smelling cake, there can be no hallucination of smelling cake. Without cups with a specific reflective outer layer, there can be no seeing red cups. Without seeing red cups, there can be no hallucination thereof.

You (and others) seem to be getting unnecessarily lost in the grammar of "I see X", but this is a red herring. The relevant concern is the reasoning that precedes such a claim, i.e. are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience and so do we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. If you accept that they're not and that we don't then you're an indirect realist, even if you don't like indirect realist grammar and would rather continue to say "I see distal objects". — Michael

Semantic hijacking of "experience".

Without cups...

Experiences, whether veridical or hallucinations, are reducible to (or supervene on) brain activity. Therefore anything that exists outside the brain cannot be a constituent of experience. Do you not accept this reasoning? — Michael

Reducible? No. Supervene on, perhaps, if that means that all experience emerge in part at least, as a result of brains being part of what it takes. I'm in agreement with that much.

Your earlier argument was valid. I simply disagree with the notion of experience you're working with. It seems to beg the question of regarding the necessary element constituents of perception/experience. You deny external content/constituents. I do not.

So, hallucinations are reducible to brain activity. Seeing a cow includes a cow. Hallucinating a cow does not. It requires having already seen cows.

Yep. Was a great night. For a while I even had a split mind which was weird. — Michael

So, I've heard about 'shrooms. More and more, I personally find myself liking life much better with the natural chemical cocktails that the body makes all by itself. When younger, things were different.

I don't understand what you think indirect realism has to account for. — Michael

That perception of apples is required in order to later have hallucinations thereof. Therefore, they are not the same thing.

What is the difference between the cause of hallucination as compared to veridical experience on the indirect account you're arguing for/from?

patterns of colours — Michael

Fungus huh?

:lol:

If hallucination of an apple amounts to the biological machinery doing the same thing it has done in past, while looking at an apple, then it becomes clear which one is existentially dependent upon the other.

They are not the same. Indirect realism cannot seem to account for that.

There is no difference between the constitution of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes. — Michael

According to the account you're arguing for/from.

Is hallucination of an apple possible if one has never ever seen an apple, if one is completely unaware that there are such things as apples?

So at least according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur. — Michael

Well, whether or not something follows from one's terms is established by one's meaning, not the others'.

If cake molecules entering the body and interacting(physically) with one's biological machinery does not count as direct perception, then nothing will.

In evolutionary progression terms...

I cannot make sense of hallucination unless compared to non-hallucinatory experience. Non hallucinatory experience does not depend upon hallucinatory in the same sense of "depend". Existential dependency. On the indirect realist account, there is no difference between the constituents.

That's just plain wrong.

A hallucination or dream of an apple does not require a distal object(an apple) except sometime in past experience. For that is when the biological machinery does its perception work. In dreams and hallucinations, its (mis)firing as though it has once again perceived or is once again perceiving an apple, despite no apple being perceived.

So, I'm curious and I've circled around some questions I'd like you to answer. I've hinted, I guess is one way to put it. Now, I'm going to directly ask(pardon the pun).

There's some barbecue chicken in the kitchen. I can smell it, because the molecules are entering into my body unimpeded, carried along in the air. My biological machinery is doing what it does.

To me, I am directly perceiving the chicken in the other room, because small parts of it entered my nose.

I'm guessing you'll deny that my perception of the chicken is direct. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the chicken is a constituent of my perception or my experience. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the molecules are a constituent of my perception or experience.

Do I have that right?

Yes, I do believe that the existence of the tree I see is not in question. If I decide to question it and then accept an answer, then, and only then, has belief come into play. In other words, of course all doubt concerning the veracity of our vision is belief based, but I am speaking about the situation prior to any doubt about the veracity of our vision. — Janus

That's when one's initial basic worldview is forming. One is acquiring and accruing belief about themselves and the world around them. Prior to doubting the veracity of one's own vision, one completely and totally trusts their physiological sensory perception(eyes in this case). During these times prior to that awareness... seeing is believing. What I mean is that one does not doubt their own eyes until they become that they are sometimes untrustworthy, by then we're operating under a belief system.

When we begin looking at the world, we believe that there are things all around us, despite the fact that we cannot articulate nor formulate our own experiences. It's impossible for a bike rider to swerve in order to avoid an obstacle that they do not believe is there. Belief is baked into all experiences.

It leads to a whole network of philosophical garden paths in which, absurdly, the self is forever "cut off" from the world in which it lives. — Banno

Reminiscent of Kant's Noumena. The whole denial that I know that the heater grate to my right is what I'm seeing. I know what it's made of. I know where it's located. I know the size and shape. I know it's function. I know some dangers it poses to passersby. I know it's not located in my head/body. I know mental representations are. Thus, the grate I'm looking at is not a mental representation.

I don't claim not to have reliable knowledge of distal objects... — Michael

The end.

:wink:

We're in agreement.

There's semantic hijacking going on in here concerning what counts as direct realism/perception. Earlier fdrake posted some SEP stuff that is more in line with where I'm at. I also have sympathy for disjunctive views on this topic.

I also find little sense in a self divorced from physiological sensory perception.

Cut out my tongue, and I'm still me, but there's a bit less. The tongue remains a part of me, just disconnected. Self and sight, hearing, etc. seems the same.

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank

I almost quoted that paragraph, crossed that part out, and agreed. That part caused me pause as well.

I don't think believing the tree is there is necessary for seeing it. I see the tree there, and the question of whether or not it is really there (answering that question being the point where belief enters into the picture) doesn't arise, certainly doesn't have to arise.

You can say that seeing the tree presupposes believing it, (like the old adage "seeing is believing") and that is one way of speaking about what is happening; I just happen to see that way of speaking as redundant. I think believing comes into play when there is doubt and we decide to go with one possibility or another. — Janus

Do you really believe that the question of whether or not we're hallucinating(whether or not the tree is really there) comes before belief?

All doubt concerning the veracity of our vision is belief based.