Hello Alkis Piskas,

I appreciate your response!

Glad to hear names like Kastrup coming up in this medium!
It's the first time since about two years ago when I joined TPF ...

I suspect most people on this forum are physicalists or at least not idealists (;

So I would llike to know where does "What are your thoughts" refer to.

Any thoughts you may have pertaining to this subject. Please feel free to share them! I enjoy hearing everyone’s perspectives.

From a few replies I read from other people, they don't seem to have such a "problem". But I have!

Are you referring to the hard problem of consciousness? If so (or honestly even if not), I would love to hear your thoughts!

Bob

Hello Fooloso4,

It is merely a claim. It is not a theoretical or metaphysical issue, but an actual practical one

I am unsure as to what you mean here: could you please elaborate? The hard problem of consciousness is absolutely a metaphysical problem, as it pertains solely to metaphysics and has nothing to do with science.

Your metaphysical assumptions are an impediment.

What assumptions?

This is nonsense. First, Aristotle's physics rests on its own metaphysical assumptions. Second, if you want to hamstring science by requiring it to adhere to the authority of Aristotle, you are too late. If Aristotle were alive today his physics would look quite different.

Science proper tells us how things relate (i.e., it gives a map), it does not do ontology (i.e., tells the territory). I only brought up Aristotle not to import his entire philosophy but rather to give reference to the old, traditional sense of what ‘physics’ means (which is now called science). I am not importing his philosophy by noting that.

So, first you fault science for smuggling in metaphysics and then appeal to metaphysical theories.

Philosophy of mind is metaphysics, which is what we are discussing right now. We are not discussing science (although it can come up as a supplement). Metaphysics is not physics. Yes, science should not be in the business of ontology: so I do think it is a fault if a scientist tries to smuggle in metaphysics into their job.

The fact of the matter is that advances being made in neuroscience do not get tangled up in metaphysical questions of substance monism, dualism, pluralism.

Correct, because science isn’t metaphysics. The hard problem is consciousness is a metaphysical issue for a metaphysical theory called physicalism. Neuroscience (and science in general) is not synonymous with ‘physicalism’: the latter is a metaphysical theory, the former is physics (in the traditional sense of the term: science).

Speculative ontology is not something I take seriously beyond its limited entertainment value.

What counts as “speculative ontology”? To you, is that all of ontology? Are there any aspects that you would consider valid?

Do you consider metaphysics valid at all?

I am arguing that the claim that the universe is experiential in essence is, as I said, not something we experience or know.

Firstly, again, we don’t experience that the world is physical either: we infer it from the data as allegedly the best general account of the territory. So there’s nothing wrong (I would say) with inferring things based off of experience. Also, this is what is done in many areas of science and every day life (e.g., I haven’t seen bacteria, but I infer from my experience that there are germs).

Secondly, I am claiming we can know that the best general account the territory is idealism: it sounds like you don’t think that claim is substantiated. I can go into further detail about it if you would like, but essentially it is a collective argument that idealism explains the data most parsimoniously without losing explanatory power (that is generally offered to physicalism).

Bob

Hello Mww,

So….anything I said find a place in your analytic idealism?

To be honest, I still can’t say confidently that I see how those are the categories of ones mind (in the sense that it produces phenomenal experience). I can get on board with the idea that our minds produce the representations according to space and time (as the pure forms of experience)(but not as completely a priori certain how they are going to behave), but I am not entirely convinced of how exactly minds produce phenomena. So I am not against it, but I would need more information on the proofs for how it works. I read Kant and I didn’t think he really did a good job of arguing for the categories.

Bob

Hello Christoffer,

Firstly, I wanted to thank you for the wonderful post! I can tell you put a lot of thought and effort into it: I respect that and am grateful! With that being said, let me try to respond as adequately as I can.

What they fundamentally are is just a separation of molecular structures.

I agreed with you until this point. This is where metaphysics (I would argue comes in), because you are not merely claiming that science demonstrates that such behave as though there is a separation of molecular structures but that, in fact, they are such (which would entail that they are mind-independent). Idealism partially entails (I would say) scientific anti-realism (or at least quasi-anti-realism): there may really be the molecular structures phenomenally (viz., that we would expect to experience them if we could use a powerful enough measuring tool, which is still consciousness-dependent) but they do not exist noumenally (viz., there isn’t those molecular structures in the thing-in-itself): they are extrinsic representations of mentality.

This is why sometimes you will here Kastrup’s analytic idealism called a form of non-dualism, because he holds that matter still exists, but it is the representation of mentality (and so the latter is actually fundamental). We still expect to see an atom if we could zoom in that far, but it is just another extrinsic representation on our dashboard of experience like the tree outside. So, I think an idealist is committed to at least a weaker interpretation of science, whereas physicalism typically has a stronger realist position that the atom we infer exists mind-independently.

What fundamental thing or substance is it that you mean isn't defined?

My point was that science is not in the business of ontology: it only tells us how things relate better. In other words, it gives a great map, but speaks nothing of the territory. Now, metaphysics is concerned with what exists ontologically (e.g., is everything a part of a physical substance? Mental substance? Both? Neither? Etc.). Physicalists, for example, are typically going to disagree with my “science gives a map not the territory” claim because they metaphysically claim a very strong scientific realism (but this takes nothing away that there claim is metaphysical and not scientific, this is why neuroscientists can do their job without thinking twice about the hard problem of consciousness: it has nothing to do with their job intrinsically).

Every prediction Einstein made has been verified in a number of different ways, so what does that tell about a mind-independent world?

Einstein’s field equations, which pertain to the map of reality, have been empirically verified. On top of that, einstein posited a scientific theory that the best explanation is that there really is a space-time fabric. This is now a claim about the territory, and is going to utterly depend on one’s metaphysical commitments whether they agree with Einstein on that point or not. The fact that the field equations give us more precise, quantified predictions of the behavior of objects phenomenally does not tell us that he is right about his metaphysics (although one can certainly make that metaphysical stand with Einstein if they want).

What is it that you are trying to convey?

Hopefully, the above provides some clarification. The idea of whether there actually is a space-time fabric (which would be mind-independent) is a totally different claim than the field equations (which are laws, not a theory) that have been verified. Yes, one may metaphysically believe that the best explanation is that there is really is a space-time fabric: but that is metaphysics not the physics involved (where the latter is supplementing the former).

We are a limited species in our perception, in order to let us function better for the existence we have.

I completely agree, and I agree with the paragraph before that one (I just wanted to save some space).

Our mind does not represent anything accurately.

I wouldn’t say it is completely inaccurate, I would just say that it isn’t 100% accurate. Under analytic idealism, the information is fairly accurate, but the representations obviously aren’t the real things (as they are ideas).

In reality, however, these objects are not anything in themselves, outside of our interpretation of reality these objects blend together and are just formations of accumulations of matter through entropic processes

Although I think you are coming at it from the angle of physicalism (which is fine), I still agree with you that objects are only nominally distinct (however, I would not include our bodies in that, which I would imagine you might).

I think that arguments that try to distinguish reality from our perception in a "do a tree fall in the woods if no one is observing it" way, is rather an error from how our minds functions

Maybe I am misunderstanding you, but wouldn’t you say that the tree does still fall however the tree and its falling does not exist in the manner that we perceive it? To me it is incorrect to think that the information pertaining to the tree falling is perception-dependent: there is something that is objectively being represented by the tree falling even if it is just swarms of particles or what not: would you agree?

I am failing to see the conceptual loop you refer to: could you elaborate?

It is simply that emergent consequences form when a complex system reaches hyper-complexity

To me, I don’t think you actually explained. Don’t get me wrong, I think you did a fantastic job of elaborating on your view: but I don’t think it solved the problem.

I think you still have the problem of explaining qualitative experience, and so far (although correct me if I am wrong) you seem to have just obscurely noted that it essentially occurs the same as all of evolution (or organic processes): simplicity turns into hyper-complexity over billions if not trillions of years. This doesn’t explain how a brain produces consciousness, and I would add reducing it to physical phenomenon always has an explanatory gap between mechanical awarenss and qualitative experience.

The key here is that instead of looking inwards to try to understand these emergent properties, we need to observe other places where complexity exists and see such behaviors over time.

My problem is that we can know that we can’t reduce mental states to brain states, so this kind of traditional naturalistic reductionism doesn’t work.

If we agree that there aren't any religious and supernatural aspects of reality, then we are part of nature/reality and we function the same as all other organic matter around us.

I agree in the sense that we are a part of one natural world, but not that we are ontologically comprised of matter: matter is the extrinsic representation, on our dashboard, of mentality (under idealism).

In relation to what I wrote above, our consciousness is a hyper-complex ecosystem that is self-aware of being such and this self-awareness is part of the emerging abilities out of this system.

To me, this is just an obscure explanation to try to account for the irreconcilable problem of consciousness for physicalism. Could you elaborate perhaps in more detail about how that process would work?

Bob

Hello Janus,

If it is true that physicalism...can't explain consciousness then it is not a hard problem but an impossible problem. It then follows that it is not a problem at all.

A ‘hard problem’ in philosophy of mind is an irreconcilable problem for the metaphysical theory in question, whereas a ‘soft problem’ is a reconcilable (but not yet solved) problem. A hard problem is still a problem (even though it can’t be solved): it just means that is a much more damaging problem to the metaphysical theory (when compared to soft problems). It means more epistemic cost for holding it.

Or the question then becomes 'is there any alternative to a physical explanation'? and of course the answer would be 'no' sinve the so-called hard problem specifically calls for a causal, IE physical, explanation.

Yes there is an alternative explanation (in fact, there are many): idealist will argue that the brain states are extrinsic representations of the mental states. Substance dualism argues they are two independent things. Physicalists argue that the mental state is an intrinsic (or extrinsic depending on how one wants to view there qualia) representation of brain states. The hard problem is only a hard problem for physicalists, and different views (like idealism and substance dualism) attempt to provide a metaphysical theory that be rid us of the problem.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Absolutely no worries my friend! I can relate to the conceptual bubbles between physicalist and idealist metaphysics (regardless of which is right), as I it made no sense to me initially either (since I was thinking of it in light of physicalist metaphysics, and that doesn’t transfer nicely for considering idealism). If you ever think of anything would like to say, then please always feel free to message me! I always enjoy our conversations.

One statement that I think we both agree on in layman's terms is that the perception of a 'thing' is real in itself, and that the perception cannot exist without the perceiver.

Agreed.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

I appreciate your elaboration: let me try to understand it better and respond hopefully adequately.

If one only "knows" ideas because there are only ideas

Although I may be misunderstanding you, one, under analytic idealism, does not only know ideas: it is that ontologically reality is fundamentally ideas. Our entire phenomenal experience is not directly ideas but, rather, the representation of them (e.g., I can know of a tree which is a representation of ideas, however the representation is different phenomenally from the ideas which are represented). There is a dashboard and that which the dashboard represents, so to speak. Perhaps you quoted “knows” to denote something in particular?

and if each mind is an idea

Our minds (as alters) are not ideas under analytic idealism: non-minds are. Thusly, there is only a nominal distinction between non-mind objects in phenomenal experience, but there is a concrete distinction between minds.

According to analytic idealism (or at least Kastrup’s version) is that the we are disassociated alters of a universal mind. We are concretely distinct as there is a disassociated barrier “between” (obviously not in a strict spatial sense) us: we are fundamentally made up of the universal mind and are a part of it (as alters).

then all minds are properties of each mind

Are you saying that, under the conditions you set, each mind in relation to the other is really just a property of the other (and thusly really just illusory or what not)?

Although, in light of what I stated previously about those conditions you set, I don’t think I would accept (assuming I am even remotely representing your argument correctly) the consequent simply because I don’t accept the antecedent (as minds are not ideas, etc.); however, I grant that is seems as though the inference (if one accepts the antecedent) holds.

I would like to just clarify that solipsism is not just the view that there is one mind but rather that it is one’s mind. It is not the idea that we are separate, distinct minds (as alters) which are comprised fundamentally of one mind. If that were the case, then solipsism loses literally every argument and conclusion that’s ever been leveraged in its name.

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

I see. You're advocating immaterialism (which entails solipsism), not (just) panpsychism.

As I already elaborated, it isn’t a form of pansychism (unless you want to clarify that you mean a vague, superficial etymological definition that goes against the literature).

No it does not entail solipsism.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I understand this point, but how is this semantically different from just saying that reality is independent of observers? A tree is going to be what it is no matter if we observe it or not

You would have to define what you mean by “observer”: I don’t use that terminology. I would say that the tree exists as a part of ideas in the universal mind and is thusly perception-independent, where “perception” is an ability that only animals (including humans) have: the ability to take in sensations and represent that to itself (as a perception).

Why introduce mind and mentality?

Although I know you disagree, if the hard problem of conscious exists, then it is more parsimonious to posit that the strong correlation between mental states and brain states is that the latter (not the former) is an extrinsic representation of (is produced by) the former. In that case, we still have to account for why there is a objective reality which goes beyond my particular mind and thusly there must be a universal mind (as if it isn’t mind, then we have the hard problem all over again).

Mind and mentality imply an observer, which always leads to the question of, "Then what is the observer?" You have an outside entity which needs explaining. Is it also just a mentality? If a mentality can have a mentality, what does the word even mean at that point?

I didn’t follow this chain of reasoning: perhaps if you explain what you mean by “observer” then it will become clear to me.

If being is reality, then all of reality is being.

I agree, this is just a tautology.

I think I just need a better definition of "mentality" and "mental".

“Mentality” is the sum total of qualitative experience—of activity in the mind (e.g., ideas, thoughts, emotions, feeling, sight, colors, etc.). Although I know you are a physicalist, forget that for a second. Just from introspection, birth the idea of raising your right arm and watch it rise. The idea to raise the right arm was prima facea mental, not physical (although you may ultimately argue it is reducible to something physical). Look at a green pen, that pen is prima facea within your qualitative, conscious experience: it is a greeness (and a pen) which you subjectively experience. You are experiencing as a mind (even in physicalist worldview): everything you experience is within mind. Of course, a physicalist will abstract that that mind is reducible to something non-mind (i.e., a brain).

I agree, but this isn't any different from a physical reality based model. Reality exists independently of what is observed
…
I suppose this really asks us to break down what "physical" means, as its only been implicit. "Physical" essentially means there is an existence independent from our observation.

No. “Physical” within physicalist metaphysics refers to something mind-independent: something quantitative. Again, maybe by “observer” you are meaning “mind”, but then you will have to explicate what you exactly for me to determine if I agree or not. Further, the idea that there is an “existence independent of our observation” is just the definition of an objective world: not physicalism. Analytic idealism makes the exact same claim. I think that the tree exists independent of our perception as well (as I would imagine you would agree with that too). This isn’t unique to physicalism.

As noted, this eliminates infinite meta self-observation

The universal mind does not have meta-consciousness: it doesn’t have self-knowledge.

You exist as a physical being. Despite your lack of observing yourself, you still exist physically in the world.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, now you may be referring to the colloquial usage of the term “physical” (i.e., something with solidity, shape, size...material): this isn’t what it means in physicalism metaphysics—it is mind-independent. In the colloquial usage of the term (explicated above), I would agree that my experience is of a physical world; however, I am not a physical body but rather, under analytic idealism, my body is an extrinsic representation of my mind. To better understand this, recall the tree in the game analogy: the tree doesn’t exist fundamentally how it gets perceived and so, under analytic idealism, the tree in our perception is just a representation of the tree (which is fundamentally information: ideas in a mind). Likewise, this includes our bodies no differently than the tree: my body, my organs, my brain, etc. is my mind representing itself to itself and it doesn’t, just like the tree, exist fundamentally how it is perceived.

our mind does not float, it is located within your body

This doesn’t apply to my view (I don’t think) because I agree that the body and mind are inextricably linked: because they are two sides of the same coin. So, of course, I would not expect my mind to somehow float outside my body in space. My body is just in extrinsic representation of myself (as a mind) within my perception.

What is real is not perception-independent. What is real is what exists, and does not need to be perceived to exist.

I am a bit confused here. If what is real is what exists independently of what we perceive to exist, then isn’t it perception-independent?

Maybe we are saying the same thing two different ways.

I am not sure I agree with this assessment. Science uses falsification to test hypotheses by trying to break them. When they cannot be broken, what is left is considered scientific fact. This does in fact describe what certain things fundamentally are.

Not quite. Scientific facts are “observations of reality”: there are also laws and theories. Laws and facts are science proper (as far as I am concerned) as it is the attempt to understand how things relate and not in the business of metaphysics (e.g., ontology). Scientific theories can be either (1) metaphysical claims, (2) an explanation in terms of another relation, or (3) both.

The problem with your idea of falsification for the claim that mental states are brain states is that metaphysics can’t work with the same criteria that science uses—and I can demonstrate this with your example:

How could this be falsified? Destroying the brain and still seeing green

This criteria of falsification for mental states being brain states (that you postulated here) applies to a whole range of metaphysical theories: not just physicalism. For example, I can, as analytic idealism, claim that the mental states are producing the brain states and the way by which you can falsify it is to destroy a brain and prove that they are still seeing green (as that would disprove that the link between mental and physical states). Under idealism, just as much as physicalism, it is expected that there is a strong correlation between mental states and brain states. Since we can posit the same falsification criteria that you just posited to try and back physicalism, there must be some other criteria that you are using to determine that physicalism is better than idealism (for they both can be falsified in that exact same manner).

I don’t see how your criteria uniquely applies to the metaphysical theory of physicalism.

It is a common mistake to believe that the hard problem is claiming physicalism cannot link brain states and consciousness together.

I was never disputing that brain states cannot be linked to mental states nor that that is the hard problem of consciousness. Physicalism cannot account for qualitative experience: understanding scientifically how brain states are linked to mental states (and vice-versa) does not entail any metaphysical view whatsoever. Science and physicalism are two entirely different things.

What I am open to is seeing if you can prove that physicalism cannot link the brain and consciousness together.

Again, both idealism and physicalism expect links between the brain the mental events. Proving that there is not such correlation between the two would equally disprove analytic idealism.

The answer a physicalist gives is, "Because our attempts to disprove this claim have all failed". Neuroscience does not assert a theory that we are to buy into. It asserts a theory that we cannot buy out of.

I think you might be conflating metaphysics with physics: neuroscience is science, not physicalism. Metaphysics can only use falsifiability as a negative concept (i.e., that it can disprove some metaphysical theories) and not a positive one (i.e., not being falsified does not prove a metaphysical theory correct).

Bob

Hello creativesoul,

I appreciate your response!

What struck me immediately was that the OP presupposes that the purportedly "'Hard Problem' of Consciousness" refers to an actual problem, particularly for reductive physicalism. I think that that presupposition is based upon an ambiguous inadequate idea... regarding exactly what counts as being a problem. If there is no problem to begin with, then the entire exercise is moot.

I agree that if the hard problem isn’t actually a hard problem then there physicalism would be a much more appealing metaphysical account than I would currently consider it.

Consciousness is emergent. As such, it is - as we know it - the result of millions of years of evolutionary progression

I disagree. I think that physicalism cannot account for consciousness. There is a conceptual gap in reductive physicalism between mechanical awareness and qualitative experience. For example, the physicalist can account for how a brain can acquire knowledge of its environment (e.g., how a brain acquires the knowledge of greeness) but not why one has a subjective experience of it which goes beyond and above the mere brain-knowledge of it (e.g., not how one qualitatively experiences the greeness: there is not reason for that to happen under a physicalist account of the world).

There is no "aha!" point or moment in time that can be pointed at, and then it can be said "here it is!".

The hard problem of consciousness is not where exactly, in evolution, one particular organism (or a group) acquired consciousness but, rather, how one can even account for consciousness (even theoretically) within a physicalist metaphysics.

I would agree with you that if consciousness did arise via evolution, then there wouldn’t be an exact “aha!” moment, just like how there is not exact “aha!” moment of when one species transitions into another.

The reductive physicalist can identify and thoroughly explain how all sorts of 'the parts' commonly associated with conscious subjective experience work physically(See Dennett's Quining Qualia).

I disagree.

It's akin to the physicalist pouring hundreds of thousands of grains of sand onto the floor and pointing at the result, while the opponent says... that's not enough to count as a pile of sand.

That is a mischaracterization of what the hard problem is. It is not what exact species it arose in (or something like that): it is the claim that in principle consciousness is not explanable via the reductive physicalist method.

Bob

Hello Mww,

Thank you for the elaboration!

Bob

Hello schopenhauer1,

So the problem with Kastrup is the problem I have with Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Why is there so much involved in this "illusion" of the representation (physical) from the monistic Mind? I don't know. Why should it be so complex if it is some sort of unity?

I totally understand your concerns here: they perfectly valid. My response would be to note that analytic idealism is meant to explain the empirical data better than other theories, and so it seems empirically that the mind is natural in the sense that it is a lower grade of mind (than our evolved ones) which is following a rigid pattern of excitation. Why is it doing that? I have no clue. Analytic idealism has its fair share of soft problems.

Even if it is unity individuated into an "alter" of disassociated parts, why should these parts be the complexity that it is?

This is because of evolution. Kastrup is a staunch empiricist, and so he explains the develop of alters in terms of standard biological evolution: the lower grades of conscious beings slowly develop more complexity over time in its environment. The only difference (in comparison to physicalism) is that Kastrup views those beings (which are evolving and have evolved biologically) as in essence mind and not matter (i.e., alters and not mind-independent organisms).

Why would it take on this complexity rather than simply being a simple physical aspect?

Although you didn’t explicitly state this, I would like to clarify that the mind-at-large doesn’t choose in the sense of having deliberate, cognitive decisions: it is, according to Kastrup, following a natural process. Kastrup claims that originally the mind-at-large was in harmony until “something” disrupted the process and formulated an alter: the first life (other than that universal mind). How did that happen? I have no clue. Again, analytic idealism has its soft problems for sure.

Let's take the known seriously at least, and take that where it leads us, to perhaps a plurality.

I agree: we should always be open minded to other metaphysical accounts of the world. I just don’t see what need we have to posit substance pluralism. It also comes with hard problems (like interaction) whereas your critique of idealism is a soft problem.

I guess I can try to counter-argue this point and say, time is the main factor of why we think of plurality. If everything started as a unity (singularity), then time makes it seem as if things are not a singularity. So the multiplicity is not a multiplicity in at least one point in time (the singularity). But then why is that point in time the only one we are focusing on? Not sure, maybe someone like @Bob Ross wants to chime in.

Honestly, the principium individuationis aspect of schopenhauerian metaphysics still leaves my mouth sour: I find it utterly obscure how eternity “converts” to temporality. So, unfortunately, I am still thinking through that part and can’t give a good answer yet. However, what I can say is that I think all metaphysical theories run into this problem: fundamentally something has to be eternal (even if it is the infinite regress itself) and thusly there is this problem of explaining how eternity relates to temporality. Perhaps positing time itself as eternal would help resolve the issue: I am not sure yet.

Bob

Hello Fooloso4,

The fact that we cannot now explain consciousness does not mean that there is not a physical explanation.

It is true that an unsolved problem which can be theoretically solved under a metaphysical theory is not to say that it cannot be solved eventually (by that theory); however, those are called soft problems. I am not merely claiming that physicalism hasn’t explained mentality but, rather, that it can’t. That is the hard problem of consciousness.

According to the Standard Model of Particle Physics there are fundamental or elementary particles of matter.

That is a metaphysical claim (specifically a physicalist claim), not science proper (i.e., physics in the tradition, Aristotelian sense). Nowadays, due to the age of enlightenment and modernism, we tend to smuggle metaphysics into ‘science’ without batting an eye.

You are assuming that there is mind, but what do we know of mind that is not based on our mind? You are arguing that our consciousness cannot be explained unless consciousness is fundamental and irreducible

I am arguing qualities, which are expressions of ideas, is reality and not the quantitative maps that we produce to better navigate existence. I am not assuming a mind: if mind cannot be reduced to something mind-independent, then the only other option is that whatever affects (my and our) mind(s) is mind. If mind is irreducible to matter and I were to postulate that reality isn’t fundamentally mind, then I either have to concede substance dualism or the hard problem of consciousness re-emerges full force. In the case of the former, it has the hard problem of interaction which renders it more epistemically costly than simply positing reality as mind.

Based off of our experience you infer that reality is essentially experiential.

Physicalism is us using our experience to infer that reality is nothing like our experience. I am not following what the critique is here. We use experience to try to infer what reality fundamentally is.

Put differently, based off the human mind you infer that there is mind itself.

Again, I am not simply claiming there is a universal mind because we are minds: it is due to a careful consideration of the possible metaphysical theories and finding it the most parismonous. To claim that fundamentally all is mind simply because we are mind is a bad argument for idealism.

The best theories do not misuse Occam's razor. Monism is not better than dualism or pluralism simply because it seems simpler to have one thing rather than many. Unless the theory can explain the whole of reality in terms of this one thing then Occam's razor does not apply.

I apologize: I slightly misspoke. You are right that monism is only more parsimonious if it it accounts for the same data which I failed to mention earlier. However, monism is better because it does account for everything more parsimoniously. For example, substance dualism is indefensible compared to physicalism and idealism. In order to account for the world, it has to overly complicate its explanation (to try and account for the hard problem of interaction). These other theories (which are not monist) are extremely epistemically costly.

is not something we can experience but it is also not something we know. Whether it is something that can be known is questionable.

Are you essentially arguing for ontological agnosticism?

But now it seems that in order for there to be experience there must be us or something like us. If so, then prior in time to such animals the nature of reality could not have been experiential. There was nothing capable of experiencing.

What do you mean by “experience”? If you mean perception, then no: the universal mind does not perceive anything and it has no self-knowledge. The universal mind is not something we can personify.

In order for Kastrup's assertion to qualify for a theory of reality it must explain how animals like us, capable of experiencing, came to be in a universe like ours full of things to be experienced.

Through the natural process of evolution as disassociated alters.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Wonderful analysis as usually! As I think that the root of our dispute is the hard problem of consciousness, I am going to briefly elaborate on the other portions of your reply (for now) so as to focus on the hard problem. If, at any point, you feel as though the conversation pertaining thereto is circling around or hitting a brick wall, then we can absolutely just agree to disagree; however, I think as of now that we have much more in common than we both may think and I do think we are both slightly speaking over one another (although not on purpose of course). There is still much to explicate on the topic.

I've heard something similar to this before. Its sort of a "God observer of reality" idea (does not necessitate a God). I've seen this type of thought as the idea that if we could have an observer that could observe and comprehend reality, that would be the true understanding of reality.

I want to clarify that this view is not a form of Berkleian idealism, where “to be is to perceive or to be perceived”. I do not hold that the universal mind is “observing” the world in the sense that we are. Instead, it is a lower grade of consciousness. Our, as humans, evolved consciousness is capable of things which the universal mind is not (e.g., cognitive deliberation, motive deliberation, meta-consciousness, etc.). In other words, I don’t think that the tree that I am seeing exists in the (or close to the) manner that I am perceiving it nor that it exists in that manner independently of perception due to a God-observer. The tree that I phenomenally see is perception-dependent, but the tree-in-itself still exists independently of perception: it is a part of the ideas within the universal mind. Think of it this way: if no one is looking at the tree, then it does not continue to exist in the manner that we perceive it, but it continues to exist in the sense that it is an idea in the universal mind that if we were to go perceive it we would expect to see the same tree (because our ability to perceive will represent the ideas the same manner it did before).

It is kind of like a video game in the sense that the game world (whatever it may be) is a representation of 0s and 1s. If the character moves to view a tree in that game, then they should expect to see the same representation (i.e., the tree), but that tree doesn’t ontologically exist: it is a representation of 0s and 1s. So, although the game analogy isn’t equivalent to our experience, under analytic idealism, the tree we perceive is just a representation within our perception-dashboard and the true essence of the tree is ideas (information).

Isn't reality itself the substance the God observer observes, while the entire rational interpretation of it all can be known about that substance?

This is a fair critique of berkelian idealism (where God is keeping the tree existing by continually perceiving it). The substance of reality under analytic idealism is mentality and the universal mind is fundamentally the one existing brute fact, and we are derivatives thereof (i.e., priority monism).

If I understand what you're going for here, its the idea that the "sun-in-itself" only has identity because of rational beings. Let us imagine a child who looks at a picture and see a sun in a sky. If the child has never been told that there is a sun and a sky, would the child necessarily see the sun and sky as separate? We identify it as separate, and so it is. But without a rational being doing the identifying, would the concept of the sun and the sky exist? Would there really be a separation, or would it just be a blend of atoms?

You actually went a step deeper than I was intending for the original post. I was just attempting to mention that the tree (or sun) doesn’t exist as what we perceive it (just like how the tree in the video game exists truly as 0s and 1s). But you are nevertheless correct that, under analytic idealism, the distinction between non-conscious entities is nominal. So I agree with you there.

Also, I really like the air example! That is really good for explaining that situation.

If I have this right, this still does not eliminate the sun as an existence if an observer did not exist.

This is correct. The idea is that the sun (just like the sun in a video game) doesn’t exist ‘in-itself’ (even though I only think it nominally is distinguishable from other non-conscious things, I like to use ‘in-itself’ still just to keep it simple) as what is perceived by conscious beings that are capable of perception.

This is the vital distinction between analytical (i.e., objective) idealism and subjective idealism and why I am not the latter.

If "being" is reality, why not just call it "being" instead of reality?

You could. I was using them interchangeably.

In which case, why not simplify it to state that reality is what exists regardless of our observations, or our being, while what we know about reality is a combination of our rational identifications that aren't contradicted by what exists?

Because what we observe is also real (i.e., a part of reality). When I imagine a unicorn, that unicorn exists as an imaginary unicorn. My concept of a car exists in my mind and is thusly a part of reality: humans and other conscious beings are a part of reality.

If one simply calls what is real what is perception-independent (or something similar) than (I would say) it fails under more in depth scrutiny. For example, one cannot evaluate the concept of concepts as true (even in the case that it references what a concept is correctly) because it doesn’t correspond to something outside of perceptive-experience (which is what you would be calling ‘reality’).

Ok, now for the hard problem of consciousness. Firstly, I really appreciate you sharing neuroscience with me, but I don’t think that is what is under dispute here. Let’s see if we can find some common ground.

Science (proper) tells us how things relate and not what they fundamentally are. The latter is actually metaphysics. All neuroscience is engaged in understanding how conscious experience relates to brain states and does not in-itself have anything to do with what conscious experience nor brain states fundamentally are (ontologically). Thusly, there are two claims I think you are accepting: (1) that neuroscience proves that brain states are strongly (maybe even incessantly) correlated with mental states and (2) that that suggests that metaphysically the former is the latter. I accept #1, but not #2: so our dispute is not about the science but rather the metaphysical implications of the science. To me, thusly, I agree with many claims you make because they are geared towards #1: such as the neuroscience you quoted.

However, you haven’t provided an argument for why you think that the fact that conscious states are heavily correlated with brain states (which is a scientific fact) suggests or implies that the latter is reducible to the former. Why do you think that?

Another key distinction I think needs to be made to provide clarity is that there is a difference between explaining mechanical awareness and qualitative experience. The former is how a mechanical (or otherwise consciousness-independent) organism can acquire information about its environment, whereas the latter is the qualitative experience that a subject has. Some of the claims you are making are really not a hard problem for physicalism at all (as you rightly point out) but this is because you are providing explanations of the former and not the latter. The hard problem pertains to how a consciousness-independent organism produces the latter, not how it has the former.

For example, when you say that we see the color green because of the light wavelengths and its interpretation by the brain to be green, that explains how the brain acquired knowledge of the greeness of the object (in the sense that it is reflected those wavelengths) and not why you have a qualitative experience of greeness. According to that account, we have not reason to expect that a qualitative experience of greeness would be produced: that is what you would have to explain to solve the hard problem.

Now, you could argue that we see strong correlations between the brain acquiring the knowledge of the greeness and the subject qualitatively experiencing the greeness to claim an inference that the latter is really reducible to the former, but, right now, I am just trying to explicate that the brain acquiring the knowledge of a color is distinct from a subject qualitatively experiencing that color; and, inherently, the account that you gave (i.e., the wavelengths being interpreted by the brain) only implies that the brain knows it is green, but not why would or how the brain generate an extra qualitative experience of it. This is a subtle but incredibly important distinction to make when discussing the hard problem: otherwise we begin to talk passed each other.

Further, I would anticipate that your response (although correct me if I am wrong) is that the strong correlations (e.g., the fact that every time the brain state has acquired the knowledge of the greeness we also subjectively experience the greeness) suggests that the mental state is truly the brain state (or states): this is where are dispute really lies.

I think that the only way one can account for consciousness in that manner is by obscurely noting it as produced by the brain (in light of strong correlations between the two) but never actually being able to account for its productions (i.e., how it actually happens). The reason I would say this is impossible to account for in physicalism (as opposed to being a soft problem) is because fundamentally the physicalist can only try to explain it by reduction to some brain state (or states) of which they are always only (at best) strong correlations between the two: the brain states themselves can never, due to them being brain states, account for how the qualitative is being produced by the quantitative. For example, if a person claims that this mental state X is strongly correlated to this brain state Y, there is still the valid conceptual question of “how did Y produce X”? The physicalist then has to explain this either (1) by another appeal to the same relationship (i.e., “because Y is correlated with Z”) of which the same conceptual question applies (i.e., “how did Z and Y produce X?”) or (2) by positing that “because strong correlation entails or implies causation” of which it equally applies, and is thusly not unique to physicalism, to an idealistic account of it (i.e., an idealist can accept that claim and hold that the brain states are extrinsic representations—or ‘caused’--by the mental states).

I am going to stop there to allow you to respond.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Mww,

I appreciate your response!

I am familiar with what Kant said were the categories, but I have never understood the proof for it. I don't see how those categories are function that produce objects as opposed to being meaning an aspect of our cognition (in the modern sense of the word). Could you elaborate on why one should believe that these categories are what our minds use as functions to produce phenomenal experience?

Bob

Under analytical idealism, the entirety of reality is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious: not just animals. — Bob Ross

Analytical Idealism is not a form of pansychism. Furthermore, could you please elaborate on why you think such? — Bob Ross

Explain why you have not just contradicted yourself, Bob. Thanks.

Absolutely: let me explain. Pansychism, in the literature, although the word etymologically means "all" + "soul", is reserved prominently for a family of metaphysical views which claim that matter is fundamental but that matter is conscious, whereas analytic idealism is the view that mind (i.e., consciousness) is fundamental: the former is the claim that everything has consciousness and the latter is that everything is in consciousness--which is a vital distinction. That is why I said it is not a form of pansychism.

I don't remember the exact context of the first quote of me from you, but when I said everything "is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious", I was referring to the idea that everything is in a mind-at-large and not that everything has consciousness.

The reason this distinction is vital (i.e., between having vs. being in consciousness) is because pansychism has two issues that analytical idealism does not: the hard problem of consciousness (viz., how did those tiny bits or entities of matter become conscious?) and the compositional problem (viz., how can tiny conscious bits or entities of matter compose a much large and more complex subject like ourselves?). Ultimately I think that these problems render pansychism epistemically costly to hold (and that is why I am not a panpsychist).

If by pansychism, you were just referring to its etymological meaning (i.e., all + soul), then technically this would be a form of pansychism (so I apologize if I misunderstood you)--but I have been and would like to keep to the formal, traditional usages of the terms to reduce confusion.

With that being said, please let me know if you think I am still contradicting myself and I would love to hear that fallacies you think analytic idealism is committing.

Bob

I appreciate your response!

I don't have much substantive to offer here, but I wanted to compliment you on a well written and clear OP. You obviously put a lot of thought and effort into it.

Thank you! I really appreciate that. I am still thinking over my metaphysics and so I am interested to hear everyone's opinions on it.

Bob

Hello Wayfarer,

I appreciate your response!

but I adopt the Kantian principle of there being innate categories and functionalities of the mind which are not simply given but which the mind brings to experience.

Very interesting: what would those categories be exactly?

Bob

Hello 180 Proof,

Yes, it seems to me that 'panpsychist' arguments (e.g. analytical idealism) consist of appeal to ignorance / incredulity, hasty generalization and compositional fallacies.

Analytical Idealism is not a form of pansychism. Furthermore, could you please elaborate on why you think such?

Bob

Hello Fooloso4,

Does science suggest that there was mind experiencing itself experiencing?

No; and neither does analytical idealism. The universal mind is not something we can personify: the cognition, deliberation, and meta-consciousness that we (as humans) have are a product of evolution and are not something the universal mind has.

The universal mind is not experiencing itself directly like we experience the world but, arguably under Kastrup’s view, it is experiencing itself via us (as we are alters of that mind).

Or that there is something experienced that is not experience? That there is a difference between experience and what is experienced?

Science only tells us how things behave, not what they fundamentally are.

There is a logical leap from our being experiential to the universe being experiential. We have no experience of the experience of the universe or of it being experiential. It seems to be a form of anthropomorphism. The ancient assumption of like to like. Microcosm and macrocosm.

This would be true if my argument was that the universe is mind simply because we are mind: it is not. The argument is that we cannot account for consciousness by the reductive physicalist method and we can explain the exact same data with idealism, so that is our best metaphysical theory. I am not simply assuming the world out there is mind because I am mind: that is a bad argument.

This is still within the world of human experience.

What do you mean? My point is that we use reason to infer, based off of experience, things which are not a part of our experience (and this is perfectly valid).

It is the best because the best theory must be reductive?

Analytical idealism is not the best theory simply because it is a reductive methodololgical approach; however, yes, reductionism is the best means of explanation (regardless of whether one is a physicalist or idealist): “explanations” are fundamentally the reduction of a phenomenon (an effect) to other effects (or potential abstractions). If you don’t agree with that methodological approach, then you can’t be a physicalist either.

That there must be a single something that is fundamental?

There is nothing in reality that necessitates substance monism; however, the best theories are the one’s that use occam’s razor: otherwise, theories explode into triviality.

We have no experience of something fundamental.

I am not a full blown empiricist: it sounds like you might be. I think we can know things without directly experiencing them.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

So if I understand this correctly, reality is the total abstraction of an observer

No. The concept of “reality” is the sum total of existence (i.e., of being), just like how “substance” is the concept of a type of being. I am not saying that something is real simply by being abstracted by a human being (or something like that). Abstracts are prominently associated with our ability to reason, which has nothing directly to do with what exists.

Isn't this just solipsism?

Good question: no. Solipsism is the idea that everything is in my mind, whereas analytical idealism is the idea that both our minds are in a universal mind.

Because this seems to run into the problem of multiple beings each having a separate, and often times conflicting representation of reality.

There is no doubt that we have different experiences because we are different minds (i.e., different disassociated alters), but that doesn’t mean we aren’t a part of the same mind-at-large fundamentally.

If the observer is doing the abstracting, what is the observer? Is that also an abstraction of itself? In which case, what is it?

I didn’t quite follow this part: could you elaborate? Reality isn’t an abstraction: our understanding of reality by application of reason (i.e., our concepts of reality) are abstractions.

For example, if I abstract that I can fly, but fall and shatter half of my body, while I am in the hospital I have to find an explanation for why my abstraction failed.

This isn’t unique to a solipsist view (although analytic idealism is not solipsism regardless): our abstractions is our cognizing of what exists and it isn’t necessarily accurate all the time. Truth, I would say, is a relationship between thinking (cognizing) and being (reality) whereof something is true if our concept corresponds to what it is referencing in reality. This can include concepts referencing other concepts as well.

They cannot understand what it is like to experience a green pen from your point of view.
…
This is where we run into the hard problem. How do we objectively handle personal qualitative experience when it is impossible to know if we can replicate it on ourselves? Is what I call green your qualitative green when you see the waves that represent green? So far this seems impossible.

They cannot explain why anyone experiences the color green. A strong correlation between a brain function and the qualitative experience of greeness does not entail that the latter was produced by the former.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, what you refer to by “the hard problem of consciousness” is how we account for the uniqueness of each persons experience: but I would say it is a much deeper problem than that. Just because they can stimulate something in brain that affects the conscious experiencer does not entail nor is proof that consciousness is reducible to the brain.

No, we know you're going to see green when a green wavelength hits your eyes and the proper signals go to your brain.

Again, this is just to acknowledge that conscious states are correlated with brain states: this does not prove that conscious states are brain states.

The fact that everything you experience is from your brain is not questioned in neuroscience at this point, only philosophy.

I agree with you on this, because I think most neuroscientists are physicalists and they are not acquainted with nor interested in the philosophical side of it, and really the only thing they are proving is a strong correlation between consciousness and brain states—not that the brain produces consciousness.

What is it like to be a fire for example?

Did you mean “to be on fire”? There is nothing to be like a fire: it isn’t a subject. Or are you saying it is a subject?

Just because we don't understand all the mechanics to the exact degree in a system does not invalidate the overlaying mechanics that we do understand about that system.

I absolutely agree, but a system not accounting for something it can theoretically account for is a soft problem, whereas a hard problem is in theory unprovable from the system. I think that the latter is the case with consciousness with respect to physicalism. Just to clarify, I am not claiming that we simply can’t explain it now, I am saying the reductive physicalist method fails in theory to be able to explain it.

qualitative experiences being linked to the physical brain

Again, them being linked is not under dispute: it is whether the brain is producing the qualitative experience and, thusly, whether reductive physicalism can account for it under its methodological approach. I agree that brain states are heavily correlated with conscious states; however, this is accounted for in analytic idealism by postulating that the brain state is an extrinsic representation of mental states (including the aspects of consciousness that bubble up to the ego: to our immediate awareness).

it is that a physicalist method cannot account for what it is like to be the thing experiencing that qualitative experience, because it is purely in the realm of the subject having the experience

I agree here: I am claiming that physicalism cannot account for what it is like to be a subject.

We cannot objectively know through the mechanics of stimulating the brain what it is like to have the experience of that brain, as we can never be that other brain.

This is also true for our own brain + mental states (if we were to experiment on them): we would never come closer, under physicalism, to proving mental states are derived from brain states.

Check out brain surgeries, or the case of the color blind painter who had brain damage that removed his ability to ever see or imagine color again

I don’t deny that we can manipulate conscious states by affecting brain states, this is also expected under analytic idealism.

Bob

Hello Manuel,

I appreciate your response!

First of all, very few people actually believe in "materialism" meaning, that very few people think that all we are bits of matter that can be reduced to tiny particles and that emotions are just chemicals.

That is why I distinguish “physicalism” from “materialism”: the former is more generally the notion that everything is ultimately reducible to something mind-independent (i.e., a physical substance) whereas the latter is a more archaic view that everything is made up of smaller, elementary particles. Either way, both have the hard problem of consciousness.

But mental properties couldn't be explained by these mechanical properties, ergo dualism.

I found that substance dualism, likewise, fails to explain reality as well as analytical idealism because of the hard problem of interaction.

Lastly, we know so little about personal identity and how it actually works, that it just makes no sense to say objects in the universe are "disassociated complexes" of a universal mind

Firstly, objects in general, under analytical idealism, are not disassociated complexes: only other conscious beings are. The cup I am holding exists only nominally distinctly from the chair I am sitting on: they both do not have distinct boundaries like disassociated minds.

Secondly, I agree with you that DID is still a very newly researched psychological disorder, and that is why Kastrup notes it as a working hypothesis to solve to soft problem of decomposition.

Bob

One little grain of sand, or one little atom is conscious sounds odd.

I would like to clarify that analytic idealism is not a form of pansychism: I do not hold that reality is fundamentally matter that has consciousness but rather that everything is in consciousness (i.e., one universal mind). Pansychism and the like still have the exact same hard problem of consciousness, as there is not possible explanation for how the little grain of sand or atom is became conscious itself.

Sounds like neo-Schopenhauerian metaphysics.

It absolutely is (;

Bob

Hello Chistoffer,

I appreciate your response!

Isn't it the modern scientific paradigm that everything is relative to something else?

I believe that is essentially the case when it comes down the micro-micro level (i.e., quantum mechanics). However, the idea that entities behave or relate to each other relatively to observation (or what have you) does not say anything about what they fundamentally are nor what substance they are of.

Even the core of spacetime functions on relative terms.

The idea that there is an actual space-time fabric is predicated on the physicalist metaphysical notion that there is a mind-independent world (and no wonder Einstein, being a realist, tried to explain his field equations within that metaphysical schema). Science proper in relation to spacetime is not that there actually is such but rather that space and time behave differently (in accordance with Einstein’s field equations) than we originally intuited. For a realist though, they will probably be committed (metaphysically) to there actually being a space-time fabric.

So can someone even claim that something is something in itself?

There has to be at least one thing-in-itself of which you-as-yourself are representing in your conscious experience, unless you would like to argue that somehow you are both the thing-in-itself and the you-as-yourself (i.e. solipsism).

Everything in the universe has some connection to each other, energy transfers, everything is entropic

Everthing in phenonimal experience is connected to each other: but what is your mind fundamentally representing to you (as that is the thing in itself or things in themselves)?

There are no notions that something that is just what it is, separate from everything else.

The idea is to question what exists sans your particular experience. If you died, how do things exist in-themselves? Do they at all? That is the question. Perhaps, for you, the thing-in-itself is a giant blur of everything, but that is still a thing-in-itself.

My position is that our consciousness emerged from a simple evolutionary origin of adaptability.

Very interesting. Your view, as far as I understand it, still has then the hard problem of consciousness: how does that emergence actually happen? How is it even possible to account for it under such a reductive method? I don’t think you can.

But in essence I think that the notion in science that everything relates to everything else is fundamental for the universe, maybe even beyond, and that specific definitions of objects core definition of being are made-up by us to be able to communicate better about reality.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it sounds like you may be an existence monist? Even if that is the case, then the entire universe (reality) would be the thing-in-itself. There’s always at least one thing-in-itself as something has to be posited as fundamental and eternal, even in the case of an infinite regression.

I then think that our mind, consciousness and cognition needs to be viewed as an emergent phenomena based on an analysis of its original evolutionary function and how our advanced form of experience and self-awareness are emergent factors out of these fundamental evolutionary functions

I don’t think it is possible to account for consciousness in this manner because no matter how well we uncover how consciousness relates to bodily functions it fundamentally does not explain consciousness itself.

Bob

Hello Fooloso4,

I appreciate your response!

If the nature of reality is essentially experiential does this mean that prior to experiential animals there was no reality

Under analytical idealism, the entirety of reality is fundamentally mind and is thusly conscious: not just animals. Animals are conscious beings that are higher evolved, dissociated alters, of the universal mind (or mind-at-large). So, to answer your question, there was a reality before any animals (as science suggests).

Given our limited experience how can we move beyond our experience to something prior to it?

I am not sure I am completely following, but we can infer that the most reasonable explanation for the data of experience is that there was a world before we opened our own eyes. It is very epistemically costly to be a solipsist if that is what you are referring to.

What do we know of subjectivity beyond the personal and interpersonal?

A lot. I can reasonably infer that I was born and before that my mother and father existed (for example). It would be special pleading for me to think that everyone else is a philosophical zombie but yet I am somehow special (even though I can be categorized as just like them and I have conscious experience).

Is it? In what way is this claim an explanation? Does it merely assert the very thing it is to explain?

It is the best metaphysical theory I have heard (so far) for what reality fundamentally is. It isn’t supposed to explain the hard problem because there isn’t one from an idealistic perspective, it posits that we should reduce everything fundamentally to mind and claims that we can do so while adequately fitting the data of experience.

Bob

Good to see you again Philosophim!

I really appreciate your response! As a disclaimer, I am still working through my metaphysics so I am just as curious as you to see how well Analytic Idealism holds up to scrutiny!

First, what is your definition of reality?

By “reality” I am abstracting the entirety of existence under an abstract entity. I view it kind of like speaking of being as “substances” which are abstracted entities of kinds of existences (e.g., substance dualism is two kinds of being where monism says there is only one): similarly, I abstract the sum total of existence into “reality”. Reality is being (including all types one may believe in).

How does the statement above differ from stating that the mind is simply an interpreter of reality?

It just depends on what you are referring to by “interpreter”. I would say that, instead of mind being the emergent property of a mind-independent brain’s interpretation of a mind-independent world, mind is what fundamental is and perception is the representation of it (i.e., of mental events).

For sake of clarity, take the dream analogy. When I have a vivid dream, I assume the identity of a character within that dream (which usually mirrors myself from the “non-dream world”). Even though I am not aware of it while the dream is occurring, my perception as that character is the perspective of a relation of ideas within my mind (because my mind is ultimately responsible for the whole thing). When I wake up, I realize instantly that I was not that character (but rather simply seemed to be that character when I dreaming) for I was the mind generating the dream and my character was representing it from their perspective.

My dream character was indeed representing the world around it which was outside of its control, but the “world” was the relation of ideas within a larger mind than the character itself. In that sense, the character is “interpreting” the world; but it isn’t interpreting a mind-independent world.

So there is no question that mechanical processes of the brain cause qualitative experiences.

I disagree. For example, let’s say that you are holding and seeing a green pen. A neuroscience (and biologist) can absolutely account for how your brain knows that the pen is green (i.e., the reflection of wavelengths in sunlight in relation to what the object absorbs and the interpretation of it by the brain), but they cannot account for the qualitative experience of the green pen.

In the more abstract, a neuroscience can account for mechanical awareness (i.e., how brain functions can account for how a mind-independent being can come to understand and interpret its environment) but not qualitative experience (i.e., why there is something to be like a subject).

There is absolutely no reason why you should be having a qualitative experience of the green pen even granted the brain functions that interpret it as green.

As far as I understand it (and correct where I am wrong), we can only (by the reductive physicalist methodology) understand better how brain functions correlate to qualitative experience, but not how it could possibly be responsible for it.

The hard problem is that we cannot ourselves know what it is like for another being to experience that qualitative experience.

To me, this implies that the hard problem is not how to account for one’s qualitative experience, but how other people have qualitative experience and I think this is wrong. The hard problem is that the reductive physicalist method cannot account for qualitative experience at all.

We've learned that a particular string of responses equates to the brain being happy. But do we know what its like to be that brain experiencing happiness? No

To me, this is no different than the green pen analogy: the fact that a certain string of responses correlates with a person qualitatively experiencing happiness does not explain nor suggest that one can reduce the latter to the former.

Another crude way of describing the hard problem is the act of trying to objectively experience another thing's subjective experience.

I don’t think so. It is that reductive physicalism cannot account for why there is something to be like a subject, which includes one’s own qualitative experience.

Of course, I'm not sure what you mean by "physicalism" either

By physicalism, I mean most generally the view that reality can be reduced to a mind-independent substance (regardless of whether one is an indirect or direct realist about it).

I'm assuming we're speaking about the idea that everything is essentially reduced to matter and energy, so please correct me on this where necessary.

I am honestly not sure if every physicalist would agree with that, but that is definitely a position that I would qualify as physicalism (and is very prominent).

Bob

Making the virtue true -- that part takes a will.

Very interesting: so, to you, a moral judgment can exist without being true or false and whether it is true or false can be later provided by a will? Is that the idea?

Do you see how this is different from the usual notion of will, which generally revolves around making choices?

I see. Let me clarify that I am not using "subjectivity" in the sense of "something we 'choose'" in the sense of the colloquial usages of the word 'choose' (which I find to be a vague distinction that is practical but does not hold up to scrutiny). Instead, anything which is "will-dependent" is "subjective" to me. Our ego is really a "part" of a bigger will, which is ourselves ultimately in our entirety of existing as an organism (or conscious being), and so I consider event that which is "ego-independent" but yet "will-dependent" as "subjective". In other words, I don't use "subjectivity" to refer to just "opinions" or "whimsical desires" or what have you.

But if goodness is somehow a natural pattern, in a similar way to procreation being a natural pattern (the desire to procreate isn't exactly something one wills) -- then the objectivity comes from it being apart from our will.

With respect to how I define "will" (which is not synonymous with our egos), procreation would be subjective because it is will-dependent (regardless of whether it bubbles up to the ego in a way that one could intuit as the ego's decision). This doesn't mean that I think I can whimsically change my sexual orientation or general urge to procreate. So, if goodness were somehow a natural pattern analogous to procreation, then I am inclined to claim it is still subjective.

Such and such a moral proposition -- whatever form we decide is best(virtues, rules, or consequences) -- could be objectively good, if not objectively true.

Interesting: could you elaborate more an this distinction between a proposition being "objectively true" vs. "objectively good"? I do not fully understand what that entails.

Bob

But whenever we apply the results of logic and rational inference to a practical outcome, isn't that an instance of mental causation, in some sense?

That's fair. The "mental causation" would be simply reasons that determined a choice (to some extent) whereas "physical causation" would be the interaction of either mind-independent parts or phenomenal objects. Thank you for sharing!

Bob

I see no issue redefining terms so long as the new definition is explicated and clear. Furthermore, I do not think physicality is a criterium for causality in any mainstream (philosophical or otherwise) definitions in the literature.

Interesting. "Causality", as far as I have heard it used in the literature, is the idea of how material objects interact with each other or how mind-independent parts explain one another. Depending on the flavor of idealism, causality may still exist (e.g., schopenhauer's epistemic dualist view allowed for causality as the extrinsic representation of mentality); however, the mentality itself has no causality: what are you referring to by 'causality' in idealistic metaphysics? I don't see what the causal relationships would be between mentality--it is all immaterial mind operations.

Bob

I'd counter here and say that a metaethical theory in conjunction with a metaphysical theory of naturalism is what makes that fixation a form of moral realism.

I think this is a fair assessment of what is considered in the literature moral naturalism, but when I look at the actual metaethical theories thereof I genuinely don't see any objective moral judgments. I would grant that they claim that there are moral facts, but I don't see anything in the (prominent) theories themselves that back that claim adequately.

What I was trying to convey is that the obligation to naturalistic accounts of morals is not itself a moral fact but, rather, there could be genuinely will-independent morals which are natural (regardless).

The metaphysical claim of naturalism is what girds it. If you're a naturalist, what could be more objective than your nature?

...

Right! So the truthity of a fixation is your nature, and since nature is all that is real, it's a form of moral realism. It's not like you got to will your nature -- you were born human.

So here's where I think I have to be very careful. You are right that our nature is not in our control, as we cannot will what we will because we are that will; however, what we will is will-dependent and thusly the normative judgments we proclaim as true simply because we want it to be true are relative to our desires--they are not objective in virtue of our will in general being outside of our control nor being objectively true that they occurred (i.e., I desired X, and that is objectively true if I did desire X--but the desire for X is still subjective).

The idea, to me, of the distinction between will-dependence and will-independence is whether it was contingent on a will and not if that will has absolute control over itself.

I am a naturalist in the sense that I do think we are all a part of one, natural reality though; I just don't think that that justifies claiming that the propositions who's truthity is relative to (a) will(s) is somehow objective in virtue of our will's being a part of nature.

Bob

Hello Moliere,

I apologize for the belated response!

Any sort of moral realism which depends upon our nature, similar to your:

I want to clarify that my commitment to fixating upon what is of my nature is not itself an objective moral judgment. I don’t think that a metaethical theory that simply contains the obligation to what is one’s nature is thereby a form of moral realism.

will have to reconcile with some apparent difficulties like the naturalistic fallacy or the fact/value distinction.

I think the way I'm reading unenlightened is the actuality of human realitionships require moral commitments to be shared overall in order for said set of human relationships to not deteriorate. And by and large I think there's some truth to that. And it makes for an interesting case where we are sort of combining values and facts together at once -- from the existential perspective we can always choose against some rule or value, and there are some who are smarter than others and can exploit the rules, but in actuality people are generally wise to who they can trust. If trust fades then relationships die, and trust is very important when it comes to keeping people together -- the very stuff of morality.

I appreciate you elaborating on this! I also understood them in that way; however, where I am confused, is how any of that is objective morality. This sounds like a form of moral subjectivism that accounts for its fundamental obligations by reviewing what is required to have a functioning society. What, in terms of how you explained it, do you think is the objectivity in the moral judgments (of unenlightened’s view)? That is what I am failing to see.

So actions are the value-makers in moral propositions -- if you act to make it so, and it is also good, then moral realism is true -- because the good is now true.

I am not sure if I entirely understood your second post, but let me try to adequately respond. If someone acts as though “P is good”, that does not thereby make P objectively good (although, arguably, it may be subjectively good). A normative judgment is objective iff the proposition (that expresses it) has a truthity that is will-independent. If the truthity, on the other hand, is indexical, then it is subjective.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

I apologize for the belated response.

Why would you argue that? I can't think of any rational or instrumental (goal-related) reasons for doing so.

Because that is what (I think) “objectivity” means: a proposition whereof its truthity is will-independent. I am not defining it that way for the purpose of a goal but, rather, because I think that is the only coherent definition for “objectivity” itself.

Thusly, I extend this definition to what a “objective” + “moral judgement” would be, and conclude it would be a proposition which expresses a normative statement whereof its truthity is will-independent.

Finally, I conclude that the only example of such that I can think of for an “objective moral judgment” would be an objective feature of being a will itself, which causes one to be obligated towards a norm irregardless of what one chooses to be obligated to.

That may be your intuition, but what is your intuition’s philosophical merit if it is an illusion foisted on you by your genes?

I don’t think that definition (nor my derivation) is “foisted on [me] by [my] genes” in a way that would invalidate or undermine it: why would that be the case?

Building moral philosophy on an illusionary understanding of “an objective moral judgment” is a recipe for endless speculations.

Why is it an illusory understanding?

Why not ground moral philosophy in the origins and objective function (the principal reason it exists) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?

One could choose to do that, but it wouldn’t be objective morality but, rather, a kind of moral subjectivism. Do you think it would still be an objective form of morality if one chooses to do that?

With that, you can build a solid, culturally useful structure and, for the most part, leave the endless speculations behind.

It being culturally useful does not entail that it is a form of moral realism.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

I apologize for the belated response.

You are holding now to the standard of necessary truth, not objective truth.

I am failing to understand the relevance of this claim, nor what “necessary” vs “objective” truth means. Could you please elaborate?

To me, I think that truth is the relation between thinking and being: it is when the asserted being (by a mind) corresponds to the actual being (which exists independent of that mind’s will).

If I take my keys out of my pocket in front of you, then I have demonstrated that my keys were in my pocket; I do not have to prove that they couldn't have been anywhere else.

What is the relevance of this? I see that it pertains to your formulation of “necessary” vs. “objective” truth.

The point was that you have not adequately addressed my counter-example. I don’t think you can claim that society cannot flourish with lies and also hold that morality (at large) could (hypothetically) be all lies and still function properly (because that directly counters your own point): this does not cohere with your view well (at a minimum).

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

I agree with you. but I do not believe in the flourishing society of liars. You would have to show me a real example

I think you have missed the point if you are asking for an actual example (as opposed to theoretical). You claimed that society cannot flourish in lies, and I gave a counter-example wherein society would flourish in lies. It is irrelevant if there has ever been an existent society which was setup with lies or not (in the sense of morality): it does not negate my contention whatsoever.

If your claim holds good (i.e., that “society cannot flourish in lies”), then you will have to demonstrate why it is impossible for a society to function in the manner that I described (whether that be actual, logical, or metaphysical impossibility I leave up to you).

Likewise, the counter-example was not “a sub-culture exploiting the majority”: it was the majority exploiting the majority.

Bob

Hello Moliere,

So it seems, if universal objective categorical imperatives are real, we shouldn't be able to make exceptions. I think that might be some of confusion between yourself and @Bob Ross?

I wouldn’t say it is the root of our dispute (as I don’t even think their view has any objective morality in it but I would concede it would be generally categorized as ‘moral realism’ in the literature), but I would agree with you that, yes, there can’t be exceptions if it is an objective moral judgment. There can be seemingly exceptions within our pragmatic approach to upholding the ideal, but not in the ideal itself.

Maybe you, given you seem to understand what unenlightened is saying in terms of being moral realist, can explain what I am missing? Where are the objective moral judgments in their view?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

That's fine with me, I'm not much enamoured of the objective/subjective distinction in the first place. I tried to explain myself in your conceptual language and failed. Or maybe I'm just confused.

I respect and appreciate you attempting to explain your moral realist view from my conceptual schema! If you would like, then please feel free to invoke your own schema and I will do my absolute best to understand it. It seems as though, based off of your comment, that you wouldn’t make even an “objective vs. subjective” distinction: what distinction would you make?

But now Bob's going to say that I'm promoting deception for the greater good. And i might be, but only as the exception, not as the rule.

To me, your acceptance, within our conversation, about the morality counter-example I gave is, indeed, an acknowledgment of an exception—but, likewise, to me, it is a rather large exception. How many counter-example would I need to give for it to become the rule?

If everyone is capable of lying about morals and society doesn’t crumble (but could actually flourish), then I think that a pretty large exception to the so called rule.

Which is pretty much straightforward Kant. Lies need to be justified, and the truth does not.

If I remember Kantian ethics correctly, then he actually thought that they are absolute: so, no, he would never permit a lie. He is famous for demanding we tell the truth to the axe man.

If your child walks into the road in front of a bus, it's ok to jerk them back to the pavement so violently it dislocates their shoulder. But if you do something like that because they are using the fish knife when they should be using the butter knife, that's child abuse.

For me, this is all in accordance with the rule that we ought to strive to uphold the sovereignty of wills (i.e., subjects), and, as a part of that plan, to quickly summarize, it makes sense (pragmatically) to do exactly as you outlined above (in the quote). It almost sounds like, to me, you are advocating for absolute rules (e.g., don’t lie) but yet they also can have exceptions.

Bob

Hello Count Timothy von Icarus,

Thank you for the elaboration on Bernardo Kastrupt’s “The Idea of the World”! I cannot say I have read it, but I will (eventually).

To be honest, I didn’t find anything in your post that I disagreed with, so let me try to build off of it (and you tell me what you think).

As an introduction, I think that when one takes on the mantle of discovering the ontology of the world (regardless of whether they come at it from a more idealistic or materialistic perspective) they should come to the same conclusion (which, I think coincides with how you also think that under physicalism we would still expect to be stuck in the same idealistic illusion as outlined in your post): first-order (ontological) idealism and second-order (ontological) agnosticism.

In order to even discover the ontology of the world, I think that we must understanding our approach, as it is going to heavily decide our conclusions; and I suggest that we fundamentally split the ontology of the world into two sub-ontologies: first-order (i.e., the structure of reality within first-person experience) and second-order (i.e., the structure of reality at “rock bottom”).

Since we are first-person experiencers (i.e., conscious beings), we must start our investigation within the first-order, and use that ontology to attempt to decipher the second, deeper ontology (I would argue). Within the first-order ontology (of reality), I think you have done a great job of outlining (generally) why idealism is true: we, as first-person experiencers, are always working with mentality—i.e., always within consciousness. Science only gives us better models of how to navigate the “mental territory”, but never tells us anything ontologically. However, this does not entail that what fundamentally exists is just mentality: that is a second-order concern.

As second-order ontology (of reality), which consists of whatever the fundamental “stuff” of reality may be and what exists thereof, I find that the only legitimate response is agnosticism. We are essentially trapped in the first-order ontological idealism, and we have no means of deciphering anything being that (once we properly understand the first-order ontology [of reality] itself).

I look forward to your response,
Bob

Hello Mark S,

Thank you for the elaboration: let me try to adequately respond.

The problem I have with your syllogism is that the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

If P1 is true, then we are acknowledging that subjects tends towards solving cooperation problems: it is a fact about subjects in the sense of what they tend to will (which is not will-independent), not a moral judgment that is objective.

If P2 is true, then we are simply acknowledge a non-moral objective fact.

Therefore, the conclusion does not follow that “By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts”.

Your conclusion is actually a hypothetical imperative (an objective fact that follows validly only if one accepts the antecedent); but I think (and correct me if I am wrong) you would agree with that because you say “with no imperative moral oughts”; however, you are claiming something about that syllogism just produce a valid entailment of objective moral judgments (even in the sense that they are not absolutely obligatory): is it in P1? Because, to me, P1 is the only place I would imagine you may push back with “the objective fact that a subject tends towards solving cooperation problems would be an objective moral judgement”: is that correct?

Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps.

Correct. But nothing about acknowledging that leads directly to any objective moral judgments.

If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.

Perhaps, but I think that definition is more for the purposes of noting different general camps of dispositions within metaethics, and not an accurate representation of what a moral judgment is. For example, one can be a moral realist by simply acknowledging there are objective moral judgments, but that doesn’t mean that I think they validly hold any necessarily: it’s just a depiction of their disposition on the subject-matter.

Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?

It could be a form of moral realism in the sense that I could see its proponents advocating that it is a source of objective morality, but no I don’t think it determines mind-independent moral truth values.

Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents.

The fact that we need to solve cooperative problems to suffice our subjective wants does not include any mind-independent obligations. If I want to survive (subjectively), then I have to participate in society: it’s not an objective obligation to participate in society nor to solve cooperation problems but, rather, pragmatically necessary once one was committed themselves (for the most part) to surviving.

Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?

An objective moral judgment itself, I would argue, is involuntary and is an imperative in the sense that we do it regardless of whether we want to or not. I don’t see how describing the most fundamental and subjectively universal hypothetical imperatives entails any objective moral judgments.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Right. The way everyone pretends that Father Christmas exists.

I think this is false: everyone does not pretend Santa (or perhaps you meant Jesus?) exists in an analogous sense to the morality counter-example. It is a faker, more-superficial acting that Santa exists because it is only for the sake of the children. In the sense of the morals, everyone would be acting very serious about it and would not only be faking it for children. When I say “Santa exists” in front of a child and an adult, the adult can look at me and we both acknowledge that that was a lie: we don’t then try to lie to each other about it.

but such conventions are not lies but agreed performances

This could be true in the counter-example if everyone was really bad at faking it, but my example was that they are all skilled deceivers: therefore, it is not an agreed performance, because everyone is convinced the other sincerely believes there are objective moral judgments—but each person knows that they themselves don’t buy it.

One of the things it talks about is the possibility of social collapse brought about by the ubiquity of deep-fakes becoming impossible to detect. Worth watching quite carefully, and rather supposing the moral case I have been making.

That is interesting, but, unfortunately, I do not have time to listen to it right now, so I will have to watch that later. I still don’t see, if I am being honest, how your view has any objective moral judgments in it.

Bob

Hello Invicta,

I appreciate your response!

I feel that the distinction is indeed blurry, however it only seems Hegelian in that respect if I may say so

Interesting, I am not that familiar with hegel (as I found his books incredibly poorly written and hard to comprehend): could you elaborate on what you mean?

In terms of meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism for right and wrong are both imperative and categorical using kantian terminology (if i was to really get dialectical in the German sense)

I am not sure what you mean here. Yes, Kant talks about “objective moral judgments” as “categorical imperatives”, but I actually think we mistakenly does so. Also, what do you mean by “meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism”?

The interjection only becomes obvious post fact although admittedly that is not always the case

I didn’t quite follow this part: can you please elaborate?

Bob