Existence is attributed to things merely experienced. Making any distinction/correlation , linguistic or nonlinguistic, is predicated on the pressupossition of existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

There is no such thing as non linguistic predication...

I'm seriously re-thinking how to parse that bit. "All correlation presupposes it's own content" does what it needs to do, for now.

I think we can validly conceive of a sequence of 'perceptually receptive states' which are associated with shifting 'physiological needs', for all creatures, which defines for them the nature of their shifting world. Where 'language' might come in (at the crudest level) is as a facility to delay any automatici stimulus response linkage, by allowing for internal 'considering' (aka 'thinking') .
NB One psychological definition of 'intelligence' is 'the capacity to delay a response'. — fresco

Nicely put.

Existence is present at all levels of thought, linguistic or nonlinguistic. — Merkwurdichliebe

Stuff exists prior to thinking about it. That's not the same as saying that existence can be in the mind of a non-linguistic creature. Existence is not directly perceptible. Only directly perceptible things can be the content of non linguistic thought/belief.

. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices.
— creativesoul

Why? — Merkwurdichliebe

Wrong question. It's not a matter of why. It's a matter of how we come to think in terms of existence.

One without language can have existence in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "existence" simply by drawing a correlation between the existent and other things that may or may not exist. — Merkwurdichliebe

The existent is not existence.

I'm trying to understand this shit, and I'm attempting to show you that in nonlinguistic thought, existence is just as possible as tree. — Merkwurdichliebe

You cannot show that. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. That can be shown.

I do not appreciate the misquote.

Sever the term "tree" from everything and we're left with the term while the tree no longer remains. Sever the tree from everything, and we're left with the tree while the term "tree" no longer remains.

However, very strange and telling things happen when we attempt to sever "existence" from everything, because we're left with the term "existence", and if it works like other names/proxies, then existence no longer remains although the term does. That doesn't work. The term remains. If anything remains then something exists.

A tree severed from everything is still a tree. The term "tree" severed from everything is still the term "tree". The term "existence" severed from everything is still the term "existence".

Existence severed from everything is nothing.

The question is about the content of non-linguistic thought/belief. In particular some folk seem to wonder whether or not a non-linguistic creature is capable of thinking about trees and/or existence. To be blunt...

There is no such thing as non-linguistic thought/belief of and/or about existence. Bear with me while I help the reader to understand. Thought/belief is not all that hard to grasp if we just avoid all the unnecessary language use and the bag of historical mistakes it carries alongside and within.


1Thinking about "tree". 2Thinking about a tree. 3Thinking about "existence". 4 Thinking about existence.

Which of these scenarios, if any, are capable of happening prior to language acquisition?

All thought/belief consists of correlations drawn between different things.

1All thinking about "tree" is drawing correlations between the term "tree" and something else. "Tree" is a term. It is a proxy. It picks out trees. "Trees" are not trees. "Tree" is what we've named some of the things in my yard. Trees are not names. Trees are not terms. "Trees" is a term. All thought/belief about the term "trees" is existentially dependent upon language use, for all terms are existentially dependent upon language.

There is no non linguistic thought/belief about the term "trees"(aside from first learning how to use it).


2All thinking about a tree is drawing a correlation between that tree and something else. One without language can have the tree in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "tree" simply by drawing a correlation between the tree and other things. Not all thought/belief about trees requires language use.

Some creatures without language can think about trees. There is non linguistic thought/belief about trees.


3All thinking about "existence" is drawing correlations between "existence" and something else. "Existence" is a term, a proxy. It is always attached to something already named. We begin talking about trees and other things long before we begin talking about then in terms of their existence. All thought/belief about "existence" requires language use replete with a rich background of things to already talk about in terms of their existence.

One without language has no such background, and thus cannot think about a thing's "existence".


4All thinking about existence is drawing correlations between "existence" and something already named. A thing's existence is not directly perceptible. One without language cannot think about existence. All thought/belief about existence requires language use.

One without language cannot think of and/or about a thing's existence.

Yet, I find a problem here, it seems to be beyond the scope of linguistic thought, to speculate whether or not "existence", like the "tree", can factor as something distinct, with some correlation to something else distinct, in prelinguistic thought. As it stands, it is impossible for the linguistic thinker to enter into the mind of the nonlinguistic thinker without going silent...from our perspective, we can only understand the "tree", "existence", or the nonlinguistic thinker through language — Merkwurdichliebe

That's a common belief. It's false. No time now... Later.

My question is, how can we say the prelinguistic creature cannot think of "existence" as it does a "tree"? After all, the tree is not a "tree" in prelinguistic thought, it only factors as something distinct that correlates to something else distinct. So, it is very possible that "existence", like the "tree", can be thought by the nonlinguistic creature. — Merkwurdichliebe

Prelinguistic creatures do not think of "trees". Rather, they draw a correlation between trees and other things. "Trees" is a word. Trees are not. The tree is not a "tree" in linguistic thought. It is part of a correlation which attributes meaning and as such makes the tree meaningful/significant to the creature.

Nonlinguistic creatures cannot think of "existence" for it is a word. Non linguistic creatures cannot think of existence because it is not directly perceptible.

It makes no sense whatsoever to say that non linguistic animals can entertain thought/belief that they cannot have. Entertaining thought/belief is thinking about it. Thinking about it requires being able to talk about it.
— creativesoul

Could you clarify this? Maybe rephrase it? — Merkwurdichliebe

I'll add a bit. Perhaps it will help.

Non linguistic animals cannot talk about thought/belief. Thus, they cannot think about thought/belief. Since entertaining a thought is to think about it, it makes no sense to say that a creature without the capability to think about thought/belief can entertain thought/belief.

...

"Something has existence" is not "Something exists".

The former uses the term "existence" as a predicate. The latter does not. — creativesoul

No... — Janus

:brow:

Yeah. I'm done here.

Saying that something has existence is not attributing a predicate; it is simply saying that something exists. — Janus

"Something has existence" is not "Something exists".

The former uses the term "existence" as a predicate. The latter does not.

Kant argues against the former, and Quine... both.

I don't think it is in these kinds of considerations that important philosophy lives. — Janus

All philosophy consists of thought/belief. Seems to me that getting that right is imperative.

Where have I attributed existence as a predicate to anything? Things exist, that is basic; but their existence is not a predicate like other predicates, their existence is more like an activity that will cease someday. If something does not exist then no predicates can be attributed to it. If something has fictional existence... — Janus

Do you really not understand the problem here?

Compare the first question to the last phrase...

Animals can entertain thoughts that they cannot hold.
— creativesoul

It is very reasonable to say that an animal could have a transient thought which might compel it to act... — Merkwurdichliebe

That's not what was said.

It makes no sense whatsoever to say that non linguistic animals can entertain thought/belief that they cannot have. Entertaining thought/belief is thinking about it. Thinking about it requires being able to talk about it.

I'm having quite a bit of trouble understanding how someone can bring past thought/belief back in mind - whenever they wish - without thinking about past thought/belief. — creativesoul

You simply think repeatedly anything you have previously thought. You don't need to think about the thought itself or about your re-thinking it in order to re-think it... — Janus

So, if this is true then there is no difference between having the same thought on more than one occasion, and having the same thought whenever one wishes to...

Kant did not argue against talking in terms of existence tout court but against imagining that existence is a property which something may either possess or not. The difficulty I find for you is that you argue against talking in terms of existence and yet you need to talk in terms of existence to make your distinction between existential dependency and other forms of dependency, and also to make your claim that the existence of what we think about is presupposed in the thinking about it. You have not convinced me that you can do without that distinction — Janus

The difficulty you find with my recent meanderings are valid but have nothing to do with your own self-contradiction/incoherence.

Kant argued against using the term "existence" as a predicate(predicating/attributing existence to a thing). You've done that throughout our exchange here, and yet you attempted to invoke Kant as though his position on existence somehow aligns with your own. It doesn't.

The justification, it seems, is knowing the names of things. This is called "a hand". This is a picture of a person called "N".

Witt wouldn't agree though, would he? For him, we can only know things that can be doubted, right?

Wasn't that his argument against Moore?

That we could not doubt Moore's proposition, so it makes no sense to say that we know it?

When Kant said that existence is not a predicate, what he meant is that existence is not a property that things can either possess or fail to possess.

That is along the lines of what I meant when I said that there is nothing (excluding logical contradictions like "round triangles" which are merely words incoherently strung together) that doesn't exist or hasn't existed in some way or other. — Janus

:brow:

And yet you've been also talking in terms of a thing's existence, and that is exactly what Kant was arguing against.

the thoughts animals may momentarily entertain cannot be held... — Janus

And this...

What am I to make of it?

Animals can entertain thoughts that they cannot hold.

:yikes:

I'll stick with what I've got. Although, your criticisms have helped me many times over.

Terminological differences then I guess. — Janus

And more...

What counts as thought/belief on your view?

I'm having quite a bit of trouble understanding how someone can bring past thought/belief back in mind - whenever they wish - without thinking about past thought/belief.

Having specific thoughts in mind is to think about thought/belief,
— creativesoul

No, it's not. You can have a specific thought in mind without thinking about thought at all.
— Janus

Alright...

What's the difference between having specific thoughts and having specific thoughts in mind? — creativesoul

The only way to show that you are having a specific thought is to to be able to repeat it; to be able to have it in mind again and again at will. That is what I would call holding a thought. — Janus

So you're saying that there's no difference between having a specific thought and having specific thought in mind.

To me, having a specific thought in mind is to be thinking about that specific thought, whereas having a specific thought is drawing correlations between specific things.

You can't dispense with the idea of existence, because you use it in your term "existential dependency" to distinguish the idea that something is dependent on something else for its very existence, from other forms of mere functional dependency. If you use some alternative term it can only be an analogue of 'existence', otherwise it won't perform the conceptual job you want it to. — Janus

I think I can dispense with the practice of using it as a predicate as well as talking in terms of kinds of existence.

Having specific thoughts in mind is to think about thought/belief,
— creativesoul

No, it's not. You can have a specific thought in mind without thinking about thought at all. — Janus

Alright...

What's the difference between having specific thoughts and having specific thoughts in mind?

We cannot say what existence or being is in some more fundamental terms, but it is an indispensable idea. We can conceive of different kinds of existence, what more do you want?

You can't dispense with the idea of existence, because you use it in your term "existential dependency" to distinguish the idea that something is dependent on something else for its very existence, from other forms of mere functional dependency. If you use some alternative term it can only be an analogue of 'existence', otherwise it won't perform the conceptual job you want it to. — Janus

To a very large extent, what you say here is undeniable given my own work.

If by 'having thoughts" you just mean that they think, then I have no problem with that, but if you mean that they hold specific thoughts in mind, then no. — Janus

They do have/hold specific thoughts. That is not to say that they have specific thoughts in mind. Having specific thoughts in mind is to think about thought/belief, and doing so requires common language use. Non linguistic creatures have none. Therefore they cannot have specific thoughts and beliefs in mind.

They can and do form, have, and hold specific thought/belief nonetheless.

The only way I can understand having or holding a thought or belief is that we do it by deliberately formulating thoughts and beliefs into determinate conceptual structures, and this requires language. Neuroscience tells us that there are neural connections constantly being made and forming complex networks which persist in brains provided they are fulfilling some function.

I have no doubt animal brains form such persistent neural structures, which enables them to recognize entities and features of their environments, but I don't see animals as experiencing themselves holding specific thoughts or beliefs. We don't really know since we are not non-linguistic animals, so we only say what seems most plausible — Janus

This bears witness to major differences between our frameworks; our criteria for what counts as thought/belief seem to be directly at odds.

You've said something here that caught my eye regarding yours.

It seems that your criterion for having and/or holding thought/belief includes the creature being able to experience themselves holding specific thoughts or beliefs. That's a confusing way to talk, but I think you're referring to a kind of experience that requires using language to talk about one's own thought/belief.

I also do not see animals having such experiences, but those kinds of experience are not necessary for thought/belief formation. No matter how fleeting, if a creature forms thought/belief, it holds and/or has it.... even if only for a moment.

he'd then be right that they can't hold thoughts, but clearly can have thoughts, — Shamshir

Well. To be clear, he denied having thoughts too....

They are just different kinds of existence as generally conceived is all. — Janus

So, the only commonality between different kinds of existence is the term "existence"?

Seems we all agree that the way humans have and/or hold belief is more complex than the way non linguistic creatures' do.

Denying those differences results in denying the ability of having and/or holding thought/belief to non linguistic creatures.

That's what I think is going on here.

The duration of the correlation doesn't matter.
— creativesoul
Well, it matters if it's what Janus means when he refers to holding thought. — Shamshir

A bit of context for you...

That's a critique from Janus regarding my practice of saying that non-linguistic creatures can form, have, and/or hold thought/belief.

Think Pavlov's dog here...

If a creature draws a correlation between the sound of a bell and eating, then the creature has formed rudimentary thought/belief. The creature is capable of forming/having/holding thought/belief - however shortlived. The duration of the correlation doesn't matter. The expectation that stands as evidence of forming/having the thought/belief is shown later when the creature hears the sound of the bell once again.

Ring the bell and - only as a result of having already drawn the correlation between the bell and eating - Pavlov's dog thinks/believes that it's about to eat(once again). It's involuntary behaviour proves this. It goes to the feeding place. It begins salivating. It gets excited.

That is behaviour driven by thinking/believing that it is about to get fed. The result of hearing the bell and already having drawn correlations between the sound of the bell and eating.

I believe animals definitely think, but they do not hold or stand by their thinking such that we could say they "have thoughts". this latter comes about only with language where the thoughts can be precisely formulated and therefore "grasped" and "held".

The answer to your question is right there, is it not?

Having thoughts, according to Janus, requires language whereas thinking evidently does not.

Of course, if we examine the above carefully, we'll see a bit of a problem in the parsing. Thoughts are there, but not held. The animal thinks but does not have thoughts, until the animal uses language to think about the thoughts(precisely formulate them via language use).

Not at all clear or helpful.

As before...

There is an actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief that Janus has neglected to draw and maintain.

I suppose he thinks/believes that thinking does not require having thoughts. You'll have to ask him "why?". That's a psychological question.

Whatever the case, you present an honest and reasonable counterbalance to speculative philosophers like myself, and I value your contributions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Oh, where are my manners?

Thanks.

He denied that animals can have thoughts at all. He's wrong. Having thought is drawing correlations between different things. Thinking is the same.