Think about what? Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. But to think about how the brain as a physical substance works, as that by which our intellect is possible, representationalism wouldn’t even be a theoretical condition, hence wouldn’t make any sense to include it in an empirical descriptive method. — Mww

I think we're just disagreeing on language. I don't think it's very likely that the brain takes in sensory input and constructs experience out of it. That was the original idea behind indirect realism.

I think there's more likely a built-in framework that takes cues from sensory data. In other words, it's a kind of tango with world and conscious entity as the dancers. Is this direct realism? Not exactly, although it's something Aristotle might accept if we made the model something cosmic, which isn't outside the bounds of reason.

a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view, sufficient for us to comprehend what it is we do with our intelligence, cannot possibly be the method the brain, in and of itself, actually uses to provide it. — Mww

I'm not understanding this. Could you say more?

Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. — Mww

It depends what you mean by representation I think. You can have very minimal notions which do not do very much work or richer notions which are just unrealistic imo. I think representation is an idealized concept arising from meta-cognitive capacities (another idealization). But what is most fundamental is that the brain is in the business of 'what happens next?', most of this business being hidden from us because of the trillions of parameters in neurons that are hidden from us.

Because of this complexity, intelligible notions of representation are difficult to sustain imo simply because the brain's ability to track or enact 'what happens next?' is far more complicated than our metacognitive ability to track it (which is embedded within that, obviously). Our own notions of representations will constantly come up against fuzziness and exceptions to rules. All this suggesting that what we think of as representations are redundant to whatever is going on underneath the hood. The representations we do make up and are intelligible to us are idealizations that cannot possibly precisely describe what the brain, or even our own experiences actually do. It is not some essential nature in experiences which lead to what happens next but the trillions of parameters in neurons, which are much more complicated and noisy than our metacognitive abilities.

Imo, our notions of representations are not things in themselves but inferential. No experience has an innate representative quality; instead, I infer that an experience has features that seem representation-like. Again, I don't think the notion of representation is impossible or something to be shut out, just it has to be quite weak.

Right, but the direct/indirect realism discussion is also commonly framed in terms of whether we directly perceive real objects or whether we instead directly perceive a representation or other perceptual intermediary (and only indirectly perceive real objects). I reject that we perceive a mental representation and say that we directly perceive real objects.

As stated earlier, I think the naive realist position is based on the misguided notion that when we perceive a real object we perceive the world in itself (or somehow identify the perception with the object). A perception that is identical with its object is not really a perception at all; it is the object.

The indirect realist opposes the naive realist position, saying that we do not directly perceive a real object but that we directly perceive only a mental representation of the real object.

I reject the direct realist notion that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself (or that our perceptions are identical with the perceived object) and the indirect realist notion that we directly perceive only mental representations of real objects. Instead, I say that our perception of real objects is direct (in a non-naive sense) because perceptions are mental representations.

Thanks for the explanation. A question arises regarding the misguided notion of naive realism, that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself.

The qualifiers “in itself” or “as it is” confuse me to no end, and to be honest I have never seen a naive realist affix these phrases to statements about an object of perception, at least in common language. It makes me think that in order to see an object “as it is” I must see it from an infinite amount of perspectives at the same time, that in order to really see an object I must also see what I cannot possibly see, for instance the back of an object while looking at the front of it, or what it looks like if no one was looking at it, and so on.

So the question is: If we’re not perceiving the world in itself or as it is, what are we perceiving?

Our own notions of representations will constantly come up against fuzziness and exceptions to rules. All this suggesting that what we think of as representations are redundant to whatever is going on underneath the hood — Apustimelogist

No disagreement from me here. Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. Besides, and quite obviously, we do not think in terms of neural activity, even if that is exactly how the brain works, which is perfect justification for a substitute descriptive methodology. To be a rationally adept human is to be discontented with no understanding at all, so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks, and whatever does is what we deem as understandable. Hence, speculative metaphysics; been that way since Day One.
—————

a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view…..cannot possibly be the method the brain…..actually uses.
— Mww

I'm not understanding this. Could you say more? — frank

Maybe what I said just above is sufficient? Enlightenment philosophy in general understood the brain’s overall necessary functionality without knowing hardly a single thing about the brain, so whatever we say about what’s going on between our ears is a fiction with respect to the physical operation of material substances. All Kant wanted to state as a warning to his peers, is to be careful in the construction of those fictions, one of which….his in particular it so happens….is what you already said regarding a built-in a priori framework.

Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. — Mww

so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks — Mww

Yup, definitely agree with your sentiments in this post! I think this applies to all our learning. All we have are "stories" that are constructed and enacted in experience and we argue about their merits.

Experiences don’t exist in the brain, but the things the brain does, whatever that is, that makes it seem like experiences exist in the brain, exist in the brain. — Mww

Yes, that seems right.

In for a penny, why not in for a pound? Thinking and judging is just about the entire human conscious intellectual environment anyway, isn’t it?

At least now I have a better idea regarding your mindset, so, thanks for that. — Mww

It seems that language is dualistic in its logical structure, its grammar. If that is so, then all of our discourse will be dualistic also. But I don't want to go further and impute a dualistic structure to the mind-independent actuality.

I don't think our mindsets are that far apart.

Thanks for the explanation. A question arises regarding the misguided notion of naive realism, that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself.

The qualifiers “in itself” or “as it is” confuse me to no end, and to be honest I have never seen a naive realist affix these phrases to statements about an object of perception, at least in common language. It makes me think that in order to see an object “as it is” I must see it from an infinite amount of perspectives at the same time, that in order to really see an object I must also see what I cannot possibly see, for instance the back of an object while looking at the front of it, or what it looks like if no one was looking at it, and so on. — NOS4A2

Naive realism "is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are." (Wikipedia)

"Naïve realism claims that [...] objects continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, warmth, and mass." (IEP)

"Naive realism is the philosophical concept that suggests our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world as it truly is, without any interpretation or mediation. According to naive realism, when we perceive something, we directly perceive the object itself as it exists independently of our perception." (ChatGPT)

Illusions and hallucinations are often cited as being problematic for naive realism, suggesting that our senses do not provide us with direct awareness of the external world as it is. Science also tells us that the world isn't really coloured, so we do not perceive the world as it really is wrt colour. Hopefully, this gives you an idea of the naive realist view of perceiving the world in itself, or as it really is.

So the question is: If we’re not perceiving the world in itself or as it is, what are we perceiving? — NOS4A2

According to my view, which is neither naive realism or indirect realism, we are perceiving the world as (normal) humans (normally) perceive it, given our human sensory organs (that is, assuming you and I both perceive it in the normal way, like most humans do). This includes us perceiving illusions, such as sticks bending in water, the Muller-Lyer illusion, or the checker shadow illusion. Science tells us that other animals (and some other humans) may perceive the world differently to us.

To paraphrase the ChatGPT definition of naive realism above, on my view, when we perceive something, we can directly perceive the object itself, but the perception depends on our sensory organs or perceptual apparatus.

What is the physical/physiological difference between us seeing a mental representation and a mental representation existing in our heads?

This is where I think you're getting so confused by grammar.

If mental representations exist and if distal objects are not constituents of these mental representations and if our knowledge of distal objects is mediated by knowledge of these mental representations then indirect realism is true, because that's all that indirect realism means. — Michael

Apologies for the following "argument by AI", but it is far more eloquent than I am, and I believe is in agreement with my view:

I asked ChatGPT for some assistance in distinguishing my view from indirect realism:

User
With respect to the direct/indirect realism debate, what difference does it make to the indirect realist position to say that perceptions are mental representations, instead of that we perceive mental representations?

ChatGPT
In the direct/indirect realism debate, direct realists argue that we perceive the external world directly, while indirect realists contend that what we perceive are mental representations or sense data, rather than the external world itself. The distinction between saying "perceptions are mental representations" versus "we perceive mental representations" may seem subtle, but it carries significant implications for the indirect realist position.

Perceptions as Mental Representations: This perspective suggests that perceptions are constructed within the mind based on sensory input. In other words, our experiences of the external world are mediated by mental processes that interpret and represent sensory data. From this viewpoint, perceptions are seen as internal mental states that correspond to external objects or events. Indirect realists who adopt this view typically argue that our awareness of the external world is always filtered through mental representations, which may or may not accurately reflect the true nature of external objects.

