As long the individuals treat one another as worthy of respect (independent of particular theories) this can work beautifully. — ghost

Well put.

The best we can do is presuppose the premise... — Merkwurdichliebe

But that is just not true.

I appreciate the overtly friendly discourse more than my words can probably convey. There's much to be agreed with regarding the bits about rules and social interactions.

There are two main premisses at work here for my part at least. One involves what all things moral have in common, and the other involves what all thought/belief have in common. While those two premisses can be used as premisses, they were not arrived at by virtue of assumption.

However, I'm always at a complete loss when others talk about and/or imply some foregone conclusion - some fait accompli - that we cannot get 'beneath' language. It's just not true. There's also a hint of discarding truth altogether and/or at least misunderstanding the irrevocable role that truth plays in all thought/belief and statements thereof.

We cannot get there(beneath language) if we continue employing historical frameworks which fail to draw and maintain the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

Another is the notion and/or dichotomy of contingency/necessity that results from neglecting the aforementioned distinction. Then, we have all those other notions that have proved as little more than a waste of time and a lot of it(apriori, a posterior, analytic/synthetic, etc), because they are also based upon the same neglect.

The point here is that as long as one follows Zeno's framework, the hare never catches up to the rabbit. The historical frameworks of philosophy proper have not gotten human thought/belief correct. That's the problem writ large for those willing to admit it. There are no philosophers... ever... to have clearly and unequivocally drawn the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

That's how this discussion began. It remains germane to the task at hand. That is particularly true of the current thought experiment and/or metacognitive endeavor of putting the distinction to good use.

I agree that "proto-morality" is not "a domain of morals", and this agreement is related to several discussions about terminology I have had with creativesoul in the past, where I have said that I think it is best for clarity and avoidance of unnecessary and possibly misleading anthropomorphization to make a distinction between the linguistically based abstract forming, having and holding of thoughts and beliefs, and the kinds of pre-linguistic cognitve processes, which we might refer to as 'thinking' or 'believing'. — Janus

Yes.

I would even take this a bit further and say that distinguishing between pre-linguistic thought/belief and linguistic thought/belief still isn't quite enough parsing. There also needs to be a distinction drawn between linguistic thought/belief that is not reflective, and linguistic thought/belief that is.

There's a need to establish existential dependency between different moral notions, such as all the ones heretofore discussed in addition to a few more perhaps. I think such a parsing is needed in order for our establishing a well-grounded evolutionary timeline. The timeline is needed to help parse which notions existentially predate others. That knowledge serves as ground for conclusions about origens.

Under our criterion, it would be thought/belief about evolution, by which we could talk about evolution of thought/belief. It is very paradoxical. — Merkwurdichliebe

Not all thought/belief about evolution is moral in kind. Paradox is a result of inadequate framework. No need for paradox here.

Not all moral thought/belief is morality. All morality is moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief are moral principles. All moral principles are moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief are social mores. All social mores are moral thought/belief. Etc.

What we need to do is discuss how morals arrive in prelinguistic thought/belief, both individually and culturally. — Merkwurdichliebe

They don't. Only rudimentary moral belief are possible(similar to Janus' "proto-morality" and some notions of "moral intuition"). Morality and morals both require language. There are no prelinguistic morals or morality.

:cool:

...My question is how can we account for the notion of "acceptable/unacceptable" in the absence of language? — Merkwurdichliebe

The notion of "acceptable/unacceptable" consists of language use(thought/belief statements). As is the case with all thought/belief, thought/belief about those two terms consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. In this case one of those things is the language use itself.

That's the wrong question to ask.

We cannot account for anything if we do not have language. It does not follow that what we're taking account of is existentially dependent upon being taken account of. Some things exist in their entirety prior to our account of them. Prelinguistic thought/belief is one such thing. Some of it is about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

How can it be the case that prelinguistic thought/belief can be about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

That's a much better question by my lights.

In short, pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour can be formed and/or held(re-formed) when a pre-linguistic creature replete with the ability to draw a correlation, association, and/or connection between different things makes that connection between another's harmful behaviour and the resulting onset of discontent.

These things happen on a daily basis. They will continue to do so. What possible ground could serve to deny this?

Would anyone here be willing to say that we cannot form, have, and/or hold thought/belief about behaviour that we do not accept, behaviour that we outright reject - at that moment - simply because we have not yet acquired the common language used to talk about it?

All things moral...

As we've discussed in past, and as I've repeated here in this thread... I'm not yet entirely sold that I have stumbled upon a basic framework that can exhaust all the important aspects of morality. However, if morality is the result of evolution, if it consists entirely of thought/belief, and if I have thought/belief right(from prelinguistic onwards), then the framework ought show some potential/promise(pun intended). Sorting through it all is quite the task. Impossible without others.

:wink:

I appreciate your participation.

Well said. Nice general outline. Also completely commensurate with what I'm attempting to establish with some common sense logical groundwork.

One thing that we need to address is prelinguistic thought/belief that is moral in kind...in other words, prelinguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. My question is how can we account for the notion of "acceptable/unacceptable" in the absence of language?

Imo, prelinguistic thought/belief is limited to nonrational and immediate corellations/associations/connections - primitive assessments. From the perspective of linguistic thought/belief, it is easy to impose the terms of acceptable/unacceptable upon the prelinguistic form, but from the perspective of prelinguistic thought/belief, the faculty of conceptualization has not yet been developed. As such, there can be no concept of acceptable/unacceptable. Prelinguistic thought/belief is incapable of the mode of thought/belief necessary to create/discover a rational worldview, and it certainly is incapable of abstraction, which is a necessary faculty for applying more complex concepts (like moral principles) onto particulars. — Merkwurdichliebe

This needs addressed more to both of our satisfaction. Next time. Until then, just wanted to let you know that I'm working on this aspect.

When something exists prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. When something is existentially dependent upon something else it cannot exist prior to that something else. When something consists of other things, it is existentially dependent upon those other things. Those things can be called "elemental constituents". When something consists of elemental constituents, the constituents either exist in their entirety prior to being a part of the combination, or they emerge as a result of the combination.

Those considerations are needed for establishing a timeline of/for the evolution of thought/belief. It's one part of a more complex process. It is not required for one to adopt and/or have and express morals. Rather, it is required for one to have knowledge of how we've come to have them(the origen of morals). It can also help parse out the different things that we attach "moral" to such as principles.

I don't need a theoretical justification for the wrongness of hurting cats when I walk at night. Or of covering my mouth when I cough. So I'd say that within a culture the conscious moral discussion is focused on difficult cases where the gut-level principles of a culture clash. — ghost

Indeed. Our awareness of differences is heightened during conflict between opposing moral thought/belief. That is particularly the case when they've been held for a long time period. In these situations it is also often the case that there are innumerable other beliefs connected to them in some important way. Conviction of the moral variety can take hold. Righteous indignation can result, on both sides...

if we drop out of the fantasy land of intellectual talk, this becomes extremely obvious. — ghost

Be careful here. Not all intellectual talk is to be shunned simply because it is intellectual talk. Your post, for instance... plenty intellectual without fancy words. I like it.

Yup. The task here is taking proper account of all that.

We all adopt(almost entirely) our initial original worldview, replete with morality intact. That's true for everyone, regardless of that which is subject to the individual particular situations(family, culture, history, society, etc.)

The morality one first adopts, and later comes to question, is (largely)relative to the situations they are born into and live through(take part in).

Btw, we have worked out these misunderstandings numerous time throughout the course of this thread. Why would we assume this misunderstanding would condemn the conversation. — Merkwurdichliebe

I should've attended to some of the earlier posts you made. Some seemed like a misunderstanding was at work. It's nice when they work themselves out. I'm certain they can.

Can you explain what you mean by "moral-in-kind" and "morality". What is it that unifies them, and in what ways are they different? — Merkwurdichliebe

They are both names. I do not even know what it could even mean to talk about 'unifying' them.

What they pick out to the exclusion of all other things is what makes them different. They pick out different things. "Moral in kind" picks out all things called "moral", in particular, it points - when properly understood - to exactly what it is that makes them moral things and not some other kind of thing.

Moral discourse. Moral thought. Moral belief. Moral sentiment. Moral judgment. The moral of the story. Etc.

Being about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour is what makes something moral in kind.

"Morality" is one of those things that is moral - in kind. Morality is the written rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Moral belief is belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. That's what makes it moral - in kind. Morality is codified moral belief. All morality is moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief is morality.

Knowing the evolutionary origen of anything depends upon knowing that much... morals notwithstanding.
— creativesoul

Go on...I'm listening. — Merkwurdichliebe

As I said in the portion of my reply that has been left unattended...

We're not even close to being there yet.

That is what I needed to hear. Do you not agree, that this distinction between moral-in-kind and morality is not of essential importance here? We have barely discussed it.

I just need it clarified a bit more and we will be back on track. — Merkwurdichliebe

What question would you like an answer to?

Establishing a well grounded timeline of the evolution of moral thought/belief will require implementing existential dependency. It's common sense logic. That's the best kind. We're not even close to being there yet.

Hopefully that time will come. Knowing the evolutionary origen of anything depends upon knowing that much... morals notwithstanding.

Perhaps.

Ok, just clarifying. So, we can say, that which is moral in kind is equivalent to:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — Merkwurdichliebe

No. We cannot. At least not if we hold to our groundwork.

All moral things are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief and/or behaviour. Morality requires language. Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour does not. That which is moral in kind is not equivalent to morality. The aforementioned list of moral things are all moral things. They are not all morality. Not all moral things are morality.

What's the problem? — Merkwurdichliebe

There has been considerable groundwork done heretofore. It stands without subsequent refutation and/or valid objection.

The recent current veins of thought are not taking the groundwork into proper and rightful consideration. That seems to be the problem I'm seeing.

I'm considering moving on without you Merk. I do not like the signs here.

Ok, just clarifying. So, we can say, that which is moral in kind is equivalent to:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.
— creativesoul

I would say anything codified would require language. I don't see how I have been considering it otherwise in any of my posts. Please feel free to point out where I have done so. — Merkwurdichliebe

:meh:

Morality is codified moral thought/belief:The rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

This is well trodden ground.

An astute reader ought already know the answer.

All things called "moral" are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. There are no exceptions. Thus, there is no stronger justificatory ground upon which to build a knowledge base regarding morals. We look to language use of the term "moral". We look to language use of the term "morality". We look to language use of all terms prefixed by and/or otherwise adjoined to the term "moral". Do they all have anything else in common aside from sharing a namesake?

Yes. They do.

All of these things called "moral", all of these uses of the term "moral" share a binding and relevant common denominator. Their content. What all of them are about. We can readily acknowledge this.

Discourse. Thought/belief. Intuition. Feeling. Attitude. Disposition. Lessons. Principles. Guidelines.

The above list provides additional elements to our consideration. This is meant as a deliberate attempt to further drive this point home. All of the above can be sensibly pre-fixed with the term "moral". Doing so is to say that those things are moral - in kind. Some kinds of discourse, thought/belief, intuition, feelings, attitudes, dispositions, lessons, principles and guidelines are moral in kind because they are moral in their constitution, not just because we call them "moral". They all consist entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

This is also immune to Witt's argument against essentialism. I'm not arguing for the essence of anything. Nor would I. Rather, I acknowledge that Witt has made a great point. Here's what I walked away with, so to speak...

There are many names that pick out and/or refer to a plurality of different individual things. Such things sometimes have nothing in common to all aside from sharing the namesake. Hence, I agree with Witt regarding what all games have in common. I further acknowledge that any subsequent consideration regarding these kinds of groups(the ones that share only the namesake) is not amenable to arriving at a universal criterion based upon that namesake.

All things called "moral" are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Perhaps we need to also set out how we arrived at the universal criterion for thought/belief?

After further considerations, I've determined that moral thought/belief is not just limited to judgement. I have now identified moral principle as another type of moral thought/belief. As it stands now, principle and judgment represent two of the primary types of moral thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

My question is what makes them both moral - in kind?

So all self-identity and/or self-image is drama on this rendering? All different personae are but kinds of dramatis personae.

The criterion you've put forth here cannot account for moral discourse because being moral according to your criterion requires moral judgment(approval/disapproval). Not all discourse about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour consists of such judgment. It is all moral discourse nonetheless.

How we arrive at our criterions matter. Universal criterions are easy enough to refute should one feel the need. One example to the contrary. That is what I've just done. Not all things moral consist of approval/disapproval(moral judgment). Thus I reject that offering. All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Upon what ground are you rejecting it in lieu of your own? I've shown an exception to yours. There are none to my own. How do we reconcile this?

You say the reasoning is "Those who benefit the most have the greatest debt to pay." But that doesn't apply to why Mary has to pay more does it? — tinman917

Certainly applies. It's a standard. Individual situations inform the judgment. Mary's is an unknown one.

The Oracle Has Spoken...

:rofl:

Just friendly offerings. Do with it what you may.

Serenity comes when one changes what they can(and should), accepts what they cannot(and moves on), and knows the difference between the two.

There's always value to be had by carrying the good away after laying down the bad. The linguistic framework one uses limits/delimits what can be subsequently and coherently stated. One can deliberately want to come to different terms about the same events. One who is wise knows that coming to different terms changes one's outlook, and the ability to do that always takes an other.

Not just any other will do.

How can we trust?

Acquire knowledge of what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. That's the first step. Use that knowledge as a filter through which to sift all subsequent relevant offerings. It gets one closer than not. This alone is not a solution to anything at all. It's a means for improvement as it is a means to better navigate the world.

Realize that not all people are the same. Not all groups of people are the same. Not all individuals are the same aside from their namesake. All paid therapists are therapists. Some are not trustworthy. Some are. The same goes with other people, except they will often do what they believes will help for free. Others help unknowingly if the right attitude is within earshot.

There are trustworthy people in this world.

Someone mentioned drama. Here's my down and dirty take...

Shit happens. Shit happening is reality. Whether or not it is also drama depends largely upon how the shitty situation is handled. Drama is largely self-perpetuated. Not always. Bad shit happens to good people. Good shit happens to bad people. How shit is handled can do both, help or hinder the possibility of drama.

If being paid for one's services makes one a prostitute, then capitalism has made prostitutes of us all.
— creativesoul

Yes, and I think there is a very real sense in which it has; if you buy into it at least. ("Buy into it" look at the terminology there and its implications). — Janus

Not all services rendered for monetary gain are sexual practice. Those have a certain moral/religious connotation and can result in invoking opposing feelings/attitude. Prostitutes are shamed in public far more than they are admired/valued/praised. For those who hold prostitution in negative light only, capitalism has negative value if they think/believe about capitalism in such terms. If one holds prostitution in a positive light, the capitalism is valued in the same light.

Regardless of one's judgmental tendency towards prostitutes, drawing an equivalence between capitalism and prostitution does not have a clear result. Rather, that equivalence is ambiguous. It means different things depending upon one's morals.

It's rhetoric, but well used.

Do I think/believe that they are some psychologists, therapists, and/or self-help gurus who do not care about helping patients as much as they care about receiving payment? Of course. Not all.

Feelings are often mistaken for thought/belief.

That is my problem with some purportedly therapeutical discourse.

I'll pause at this point, and wait for your response.

Continuing with that same disagreement, the following exchange has been revisited by you and deserves my attention, for it seems to be when misunderstanding grew... slightly it seems, but operative nonetheless...

Consider, that early in life, the infant begins to evaluate the desirable somewhere in the interplay of her nerve stimuli, and her emotional responses. As primitive as it is, this does constitute a valuation, despite the absence of any language skills. The primitive level in which value is imposed on emotional affection does not constitute a proper ethical judgement - it is more like an observation of what seems pleasing to me, rather than a moral choice about what I ought to do. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree here. The prelinguistic thought/belief that I'm counting as moral - in kind - does not count as being a choice about what I ought do. Rather, it counts as being moral - in kind - as a result of the content of it's correlations. It's about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief and/or behaviour.

This is at the rudimentary level of complexity, nearly bare-bones, but not quite. This example was invoked earlier by praxis I think anyway, as an equivalent candidate for the emergence and/or origen of moral intuition. I cannot say that I would disagree with that assessment aside from not seeing the need for the notion of "intuition", because it can be properly captured and/or explained in terms of thought/belief. Hence, I invoked Ockham's razor...

Then we can think about the toddler who has begun to acquire language. At this point, he is being linguistically conditioned (with some corporal conditioning) so that he can be assimilated into the culture to which he belongs. It is somewhere in this process that the evaluation of his primitive valuations commences; most importantly any evaluations of his primitive valuations are primarily acquired externally from culture, and not internally as a result of primitive valuation. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree with this as well. It also poses no coherency issues with what's been set forth heretofore.

On my view, this scenario would be accounted for by noting that language acquisition is necessary for all thinking about thought/belief. The term "necessary" here refers to existential dependency. Thinking about thought/belief(metacognition) is existentially dependent upon something to think about and a means of doing so. Complex language use is more than adequate. We use all sorts of names to refer to mental ongoings. Imagination, reasoning, rational thinking, thought, belief, ideas, etc... On my view, all of these reduce to thought/belief and/or thinking about thought/belief, depending upon the complexity level and whether or not the candidate under consideration is itself existentially dependent upon language.

So, we agree that subsequent intentional deliberate thinking about pre-existing thought/belief(prelinguistic) is primarily acquired from culture(language acquisition and subsequent use). That is to say that one's evaluation of one's own worldview is acquired from and is thus existentially dependent upon the society one is born into. However, there must must be something to think about. So, it is not quite accurate to say that the evaluation is not existentially dependent upon pre-linguistic thought/belief as well.

The main difference it seems is that I hold a minimalist criterion for what counts as being moral - in kind - whereas you hold a more complex notion of what counts as moral thought/belief.

I hope this takes us one step closer to adequately understanding the source of morals. I could be mistaken, it's a terrible tragedy.
— Merkwurdichliebe

That's not a bad summary of pre linguistic thought/belief as it pertains to morals.
— creativesoul

Here you did not object to my point. Let me slightly rephrase it for clarity: the level of prelinguistic thought/belief, at which value is imposed on primitive emotional affection, does not constitute morality - it is an observation of what seems pleasing to me, rather than a moral thought/belief concerning acceptable/unacceptable intention/behavior. You actually seemed to agree. — Merkwurdichliebe

We do agree regarding morality. Morality is codified moral thought/belief. Prelinguistic thought/belief that is moral - in kind - (on my view at least) is inadequate for morality. So one cannot have pre-linguistic morality, but can form pre-linguistic thought/belief - that is moral in kind - as a result of it being about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

I suppose a criticism of my position above could be levied with a simple question:What is the difference between being about thought, belief, and/or behaviour and being about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

Perhaps that is what underwrites your invocation of "valuation"?

The question is: what exactly is the reasoning behind the principle of progressive taxation? — tinman917

The answer is that without a society there can be no accumulation of wealth. Those who benefit the most have the greatest debt to pay. It is that simple.

So, it seems we can isolate one primary disagreement and go from there. There's a few that need worked through. It would behoove us both, I think, to work through them carefully beginning with the following...

I hold that moral thought/belief can be prelinguistic on the basis that all things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. This pre-linguistic moral thought/belief would be rudimentary in complexity level, but counts as being moral - in kind - as a result of what it's about(the content of the correlations).

You disagree on the basis that all moral thought/belief is moral judgment.

Does this capture one(primary on my view) disagreement in a nutshell?

Aside from times of being silly and/or facetious(which I'm certainly prone to), I typically allow someone else to pay me compliments(tell me how good, or talented, or smart, or whatever they think I am). Around here, compliments are few and far between. That's partly due - I am certain - to my lack of patience at times. I'm also certainly capable of being a dick. In addition, there are many who have much more a vested interest in philosophy than I. Vehemently arguing against my position. The sheer amount of vitriolic rhetoric astounds me...

However, I've also actually had a couple of participants here and elsewhere ask me in pms if I was worried about my ideas being stolen, going as far as to say I ought be. I'm not. I've got more than enough timestamped original material to prove beyond any doubt that these are my ideas that I'm working through the consequences of. Besides that, my sources of income have nothing to do with philosophical endeavors, but everything to do with other critical thinking, problem solving, abstract reasoning, spatial reasoning, systems analysis and/or development, and other such creative endeavors. And yet... I'm a very boring guy, with a very boring life, and that's exactly how I like it. No surprises, no unexpected results...

That said, which is too much, I do appreciate your involvement with me here and thank you for the compliment. Perhaps that helps you to get a better 'feel' for your interlocutor... me!

:wink: