Is the sense of fairness uniquely human? Human reactions to reward division are often studied by means of the ultimatum game, in which both partners need to agree on a distribution for both to receive rewards. Humans typically offer generous portions of the reward to their partner, a tendency our close primate relatives have thus far failed to show in experiments.
As recent work has shown, nonhuman primates, particularly chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys (Cebus ssp.), resemble humans in their decisions about cooperation (12–15) and their aversion to inequitable reward divisions (16–18). However, it is unclear how these same nonhuman primates respond to situations in which a peer can influence the outcome of a task, such as in the UG. In contrast to the human tendency to split rewards roughly equally (at least in most cultures), two previous studies found apes to be entirely self-interested: Proposers offered the smallest possible amount and respondents accepted virtually all offers...
you know, I don't think they've thought of that, perhaps you better pop up to the neurosciences lab at Sussex and give them a few pointers, sounds like they need a bit of help. — Isaac
Everything is phenomenon — I like sushi
I've been waiting for them(the experts, specialists, and groupies in/of the field) to admit that there is no one to one mapping between brain activity and particular thought. Many different thoughts correspond virtually the exact same brain state. Thought and belief(thinking about stuff) involve firing neurons, and different physiological biological structures and systems, but they most certainly do not consist entirely thereof.
— creativesoul
...sure, you know, I don't think they've thought of that, perhaps you better pop up to the neurosciences lab at Sussex and give them a few pointers, sounds like they need a bit of help. — Isaac
Chimpanzees also favour fair (50:50 split) offers in Ultimatum Game experiments to unfair ones (80:20 split), even when the unfair split is in favour of the proposer. — Isaac
Should Trump supporters be treated like addicts? — Mark Dennis
So it is a phenomenological approach then? — I like sushi
I just don’t really see where this discussion is going? There appears to be a lot of emphasis on ‘concepts’ and ‘naming concepts’ ... why? — I like sushi
...there are those things the constituency of which is quite relevant, but it remains to be seen whether the constituency is a population given to them by their use. — Mww
...they think that their situation is down to the evils of "globalism" and only Trump is willing to actually fight it. — Echarmion
I have a problem with the celebration of violence and death, regardless of how it comes. His last act was evil; I'd still not say he was evil as otherwise, I'm sure, he wouldn't have had any wives or children to begin with. Plus, I think the civility that we pretend puts us above such barbaric acts is very thin veneer that will come off as soon as life becomes slightly harder. Abu Ghraib, Guantanomo, rendition, torture, etc. etc. — Benkei
...rather than knowing what all thoughts, beliefs and concepts consist of, it is better suited for the method, to know what they do. If they do what they do without contradiction or inconsistency, their constituency may not matter. That being said, there are those things the constituency of which is quite relevant, but it remains to be seen whether the constituency is a population given to them by their use. In other words, a faculty certainly has a population of a priori objects of reason for its constituency, but each a priori object of reason that is a constituent, may not consist of anything. We must nip inevitable infinite regress at the root somehow. — Mww
Mind/consciousness produces meaning. — Chris Hughes
When a chimpanzee rejects a previously gratefully accepted cucumber as reward on the grounds that the other chimp has been given a grape, are they not using a model of justice, or fairness?
— Isaac
This seems to be all in the interpretation: alternatively, it could be down to a feeling of envy or a preference for grape over cucumber. — Janus
"I think I am, I think I am, I think I am..." - The Little Descartes That Could — Pfhorrest
Also, I’d agree that one does not need to be known to be respectable. — Mark Dennis
...is being right the same as being perfect? — Mark Dennis
When a chimpanzee rejects a previously gratefully accepted cucumber as reward on the grounds that the other chimp has been given a grape, are they not using a model of justice, or fairness? — Isaac
What if the fundamental entities of the Universe are not matter, or consciousness, but Good and Evil? — leo
Try this: concepts do not begin with naming, but end with it. This way, the presupposition of names is eliminated, as well as their constituency, because the concepts are the names. — Mww
I think of Russell and Wittgenstein. If you seduce the right somebody, you don't stay a nobody for long. Now I love me some Wittgenstein, but homeboy was a troll sometimes? — jellyfish
Isn't having no unobtainable goals itself an unobtainable goal? — jellyfish
Thanks for jumping in.
Part of it is interpersonal.
— creativesoul
To put it mildly. — jellyfish
Acknowledge the role you play. Acknowledge that the cool stoic is one more role, one more project. That 'my' position is one more role shouldn't have to be mentioned. — jellyfish
Yet philosophers have done this sort of thing and become respectable. — jellyfish
To be perfect is to be unassailable, so it stands to reason that if you are being assailed then you are not perfect. — Mark Dennis
...I found myself spiraling into a panic attack about pointless cosmic bullshit... — Pfhorrest
How does one after all determine what is in and ou[t] of our control? — jellyfish
The SEP begins with this...
Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts.
Of course, I strongly disagree!
— creativesoul
Because you hold the reverse, that thoughts (and beliefs) are the building blocks of concepts? — Mww
I think it is more helpful to maintain distinctions between linguistically and culturally elaborated conceptualizing capacities, and the primordial somatically-based embodied cognition we share with animals. — Janus