We Perceive Mental Representations: This formulation emphasizes the act of perception itself, suggesting that what we directly encounter are mental representations rather than external objects. According to this interpretation, perception is inherently subjective and mediated by mental processes. Indirect realists who adopt this stance argue that our experiences are fundamentally shaped by the way our minds represent sensory information, and that there is no direct access to the external world independent of these mental representations.

The difference between these two formulations lies in the emphasis on either the nature of perceptions themselves or the act of perceiving. However, both perspectives align in asserting that our awareness of the world is mediated by mental representations. The distinction may have implications for how indirect realists conceptualize the relationship between the mind and the external world, as well as how they address philosophical challenges such as skepticism and the problem of perception.

User
Could those who say "perceptions are mental representations" be direct realists instead of indirect realists?

ChatGPT
Yes, it's possible for individuals who assert that "perceptions are mental representations" to still be direct realists, although this stance might require some clarification and nuance.

In the direct realism framework, the key idea is that our perceptual experiences directly reflect the external world as it is, without the need for intermediary mental representations. However, some direct realists might acknowledge that perceptions involve mental processing and representation without necessarily subscribing to the idea that these representations mediate our access to the external world.

For instance, a direct realist who asserts that "perceptions are mental representations" might argue that the mind actively organizes sensory input and constructs a coherent perceptual experience, but they would maintain that this process occurs in real-time and directly corresponds to external objects or events. In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality.

So, while the statement "perceptions are mental representations" is often associated with indirect realism, it's conceivable for a direct realist to adopt this view with the caveat that mental representations serve as immediate reflections of external reality rather than as intermediaries mediating perception.

This also appears to be consistent with the enactivist view that @Pierre-Normand and @fdrake have been arguing for, if I understand it correctly.

I'm not speaking for Luke. He's far more eloquent and concise than I. — creativesoul

I don't know about that, but it's very kind of you to say. :)

This also appears to be consistent with the enactivist view that Pierre-Normand and @fdrake have been arguing for, if I understand it correctly. — Luke

I'd like to raise two distinct but related issues here:

First, regarding representation, it's important to distinguish between external representational artifacts and the internal mental representations posited by indirect realists. Consider the duck-rabbit ambiguous image. As a flat graphical depiction, it is an external representation that can be interpreted as representing a duck or a rabbit. But this is different from the claim that our perceptual experience itself relies on internal mental representations.

To illustrate this difference, consider an example from my own experience. Several years ago, while walking home at night, I suddenly stopped because I thought I saw a large black dog lying on a lawn near the sidewalk. As I approached cautiously, I realized it was actually a black garbage bag folded in a way that resembled a dog. In this case, the garbage bag itself was not a representation, but an object that I misinterpreted as a dog. If I had seen a real rabbit and mistaken it for a duck, my error would have been in misinterpreting the rabbit itself, not an internal mental representation of the rabbit.

This leads to the second point, regarding interpretation. Interpretation is not a matter of decoding internal representations, but of bringing our concepts and past experiences to bear on what we directly perceive. In the duck-rabbit case, we can shift our interpretation by actively redirecting our attention and applying different concepts to what we see. But this is a matter of world-directed sense-making, not the manipulation of mental representations.

Moreover, our ability to interpret what we perceive depends on our prior embodied experiences and conceptual repertoire. I couldn't see a duck as a duck if I had never encountered ducks before, either in person or through images. But these enabling conditions for interpretation do not stand between me and the duck when I perceive it. Rather, they are the background that allows me to make sense of my direct perceptual encounter with the duck itself.

So, while perception certainly involves interpretation, this need not commit us to indirect realism. Interpretive processes, unlike representational artifacts, can play a role in our perceptual lives without functioning as intermediaries between us and the external world. By recognizing the world-directed, enactive nature of perceptual interpretation, we can preserve the direct realist insight that perception puts us in immediate contact with the environment as it is disclosed through our embodied skills and conceptual capacities (rather than as it is in itself!)

In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality. — Luke

I don't understand this distinction. What is the physical/physiological difference between the two?

If you accept that mental "representations" exist and if you accept that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations and if you accept that the qualities of these mental representations (smells, tastes, colours, etc.) are not (and are possibly unlike) the mind-independent properties of distal objects then I agree with you.

I call this view "indirect realism" as it is all I understand indirect realism to be; the rejection of naive realism. If you want to call this view "direct realism" then go ahead. The label is irrelevant.

Just understand that your direct realism is not inconsistent with my indirect realism. They're the same position, just given different names.

But I don't want to go further and impute a dualistic structure to the mind-independent actuality. — Janus

A perfect example of the difficulties with language: to impute dualism to actuality is metaphysically disastrous, re: whatever is just is, Aristotle’s A = A, but when actuality is qualified by “mind-independent”, a dualism is automatically given.

An overly-critical analyst might even go so far as to assert there is no such thing as “actuality” without an intelligence affected by it, the repercussion being non-dualism is impossible, from which follows A = whatever I think it is.
———-

It seems that language is dualistic in its logical structure, its grammar. If that is so, then all of our discourse will be dualistic also. (…) I don't think our mindsets are that far apart. — Janus

Respectfully, I submit that our intelligence is dualist in its logical structure, and language merely represents the expression of its employment, so our mindsets are at least that far apart. Dualistic in logical structure just meant to indicate the rational/empirical grounds for proof, the former being necessary from which follows the possibility of truth, the latter contingent from which follows the possibility of knowledge.

Anyway….historically we’ve noticed between us the pitfalls of OLP, so in that respect, we’re not that far apart.

...our ability to interpret what we perceive depends on our prior embodied experiences and conceptual repertoire. I couldn't see a duck as a duck if I had never encountered ducks before, either in person or through images. But these enabling conditions for interpretation do not stand between me and the duck when I perceive it. Rather, they are the background that allows me to make sense of my direct perceptual encounter with the duck itself. — Pierre-Normand

The most salient - but sorely neglected - point made thus far.

We don't directly see cows – according to the naive and indirect realist's meaning of "directly see"1 – but we do indirectly see cows.

Given that the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see", the phrases "I directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" do not mean the same thing. The phrase "I indirectly see a cow" entails "I see a cow" and so the phrases "I do not directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" are not contradictory.

1 A directly sees B iff B is a constituent of A's visual experience. — Michael

Blather.

Where is the cow you see?

In the field I presume.

Is the field in your brain?

No

Do you see something that is not a constituent of your experience?

Yes.

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul

The cow I see exists outside my head. My visual experience exists inside my head. Therefore, the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.

the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see?

I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”.

The fact is that the President is not a constituent of the portrait. The portrait is paint and canvas hanging on a wall. The President is in the White House having breakfast.

I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”. — Michael

No, it's not. False analogy. Red herring as well. Portraits are not equivalent to seeing cows(which is one kind of visual experience).

the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.
— Michael

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul

If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing.

If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing. — creativesoul

The constituents of visual experience are shapes and colours, the constituents of auditory experience are sounds, the constituents of olfactory experiences are smells, etc.

Qualia?

So, shapes, colors, smells, and sounds are in your brain?

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism.

All I will say is that experience exists inside the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, and so distal objects are not constituents of experience. Therefore naive realism is false. Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, and these further disputes between indirect realism and so-called non-naive “direct” realism are confusions arising from different groups meaning different things by the terms “direct” and “see”.

Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. — Michael

Interesting. Dennett is an eliminative materialist. The Churchlands are as well, I think. In "From Bacteria to Bach and Back" and "Kinds of Minds he employs an intentionalism stance in a manner that I find to be guilty of anthropomorphism, but the practice does seem capable of making a whole lot of sense of the evolutionary progression of minds.

All we have are "stories" that are constructed and enacted in experience and we argue about their merits. — Apustimelogist

That’s half of what we have, albeit the more important half. It is necessary there be that which serves as the occassion for the construction of the stories, therefrom the experiences we argue about. If there weren’t things to be experienced as trees, there wouldn’t be trees.