Nice discussion. Kudos!

:smile:

It's not just a matter of which came first.
— creativesoul

It certainly is if there’s no way to tell which one of two or more somethings came first. How are we supposed to keep in mind evolution is important if it isn’t just a matter of which came first. How can there be said to even be any evolution if the matter of a first, and thereby a succession in time, isn’t resolved?

This I think is only important if we think concepts consist of something other than just other concepts. Actually, I guess it could get real muddy, depending on the scope of reductionism being played with. — Mww

Indeed, it could get muddy, but it need not. It is most certainly quite complex, but there's also a very basic simplicity about it, as must be the case given the evolutionary progression of thought, belief, and concepts. It's not all reduction, though. Not on my view anyway. I mean, language is recursive, so that must also be taken proper account of. The framework we offer must take all sorts of things into account.

Of course I would concur with the need for a timeline. As you've asserted here keeping evolution in mind requires some sort of succession. With all that in mind...

What I meant by "it's not just a matter of which came first", was that that is an gross oversimplification of the methodological approach needed in order to even be able to acquire the knowledge we're seeking to obtain here. I think you'll agree with this? Knowing which came first requires knowing what all thought, all belief, and all concepts consist of. For when we know what each consists of, it offers us solid ground to be able to deduce which came first, by knowing what each is existentially dependent upon.

For example, if all A's consist of B, then no A exists prior to B. If all A's consist of B, then each and every A is existentially dependent upon B. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else. These are the sorts of reasoning that come into play here.

If you could be so kind, I would like for you to confirm whether or not I adequately understand what you've offered here. I've broken it down for easier reference. I don't think that I've broken anything up that needs to stay together, if you know what I mean. It's an interesting take, if I understand you correctly. There's some agreement, I think...

:smile:

There is an inductively quantitative evolution, as major name concepts multiply in complexity by a compendium of minor names inhering in the same phenomenal object, which always comes first. — Mww

The above seems to be referring to the quantitative increase of our concepts via naming practices. I take it mean something like our concepts increase in quantity along with the number of names we use. Specifically speaking, you seem to be also claiming that there is a hierarchy of namesakes involved within our use of concepts. I take this to be referring to all the different names of all the different features of a referent(the same phenomenal object). So, for example, if I have read you correctly, the major name concept could be "tree", and the compendium of minor names would include all of the names for the features, properties, and/or attributes of the tree. "Leaves", "roots", "trunk", etc. would all qualify for being in this compendium of minor names.

Do I have that much right?

What I'm left wondering still, is not only what exactly is it that you're claiming "always comes first", but "first" - as in prior to what else? I want to say that the primary namesake comes first, but I'm hesitant for you may be saying that the phenomenal object comes first. If it's the latter, then I would agree that some conceptions are of phenomenal objects and in those cases the object 'comes first'.

There is deductively qualitative evolution, as the procedural method itself reduces from the compendium of possible named identities for a phenomenal object to a particular named identity judged as belonging to it, which always comes last. — Mww

This bit I cannot understand. Could you set it out with an example?

:brow:

I would also propose that some of our concepts are capable of describing and/or pointing towards that which existed in it's entirety prior to our reports.
— creativesoul

Of course, no argument here. Their names are in the literature, if one knows where to look. Do you have names for them of your own, or from some other literature? — Mww

I thought we would agree there.

:smile:

Do I have names for those concepts of my own? I wouldn't say that. I am very fond of simple ordinary language when adequate. Given that we're discussing the evolution of concepts, thought, and belief, we must also keep in mind that the proposed complexity level that we're claiming exists at some specific time period must belong to a creature capable of having such complexity. I mean, in the beginning, the thought, belief, and/or conceptualization must be at a rudimentary and/or very basic level of complexity. In addition, those rudimentary thoughts, beliefs, and/or conceptualizations must consist of that which is amenable to evolutionary progression.

To directly answer your question, or at least what I think you're asking me for...

Thought, belief, meaning, and truth all exist in their entirety(on the most basic level/degree of complexity) prior to our conceptualizations/names of/for them... that is... prior to common language use.

I call our reports cognitions. Will you agree reports are at the end of the cognitive chain? Or for you, where are reports located? Where....when.....does a report manifest? — Mww

That all depends upon what we're reporting upon. Metacognitive endeavors, such as the one we're involved in, are most certainly "at the end of the cognitive chain". Thinking about our own thought and belief is metacognition. Not all thought and belief is metacognitive.

Not all reports are existentially dependent upon metacognition though. A young child - particularly an honest and talkative one - will offer their own report of all sorts of stuff that they're thinking about. This youngster's report is not at the end of the cognitive chain. Well, strictly speaking, until the child learns to start talking about it's own thought and belief, and it's own language use, it's at the end of what's cognitively possible - at the time - for them. However, assuming that they go on as most do, the end of the cognitive chain(metacognition) comes later.

:smile:

You've proposed this in past. It's not a good characterization. It's not just a matter of which came first. It's also matter of what both consist of. Correlations drawn between different things...

So, it's not so easily characterized as chicken/egg. Eggs came first though, as far as that goes. Chickens evolved from reptiles. Reptiles lay eggs.

The evolution part is important to keep in mind. One's theory of mind(thought and belief) must be amenable to evolutionary progression.

Be well .

All that is needed for you to correct your (mis)understandings has been expressed heretofore...

:up:

Strawman.

Trump would love this discussion so much I should really close it. — Baden

:wink:

There’s nothing else but substance to conceive of substance, sure, but the point is that there’s nothing else but substance to be conceived of as being independent of everything else, i.e., as being that which is in itself. Derp. This all went right over your head. — aRealidealist

More equivocation of the term "conceive"...

:sad:

Cause the practice feels so good.

Swan beat me to it...

I disproved that your description stands. — god must be atheist

Do it again, I must have missed it..

So...

Your equivocating the term "conception" is somehow my fault?

:brow:

How is distinguishing between the thing of which one conceives, &, the conception itself, e.g, the sun is different from my conception of it, equivocating? — aRealidealist

Equivocating is when an author is using two different senses/acceptable uses/definitions of the same term in the same argument. In this case, you're using two different definitions of the term "conception" in the very same claim...

Being conceived counts as conception, but the thing of which one has a conception doesn’t. — aRealidealist

Define "conception" here in a way that we can substitute both instances of it in the above quote with that definition and the claim remain meaningful.

If you can do that, then you're not equivocating.

You can't.

Anything besides direct quotes from Spinoza, for fuck’s sake, is irrelevant. You thinking otherwise is quite telling. — aRealidealist

Wonderful. So I tell myself... what on earth are you still doing arguing with this person when they believe that Spinoza's own life circumstances are irrelevant to Spinoza's philosophy....

Being conceived counts as conception, but the thing of which one has a conception doesn’t. Very simple — aRealidealist

You're equivocating the term conception.

The irony... given that you've charged Spinoza with self-contradiction and/or incoherence.

Sigh...

Fer fuck's sake...

The important prevailing philosophical discourse of Spinoza's time revolved around ideas of what it would take to be self-caused, notions of God, etc. I tried to invoke those considerations, but you said that they were irrelevant. They may be irrelevant to what you are arguing about Spinoza, but they are not at all irrelevant to what Spinoza was arguing.

...substance isn’t a conception. — aRealidealist

It most certainly is according to Spinoza. It's a particular kind of conception. Self-caused. Infinite. Etc.

Sigh...

:roll:

Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?

That's a simple question with a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Which is it?

:smile:

I could be mistaken here, but I'm fairly certain Spinoza's definition of substance also has everything to do with what it would take for something to be self-caused.

Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or being conceived does count as conception and you're wrong...

Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?

:smile:

Cheers. Til next time.

I’ve already addressed you, over & over, you just ignore my response; in Spinoza’s philosophy, “substance” isn’t a conception... — aRealidealist

You've yet to have addressed the issue I've raised here... today. In very simple terms to understand, Spinoza's definition of substance is all the evidence needed to know that your claim about Spinoza's notion of substance is false, on it's face. Spinoza's own words falsify what you're arguing here. Those same words verify what I've charged you with from the beginning.

You're just denying Spinoza's definition.

Yes.

I'm no Spinozan scholar, but jeez! I've laid it out as simply as I know how.

I think there's misunderstanding here...

All ethics is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

That's the claim.

Do you disagree?

Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or being conceived does count as conception and you're wrong...

Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?

Substance isn’t a conception... — aRealidealist

By substance, I mean that which... ...IS conceived through itself...

Further reduced...

Substance is conceived.

You’re making things up in your head. — aRealidealist

:rofl:

Directly address my last post, if you want me to continue here. If not, I rest my case on it.

...no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P — aRealidealist

Not according to Spinoza... Look for yourself.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. — creativesoul

Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or substance is conceived through itself, and as such is a conception independent of any other conception, and thus he has drawn a distinction between kinds of conception.

:smile:

Creative soul, if at work which is computer programming, I start to play loud music, or else start to sing loudly, or play roulette with my co-workers, I display unacceptable behaviour, but they are not unethical. — god must be atheist

Do those behaviours break the rules of acceptable conduct at your workplace? Are you allowed to act like that?

I am curious to see that you can show a feature (principle or quality) of ethics, which is unique and pervasive to all ethics. Both UNIQUE and PERVASIVE. — god must be atheist

Ethics is always about acceptable and/or unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

That's the answer. I stand beside it. Rather than be a blowhard, offer one example to the contrary. I adequately satisfied your request, which I took to be a standard which if met would convince you that ethics exists.

There it is. All ethics have that much in common, amongst other things.

I agree we do correlate things. And such correlation develops out of thoughts. I hesitate to call such correlation the development of concepts. — Mww

Concepts begin with naming. They gain in complexity by talking about the referent using it's conceptual identity(name), for doing so is to multiply the correlations drawn between the referent and other things.

Simply put, there is no difference between one's concept of a dog and one's thought and belief about dogs.

Now show me that ethics is a different thing from everything else, by showing at least one quality (which may be a combination of qualities) that applies only to ethics. If you show that, then you prove that ethics exist — god must be atheist

Ethics is always about acceptable and/or unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Could you rephrase the question? I cannot make much sense out of it.

Determining distinctions between kinds of conception is one thing, understanding Spinoza another; your attempts at both, either way, are quite dissatisfactory. Moreover, no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P.; for this can only be asserted of “substance”, according to Spinoza, not of any conception (no conception is “substance”, therefore no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself [as I’ve maintained in the O.P.]). You have no idea what you’re talking about. — aRealidealist

Of course you're entitled to believe I'm wrong. What if I'm not though?

Here's what I find important to keep in mind, for starters at least...

Spinoza was of financially solid socio-economic circumstances(privileged well-educated upper class) at a time when the church had the most power(they wrote the rules). Spinoza argues against the church and believers at the time. He was a heretic to many as a result. Blasphemy was sometimes taken much farther than mere exile, which was his punishment. Someone of a lesser important social status might well have been hanged/burned to death for offering/openly espousing an outline of monism, that if true, is solid reasonable ground against the God of Abraham.

Spinoza argues for god as the origen of everything(a creator of some things, and the origen of everything), but his philosophy does not support the God of Abraham. Rather, he argues for god using a methodological approach that I would call ontological monism. His language use is densely populated with key notions at the time. Too much so, to my own chagrin.

Only that which conceives all by itself counts as substance.

When substance(god) first conceives, it(god) does so entirely through(in and of) itself, as it must. It is all that exists. That kind of conception is more along the lines of creation. Some of those new creations are capable of conception themselves. They are dependent upon substance, but not the other way around.

So, not drawing this distinction between kinds of conception leads one to where you're at now. Draw it and the problem dissolves.

Concepts do not correlate different things. Thinking and believing creatures do, and they do so by virtue of drawing correlations and/or associations between different things. Concepts are developed by virtue of drawing correlations between names and referents.

You may be interested in this as well. It has everything to do with our earlier exchange, and it ties directly into a much earlier conversation in the Kripke thread(reading group).

What do you think is the constituency of concepts? — Mww

Thought and belief. Correlations drawn between different things.

Maybe. :smile:

New thread? "What are concepts?" perhaps as a title?

The SEP begins with this...

Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts.

Of course, I strongly disagree!

2.) That which a concept is existentially dependent upon, is the entirety of the argument... — Mww

Is it though?

How can we know what a concept is existentially dependent upon if we do not know what a concept consists of?

All that to say this: you’re on record as saying we are too far apart in our thinking, so.....enough is enough, right? — Mww

We've had several discussions that widened the gap. That's not to say that every one will. I'm more than willing to continue this one. Are you?

Another broader point, I think, is that in order to determine a relation(or lack thereof) between two concepts, in order to even make a comparison between a plurality of things, we must first know the answers to the aforementioned questions. That is required prior to being able to determine the relation, or perform a comparative analysis.

The question then arises, how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or concepts arise by degree from a simpliciter, or, divide into simpliciters from a whole, from one mechanism? — Mww

By comparison. — creativesoul

It’s a fine line between comparison and relation. It suffices to say comparison, when the rational chronology is from knowledge backwards to perception, insofar as knowledge may or may not compare one-to-one apodectically with the object. In the case of that chronology from perception forward to knowledge, which is the major concern of reason anyway, wherein all procedural methodology is strictly a priori, the much more general relational operative is better suited for deducing precisely what the object is, out of the manifold of possible objects it might be. — Mww

So, we're talking about methodological approach here, aren't we? I find some of the language quite unhelpful. Unnecessarily complex.

If the question is how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or by degree from a simpliciter, or divide into simpliciters from a whole, aren't we asking two questions about our candidate?

What does it consist of?

What is it existentially dependent upon?