I'm talking about 'truth'. I have said nothing whatsoever about true beliefs and language. Nothing — Bartricks

Perhaps you ought start to think about them...

Answer?

Are you denying that true belief exists prior to language?

I'm objecting to your definition of "truth" because Reason is both insufficient and unnecessary for true belief.

Don't hold me to a standard of argument/justification that you yourself have yet to have met. It will not end well for you...

Truth is correspondence.

Arguing for any claim is an appeal to Reason. I could set out an argument that some things exist in their entirety prior to my setting them out. It does not follow that those things are existentially dependent upon Reason. To quite the contrary, our understanding of them is.

Truth is one such thing, as is true belief, meaning, and Mt. Everest.

Reason has been shown to result in false conclusions. True belief exists in it's entirety prior to Reason. Thus, the following is rejected...

...'truth' is the property of being a proposition whose contents Reason asserts to be the case - is true. — Bartricks

Truth is correspondence between thought and/or belief and what's happened, is happening, and/or will happen.

Good for you. Just so long as you do not conclude , as you did, that a statement's being true requires it's being believed. — Banno

No, I didn't.

You cannot divorce truth from belief. <-------that's what I've been setting out, some of which you've quoted.

I'm very well aware that a statement can be true regardless of whether or not any specific individual believes the statement. I'm also very well aware that all true statements are existentially dependent upon belief. So, keeping this in mind, we cannot conclude that truth is existentially independent of all belief simply because some particular statements need not be believed by any individual speaker in order to be true.

So...

Pots and kettles to the earlier charge.

...you are confusing belief as a whole with belief in any particular. — Banno

I'm noting the existential dependency that all statements have upon belief.

A statement's being true requires more than being believed.
— creativesoul

What?

A statement's being true requires exactly that it be true, no more and no less. — Banno

A statement's being true requires statements. Statements require belief. Thus, a statement's being true requires belief.

The Subjects of Reality
What is the nature of the mind, inasmuch as that means the capacity for believing and making such judgements about what to believe? — Pfhorrest

Satisfaction of that criterion requires a creature capable of thinking about it's own thought and belief.

What do you make of this?
Language, Saussure insists, has an oral tradition that is independent of writing, and it is this independence that makes a pure science of speech possible. Derrida vehemently disagrees with this hierarchy and instead argues that all that can be claimed of writing - eg. that it is derivative and merely refers to other signs - is equally true of speech. But as well as criticising such a position for certain unjustifiable presuppositions, including the idea that we are self-identical with ourselves in 'hearing' ourselves think, Derrida also makes explicit the manner in which such a hierarchy is rendered untenable from within Saussure's own text. Most famously, Saussure is the proponent of the thesis that is commonly referred to as "the arbitrariness of the sign", and this asserts, to simplify matters considerably, that the signifier bears no necessary relationship to that which is signified. Saussure derives numerous consequences from this position, but as Derrida points out, this notion of arbitrariness and of "unmotivated institutions" of signs, would seem to deny the possibility of any natural attachment (OG 44). After all, if the sign is arbitrary and eschews any foundational reference to reality, it would seem that a certain type of sign (ie. the spoken) could not be more natural than another (ie. the written). However, it is precisely this idea of a natural attachment that Saussure relies upon to argue for our "natural bond" with sound (25), and his suggestion that sounds are more intimately related to our thoughts than the written word hence runs counter to his fundamental principle regarding the arbitrariness of the sign.
— SEP

To me one of the interesting themes is a destabilizing of the so-called mental realm, the idea of which is tied up with pure meaning. Of course we have intuitions of being minds, and we take this granted, the talk of minds filled with thoughts. But there's no private language, and we use 'I' fairly automatically. — Eee

"Natural bond" might be better rendered as one that is not existentially dependent upon the written word.

"The destabilizing of the so-called mental realm..." is an interesting notion. I take it to be referring to the conventional notion of the mental realm at that time. It was wrong. So, if deconstructing it destabilizes it, then such an endeavor was needed as a means for acquiring greater understanding of meaning and/or our own thought and belief.

The 'problem', of course, is that what counts as "mental realm" and "arbitrariness" is relative to language use. One of these notions can be said to pick out something that exists in it's entirety prior to language use, but the other not so much.

Some signs are arbitrary. Some are not.

Meaning is most certainly not properly accounted for solely in terms of "mental realm".

There is indeed a misunderstanding or miscommunication at hand. This is shown by your latest reply. All the conventional categories of philosophy are based - in part - upon a gross misunderstanding of human thought and belief.

Perhaps I'll take a stab at incorporating this consideration into specific responses to some of your questions... That may make for a more fruitful exchange.

Drago was a fictional character hyped up full of propaganda... a fitting comparison.

No pro-democracy protester has ever held up an Ivan Drago picture while protesting communist totalitarianism... — NOS4A2

But there are plenty holding up the fictional character of Trump protesting the fictional tale of communist totalitarianism in China. There is no such Trump, and no such government in China.

The distinction between meaning and causality is one of elemental constituency. They are existentially dependent upon very different things.
— creativesoul
How so?

I would have expected something to chew on rather than these empty claims and answers you've provided. Be more specific. — Harry Hindu

Do you know what elemental constituency is?

When you ask me what I mean when I use words, what are you asking?
— Harry Hindu

I'm asking you what you mean.
— creativesoul
Your answer lacks substance. Care to elaborate? — Harry Hindu

Look at what you wrote my friend. Your answer lies in your question.

If "pure" is meant to denote something in it's most unadulterated uncorrupted and/or basic state, then it doesn't get any purer that what I've set out here.
— creativesoul

By pure meaning I just mean the imagined context that can be moved from French to English. That somehow an English translation is the 'same' book suggest the notion of a language-independent meaning, though many translators will stress that they have only done their best and actually created a new, only similar work. — Eee

I would not say that translation suggests the notion of a language independent meaning. It does suggest that some meaning is neither bound nor completely determined by any particular language.

What has no meaning cannot be spoken of. — I like sushi

What are you speaking of then?

When we realize what meaning is, we know what it takes, we know what it is itself existentially dependent upon, what the necessary preconditions are. Hence, we can know that when those conditions have not been met, there is no meaning.

When you ask me what I mean when I use words, what are you asking? — Harry Hindu

I'm asking you what you mean.

The distinction between meaning and causality is one of elemental constituency. They are existentially dependent upon very different things.

Cool. That's what I thought, but haven't paid enough attention. I like the professor. I'm very glad that he was chosen and accepted the invitation. I'm looking forward to reading his input.

This tweet coupled with Trump’s signing of the Hong Kong human rights bill could symbolize his coming fight with this generation’s Drago, the Chinese communist party. — NOS4A2

Drago was a fictional character hyped up full of propaganda... a fitting comparison.

Is this the thread for forum members not involved in discussions with the professor? I mean, is this the place for member discussion?

I’m just interested in hearing what other individual people’s complete philosophical systems are... — Pfhorrest

All complete philosophical systems are existentially dependent upon complex language use replete with metacognition(thinking about thought and belief). Such a system need not get thought and belief right in order to be called "complete". However, if one's notion, definition, and/or conception of thought and belief is wrong in some specific way, then so too is everything else resting upon the misconception, in some foundational way or another.

That's what my own comments here have to do with the OP.

Nowhere in your system have you clearly set out an exhaustive universal criterion for what counts as thought and belief...

But with more fundamental perception, or with less concrete objects, it is perfectly possible that their form, properties or constitution really are different depending on how you perceive them, and yet that final perception is all we have access to to give a name. — Isaac

That which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it has the very same elemental constitution regardless of how one 'perceives' it. So, no... it is not perfectly possible that our talk about such things(or how we perceive them) has an effect/affect upon the constitution of such things.

In real life, when two groups of people must understand one another, a sort of baby-talk hybrid language is generated. The English language went through that after 1066. — frank

Creole. Pigeon. Combinations of English and other languages are the result of exploration and colonization. Such combinations of different languages are marked by continued use of parts of both. Names for common directly perceptible referents and common indirectly perceptible referents as well are continuations of traditional use.

The Battle of Hastings... interestingly enough, that's around the time when my own last name began showing up in historical record...

How would anyone know if a correct translation between two conceptual schemes, belief systems, and/or lines of thought had has been successfully performed?
— creativesoul

For Davidson, if you have the truth conditions for a statement, you have the meaning. This is why he rejects intranslatability, because he thinks that would compromise the concept of truth.

So "how do you know" shouldn't come up. — frank

I'm not buying that at all. In order to have the truth conditions, one must already speak the language. Davidson seems to want to be able to combine coherence and correspondence into one. That is to conflate meaning and truth.

His aversion/diversion to and from "fact" is very well grounded. The notion is riddled with problems, especially if it is accompanied by proposition talk.

Logic simply cannot be used as a means to take an account, and/or offer a rendering(convention T) of correspondence. Logic presupposes correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of premisses. The task of logic is to preserve truth. The slingshot - as far as I can see - simply confirms that inherent inability of logic to account for correspondence.

There's a concern worth careful consideration. Please overlook my ignorance if it's been dealt with in it's entirety. If that is the case, hopefully one of the participants could point me towards a place to look in order for me to get all those details. I would be quite thankful... at least for a little bit.

If my concern has been dealt with in simple convincing and perhaps irrefutable fashion, then I'd be very interested in seeing the argument in it's entirety...

:smile:

How would anyone know if a correct translation between two conceptual schemes, belief systems, and/or lines of thought had has been successfully performed?

When we're dealing with two distinct languages, we're talking about those consisting - in part - of completely different sets of marks in perhaps all sorts of different arrangements. These are native tongues replete with all sorts of written marks. So, there must be - unbeknownst to everyone beside the users - a set of referents and/or perhaps some other form of further subsequent attribution of meaning to those marks. The marks become important and/or significant again and again with each subsequent connection made between the marks and other things. The evolutionary march of meaningful marks is built upon first time correlations being drawn between those same 'ole marks, and novelty(different than the conventional norm).

There is no shortage of this. That is the evolutionary progression of meaning in a nutshell. Many old grumps moan over it when some crucial historical notion/conception/idea is lost because the newer meaning is no longer amenable to the historical. Demanding rigidity is the only thing close to preserving integral elements/aspects of meaningful marks. It demands the use be connected to the same other things... and only certain other things... besides the utterance/expression/use.

So, back to the question at hand...

We must know what the speakers do with those marks. Are they picking out some individual or another to the exclusion of all else? Are they sounding an alarm? Are they defending themselves and/or their offspring? Are they offering greetings? Are they describing the world and/or themselves? Are they talking about that which has already been picked out? Are they manipulating the situation for explicit reasons. Is there a goal in mind? Are they predicting? Are they talking about what has not happened? There are so many things that can be done with language.

:nerd:

The only way to know that different conceptual schema, belief systems, and or any other expressions made using different tongues has been successfully translated one into the other is to have very knowledgable speakers of each respective native language, and/or knowledgable speakers of both perform the meaningful assessment and/or comparison between the two. Without these necessary preconditions, without having these sorts of people perform the translation process, we've got no verification/falsification method whatsoever.

Unfortunately for Davidson, there are all sorts of bilingual people in the world that will gladly agree that sometimes there is no direct translation of one utterance in one language into one utterance of another. So, it seems that the way things are is a problem for anyone denying that.

There are times however, that we can know as best we can. Convention T proves that two languages share the same referents and/or say the same things about the same referent(mean the same thing). Yet only a knowledgable bilingual could possibly know that that's the case, for it's every bit as much about meaning as truth... more, it seems to me. It is a semantic rendering.



Here's what convention T shows me as far as correspondence goes...

The quoted left half is a true statement of belief if the right half obtains, is the case, has happened, is happening, and/or perhaps will happen. The right half could be said to amount to the truth conditions that need be met in order for the belief statement on the left to be true. We all know if there is a cat on the mat at the time one utters a belief statement saying as much, it is a true statement. The speaker has formed and/or holds true belief. Because we know what it takes, we know when it's true. Because we know what the marks means, we know where and/or what exactly to look for. It's not that hard. Likewise, we know that two statements from different languages share the same truth conditions when the exact same events serve as verification/falsification for both.

Licensing reproduction, as in having children?

Whoa.

Really? That's a bit too much confidence in the spurious presupposition that we know what the direct consequences of our decision will be.

So much for the possibility of coming out of the gutter to do great things, and in doing so helping the gutter people rid themselves of some of the gutter-ness all at the same time.

There are statements that are not believed and yet true — Banno

So, a statement need not be believed in order to be true. A statement's being true requires more than being believed.

It is a mistake to say that a statement's being true does not require belief. In order for a statement to be true, there must first be a statement. All statements(true, false, and/or neither) are existentially dependent upon belief and language use. When and where there have never been belief, there could never have been statements. When and where there have never been statements, there could not ever have been true ones.

It is a big mistake to completely divorce truth/falsity from belief.

Which makes the all referents of such perception-talk and model-dependent realism socially mediated... doesn't it?
— creativesoul

Not with inderect reference it doesn't. We can (and do) refer to 'hidden states' without directly identifying objects within them. — Isaac

We do not do so without extremely complex language use, which is precisely the point being made here. Indirect reference is a complex cognitive process that quite simply cannot happen without language use. Something that is existentially dependent upon language use is socially mediated. Indirect reference is existentially dependent upon language use. Therefore...

Indirect reference is socially mediated, as is all perception-talk and model-dependent realism.

Not all common referents are existentially dependent upon language use. Trees are not existentially dependent upon our naming and descriptive practices... all perception-talk, indirect reference, conceptual schemes, linguistic frameworks, axiomatic systems, etc., most certainly are.

Getting rid of conceptual schemes reintroduces being wrong. — Banno

I agree. However, I think we're much better served here if "being wrong" were made more explicit. If we begin by granting all conceptual schema are true - then we are doing so by virtue of granting coherency, and we further take that to mean that they cannot be wrong as a result of their being invalid or self-contradictory. If our next move involves removing conceptual schemes altogether and focusing upon belief, and our doing so reintroduces being wrong, it does so by virtue of recognizing the equivalence between scheme and belief, in addition to no longer granting that coherency alone is sufficient for truth.

I think that that's pretty important. A belief can be coherent/reasoned/etc, and false. As can an entire belief system(conceptual scheme/linguistic framework/etc.)

It is well-evidenced that we do not have direct access to the referents of perception-talk. As such we need to be able talk in terms of model-dependant realism in order to discuss the matter. Once outside of that realm, and into the realm of socially-mediated objects... — Isaac

Which makes the all referents of such perception-talk and model-dependent realism socially mediated... doesn't it?

I think it stems from Frege's notion of truth as object(truth values)?

One disarms the slingshot by removing correspondence. — Banno

That's not the only way...

Here is the SEP's take on the slingshot(Davidson style)...

All the way at the bottom/end of the page...

The great fact...

I'm more than sympathetic to the need for any theory of truth to take proper account of correspondence. I do not find it(convention T) compelling if correspondence is left in the wind. However, there are significant problems with attempting to combine the two. It's all beside the point of the thread however... which is about translation of seemingly incommensurate conceptual schema.

'P' IFF P

If it was "superfluous/ redundant" then there would be no need to mention it in the first place. — Janus

That is some weird logic Janus. Becoming aware that some language use is superfluous/redundant requires it's use in the first place. "Is true" is one such use. It adds nothing meaningful to a belief statement.

↪creativesoul Yes, but the idea behind those accounts is to indicate why the "is true" holds... — Janus

Is it?

Seems to me that some argue that it's superfluous/redundant, and others show/argue what it means.

....it seems that what we're talking about is a difference in what constitutes a 'belief' rather than anything else. — Isaac

I think that this is far more enlightening an observation that may seem at first glance, or at least, it could be...

Directly perceptible things... common referents(says Davidson).
— creativesoul

This presumes that the creation of a referent is never axiomatic, — Isaac

I don't think so. Rather, it acknowledges that some are not. Whereas, you seem to be taking a hard line stance that we have no direct access to any referents at all; Have I misunderstood?


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Truth is existentially dependent upon thought and belief. Our awareness of the role that truth plays in our thought and belief requires language. Belief does not. Truth does not. Meaning does not.

The problems - self-imposed - arise when we completely divorce truth and meaning from thought and belief.

Convention T, redundancy, and deflationary accounts focus upon "is true". Truth as predicate. Correspondence theory holds that truth is correspondence.

It's the word "underlying" that I object to; it suggests some sort of fundament were there is none. — Banno

Yes, and in line with Davidson's rejection of an uninterpreted world(and yours too, if I understand you correctly). That is - it seems to me - a major underlying difference between our views.

:wink: