I would include the artistry of sunrise, especially as I live in a hilly region where shadows form in unpredictable patterns. — Vera Mont

I can imagine that beautiful perspective. If you live in a hilly region, the colours and shadows of nature are more authentic, and they are not interrupted by the surroundings of the city.

I do love that picture! — Vera Mont

I have never seen that painting by Van Gogh until today! I was looking for autumn paintings, and the most recommended by Google art.

The larches turn gold;/ another year is ending, / sunsets burn brightly — Vera Mont

Good! Exquisite! Gorgeous! Is this poem yours? :smile:

Lecture VII: Once again, Austin is not talking about words (explaining words), he is looking at the words we say when we do something to illuminate our practices. That words are “used in a particular way” is a “fact” (p.62) because our lives have been “firmly established” (Id.) — Antony Nickles

Yes, Austin explains pretty well the ordinary vocabulary of our language, and that's why he states that the use of some words depends on the 'adaptation' of our daily life.

But he goes beyond all of that. I disagree when you say that words are dependent upon how we do something, because there are some words which their functionality is more than just a 'tool'. This is why he uses 'real' - the word 'good', too - as an example. He establishes some theories on the nature of this word, expressing that it is a 'substantive-hungry', trouser-word, dimension-word, and dimension-word. These characteristics help us in our demanding, and it is obvious that 'real' tends to be more used amongst people than 'proper' - as he states - I think this about Philosophy of Language, and I don't think he attempts to say that it depends on the way we do things. It is the opposite. Thanks to these complex words, we are able to have a better understanding.

The physics of popcorn walls in Spain sounds like it requires a post doc analysis. — Nils Loc

:lol:

It sounds like a room that will turn out very pleasant. I'd be very interested to hear about its progress. — Vera Mont

That's my main project. My bedroom is the place where I spend a lot of hours reading books, and I want to make it a pleasant place to be. I will be posting more comments in this thread, and let's see how it progresses on.

So I started looking at stained glass. Something warm, but artsy. — L'éléphant

Good choice! I have stained-glass in the living room. Basically, my parents put it just to prevent the savage heat of summer days, and it works pretty well, because the sunlight doesn't go through the living room.

I just want to cocoon in the dimmed chambre. — L'éléphant

Dimmed chamber! Good point. I couldn't find the exact word yesterday. That's what I am looking for in my bedroom. A dimmed atmosphere, I don't like 'vivid' colours.

It is not impossible to attach stuff to popcorn stone walls, but the problem is that they do not attach accurately. For example, when I use pins, they end up broken because that bloody relieve makes them bend over. I tried sticky putty too, but as I said, I live in a zone where summers are very hot, so they end up falling down...

Then you'll have to be careful with the choice of blue for the walls, so they don't cancel each other. I'd go to a darker shade, edging into aquamarine. — Vera Mont

True. I didn't realise that they cancelled each other. Thanks for the recommendations. If you do not mind, I will keep posting here my advances on the scenery of my bedroom. I am interested in 'interior design' but I am lost regarding this topic. I think it is very important to have a bedroom which accompanies your mood. What I am going to do quickly is buy new curtains. But it is important to buy transparent curtains, not opaques. I mean, the ones that, when the sunlight hits, reflects the shine - or spectrum - of the colour in the room. This is why my bedroom is red in the afternoon, but now I am tired of this colour, and I am looking for dark blue, as I said.

Yes, I tried to use sticky putty too. I still have some in my house, but there is another issue. The weather in Madrid is very hot in summer, and it makes the sticky putty to melt down. So, my posters and stuff end up falling down as well. I decided not to put anything on my walls, but it is obvious that they need another colour, because 'pearl grey paint' doesn't fit my mood. I want something related to autumn or winter, like dark blue or magenta.

(I like yellow/green/blue for curtains.) — Vera Mont

I agree, those are good colours for curtains. I would go for orange too.

Dark blue walls can be quite restful, but I suggest you relieve it with some brightly coloured pictures or fabric wall-hangings. — Vera Mont

I wish I could relieve it with pictures or fabric wall-hangings, but the walls of my bedroom were painted by gotelé - in English, it is said 'popcorn ceiling' -. acoustic ceiling
It was a common practice in Spain back in the 1990s, and it is very difficult to get rid of this. Well, it is actually possible, but I have to tear the walls down, and colour them again. I am not in the mood to do all of this because it is very messy, but my parents and I have agreed to do it one day in the house, and I promised to stay and take over the project alone with the painters... Whenever I wanted to put some stuff on the walls, it ended up falling down because they didn’t hang on too well. Some folks say this is because my bedroom cross a beam, but I guess it is gotelé's fault...

Does anyone have a winter project they would like to brag or complain about? Exchange experiences? Talk about while putting off doing? — Vera Mont

It is complex to explain, but it is precisely in autumn and winter that I feel more motivated to do something. This is weird behaviour according to common sense, supposedly.

Repurposing or redecorating a room? — Vera Mont

I will change the curtains of my bedroom. They are red and black, and now I want them orange or yellow. I would like to repaint my bedroom as well. It is just white and maybe another colour would be better to my emotions. I would like to paint in dark blue or grease.

Learning Mandarin, or the bassoon, origami or advanced physics? — Vera Mont

Keep reading more books in English, rather than translated into my language. I think this would have a good impact on my knowledge development. I always read literature, but I guess it is time to read more about philosophy or linguistics.

This is an argument I have made use of many times. I have several times used this quote from Austin's Other minds... — Banno

An example of it's use, in a conversation with T Clark — Banno

Interesting. A worth reading, and I didn't know about that work of Austin's, which looks more 'metaphysical' than 'sense and sensibilia.'

There's an evolutionary point here, that the natural language we use is the result of adaptation over a very long period of time, with the result that it is particularly well suited to doing the sorts of things we do with words. — Banno

Yes. When I read chapter VII I came to this conclusion as well, and this is why - I guess - he states that some words such as 'real' or 'good' are adjusted-words because they respond to innumerable needs from people on ordinary days. I mean, I agree with him that we tend to use 'real' with more confidence (the glass on the table is real! Instead of using 'proper' or 'reliable') and 'good' (the conversation in this thread is good. I think nobody would use 'sublime' here, for instance)

Oh, and for subsequent use, it is worth noting the last point in the lecture, that it is worth making a distinction only if there is a way of telling the difference between what has been distinguished. — Banno

And he also states that 'a distinction which we are not in fact able to draw... is not worth making.' It seems to me that he didn't want to dive in the pure distinction between real and not real.

Great points. Thanks for your effort. — Corvus

Thanks, mate. :up:

Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. The word "Real" is a qualifier to mean that what was perceived is fit for authentic knowledge of our perception among the other uses of the word. — Corvus

Exactly. But it is interesting to point out that, according to Austin, this matter doesn't usually come up in our ordinary daily life, but only when things may not be what they seem to be. Thus, I think he refers to that most of us already give for granted many truths (or real facts, like the example of the 'pig'), and only when we debate - like we are doing right now - those questions flourish.

You certainly did, and a very welcome one, too. Thank you. — Ludwig V

Thank you for your kind words. I appreciate it.

But could I add that his little disquisition about ordinary language philosophy deserves some attention too. — Ludwig V

I agree.

(a) that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part, relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary; — Ludwig V

I fully agree with you in this sense, and it reminds me of Steven Pinker and his book: 'Words and Rules. The ingredients of Language'. For example, when children learn basic 'stuff' or knowledge, they do not mimic sentences or words like parrots. First, they try to make sense of what they perceive, and this is thanks to language. It is not arbitrary, as you said.

But what Austin is emphasizing is that it does the same job, i.e. has the same use, when attached to the substantives it gets attached to. One could quarrel with that, but there's no clear principle of individuation attached to either meanings or uses, so we can allow different applications of those terms. — Ludwig V

Ah, OK. Now I can see more clear what Austin holds in his theory.

If that's what he means to say, it is indeed hard to understand. I think he is not saying that but saying that "real" is an umbrella or basket for all those other terms. Perhaps more like the head of the family. — Ludwig V

I think he actually meant that 'real' is a concept which fits better in the understanding of people rather than others, which shares the same 'substantive-hungry' claim. I don't think it is an umbrella or basket for the rest of the words with the same 'root', but the one we tend to pick before the others. That's why he named it as 'dimension-word' because 'real' - as a term - can fill up our demands better than 'proper' or 'true'. Nevertheless, although this point of Austin is very interesting, he decided not to go deeply into it...

@Corvus

I guess you would like the following quote from Austin:

When it isn't a real duck but a hallucination, it may still be a real hallucination-as opposed, for instance, to a passing quirk of a vivid imagination. That is, we must have an answer to the question 'A real what?', if the question 'Real or not?' is to have a definite sense, to get any foothold. And perhaps we should also mention here another point that the question 'Real or not?' does not always come· up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us-in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways in which things may be not what they seem. What alternative is there to being a 'real' after-image ? 'Real' is not... — Austin

I don’t mind someone else taking the lead either, — Antony Nickles

VII

@Corvus Fortunately, Austin comes back to hallucination and this chapter is worth reading and enjoying.

In this chapter, Austin wants to dive into the word 'real' more deeply, and according to him, we can set the word'real' in two categories: A normal or basic word used by ordinary people that is already established in our communicative behaviour - this is why he states: Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, things should be left exactly as we find them;
And then, an extraordinary word, whose sense is often used by philosophers. It is interesting to highlight that Austin describes the word 'real' as 'substantive-hungry'. Thus, a word that is needed for substantives, to have a definite sense, to get any foothold.

On the other hand, it is important to notice that Austin admits that a question like 'what is real or not' not always comes up. He states that we only question this when the things may be not what they seem. I agree with this. Don't you, folks?

Keeping on the track, Austin says that 'real' 'nor does it have a large number of different meanings-it is not ambiguous. ' I just don't understand why he says this. Now, he is the one who is ambiguous here. These folks... Always with the same complex philosophical arguments...

------------------------------

Austin also states that 'real' is a trouser-word. That is, a definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real such-and-such, only in the light of a specific way in which it might be, or might have been, not real. 'A real duck' differs from the simple 'a duck' only in that it is used to exclude various ways of being not a real duck-but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, etc.

I agree, and I don't have anything against his statement.

'Real' is also a dimension-word (like 'good' Austin affirms). It is an easily comprehensive term in a whole group of words of the same kind. Austin claims that 'real' is more understandable among the people than 'proper' 'genuine', 'true' 'authentic', etc. He also states in a linguistic point of view that: how does the distinction between real cream and synthetic cream differ from the distinction between pure cream and adulterated cream? Is it just that adulterated cream still is, after all, cream?
A lot of questions like these arise, and Austin claims that he shall not go into.

Lastly, 'real' is an adjuster-word. Austin says that it is adjusted to meet 'innumerable' demands of language. He also accepts that vocabulary is finite and we - sometimes - face new things that are unknown to us. An adjust-word helps us to fit the 'new' idea in the vocabulary we have already known. Austin uses a good example: We have the word 'pig', for instance, and a pretty clear idea which animals, among those that we fairly commonly encounter, are and are not to be so called. But one day we come across a new kind of animal, which looks and behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do; it is somehow different. But what we could do, and probably would do first of all, is to say, 'It's like a pig. ' ('Like' is the great adjuster-word)

But it is not a 'real' pig... So what is it then? Well, I think Austin claims an eclectic point of view and says: We have, after all, other flexibility-devices. For instance, I might say that animals of this new species are 'piggish'; I might perhaps call them 'quasi-pigs', or describe them (in the style of vendors of peculiar wines) as 'pig-type' creatures.

Again, these 'dilemmas' don't usually come up in our ordinary language. Then, Austin concludes that is not very worthy to make a distinction between 'real X' and 'not real X', and we are not even able to draw it...

Cheers. I hope I made a good effort after all.

Good points, and interesting paragraphs. It was a pleasure to read but, I admit that I am not capable of understanding everything, but that's a problem of mine, not yours and your arguments.

Hard to talk about something if there is nothing in the mind of the speaker. Before we began using terms like "perception", in order to pick stuff out of the world to the exclusion of all else, there was something to be named. Anything else is a complete fabrication of the mind. — creativesoul

I agree. But the following example is needed to take into account:

Cats perceive mice despite having no idea what the term "mice" is. No notion of "perception" necessary for that to happen either. Our acquiring knowledge of that much is another matter altogether. — creativesoul

Well, cats don't know the term 'mice' because this is a human concept of our vocabulary. Cats express themselves using the sound: 'Meow' and maybe when a cat goes with that sound, it is referring to mice as well. And, I do not understand why you claim that no notion of 'perception' is required when the animal kingdom is partially based on this. A cat goes to catch a mouse because it was perceived, they do not act randomly. So, I guess that a cat is aware of what 'mice' means in its animal mind.

Yes, good point actually. But then does Austin defines what perception is? His analysis on Delusion and Illusion is interesting. — Corvus

Yes, it is very interesting, indeed. I agree with your post entirely, and it is well written and explained. In addition to your point, I feel that analysis on Delusion and Illusion by Austin has not been appreciated in the debate of this thread, because the core seems to be whether this author embraces realism or not, or why 'direct' and 'indirect' debate is too twisted amongst the philosophers themselves. Also, the confrontation of 'perceive' and the 'perceiver', etc.

It could be the case that Austin had no idea on perception theories at all coming from a linguistic background. — Corvus

Interesting. I haven't seen it in that way, but it reminds me of you a phrase on page 47, when Austin states: In that sentence Ayer uses, not indeed for the first time, the term 'perceptions' (which incidentally has never been defined or explained).
When I read it, I thought Austin was arguing that Ayer lacks of clarity on what 'perceptions' actually are, not that maybe he is missing a comprehensive concept or definition. And this also reminds me of the problem of universals and the nature of meaning. I have been reading your post carefully, and I guess - If I am not terribly lost - we both agree on the fact that Austin criticise 'direct' and 'indirect' due to the lack of sufficient linguistic background.

Did I make a good try?

Balkan's spirit.

In Sec. VI Austin is full of so much vitriol and sarcasm it’s hard to gather what the argument is. — Antony Nickles

I agree. I felt the same when I read it. Furthermore, the fact that Austin seems ambiguous to me usually.

(Ayer p. 17 emphasis added) And here I can imagine is where Austin goes ballistic, and rightly so. Why would anyone imagine someone who ignores evidence? — Antony Nickles

I think it is not about ignoring 'evidence', he just plays sarcastically. On page 59 he states: 'If there is here to be any question of truth or falsehood, there must be some disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts.' And the he also says: 'How could anything be a question of truth or falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes? But here, of course, Ayer answers that, sometimes at least, there is real 'disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts'. But what kind of disagreement can this be?'
Ha! I think Austin is throwing a bone to Ayer, and this 'bone' consists on persuading Ayer to pick up a position: Metaphysics or Linguistics?

Instead of attributing that the philosopher is wrong, Ayer chooses that "it is to be inferred that he is assigning to the words a different meaning from that which we have given them." Id. This is why Austin keeps saying that Ayer’s philosopher can agree to the facts, but then say "whatever [they] like" — Antony Nickles

Yeah, and I think this is why Austin states that:'so long as we persist in regarding the issue as one concerning a matter of fact, it is impossible for us to refute him. We cannot refute him, because, as far as the facts are concerned, there is really no dispute between us...'
Yep, ambiguity kicking in again.

I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made. — Janus

I agree, and what a good phrase. I think what you typed is very intelligent. Philosophy allows us to keep going beyond the limits of our knowledge, and it is one of the main disciplines of humankind. Yet, there will be big debates amongst all the philosophers and their theories to discern who is more right than the other. But, how could it be the nature of philosophy if we don't disagree at all? And I think this is the beautiful debate of this thread and what Austin tried to refute to Ayer humbly.

Religion is a tool, and like any tool can be used to build and create or destroy and break things, all depending on how a person utilizes it. — Vaskane

I fully agree.

But...

Nihilism is in fact more regressive than religion, hence Nietzsche and the birth of existentialism. — Vaskane

I don't get your point here. What do you mean 'regressive' when you compare existentialism with religion? You want to mean that nihilism or existentialism are just a deconstruction of ourselves, or what exactly?

I don't want to criticise your opinion, but just to understand it, because I got surprised after reading it.
On the other hand, I guess we can't consider Kierkegaard as a 'regressive' towards religion when he clearly suffered 'humanisation' in the interpretation of the Gospels...

My point was that, in thinking about perception in different ways, using different criteria for what would count as 'direct' and 'indirect', perception can be considered to be either direct or indirect. So my question is, given there is no fact of the matter regarding which is the case. what is the problem? — Janus

Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none.

Correct me if I am wrong please, but it seems to me that you interpret Austin from a scientific perspective, and not from a philosophical point of view. To be honest, I think that Austin somehow embraces empiricism. I don't mean to say that he bases his point on this theory, but it goes beyond than just 'evidence'. Note that he states on page 60:

But here, of course, Ayer answers that, sometimes at least, there is real 'disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts'. But what kind of disagreement can this be?

I think the main issue regarding Austin is his ambiguity arguing about Ayer's points. At least, what I interpret is that there is empirical evidence that Austin gives as granted, and he is surprised of why Ayer actually believes in the existence of such a disagreement with 'empirical facts'.

On the other hand, if you believe that Austin is deconstructing metaphysics, then how should we get involved with his theory? Or at least an approach to. I interpret the verb 'deconstructing' as padding backwards on what others wrote on 'perception', 'real', 'external', 'internal'. So, do you believe that Austin took a step back from metaphysics?

Furthermore, I think Austin sates a very interesting point in page 49:

If dreams were not 'qualitatively' different from waking experiences, then every waking experience would be like a dream; the dream-like quality would be, not difficult to capture, but impossible to avoid. It is true, to repeat, that dreams are na"ated in the same terms as waking experiences: these terms, after all, are the best terms we have; but it would be wildly wrong to conclude from this that what is narrated in the two cases is exactly alike. When we are hit on the head we sometimes say that we 'see stars'; but for all that, seeing stars when you are hit on the head is not 'qualitatively' indistinguishable from seeing stars when you look at the sky

I think Austin drives us here to Idealism, or more specifically, a new use of language or Philosophy of Language. I think it is Ayer the one who embraces positivism rejecting metaphysics altogether. I beg your pardon if I am not explaining myself accurately. I attempt to understand Austin from a Philosophy of Language view, basically.

Dear Ludwig, thanks for your analysis and argumentative explanation. I really appreciate it.

On the other hand, I beg your pardon if you think that my posts are not clear or difficult to follow on, because it is true. I am very interested in philosophy, but my knowledge of the matter is basic, and I just wanted to take part in this thread, but roughly. I am aware that I am not capable of providing more substantial answers.

Continuing to the main point...

Firstly, I thought the paper of Austin was a matter of linguistics rather than metaphysics. This is what I interpreted when I read:

Now of course what brings us up short here is the word 'directly'-a great favourite among philosophers, but actually one of the less con- spicuous snakes in the linguistic grass. We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which already has a very special-use, being gradually stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it.

P. 15

And then in P. 59, he also states:

Therefore, the question to which the argument from illusion purports to provide an answer is a purely linguistic question, not a question of fact...

Nonetheless, if I am not wrong, the main direction in Austin's work is metaphysical. It makes me wonder whether Austin wants to disagree with Ayer for being 'idealistic linguistic' or if he actually considers that 'sense' and 'sensibilia' are a subject of Philosophy of Language. - or at least an approach to -

Finally, rereading what I posted previously, I think you are right. Austin agrees with Kant and Berkeley, and disagrees with Ayer. But it doesn't seem to me that he disagrees in everything about Ayer, but some points. At least, in an analytical perspective, Austin agrees with Ayer.

Well, it is obvious to highlight that an example of a 'successful' state is Japan. I personally think that Australia, New Zealand and the North European countries are successful too. Although they have some problems like most other nations, they are not critical. For example: the violence in the streets or lack of safety you could experience in Latin America, or the critical social division between the right wing and the left side we are currently living in Spain. My country is a failed nation if I compare it to Australia or Japan, for instance.

Isn't Japan famous for its unhappy salarymen and its terrible work/life balance? — Tom Storm

It is true that they have a big issue with unhappiness and suicide ratio. But these factors should not affect the fact that Japan is a prosperous country. I wish we had in my country an advanced education, economy, employment market, and sophisticated culture like the Japanese. Things would be better...

And, I never understood why people consider Japan terrible because of the balance of work/life balance. Maybe it is just a cultural conflict again...

Top 10 Most Prosperous Countries (Legatum Prosperity Index 2021): — ssu

I can't believe Japan is out from the list!

“Seeing” something is not biological—which would simply be vision—and neither is judging, identifying, categorizing, etc. (“perception” is a made up thing, never defined nor explained p. 47). . Austin is showing us that “seeing” is a learned, public process (of focus and identification). “Do you see that? What, that dog? That’s not a dog, it’s a giant rabbit; see the ears.” — Antony Nickles

Well, it doesn't surprise me that Austin embraces empiricism roughly. I read from other users who took part in this thread that, if we want to try to understand the exhange between Austin and Ayer, we have to focus on Linguistics as well, because Austin states that 'Ayer's 'linguistic' doctrine really rests squarely on the old Berkeleian, Kantian ontology of the 'sensible manifold'(p. 60), and he also states:

if Ayer were right here, then absolutely every dispute would be purely verbal. For if, when one person says whatever it may be, another person may simply 'prefer to say' something else, they will always be arguing only about words, about what terminology is to be preferred

.' (I fully agree on this point)

So I wonder to what extent we should take into account this topic from a Philosophy of Language perspective, and not just metaphysics.

On the other hand, I think pages 59, 60 and 61 are key. It shows what this is about, in my humble opinion, and even when afterwards I read them I started to wonder why people believe that Austin wants to 'disagree' with Ayer. I don't think so, but just to improve his theories and arguments. Don't you think?

Interesting, because on page 61 Austin states that there is a sense of 'melancholia' related to Locke and Berkeley, and others who worked with empiricism. Nevertheless, Austin himself states:

'Kant and Ayer all further agree that we can speak as if there were bodies, objects, material things. Certainly, Berkeley and Kant are not so liberal as Ayer-they don't suggest that, so long as we keep in step with the sensible manifold, we can talk exactly as we please; but on this issue, if I had to take sides, I think I should side with them'.

When he says 'them' it is not clear to me if he refers to all of them altogether or just Kant and Berkeley.

South of the Border, West of the Sun, Haruki Murakami

My least favorite Murakami so far. — praxis

I admit that it is not one of his best works, but I think it is emotional how both friends get along. They don't have brothers, and in that period and the social context of Japan, it was very rare, so they were considered 'freaks'. It is lovely how they become friends listening to Nat King Cole: 'Pretend you are happy when you are not, it is not so hard to do

But, it is sad how some people who are important in your childhood end up disappearing because of random causes. For example, because of changing the school or house. And then, you no longer see them no more. When I was a kid, I experienced a similar situation to this story. I was friends with a girl in my class who didn't have siblings, like me. We became very good friends the first day playing Pokemon. But one day, their parents decided to go to Gran Canaria to start a new business, and I never saw her again in my life. I remember her name: Alejandra. I wonder if she remembers me as well, and I guess this is what Murakami wanted to tell in this novel with its respective characters.

On the other hand, it is important to note that this book is a 'spin-off' from 'the wind-up bird chronicle'. Murakami decided to write it in another novel about those characters when he corrected the draft of 'the wind-up bird chronicle'.

:smile:

I don't really understand either of these models, but it is striking that Austin (so far, at least) doesn't directly consider them. — Ludwig V

I think Austin roughly consider them, at least that is what I interpret on the page 61 when he states:

It is a curious and in some ways rather melancholy fact that the relative positions of Price and Ayer at this point turn out to be exactly the same as the relative positions of Locke and Berkeley, or Hume and Kant. In Locke's view there are 'ideas' and also 'external objects', in Home's 'impressions' and also 'external objects', in Price's view 'sense-data' and also 'physical occupants'; in Berkeley's doctrine there are only ideas, in Kant's only Vorstellungen (things-in-themselves being not strictly relevant here), in Ayer's doctrine there are only sense-data-but Berkeley, Kant, and Ayer all further agree that we can speak as if there were bodies, objects, material things. Certainly, Berkeley and Kant are not so liberal as Ayer-they don't suggest that, so long as we keep in step with the sensible manifold, we can talk exactly as we please; but on this issue, if I had to take sides, I think I should side with them — Austin

We do not have to buy in to the argument that the tree falling in the forest when there is no-one to hear it does not make a sound. It depends what you choose to call a sound. — Ludwig V

Good point. What we have to take as granted is that the sound actually happened, but this one can be seen in two different perspectives, which each do not deny the sound itself.

Internal. Treats the whole of experience and objective reality. Thus, the tree fell and made the sound, doesn't matter whether we hear it or not.
External, the sound existed, but we verified its existence because we heard it eventually.
Here we must consider first that is not so much neither internal nor external but both that we are stuck with. This is why I attempted to understand Austin using these two perspectives, or at least looking for alternatives rather than denying them altogether, which is what Positivism does.

Aye! That's really gorgeous, praxis. Good job. I like the colours of the sky, and I wonder if it is a morning or a sunset.

Amrita, Banana Yoshimoto

"the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. p 43 (emphasis added). How can it be only your perception when what you see incorrectly can be pointed out by me? — Antony Nickles

Yes, this one was interesting and you raised a good question.

I will try to develop an answer and make an attempt to interpret what Austin wants to mean roughly.

I think perspective - subject and object - is based on two main categories: the external, which essentially treats all things as objects and ignores the subject (that's why inP. 61 he somehow agrees with other philosophers or thinkers such as Locke, Hume, Kant, etc. in the fact that there are 'physical occupants', thus the 'bodies'), and then internal, which treats the whole of experience and objective reality as a content, as representation, of the subject. This is why in P. 85 he states: [...] or if, being subject to an illusion of double vision, I say that I am perceiving two pieces of paper, I need not be implying that there really are two pieces of paper there)

Similarly, the content of the relation of perception between subject and object can be assigned by reflection indifferently to either object or subject. This is why what I see incorrectly, can be seen by you as well. The answer might not be who is right or wrong nor why we see it wrong, but both.

Agree?

Thanks for your substantive and instructional response. I was lost, but now I think I am getting closer to the basic concepts which are the object of this thread. My philosophical background is very basic, so I appreciate the effort of users like you who explain philosophy to me.

Cheers. :up:

Such as something wrong with our ability to perceive anything at all (which we should also keep in mind is only one example of philosophies desire to create a problem as one kind of thing, as with: appearances, beliefs, subjective, morality, etc.) — Antony Nickles

rather than what Austin is doing here which is to examine how our failings are varied and thus have various ordinary ways in which we account for them. — Antony Nickles

Yes. :up:

The invalidity of this is apparently not obvious to many. Stove's gem, the worst argument in the world, and so on. — Banno

I personally think that it is invalid because it is simplistic, and it doesn't prove too much. But I don't want to get deeper in this specific premise because I agree with you.

And when you see yourself in a mirror, there is no need to invent a simulacrum to stand in for you. There is no illusion, no hallucination and no error. What you see is yourself, reflected in the mirror. Again, this is what mirrors do, and no further explanation is needed that replaces your reflection with anything immaterial. — Banno

Interesting. But do we see ourselves in the mirrors because this is what they do - reflecting - or because do we actually exist? OK, we can conclude that 'real' objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things - or ourselves - that appear are, most of the time, real. That is just the point. And, this point comes from a 'general coherence' of our experience. What the argument from the possibility of hallucinations gets us is a brief possibility to doubt on this coherence. Note please, that my aim is not to doubt everything and always, as I said previously, things must exist objectively, but they are 'interfered' by our senses. I understand that taken delusion with sufficient seriousness, it is an argument against the possibility of knowledge in general.

So, if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to the mirror itself and not me.

Agree? Or am I lost?

I don’t know what you are quoting; I was referring to Austin’s lecture, which is what we are reading — Antony Nickles

I know this thread is about Austin, but when you mentioned me saying: There is a part in this (very small) lecture where he addresses 'real' and 'reality', (here) I thought you had a look at what I shared about Fumerton because that is what I debated with Frank mainly. He and I had a brief exchange on hallucination and how it could be related to Austin. I beg your pardon if I confused you for taking into considerations other readings.

It is a very small lecture, indeed. I think the best I can do is to share the quote entirely. Yet, I read his points because he was quoted in another paper I read about 'Ontological Undecidability'. Here: https://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm#sect-9

It was noted above that the existence of hallucinations is an important datum for the manner in which we conceive of the relation between real and phenomenal. But we are still left without clear criteria to distinguish between veridical perception and hallucinatory perception. How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object? This weakness on the objective side of perception indicates that the relation between subject and object is not one that, even with undecidability, is ontologically symmetrical. The difficulties that have always resulted from this asymmetry merit our most serious consideration. For instance, Richard Fumerton believes that "an argument from the possibility of hallucination" proves that naive realism is wrong, meaning that, "we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists..." Otherwise, Fumerton's argument turns on the same point as the argument given above, that a cause is only sufficient to its effect, that we conceive of perceptions as caused, and so that an evidently veridical perception can conceivably be caused by something other than the objects it seems to represent. In our experience we are, perhaps, directly acquainted with the facts concerning our mental states, but the possibility that experiences are hallucinations proves that we cannot be directly acquainted with the facts concerning physical objects that, beyond our reckoning, may or may not be causes of our experiences.

I am a bit lost in discerning between 'real' and 'reality', but if I am not wrong, the core of the two concepts depends on truth. Objects are the subject of our knowledge, and their reality depends on our perspective of the world, although they are plainly 'real'. So, while reality is a concept of ours, real is ontological. Agree?

I agree.

Basically, I think that reality does exist objectively. At least, there has to be something which exists at all. Because if we conclude that something doesn't exist, then it existed before, necessarily, because the latter precedes the second.

The debate goes on when Fumerton himself keeps denying realism because, according to him, it is difficult to reckon a physical object due to how the world is dependent upon our mental states.

In our experience we are, perhaps, directly acquainted with the facts concerning our mental states, but the possibility that experiences are hallucinations proves that we cannot be directly acquainted with the facts concerning physical objects that, beyond our reckoning, may or may not be causes of our experiences.

What makes me wonder if it is possible to experience reality from an objective perspective.

But if no one is telling you that you're drugged and hallucinating, you probably would just take the whatever as real. — frank

Good point, I tried to share the same thought as you did previously when I attached a brief PDF of Richard A. Fumerton.
I think this author points out interesting views such as:

How do we know when there is and when there is not a real object?: An argument from the possibility of hallucination" proves that naive realism is wrong, meaning that, "we are never directly acquainted with the fact that a physical object exists..." — Fumerton

We sometimes see things incorrectly; therefore, we never see them correctly.

But it is obvious that some see this point as invalid...

Yet, again, it seems that you and me, are the ones who are interested in 'hallucination' regarding this topic, Frank.

Hey, thank you so much for your kindness for sharing the paper with us. This thread is very interesting, and I am grateful to the users who share comments and attachments to understand it better. :up: