Thanks in advance for your financial support :up:

Probably in the way you’d protect any online account: use a strong password and enable two-factor authentication.

Any alternative to subscribe without going through PayPal? — jgill

PayPal is as safe and secure as any good online payment system and I don’t have plans to gather money in some other way.

:up:

I really don't know who is who — Mark Nyquist

https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/members/staff

You can easily upload your images to the internet somewhere and then link to them in your posts. If you want to upload them directly to TPF, subscribe to TPF here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/367/subscribe-to-tpf/p1

I don’t know why you think you should have an automatic right to use TPF to both store and display your images.

It's something that is relevant to memory, time perception, consciousness and re-creation of past events that are imperatives of the fundamentals of philosophy. — Mark Nyquist

I have no idea what this means.

Also, why did you entitle this discussion “i” and why did you post it in “Philosophy of Mind”?

Please start another thread if you want to have a discussion. This thread is solely to collect questions.

Yeah. I still haven’t seen it.

Preferred the parrot.

But Wittgenstein, and also Ryle, Strawson and Austin, were insistent that, when intelligence and mindedness are at issue, what leads us to be puzzled by the phenomena is our tendency to subsume them under theoretical categories that just aren't apt at making sense of them. They weren't targeting science but rather scientism. — Pierre-Normand

But, except for the bit about scientism, couldn’t this describe any philosopher who wants to overturn the thought of their predecessors? They reject those inapt theoretical categories in favour of their own, apt ones.

But I take Wittgenstein to be saying something more like: theoretical categories as such are inapt in some cases. (Incidentally, this is somewhat in line with Hegel and Adorno, who try to strike a balance between theory and the overcoming of theory).

Now I do not think that you do hold to such a view; and so I am at a loss as to what it is you are supposing we are doing in philosophy. — Banno

A charitable interpretation of @T Clark’s position is that he is not saying, for example, that in a discussion entitled “What is truth?” we have to agree on what truth is at the start to make any progress—that obviously couldn’t work—but that in a discussion about something else, some other concept, one that depends on the concept of truth, a way of directing the debate is to decide on the definitions of those dependencies, otherwise the wrangling over definitions never ends.

I happen not to agree with this either, because we can usually set aside or ignore any concerns about the definition of these dependencies, relying on shared meaning.

I think of it as loose constraints and tendencies, some of which are pretty heavily embedded. — Moliere

Yeah, I guess that's how I think about it too.

Is communism realistic/feasible? — jorndoe

I voted yes, but I have no idea how it could be achieved. To the extent that I'm optimistic and believe that freedom is possible, I believe that communism is possible, because freedom is possible only in a society of abundance in which individuals are not under pressure of poverty, are not exploited or dominated, are not merely used as means to the ends of others, and are not treated merely as representatives of a class, race, or other kind of group.

Notice that according to this description of communism, it is not anti-individual. The needs of society and the needs of the individual are reciprocally linked, at least in my conception and the conception of Marx.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. — The Communist Manifesto

As I say ("I have no idea how it could be achieved"), this is Utopian. However, if we look at the variety of the forms of society in which people have lived, I do not see any great impediment to communism in principle, i.e., according to human nature. I could be wrong about that. If I am, human emancipation is impossible.

I voted yes. I don't believe human nature is fixed, and I don't believe human beings are bound by necessity such that a "system" is in place to make them behave this or that way.

The future is open. And we can demand the impossible. — Moliere

:up:

On the other hand, I am still unsure about how to approach the concept of human nature. Is the claim that human nature is not fixed the same as the claim that there is no human nature at all? Is it enough to say tempting things such as, "if there is a human nature, it is in its endless flexibility," and so on?

But I actually do think it's crucial: what distinguishes us from (other) animals is history, the fact that the future is open. So we could say that the openness of the human future is human nature.

On the other hand (how many is that now?) that is rather vague. Maybe that's as it should be?

:up:

Yes, communism is merely the best taxless society among alternatives.

Why is taxation the hot topic here? In a communist society there would be no state, no money, no social classes--and no taxation.

Describe a society without taxes — Christoffer

So one answer is: communism.

I fall back on my experience here on the forum as the basis for my response - many discussions quickly descend into confusion and lack of direction caused by lack of agreement on what words mean. Prime examples are "consciousness," "metaphysics," "truth," and "reality," but there are plenty more. — T Clark

Working out what these things mean is the stuff of philosophy. To restrict the use of a term at the beginning is to shut down the philosophy. I understand your position. My last post was a response to the post of yours in which you appeared to conflate definitions at the beginning of a discussion with definitions as an aim. This is the crucial point.

This isn't the place to take up the subject, but I don't understand your objection to "personalizing" philosophical issues. As I've noted before, one of the goals of philosophy is self-awareness. For me it is the primary goal. This is certainly true of eastern philosophies, but also western ones. After all, some guy supposedly said "The unexamined life is not worth living." The point, at least the only point, isn't to discuss ideas and reason, we're also here to examine our lives. — T Clark

I have explained as clearly as I can what I think is wrong with personalizing everything, so I don’t think I’ll say any more on it. Feel free to continue.

Please believe that not all new users are here to spam your forum. I'm a long time reader and enjoy reading the posts here. I finally had something interesting to share because it reminded me of something that I had a personal connection with. — VanessaD

:up:

Exactly. That would have been impossible had I asked everyone to adhere strictly to a definition given at the beginning. The process of conceptual exploration and clarification is part of what philosophy is, rather than a necessary unquestionable first step.

The OP title is an exaggerated provocation, and the less radical thesis is…

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal.

I’m not committed to this, because I don’t trust my own taxonomy of definitions, but I hope there’s a good kernel of truth in it.



Good stuff. I’m currently unsure how best to judge the relevance of each of those approaches or where to go with them, or where to go with this discussion.

It’s possible that @T Clark’s approach is more relevant than I thought, although it’s an approach to analyzing TPF discussions in terms of psychology rather than analyzing definition itself. What I mean is, I’ve noticed that people are disagreeing in what seems a temperamental or polarized way rather than substantively. It’s not clear that, for example, @Janus and @Isaac, or @T Clark and I, would really differ much given an actual discussion to look at, and what differences there would be might be to do with temperamental levels of tolerance for troublemaking.

Whether that is interesting or philosophical, I don’t know.

Rather than just posting a link, maybe you could present his arguments or ideas if you think they’re interesting. Note that the guidelines say, under the heading “Types of posters who are not welcome here”: “Advertisers, spammers, self-promoters: No links to personal websites.”

But welcome to the forum.

With you so far. What’s next?

Looks interesting :up:

Why bother with Kant. It's confused waffle. Quine and Kripke provide firmer and more fertile ground. — Banno

I’m far more interested in Kant (it's not waffle and to the extent that it's confused it’s in the most interesting ways), but I see what you mean: just on definitions they’re more useful. I like Naming and Necessity; haven’t read Quine.

But to go there, we need to differentiate various sorts of definition, and differing ways to refer. That'd get you past page eight. — Banno

I guess that’s what I was asking for before, since I recognized that my own taxonomy of definitions was creaking under pressure.

Thank you for your efforts in getting us to page eight. :grin:

I meant read the exchange again. We weren’t talking past each other.

Read again. Think again.

No.

Maybe it does not matter, but we may disagree because I would say that we can define our concepts, after investigation, and it’s just that Kant’s understanding of, and requirement for, a “definition” is wrong. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I understand. But since Kant does say that in philosophy we can arrive at a good definition, even though we shouldn’t begin with one, he would appear to be not far from you on this.

Ok cool. I still disagree with your angle on Kant but otherwise (I’ve read your first post in this thread) I think we’re in agreement.

For some reason, it seems that some (Western) communists and socialists have become apologists for Russia.
Doesn't make sense. — jorndoe

In the left-wing community these people are referred to as “tankies”. It is indeed quite perverse. There are a few things that feed into it. The main, obvious thing is that Western leftists may tend to be sympathetic to whoever is opposed to their own governments and opposed to Western foreign policy. This means that Russian anti-western talking points coincide with their own.

Another factor is the flipside of the popular Western misconception that Russia is still in some sense socialist or represents a continuation of the Soviet Union. There is a small kernel of truth here, in that Putin’s priority is always the strength of the centralized state and the extension of its power, and if he ever expresses admiration or approval for the Soviet Union it is just for the strength of its government and its success in securing its borders. There are probably other aspects to it as well, like the Stalinist-lite cult of Putin’s personality.

Again, digressing, but Kant takes this as a failure and a tragedy for philosophy, rather than a fact that nevertheless doesn’t make philosophy less rigorous than science, less methodical, practical, relevant. — Antony Nickles

He regards speculative metaphysics as a failure, of course, as I suppose Wittgenstein and Austin do too, but the fact that what works for mathematics doesn’t work for philosophy is part of what he sets out as the bounds of good philosophy. It is part of his assessment of the failure of philosophy hitherto, a fact to be observed rather than a “failure and a tragedy” itself. The section is in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, the purpose of which is precisely to set out the limits of the rigorous and methodical use of reason, limits that enable this methodical use.

In other words, that we cannot reason mathematically in philosophy is not a “failure and a tragedy”; it is what must be payed attention to if we want to philosophize.

Well, this is the realm of science, not philosophy — Antony Nickles

I was responding to your claim that his notion of the unknowable thing-in-itself implied a “lack of faith in our ordinary understandings.” I was trying to point out that this is not at all the thrust of the idea. Rather, it is part of a critique of metaphysics, which attempts to know things beyond the conditions under which we can know things.

And you’ll notice that Kant did not stop philosophizing when he realized that speculative metaphysics was barking up the wrong tree. This is because philosophy still has a place, in examining our concepts, concepts that apply meaningfully to experience. That’s what transcendental philosophy is. The upshot is, it’s not just science.

we also fail to define the empirical, to Kant’s satisfaction — Antony Nickles

I’m really not sure where you’re getting this “to Kant’s satisfaction”, as if he has a demand and expectation that we should be able do this. The point is that we should not even try, because we can philosophize without definition, and indeed must. The point is critical—of those who carry on defining regardless.

In creating “objectivity”, Kant cordoned us off from the world “directly”, unfiltered by us, though that was his ideal. — Antony Nickles

This is a respectable interpretation of Kant, though I don’t share it. At the very least, it is not what he was trying to do. Reality for Kant is the world of experience, and we are not cordoned off from it.

I don’t really want to do more of this exegesis, but I suppose it’s fair if what you’re saying is that I was mistaken in using Kant to back up my point.

Thank you for your interesting posts Antony.

But in this latest one you've managed the remarkable feat of agreeing with Kant in substance while appearing to believe you disagree with him. So I think you're reading him wrong. You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty". Indeed the whole point of that section of the CPR is to say that what works for mathematics is not appropriate for philosophy.

Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings — Antony Nickles

In fact, in the realm of empirical reality—that which we can know—Kant is very much on the side of our ability to know, to directly perceive and to judge objectively.

I'm on my phone so I don't know if I want to get into CPR exegesis right now, but I thought I'd give you an initial response. Let me know if I've misunderstood you.

I’d heard this song a few times over the decades but never took any notice. Then on Sunday night I was walking down the street and there was a guy singing it accompanied by electric guitar and a backing track. It was weirdly, deeply affecting, not because it was an overly-emoting slow version—it wasn’t—but maybe because the strength of the song came out better when sung in a lower register.

The trouble is, neither the original nor any covers I’ve found online come close. Still, it’s a very good song in itself, despite its cheesy eightiesness.

@javi2541997 There’s a Japanese novella called 道化の華, translated as The Flowers of Buffoonery. The key word here seems to have the alternative translation of clown, so it looks like it has a very similar meaning.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Flowers_of_Buffoonery

I'm done here!

I feel there's something important to say about it though I don't know what it is yet. — Baden

I thought I'd done that already :cry:

Nice link to: — Baden

Yes, that was totally intentional. :smirk:

Interestingly, being a buffoon is acting the buffoon. Being a fool is, sometimes, acting the fool. Jesters were not always or often mere idiots, but had an act.

So these words are quite complex. They mean either the real person or their act, or both. Being and acting.

:lol:

But seriously that is how I sometimes behave, heroically bringing light where there is darkness.

"Buffoon" is in fact used in the sense of "clown", referring to someone who is "being silly" or "acting the fool". In those cases it makes sense to pull my trick. Not so much when my wife calls me a buffoon for making a mistake, causing an accident, etc.

And the key thing here is that this cannot be done if the words simply switched to positives like “nerd” or whatever.

EDIT: sorry about the multiple posts folks, I’m thinking on the fly again and I’m on a phone.

And if I manage to pull the same thing off with buffoon—I’m working on it—then I can say, you’re right, I am a buffoon, because I don’t accept this society’s attitude to frivolity, joy, silliness, and in refusing to accept it I am being a rebel and speaking truth to power, as the original buffoons did.

All good stuff, but. I meant something a bit different. Maybe amateur, which I was talking about in my last post, is a better example. To use it to mean someone who does it for the love, not the money, is not only to bring the etymology to the fore and thereby introduce a more subtle distinction; it’s also to embrace the negative connotations to some degree: you’re right, I don’t make a living from it, and I’m fine with that.