The relationship between things-in-themselves (TIS) and NI is semi-symmetrical mirroring. This discrete symmetry transformation across the change from TIS to NI might be related to non-commutative geometry.

Example: Gödel’s Incompleteness shows semi-symmetrical-like “mirroring” of an axiomatic system’s functions and derivative functions thereof not covered in the grounding functions. The semi-symmetrical inconsistency is general to first-order logical expression.

Math, like NI spins out a generative (first-order) narrative incommensurable with its source. The narratives of NI do not end, as designed by strategic incompleteness.

The material parallel to logical semi-symmetry is the entropy of inherently incomplete systemization.

If the 2nd law of thermodynamics is true, then there are no complete systems.

There is no complete work, so there can be no working towards completion of anything (GUT, T.O.E.).

Yes, Incompleteness Cosmology is bad physics. Elegant simplicity and the wholeness of validity are idealizations.

What we can know is always incomplete due to semi-symmetrical mirroring between TIS and NI.

Strategic Incompleteness lends a hand to skepticism.

If formalisms in their abstraction start looking too much like immaterial coefficients of generalizations of properties of TIS, a violation of naturalist materialism, then perhaps arguments can take recourse to the incompleteness of semi-symmetrical mirroring. Since there is no complete agreement between TIS and NI, the reality of the appearance of immaterialism might be undecidable.

The uncertainty, or imprecision of our knowledge of things in themselves is another support for strategic incompleteness.

The narratives of NI can’t end. Things in themselves, like their cognitive parallels, axiomatic systems, fund the generative narratives that make intelligent life possible.

Logical incompleteness, like Standard Model measurement uncertainty, stand as evidence we don’t and can’t know things in themselves directly or completely.

Speculation tells me knowing being not strategically incomplete parallels acceleration of matter to light speed; the equation goes to an unmanageable value.

This excess of matter and info, present stragically absentially, is always partially accessible and, as suggested by entropy, no systemization is perfectly efficient i e., no system is complete.

The second law of thermodynamics leads directly to Gódel’s Incompleteness.

Perhaps l should look at dark: matter_energy through this lens.

What would it be like to thwart materialist objectivity?

It might be like: moving a step further towards the T.O.E. and then losing your train of thought towards the big revelation as your little daughter tip toes into your study. You’re smiling as she’s holding up your glass of lemonade from her birthday party.

If you think my exam of the chief difference between “what” and “how” (i.e. what it’s like knowing the what of the world of my knowing) trivial, then the sense of omnipresence imparted to you by the expansiveness of your NI re: your boundless cognitive travels, puts a smile a on my face.

Our context is talking about the interweave of existing things and NI (natural intelligence). This approach is intended to aid in our examination of the big differences between the “what” and the “how.”

As we’ve been talking about the “what,” we’ve been looking at the boundary of NI. I see it as the world of the pure “what.” This is a world without NI and without AI.

When we speculate about the nature and content of this world, of course we’re doing it within the scope of NI. This leads me to say we don’t and can’t really know a non-NI world. While it’s easy to think we can imagine this world as an earth-like planet devoid of life, it might be the case our NI mechanisms involve heavy filtration and alteration of incoming signals. This might distance us greatly from the raw signals. Also, even as we think about this possible distance, we’re, again, thinking about it within the scope the NI that makes our thoughts possible.

For these reasons, I speculate to the claim our NI is for us insuperable. So, yes, non-NI might be an obstacle in the form of a boundary.

It’s extremely interesting to me you see the knowing capacity of NI as a powerful tool that pushes aside obstacles. We know NI overcomes obstacles, so it’s interesting to think it cannot push aside itself, and thus, ironically, its greatest obstacle might be itself.

Also interesting is how this irony re-enforces the thought the experience of NI instills a feeling of omnipresence about itself, as well as imparting a feeling of omnipresence for the subject of the NI, namely, the self holding possession of the omnipresence of the NI.

The enthusiasm about finding the T.O.E. is more evidence of this.

I’m going to try NI for natural intelligence.

Insuperable in my context here is simple: you can’t know things outside of being cons, so you can’t know yourself outside of being cons, so as long as you persist as yourself, the cons that empowers you to be yourself is, for you, insuperable.

The Hard Problem acknowledges that what it’s like to be an enduring self is resistant to the objective exam and manipulation of materialist science.

A big part of the reason for the hardness of the problem is the insuperability discussed above. Another problem of materialist science vis-a-vis selfhood is the insuperable selfhood of the scientist thwarting materialist objectivity.

This conversation is an exam of how the the two great modes differ, and The Hard Problem is that difference under a microscope.

For the sentient being (presumably alone in creation the category capable of science/humanities) cons being a state insuperable (you can’t know outside of it), thus finds cons omnipresent.

This is the strong argument for the omnipresence of cons.

If you believe existence is complete, i.e., not strategically incomplete, then knowing the universe exists means knowing everything about existence in terms of a categorical abstraction or set, with a microscopic volume of concrete details filled in. Via abstraction, cons is omnipresent.

This is the weak argument for the omnipresence of cons.

Your definition: “ln so far as subjects are self-reflexive… also has subjective constituents.” does a good job of describing what’s on my view screen as I try to examine the differences between science/humanities.

I now see that science is bounded by the cons of the scientist.
Since an insuperable subjectivity never grants access to things-in-themselves independent of observation, the omnipresence of cons limits science and epistemology to the human narrative, and this tells us why narrative can be generative.

Every human individual has a generative narrative of sincere beliefs. These beliefs construct the individual’s world. If you believe humans are individuals, then you see why warfare can never be eliminated; there can never be a utopian social contract.

Humans will forever fight over morals because adaptation is ruthless and desires are dictatorial.

The social contract is a necessary prerequisite for a peaceable society, so an effort towards moral standards is also necessary.

For me, independence = distinct things running on parallel tracks that don’t intersect. The tracks might converge and diverge at points along the way.

Regarding “from within,” knowing, i.e., cons, is insuperable. As for the question of the existence (ex) of an external (ext) world, this conversation is deeply concerned not with the question of an ext world , but with the deep interweave connecting the two. This translates to the question of the two great modes: subjective/objective.

I suspect what QM has done, in essence, is manipulate quantity, i.e., discrete measurement, towards existential ambiguity. That’s fascinating because scientific discovery of discrete particles for seeming continuities like radiation and vice versa for seeming things like elementary particles was a drive toward definitive boundaries, with opposite result of real boundary ambiguity affirmed.

Is a purely objective world out there? The answer to this question is ambiguous, and cons plays a central role in the fact of existential ambiguity instead of discrete boundaries being the picture on the scientific view screen.

Part of the difficulty of The Hard Problem is the global question whether cons is insuperable. If it is, then the “what” of experience is forever compromised by subjectivity who partially contradicts and nuances it.

You’re right. The wording is redundant. I used the modifier because I was trying to reckon with whether you think causation natural and physical. This attempt was made in the wake of your statements about formalisms.

Right now I’m going with the notion consciousness independence cannot be certified from within consciousness. It seems to me that knowledge can have no relationship with consciousness independence (CI) because knowing keeps the observer walled-in on all sides by consciousness (cons), so non-cons is forever inaccessible to cons.

This argument applies largely- but not wholly- to language, with the possibility of thinking and knowing outside of language acknowledged.

Why do you think cons-embedded language can interact with a non-cons world without perturbing it fatally?

To ask it another way, why do you think an unknown world can persist as unknown once you’ve observed it?

I’ve been wrong in claiming existence and consciousness are biconditional.

They are linked, but they remain distinct. They are not interchangeable.

At the very least, there’s the appearance that conscious beings are conditionally confined to a biconditional link to existence because their presence perturbs consciousness-devoid spacetime out of existence.

Even thinking about consciousness-devoid spacetme perturbs its ontic status as no object of consciousness remains unperturbed.

This because consciousness is uncontainable.

So the presence of consciousness makes existence of consciousness-devoid spacetime undecidable.

If it’s logically sound to think humans, being conscious, cannot experience and thereby know a world devoid of consciousness, then there’s the question whether we can certify the existence of a world devoid of consciousness.

Can we then generalize this uncertainty to conjecturing whether the presence of consciousness anywhere precludes a world devoid of consciousness anywhere?

This argument stands upon the foundation of the standard model being universal physics.

To clarify, the question is whether a consciousness-bearing natural world anywhere necessitates all other worlds be consciousness enabled.

Regarding existence and consciousness being biconditional, I’m thinking about early earth. Is it that we assume early earth was inhospitable to life and therefore we also assume a long period of earth history devoid of life?

So then the assumption is life arose from non-living earth dynamics.

This takes us to a pivot point transitioning earth from being devoid of life to being life-bearing.

Next we have scientists discovering physical evidence of life’s evolution from non-life.

If a dynamical system evolves to a level of complexity beyond measurement within its parameters, does that mean it can’t be cyclical?

In the case of dynamics with an axiomatic system logically incomplete , is causation thought to be in effect, but its info too complex for measurement ?

You do think state changes of a system are tied to complex dynamics?

You think complex dynamics include multiple causes for a specified effect?

If so, has it been observed that sometimes increasing complexity generates to much info to account for all of it within the parameters of the complex system?

If so, can we say entropy sometimes blocks us from making a determination of causality?

I’m trying to say you think causation a part of nature, but not a part of physics. I understand this to be the meaning of: the physics of

I’m wondering if conventional wisdom thinks causation a part of physics, and if it’s thought causation directly the report of empirical experience.

It’s hard to think about the world without consciousness or causation, and that’s why this thought experiment is fun.

Consciousness and existence being linked biconditionally is radical conjecture.



You don’t allow that causation is a part of the physics of nature.

What might it be a part of?

When hydrogen interacts with oxygen and water is the result, that this is a chemical reaction that is not also a case of causation as a part of the physics of chemical reaction gives me something to think about.

Might causation be mind dependent, and perhaps emergent thereof? In a world without consciousness, might there only be sequencing of events?

Does consciousness mandate causation as a part of the pattern recognition it can’t live without?

The teleology of human consciousness inserts causation into a neutral glob of things?

Okay, mind is emergent from non-mind.

Is causation an emergent phenomenon? Or Is it just part of the physics of nature?

When the wind moves a rock, and it rolls downhill, and we say the wind caused the rock to roll downhill, are we describing another part of the physics of the event, thus making causation somehow physical (and teleological), or do we assemble a continuity, a narrative, that is strictly a cognitive event?

The object can (usually) exist without a subject.

Can something be a self without consciousness?

Can something be an object without being an object to itself, which means it’s also a subject?

These questions make me wonder if there ca be discrete and real things without the consciousness of an observer.

Where do we come from? The void, which, as I’ve been guessing, might be the infinite possibilities of potential existence.

With this conjecture, the origin of things, including humans, might be an irreducible mystery in its particulars: every discrete, causally linked thing might necessarily be incomplete because that’s the nature of being from uncontainable potential existence.

Continuing in this vein, the beginning and end of existence can only be approached, never arrived at .

Interesting that you assume a world without consciousness is inanimate. I know you don’t mean a world without motion. I think you mean a world without self-willed motion.

In a world without consciousness, when the wind pushes a rock and it rolls downhill, is that causation, or is it a potential event among infinite possible events?

If we divorce consciousness from matter, does time lose its ability to parse infinite possible events into the intelligibility of distinct events causally sequenced?

With this speculation, I imagine time in the role of universal solvent. It dissolves unintelligible infinite possibilities into the world as we perceive it, and that world is real because of our presence in it.

Existence doesn’t exist without consciousness; without consciousness it is only potential existence.

This might tell us something about the “what” and its linkage to science: consciousness in its essence is measurement; it pairs with the existential solvency of time to render a realm of discrete things causally linked; this extracted from unintelligible infinite possibilities .

If morals correspond to real things and thus they are objective, then the “what” of life, that is, the facts of life (ha ha!) can generate a type of science, the science of morality. This is what the world religious try to teach.

The enemy of morals is adaptation. Adjusting to a situation for sake of survival often scuttles morals.

Proceeding from the belief morals are objectively real, the morals and behaviors of the good are what the wise person seeks to own.

This argument is hard to sell because it’s so hard to concretize what is meant by goodness,

Does causality exist in a world without consciousness?

I’m examining whether there’s an essential link between consciousness and causality. Since we can’t know a world without consciousness, might that suggest there is no existence without consciousness?

Perhaps the two are always paired. That would mean matter is always consciousness-bearing, and consciousness is always matter- bearing. The relationship is a biconditional.

“What it’s like to be a bat.”

What it’s like to be something is the great question that links consciousness with matter.

As we answer the question “What is matter?” do we discover that our deeper questions on the subject require that we answer the question what is consciousness, thereby suggesting all material road maps lead to consciousness?

Can there be an existence not known to be existence?

Does causality persist in a world without consciousness? If consciousness must filter reality to a small sample of what’s there, then an unfiltered reality might have an unparsed version of relativity that features unlimited temporal differentials super-animated beyond cause and effect into simultaneous everything. That might play as a beyond-sequencing explosion of uncontainable potential. An unspeakable fullness of possibilities.

We can’t answer this question, but it lends a hand with answering the question: Why is there not nothing?

It’s because you ask the question.

You can’t ask “Why existence?” if existence isn’t known.

Perhaps the greatest dialog between the “What” and the “How” is the “What” of the “How” and the “How” of the “What”?

The first question in our jingling duet is What is the good life? The second question is “What is the status of narrative?

There’s experience, but what experience is worthy, and how do you make it your own?

Is narrative merely descriptive, or is it also generative?

The two great modes have an important difference WRT focal range: “understanding “ has a well-defined focal range coupled with a well-defined goal, where as experience, potentially drawing from all of existence, has a focal range and pallet of goals unspecifiable.

Experience always holds the potential to explode understanding. The two modes, being in creative conflict, animate each other. New experience drives understanding forward and new understanding drives new experience forward.

Thank you for the detailed exam of my post.

“Why” is basic to both modes, and this conversation is about their differences, so I haven’t dwelt on it.

The two general meanings of the two great modes are “understanding” and “experience.”

There is much overlap between the two, so how do they differ?

Everyone sees the difference between one rock and two rocks. Do the solo rock and the rock duet, respectively, physically store number within themselves?

Regarding reversible dynamics becoming irreversible phenomena, is there an inflection point linking a containable volume of physical information with an uncontainable volume of physical information?

Might that inflection point be described by the Beckenstein bound?

You’re focused on the great conjunctive adverb: why?

Where does human fit into the universe? Why are we here? I think a big clue to answering that question is consciousness. Are we alone? Is our presence the universe arrived at a new plateau: the universe looking at itself?

The present state of my general descriptions of the two great modes: science/humanities goes as follows: science asks: what is existence? Humanities asks: how is human?

For science the focal point is on measurement. For humanities the focal point is on consciousness.

When you measure something you contain it. Containment of existing things drives toward understanding.

When you experience something you assemble a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into a narrative of an enduring point of view, your personal history.

Every human individual is both scientist and artist. The human individual needs both the understanding of measurement and the knowing-what-it’s-like of a personal history in order to live. No understanding? No personal history? No life.

The scientist measures, i.e., she sounds the dimensions of a thing, thereby revealing the what of a mysterious thing that mystifies her own knowledge of the what of her being until she finally surrenders her understanding to a radically new picture of the what of the state of being of herself.

The artist assembles a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into an arc of change and discovery that is a personal history through the start of adventures, the middle section assessing battles won/lost and finally reaching the summit/plateau of a new state of the how of her being.


Logic and math cover the two great modes thus: scientifically they mark and track the what of the position of the state of being; artistically they narrate a continuity of the direction of the how of being towards a conclusion of the what-it’s-like to reside in validity-as-truth, or not.

In each mode, one of the greatest mysteries is the location of the inflection point linking the immaterial and the material. This linkage and its circumambient mystery establish the wholely picture of life: substance grounding immanent form endlessly variable, albeit grounded within the ambiguity that animates the what and the how.

In your post to hypericin, you say math structures are an instance of info strings. By Webster’s, that means math structures are a concrete representation of info strings, as a freedom fighter is a concrete representation of freedom. I expect you to deny Webster’s definition is your intended meaning, unless you’re drawing from Aristotle’s hylomorphism in the following way: an info string is a substantial with potential, and a math structure is an actual form immanent in the substantial potential.

What do you have to say?

I’m not trying to make a point indirectly with rhetorical questions. The questions are sincere, and I want
you to answer sincerely.

At this time, I’m not trying to contest your assertions. You see I’m in error re: map/terrain.

Maybe you can pick one question — the one whose answer you deem most helpful — and answer it.

You indicate numbers are immaterial.

What are numbers abstracted from? Is an abstraction a derivative of its antecedent? Does a number have any type of connection to matter? Can a number have an application to matter and yet have no connection to matter? Can abstract numbers measure material things without establishing any type of connection to the material thing measured?

When we use numbers, do we make some type of contact_connection with the numbers? Is there a sense of “use” that involves no type of contact _connection?

Does a map have some type of relationship _connection with/to terrain?

Map in the sense of formalism is distinct from map in the sense of a graphic showing a Cartesian coordinate grid of intersecting streets?

I have revised my understanding of a formalism. If I can use the form of an equation as a formalism, then I can say $a+b=c$ is an example of a formalism.

What is its relationship to the concrete numbers that plug into its variables?

There is a difference in degree between refer to and specify.

Refer to can connect one thing to another generally.

Specify connects one thing to another with a concrete exactness (precision).

A formalism can refer generally to its powerset. $a+b=c$ in reference to only itself is useless. We only know how to use an equation when we know its powerset, which tells us the range of specific (precise) numbers (referred to generally by the formalism of the abstract equation) that can plug into the abstract form of the equation.

An abstract equation might be a set; it might be the set of all possible numbers that can plug into it meaningfully.

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

If formalisms refer generally to their powerset of possible concrete numbers that can plug into the abstract form of the formalism, then they do measure the regularities of nature, which is to say they are generally and existentially involved in concrete measurements of regularities of nature because they constrain the range of concrete numbers that can do the measuring.

Abstractionism does not break the chain of causality connecting, existentially, formalisms to regularities of nature.

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy), rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

This is how I read your statement.

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

This is your argument supporting your claim I mis-read your claim.

You seem to be implying that guidelines for best arrangement of signs (syntax) for the sake of effective communication are exclusively generalizations.

You propound your implied characterization by pointing out how your statement presents the critical verb "measurement" in the passive voice, whereas my statement presents it in the active voice. This emphasis on the passive voice is your effort at distancing formalisms from regularities of nature_matters of concrete fact.

Obviously, by definition of formalism, there is a chain-link of narration linking the meaning of formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) with how they're applied directly by their agents to things in nature. The degree of elaboration of the components of the narration (and the narrative "distance" accreted) never breaks the chain-link of narration connecting the formalisms to their objects.

sine qua non | ˌsinā ˌkwä ˈnōn, ˌsinē ˌkwä ˈnän |
noun
an essential condition; a thing that is absolutely necessary: grammar and usage are the sine qua non of language teaching and learning.
ORIGIN
Latin, literally ‘(cause) without which not’.
The Apple Dictionary

In my understanding, axiomatic system = sine qua non. If something is essential to a following thing that is the consequence of the first thing, then the first thing refers beyond itself specifically to the following thing.

There appears to be an idea floating through the zeitgeist of the scientific age that generalizations, i.e., abstractions, run parallel to the concrete and specific creations of nature. In my understanding, a generalization is a thinking process that utilizes cognitive compression of multiple applications of the generalization. This cognitive process produces the axiomatic system.

Although the cognitively compressed idea, while occupying its compressed state as an abstraction, seems not to be directly tied to any one of the many objects of its meaning, this in fact is a falsehood.

Claiming formalisms do not refer beyond themselves parallels claiming the distinction between a verb in the active voice and a verb in the passive voice has no connection to the grammar specifying a distinction between the two voices.

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

.

Your above quote makes it clear beyond doubt you're using the distinction of the passive voice of the verb from the active voice of the verb to defend your denial of the following:

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr

So, our debate over formalisms referring to things beyond themselves comes into focus here as a specific argument point you make in which you do the very thing you deny the possibility of doing: basing your defensive argument upon a grammatical formalism: English verbs have both an active and a passive voice, such that, per your argument, the grammatical formalism about the voice distinction, when it refers to that distinction in application, defends against :

Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr

The premise behind your defensive argument is the following: formalisms (English verbs have both passive and active voice) do refer to concrete matters of fact, with the purported supporting fact in this instance being: "Because I wrote my claim with the verb in the passive voice, my claim 'formalisms do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters' stands."

As you assume (in contradiction to what you say), formalisms do refer to things beyond themselves. So, by your own assumption (and debate maneuver), your claim to the contrary is false.

Facts describe real things. As you describe formalisms:

...they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact — 180 Proof

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact.

Thus,

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy)... — 180 Proof

falsely denies that formalisms refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy).