... a belief is a belief that... So, in my terms, a propensity to act as if some state of affairs were the case ... — Isaac

I afraid this doesn't pan out, simply because we can 'hold something to be true' despite evidence, despite reason, and despite our own propensity to act as though it were true.

So our 'pro-lifer' can hold the belief that all life is sacred and also hold the belief that some life is not sacred — Isaac

Rather, they can 'hold something to be true' (life is sacrid) and fail to act as though it were true.

The curious thing is that you appear perfectly willing to count emotions as social constructs but not something like beliefs.

To abandon belief is to abandon the influence of a social construct and essentially an effort to abandon tribalism. Belief died with God, in other words.

No. They were a pro-lifer and now they are not. A change of mind. — Banno

Or perhaps they never had a tendency to act according to their "beliefs".

If they have an abortion does that mean that they never actually believed in the pro-life movement? It would appear so.
— praxis

They changed their mind. — Banno

How exactly did they change it?

I was thinking of what Isaac said in relation to the location of lost keys and how one could have an equal propensity to act in multiple ways. In the keys scenario, I figured that long term memory would be a key factor. If long term memory indicated that the keys were equally likely to be in two different locations there would be a moment of indecision. Otherwise, one would readily check the most likely location first. Therefore, one way to manipulate ourselves or others would be to alter our long term memories.

Is that how you’re suggesting the pro-lifer can change their mind? To somehow make themselves forget that they are a pro-lifer?

Interesting you put it like this. Does the plant not move towards the same direction each time and if it must have beliefs, could it not feel it has been moved? :razz: — Tom Storm

Hmm, maybe we should switch to people beliefs and try to come up with a real-life scenario where a person has an equal propensity to act in contradictory ways.

Say there's a person who is pro-life and this person has the propensity to act in ways that are in line with the pro-life movement. This person becomes pregnant and due to circumstances that are out of their control they desire an abortion and therefore have the propensity to act in ways that are contrary to the pro-life movement. If they have an abortion does that mean that they never actually believed in the pro-life movement? It would appear so.

If the pro-life belief was fake then what purpose did it serve? I propose that it functioned to help bind a group with shared "beliefs".

Can you give an example?
— praxis

Not really no. The comment was on the presumption of this distinction Janus was making between a mental state and an expressed belief. A belief as a mental state has no barrier to being contradictory. Beliefs here are simply propensities to act as if some state of affairs were the case and such a propensity is carried in the brain by dynamic networks. Since these are stochastic and unstable, it's perfectly possible to hold contradictory beliefs (propensities to act as if two contradictory states of affairs were the case). In fact, it's quite a normal state.

If you thought to yourself 'now, where's my keys' the image or concept of their location that comes to you would be the result of a resolution of that network at the state it's in at the time.

As for 'feeling sure'... Feelings are all post hoc narratives invented after the event. One could 'feel' anything which makes some sense of what just happened. It tells us absolutely nothing beyond our abilities as storytellers. — Isaac

Maybe I can help provide a real-world scenario, if I'm following you correctly.

A plant has the propensity to bend towards the sun. With mirrors, or simply turning the plant around if it's in a pot, the plant can be made to bend in different directions. One day at a particular time we can make it bend to the East and the next day at the same time we can make it bend to the West.

One day the plant believes (has a propensity to act) that the sun is in the East and the next day it believes the sun is in the West, dynamically adapting to the circumstances of the moment.

Yeah, this turn of events from Janus has surprised me too. I've never heard of "I believe" being equated with "I'm certain" "I feel certain", it seemed out of the blue. — Isaac

Perhaps you're misconstruing what was said.

I could not believe (feel sure) that they were in all three of the places that I imagine.
— praxis

You absolutely could. It's perfectly possible to believe (even to feel sure of) two contradictory things at once, people do it all the time. — Isaac

Can you give an example?

What one can't do is act on both beliefs, but one can hold both beliefs. Were it not possible, each alternative would have to be completely modelled from scratch in the brain as an when it was needed.

In my example, there is one set of keys and three places that are imagined they could be located. How could someone feel sure that they are in all three places?

Obviously, we can imagine all sorts of things without believing them.

"credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true" is belief without certainty, which I do not see as problematic. — Banno

Take the 2020 American presidential election, for instance. Trump was a leader and an authority figure who made a claim that his supporters 'felt sure' was true, despite a lack of supporting evidence. This sort of thing is characterized as a "big lie". You're cool with big lies? This directly relates to Ken Edwards's experience in WW2, btw.

I could not find a dictionary that equated "belief"with "certainty", only with trust, confidence and so on. Nothin to support the idea of belief implying certitude. — Banno

Have I claimed otherwise?

What I find most problematic with belief is its meaning as described in the etymology: "be persuaded of the truth of" (a doctrine, system, religion, etc.) is from mid-13c.; meaning "credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true"

The etymology appears neck deep in theology.

believe (v.)
Old English belyfan "to have faith or confidence" (in a person), earlier geleafa (Mercian), gelefa (Northumbrian), gelyfan (West Saxon), from Proto-Germanic *ga-laubjan "to believe," perhaps literally "hold dear (or valuable, or satisfactory), to love" (source also of Old Saxon gilobian "believe," Dutch geloven, Old High German gilouben, German glauben), ultimately a compound based on PIE root *leubh- "to care, desire, love" (see belief).

Meaning "be persuaded of the truth of" (a doctrine, system, religion, etc.) is from mid-13c.; meaning "credit upon the grounds of authority or testimony without complete demonstration, accept as true" is from early 14c. General sense "be of the opinion, think" is from c. 1300. Related: Believed (formerly occasionally beleft); believing.

Perhaps like God, the term is dead.

I'm not surprised. — Banno

There's no reason to be surprised, and many reasons not to be.

@Banno

Having lost my keys, I can imagine them being in three different locations without feeling sure about them actually being in any of the different locations that I imagine. I could not believe (feel sure) that they were in all three of the places that I imagine.

I say this to point out that considering different locations is entertaining the possibilities and not believing them.

If I were to look for the keys and found something that gave me a clue to their location, like a note to myself that read "you're getting close", I might be more sure of the location that was nearest to me at that point. Even so, I don't think that I would feel sure at that point. I know myself and I can be pretty unreliable.

If out of nowhere I heard my car being driven away I would feel sure that the keys were in the car, even though I couldn't confirm it.

If at some later date I was reunited with my keys, holding them in my hand I would feel certain of their location.

You're not being clear. Also, I revised the post a couple of times.

"If the keys are not in the car then they must be everywhere somewhere else". — Banno

Fixed.

They could be in various places. I can entertain thoughts of where they might be. I can't feel sure or certain about every place that I imagine, can I?

Simply that things, like the location of keys, can be accepted and entertained without feeling sure about them.
— praxis

I don't disagree. Indeed, the grammar proposed here makes it clear that one can believe without being certain. — Banno

I still don't understand how that can be the case, and for some reason when I ask about this you do not answer.

I can't believe (feel sure) that my keys are in various places at the same time. Rather, I can entertain the thoughts of them being in various places.

Simply that things, like the location of keys, can be accepted and entertained without feeling sure about them. We can also feel certain about the location of keys. Further, we can have irrational beliefs about the location of keys.

It's common to treat things as true, even though we might be wrong. I believe the keys are in the tray, even though I might be wrong. — Banno

The keys could be in many places that you could think of, all of which would be reasonable places for them to be. You can't feel sure that they are in every reasonable place.

anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be believed provisionally for pragmatic reasons. — Banno

You're saying that all reasonable unknowns can be believed (accepted as true; feel sure of the truth of) provisionally. If I've forgotten where my keys are, how can I believe that they are in every reasonable place that comes to mind?

That's just wordplay - All it says is that anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be believed provisionally for pragmatic reasons.
— Banno

That means that we are forced to hold all reasonable unknowns to be true. That we are forced to feel confident in them. That doesn't make sense.
— praxis

How does this "force" you to do any such thing? — Banno

Say that I forgot where my keys are. There are many many reasonable places where they could be. According to you, I must have confidence (beleive) that they are in every reasonable place that comes to mind. How does that make sense?

That's just wordplay - All it says is that anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be believed provisionally for pragmatic reasons. — Banno

That means that we are forced to hold all reasonable unknowns to be true. That we are forced to feel confident in them. That doesn't make sense.

If you told me that you're wearing a green shirt I would certainly accept and entertain your claim. There would be nothing unreasonable about it. I would not hold it to be true, however. If someone asked I'd probably say something like, "Banno said he's wearing a green shirt."

Meh.

And it is not the same as "There is a place of balance between credulity and skepticism". — Banno

Were is this ballance then?

There is a place of balance between credulity and skepticism. — Banno

Indeed, and I think Janus described it most succinctly.

Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed. — Janus

It's [explicit expression of belief] not required. Not sure why that is relevant. — Banno

It's relevant because shared belief is the heart of the OP and the reason we're discussing this.

It is the case that Bob believed the keys were in his pocket, yet his belief was false. — Banno

Is it a matter of belief or was he simply misremembering their location? If he reached for his pocket in effort to use his keys, does that count as an explicit expression of belief? When a plant bends towards the sun is that an explicit expression of belief that the sun is in a particular location?

I think that my car keys are currently in the car but I'm not sure. I accept and entertain that's where they are provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed.

What this shows is that we need the notion of "belief" in order to make a basic distinction between what we think is true and what is actually true. — Banno

Jane asks, "Where are the keys?"

Bob replies, "The keys are in my pocket."

"Are you sure? Please check."

Bob probes his pockets and says, "Huh, I must have left them in the car."

-----

Bob thought the keys were in his pocket but they were actually in the car. :chin: Or perhaps they were not in the car either. Maybe after searching for a while Bob remembered that he put the keys on the upstairs dresser.

It would seem that Bob never needed to declare his belief or hold any location of the keys to be actual or true. It would be rather odd and unhelpful if he did insist that the keys were in any of the places that they weren't, actually.

I can't think of any situation where a declaration of belief is required.

How might postmodernism be helpful in determining how we should/could live? — Tom Storm

Undermine the powers that be.

:rofl:

Let’s be honest.

1. Sexbot

I don’t get how experience-based predictions can be anything other than inferences based on some experience. — javra

The rain in Spain falls mainly on the mountains
- My Fair Lady

You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometimes, well, you just might find
You get what you ask for
- Rolling Stones

A penny saved is a penny wasted
- Benjamin Franklin

Between these three examples I think it’s likely that you’ve just experienced at least one prediction error. The error didn’t occur because of good or bad reasoning but simply because the examples don’t follow a pattern that you’ve been conditioned to recognize.

While it may not have been the best example I could have offered, you’re still overlooking a key ingredient that was stipulated from the beginning: lack of knowledge. You do not know what caused the movement in the dark corner. You haven’t clearly seen anything but a movement; you haven’t seen a small animal, never mind seeing a rat. But you’re mind inferentially predicts that the movement might either have been caused by wind-blown leaves or by a small animal (but not both). Which one is real is to you not known, and hence not a psychological certainty. — javra

I guess the example is unclear because it lacks specificity. The unknown critter is referred to as both an experience-based prediction and also an inference. In the example, I assume that something in the environment, some pattern of sense data, subconsciously resulted in a prediction that a small animal may be present, even though it couldn't be verified visually or otherwise. After the prediction was conscious it could then be consciously considered or reasoned with. At that point, other information may come to mind, like that there's been an increase in rat sightings in the area because of a nearby construction project, for example. That may favor the conclusion that there is a small animal. IN ANY CASE, there's no reason to "hold it to be true." More evidence to the contrary conclusion, all things being equal, would not be resisted.

common to all three types of belief is some variant of “the attribution of reality to”. — javra

I think belief is all about the 'holding to be true', which is really about holding to shared meaning and identity. We can provisionally accept and entertain both knowledge and fiction for pragmatic reasons, but we don't need to maladaptively hold to them.

Example:
We provisionally accept and entertain the fiction that a $100 bill has value beyond its physical properties, but under different circumstances, like if we were stranded on a desert island with a group of goofy castaways, we would no longer accept or entertain the fiction.

Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed.
— Janus

Indeed, but only after already having a belief system intact. Suspending one's judgment is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognition is existentially dependent upon pre-existing belief. — creativesoul

Beliefs are ‘held to be true’, which means that experience or evidence that may disprove a belief is resisted. We don’t necessarily resist new information, clearly. The shared knowledge and fictions that bind us can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed.

In the example provided, the mind predicts two conflicting alternatives are possible: wind-blown leaves or a small animal. Also given is that you do not consciously know which alternative is real. To consciously act on either is not prediction: the predictions of if-then are already embedded in each alternative. So prediction as stipulated does not account for why one chooses to act on one alternative but not the other. — javra

You asked: “If one then moves away from one’s position so as to avoid the possibility of contact with a small animal, how can this activity be accounted for in the absence of belief (to whatever extent conscious and/or subconscious) that the movement was likely produced by a small animal (rather than, for example, by wind-blown leaves)?”

If a mind accurately predicts the presence of a rat then moving away from it, assuming the rat is rabid or whatever, is a good and adaptive prediction. Otherwise it’s a prediction error.

If there were time to think before acting, the musophobic could consider their options, to fight or flee, or come up with some other plan, all the while fully realizing that there may not be a rat rustling in the leaves. Again, it’s not necessarily an idea or prediction that’s ‘held to be true’.

As one concrete example, one sees movement in a very dark corner close to oneself outdoors. To one's momentary awareness the movement could at least either be produced by wind-blown debris, like leaves, or else by a small animal, like a rat. Both seem relatively reasonable to you and both can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; still, one does not know which alternative is true. If one then moves away from one’s position so as to avoid the possibility of contact with a small animal, how can this activity be accounted for in the absence of belief (to whatever extent conscious and/or subconscious) that the movement was likely produced by a small animal (rather than, for example, by wind-blown leaves)? — javra

Prediction, to put it succinctly. This happens whether we like it or not. Our minds are constantly looking for patterns and making predictions.

Maybe you're suggesting that our beliefs correspond to our conditioning, that if we tend to react in a particular way it indicates a belief of some kind. An irrational fear of rats, for instance, means that a person believes that rats are dangerous. This goes against the sense of "holding to be true", however, because there is little if any control over the phobia. Irrational fear is not something that is desirable, and indeed is something that most would rather not hold.

Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed. — Janus

TRUTH!

Sure, that's just a projection of what I stated. If you have your own foundational beliefs established within then you can start to try to figure out others using that reference. I am not suggesting your own foundations should be utterly chiseled in stone but you have to have some strength in your foundations. — universeness

I’m suggesting that it’s not a personal foundation but a group foundation. We don’t need to believe ourselves, do we???

Not mystical, I was just goofing. It was an interesting experience though.

How can you build who you are without some kind of foundational beliefs? — universeness

Rather, I think the question is how can you build who we are without some kind of foundational beliefs.

What does it mean to confirm one's uncertainty? Confirm that you are uncertain? Attempt to eliminate the uncertainty? There are many things about which I am uncertain for which the uncertainty cannot be eliminated. Some of those things seem to be more likely to be true than others. — Fooloso4

If I accept or trust or think or estimate or conclude or predict that you're telling the truth does that mean that I believe (hold to be true) you're telling the truth? A definition of believe includes the sense of 'feeling sure of'. Does that refer to intuition, the feeling that you're telling the truth but not an assessment based on reason? If that's the case then I could simply say that, that I feel like or intuit that you're telling the truth. It seems the only other way to 'feel sure of' is to hold you as a truth-teller or to have faith in you, to trust you implicitly. I imagine there could be circumstances where I would be forced to trust someone because it's not possible to verify their veracity, but that could be against my will and wouldn't be really 'feeling' or 'holding' their claims.

First, you say that believing expresses uncertainty and knowing expresses certainty, but then say that believing can express certainty.
— praxis

The latter is the result of the failure to make the distiction of the former. — Fooloso4

I think you're wrong about this. If we're uncertain about something do we need to confirm this uncertainty, or 'hold it to be true', to ourselves? No.

The expression of belief is nothing more than a sign of solidarity with fellow "believers", and a shared uncertainty is a leash, allowing yourself to be led like a dog.

Is this not an expression of what you believe about believing, that is is better to avoid believing?

To believe is used in distinction from to know. What I believe may turn out to be wrong. It expresses a tenuousness, a lack of certainty. It differs from a claim of knowledge.

It is when this distinction is not made, when one equates believing with being absolutely, indubitably certainty, that believing becomes dangerous. — Fooloso4

First, you say that believing expresses uncertainty and knowing expresses certainty, but then say that believing can express certainty. There is also the fact that what we know can turn out to be wrong, and in those cases are we actually only believing when we think that we're knowing?

Wow, that’s heavy, and I thought Trump supporters were a bad enough exemplar to justify the condemnation of belief.

Non-fossil energy is only a fantasy if you're demanding that our current way of life (hollow materialism) remains the same.

As Banno said... the problem is not that we believe, but rather it is what we believe. So, seems better to examine how we come to believe the things we do, and what sorts of belief are best to have/hold rather than make an attempt to convince ourselves that we ought not believe anyone or anything. — creativesoul

If I accept or trust or think or estimate or conclude or predict that you're telling the truth does that mean that I believe (hold to be true) you're telling the truth? A definition of believe includes the sense of 'feeling sure of'. Does that refer to intuition, the feeling that you're telling the truth but not an assessment based on reason? If that's the case then I could simply say that, that I feel like or intuit that you're telling the truth. It seems the only other way to 'feel sure of' is to hold you as a truth-teller or to have faith in you, to trust you implicitly. I imagine there could be circumstances where I would be forced to trust someone because it's not possible to verify their veracity, but that could be against my will and wouldn't be really 'feeling' or 'holding' their claims.