If a person's moral reasoning tells him that it is good to be a selfish bastard that gets over on others, then it is the moral thing to do, and nothing can tell against it. — Merkwurdichliebe

The problem you and Moliere are not recognizing in this exchange is that you are reducing morality to selfishness/altruism. But these are only particular perspectives based on moral reasoning. And until we can demonstrate the existence of an universal and absolute moral code, morality as a matter of selfishness/altrusism has ground in nothing but baseless subjectivity. — Merkwurdichliebe

Hrmmm... smells like - Kantianism! :D

To which I'd say: go right ahead. Speak your mind. The abstruse nature of your reasoning will ensure that it never escapes into the wild, and you can have your truth all to yourself. The Kingdom of Ends, because God does not exist on high, will also not exist -- so why bother, if you're not immortal, to live with a code for a world that doesn't exist, that will not exist, and is even counter to the type of being you are?

As it is, baseless subjectivity is the defect being explored. Dedication to principles for a kingdom of ends that will eventually be is one way human beings carry on, ethically -- they even convince themselves that if they repeat certain patterns to themselves that they have contact with Forms or Eternal Good or something. We're an odd, irrational species.

But it's not a satisfying one, from what I can see. Who even understands it but a handful of nerds who like to read?

It's what I term a ghost-morality. The Holy Ghost on high watches you watching yourself doing things in a moral world that will never be.

Sounds like a hobby to me.

Cool, I think we've arrived at an understanding. I understand you to be saying that it's not enough to count, but at least you see the pattern in the example that I'm drawing from. Maybe could draw a weak/strong distinction if we needed to down the road.

Gets at the question I still don't have a good answer for -- what counts as a paradigm? Even Kuhn's example of quantum physics doesn't quite seem paradigmatic in the strong sense in that it does not replace the standard model, but is kind of a science which is about physical reality but describes it different because of the phenomena it focuses upon.

What counts as meaning change within a scientific community?


I agree that the practices, forms of measurement, interpretation of measurement and use of the apparatus must be transformed -- but that's exactly what's taken place with temperature. No one uses the instruments they used in determining the boiling point of water (which is why Chang had to argue that a modern volumetric flask counted as a recreation of the experiments). We've replaced that apparatus with the theoretical "standard temperature and pressure". Temperature is usually measured with a thermocouple or digital thermometer. Chang notes that engineers still study these properties of water, but chemists do not -- the goals and practices of science have changed so much from then that, while it was not a revolution between competing factions ala Lavoisier, a lot has changed since then. (especially, it should be noted, how science is funded -- who has time for such foundational questions as the standard of boiling points or temperatures when we have to make the newest molecule to keep the lab funded, and the thermometers work good enough for our purposes?)

Some additional thoughts:

The measurement of temperature is especially important to chemistry. I could see that maybe boiling point just doesn't seem that important -- it seems like a stray fact rather than some sort of foundational concept which has paradigm-changing possibilities. But establishing a basis of measuring temperature which can be shared made thermodynamics possible, and thermodynamics is a huge part of modern theoretical chemistry.

I'm not sure I'd say that this is a paradigm change though -- only a change in meaning of a basic concept. So maybe not a Kuhnian loss in that sense, like you're saying. But it seemed close enough -- a change in meaning resulting in a loss between generations of scientists -- to count to me.

These two ways of speaking about boiling point don’t seem to
present us with the alternative meanings of ‘boiling point’. They are not disputing what it means for water to boil, or what a threshold ‘point’ means , or what water or temperature mean( these basic concepts are the sort that would be in question in a paradigm shift) . — Joshs

I'd say "threshold point" is the exact thing that changed meaning. In the old way there is no point, it was just a matter of convenience that steam seemed to hold constant temperature so they could get on with the business of measuring temperature after establishing some kind of way of making consistent measurements.

The notion of a point goes along with Standard Temperature and Pressure, which is really more theoretical than empirical. It's *at 100 degrees C* that water boils, with some changes due to temperature and pressure -- but no mention of the hydrophobic/phillic properties of the vessel changing the boiling point, or the effect of dissolved air on water's boiling.


I'd say that the equipment involved and the economic model of science at the time and all that goes into the context of discovery would change the meanings of the terms.


I'd say that what the scientists were doing to improve measurements of water boiling point would count as normal science, for sure -- I'm not sure where the loss actually occurred. But what they meant by "water boils at 100 degrees C" and what we mean seem different to my eyes.

Yes, I see that connection. In a way you could say that personal integrity comes before all other considerations -- including others, as has been pointed out here.

Doesn't boiling point count? Hasok Chang speaks of two ways of speaking about boiling points -- the "Standard Temperature and Pressure" modern sense, and the variable-empirical route from the 18/19th centuries gone over in the paper which includes marking where water begins to boil and when it's a full boil.

http://www.sites.hps.cam.ac.uk/boiling/

Came across this guy today. Cool little essay on the history of boiling points, and some experiments the guy did to validate some of the old work on boiling points that had been lost.

Here's a pretty clear case of Kuhn loss, I think. Note that Kuhn-loss doesn't mean that these things are irretrievable -- only that they are lost due to the accidents of history (focusing on cutting edge research, as the author puts it here -- or, in the case of Kuhn, during scientific revolutions).

I think this thought of the image is something which existentialists attempt to stop. Isn't conforming to an image of yourself a good description of inauthenticity? You aren't being, you're cognizing who you are and acting from that. Sartre's description of the waiter seems to fit that description. Rather, it seems the existentialist wants us to be who we are rather than conform to an image of who I am, in accord with a role with such-and-such responsibilities and privileges.


At its broadest I think that existential ethics are possibly consistent with a religious life -- a life of death-and-rebirth, in a sense, gets along with how wide the existential condition is. I think that this point of contrast is good because I think that the existential religionists reinterpret their religions in light of existentialism (perhaps this is a way of filling out the existential ethic?) And I like your contrast between the death of the self with life-affirming (self-affirming?) themes in existentialism. There's something to that.

Perhaps the religious life sees an end-point -- to act out of universal love, as opposed to from the self. An atheist existentialist would say that such a condition of universal love does not exist due to moral rules or religious teaching. These too are images. Or, at least, if we are the saints that the religious talk about, we have no need for moral codes or injunctions from religious leaders, and no amount of social pressure will turn us into what we aren't. It's not the code doing the work, it's the person being who they are! We apes are partially saintlike, at times -- though not all of us.

***

Or, being who they aren't? funny thing here -- if who we are is what we do, then whatever we do we are who we are, but there is the theme of authenticity -- we can be ourselves authentically or inauthentically. For Heidegger he seemed to contrast authenticity with everydayness or being busy. Interestingly to the charges made here, if we include Levinas, then I'd say he actually manages to escape the charge of selfishness or individuality, given that we only come to know ourselves as ethical beings within the face-to-face relationship of the Other.

Then I don't see what this thread is about. — Bartricks

Sometimes I just have thoughts come to me, and in this case that's all the thread was about -- here attempting a summation of sorts that captures many diverse thoughts into a few.

Perhaps a good frame would be to ask "What are the limits of an existential ethic?" ? That'd be a question that gets at what I was thinking through.

But there's no 'ethic' here, inasmuch as it is left open exactly what we are morally obliged to do. The point is just that when the ground of the reason for action is some consideration that is not to do with one's self - not to do with promoting one's own interests - it can qualify as a moral reason. — Bartricks

This is fascinating in relation to:

For Sartre, Marxism. But I think virtue ethics will suffice; a virtue being how we want to be, and hence authenticity remains "living with yourself". — Banno

We can call ourselves moral by committing to something other than ourselves. That fits perfectly with the frame proposed here -- insofar that a person is committed to anything outside the self, then they are acting morally. So existential ethics don't prevent one from committing to Family, God, and Country. If that's who you are then you are acting in good faith, and the meta-ethical consideration is satisfied.

I think the charge is that existentialism is too permissive -- while one could be dedicated to Marxism, one could also be dedicated to building a cult of personality, and insofar that you are authentically a sociopath you can continue to live with yourself, or live authentically. So, at best, existential ethics can offer some persons a way to question what they are doing and whether or not it's something they ought to be doing or if they should do something else, it doesn't give a guide beyond that.


I wonder -- is there some way to state the existential demand which addresses this concern? Or is individualism and and selfishness enough of a charge to deflate the project?

Is this a discussion on (the pricking of) conscience? What is conscience but the realization that one has done wrong even when one has gotten away with it? The context, sensu amplo, is the perfect murder and the experiences of the murderer, morally and judicially speaking. Is an immoral act a cross to bear, a millstone around the neck, a sword of Damocles vis-à-vis an active, unforgiving, conscience? — Agent Smith

I think it could be, in that "the pricking of conscience" is a common way people make ethical decisions -- you mentioning murder makes me think of Raskolnikov, who was clearly overly bothered by the existential situation and took it to an extreme -- I wonder if the fear holds up? If there is no God, is everything permitted? Did Raskolnikov actually demonstrate our freedom to murder, or did he demonstrate the opposite? It's not like he lived a happy life.

There is no escape from choosing and no escape from the consequences of making choices. That's existentialism in a nutshell for me — 180 Proof

This inability to escape -- I agree that that's the theme! But I wonder why is "escape" the metaphor? (edit: not that you have to answer or anything... just an errant thought)

In Sartre's terms values make demands on us, yet we must choose which of those demands we will meet. So we live with the results of those choices. Hence, commitment then becomes the basis for authenticity. — Banno

Fair. "Living with yourself..." includes Sartre and Trump. Both of them lived with the decisions. And regardless of the facts, philosophically speaking we can see them both as paragons of how they wanted to be.

An existential interpretation of virtue -- hrm thinking the thoughts now

I agree. That's probably what I'm going for. I acknowledge that the extreme needs to be known though.

Perhaps replacing "authenticity" with "living with yourself"?

But what work is the word 'existential' doing? — Bartricks

Just a category term, nothing more. Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, Levinas.

(EDIT: persons I still puzzle through. I'm no expert on any of them, and "existential" should be understood in a general category of philosophy sense. but this seemed like a synthesis/summation that might look good, or at least generate discussion ;) )

But surely morality is primarily about others, not oneself? — Bartricks

I agree.

And, after you mistreat someone, you will still live with yourself -- knowing what you did.

I decided to go ahead and vote "Yes" because some losses seem reasonable.

I wonder about the notion of "paradigm". Would the so-called "quantum revolution" count in spite of being a common example of a paradigm? Couldn't you just see these are two physics, one of the bigger-than-quantum, and the other of the smaller-than-continua? Isn't that a sort of "rule" that makes them co-exist?

:up: -- Coyne's work is one of my favorite pop-sci's that actually goes over the reasoning.

I think this is the sort of ideal that scientists aspire to. One can even interpret Aristotle's physics in Newtonian language as a limiting case of Newtonian physics -- objects falling in a fluid do fall at different rates, and the heavier ones tend to displace fluids faster so, in that limited sense, it was a correct statement, with a different explanation.

What do you make of this? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/#KuhnEarlSemaIncoThes

It directly addresses this line of thinking.

Are there useful points of comparison in this between Kuhn and Feyerabend? — Tom Storm

I think so. Feyerabend was clearer than Kuhn, especially on incommensurability.

But I think I'm coming around on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions -- one of the problems I've had in talking Feyerabend is feeling like I have to explain Popper first. Feyerabend is technically clearer, but requires more background. Kuhn, on the other hand -- while the text isn't super clear, it's not reliant upon a dialogue either.

I agree that I don't see much loss... I wonder if the amount of loss matters?

Or, maybe there's a way to demonstrate loss academically -- going back to see if there really are records and such that you could try and decipher to compare -- so the amount that it matters could be determined by academics, while we merely interested persons could at least learn that science isn't immune to human frailty.

It may not matter in the long run, but I'd say that Kuhnian loss -- even of a small variety -- goes against some version of scientific progress. I believe we'd agree here.

But the judgment of degree isn't easy to say, I think. It's a historical counter-factual, so... at best imaginative guesses informed by reality and patterns.


I think one of the reasons Kuhn is interesting to read is he was crossing the boundary between scientific and historical thought, and somehow managed to write a text that almost blended the two. (but failed, ultimately)

I think this another good, accessible read:

https://www.acs.org/content/dam/acsorg/education/whatischemistry/landmarks/lavoisier/antoine-laurent-lavoisier-commemorative-booklet.pdf

Obviously in favor of the revolution -- and really, why not? It's born some good fruits (and some bad ones too...)

But I don't know if I'd be willing to say progress was exactly what happened in the revolution. I remember watching a documentary about Newton's fascination with alchemy -- not just Newton's research but was there a loss of knowledge just by this switch distinctly opposed to alchemy?

Also, even within the pamphlet, it's interesting to note that Lavoisier looked to the youth in his arguments -- so, insofar that the youth do not listen to their elders, it'd seem that there'd be a Kuhn-loss there -- but one that's not easy to demonstrate (just thinking about how much knowledge my own mentors had retained, but hadn't really shared except verbally)

@Banno has the right read on him, I think. He's always interesting. He shares his work for the public. He definitely has a unique perspective on the world. And figuring out why he's wrong is a great pass time :D

Though, I'll say just to give a little diversity here -- in the hopes that others will share where they began -- my first philosophical thoughts began in the old time religion. People said some stuff, but it wasn't quite like whatever else was up. And really to me, then, it was all the same: a child just learns from the people around them.

So, historically too -- philosophy begins in religion.

Obviously, since the first offers hard-to- be-denied proofs and the other not. The first uses hard-to-be-ignored physical experimentation and the other not. And so on. — Alkis Piskas

I think this is the one part where you and I differ. While I have a limiting view of philosophy, since I see the two as kind of doing the same thing more or less, that view applies to science as well.

Agreement? Disagreement? Why did that matter in the first place? Not sure.

I think that, at first blush, they look very different. But if you care about them and invest the time to figure out why one or the other works then that difference isn't as easy to pin down as it looked up front.

Heh. Yes, despair.

I had the thought this evening -- it also begins in anger. When things aren't right, but you can't articulate it -- philosophy begins in an anger that wants to understand itself.

Fanon (and on certain readings, Plato even!) come to mind here.

Hrm, hrm, hrm... Yeah, I can see that Chalmer's is being Chalmers. :D He has a masterful command of the issue, he explains his opponents positions clearly and eloquently, then he asserts "But there's more to it!" :D

To be fair he's right that my thesis would need more work than some hand-wavey allusions, so we're kind of in the same boat in that regard. So I can understand why someone whose looking for a reason for philosophy questions to be different to simply not see eye-to-eye with me, since I tend to see the activities as pretty similar, at least similar enough that there's not a strict distinction to be made. We can take examples for a basis of judgment and we kind of know what we're talking about in how they're different, but it's not anywhere near as clear as it needs to be for Chalmers' thesis, I think. But there it is -- dueling intuitions :D


EDIT: I should note I love Chalmers, even if this sounds disparaging. He's definitely one of my favorite living philosophers.

Thank you :)

Re "the spin-off theory": Indeed, the lack of progress in philosophy may be an illusion.
Well, again, it depends on how one defines and what one considers as "progress" ... — Alkis Piskas

Definitely. And I'm saying that philosophy often serves as a kind of creative ground for the creation of new sciences -- it's called philosophy when no one agrees and it sounds absurd (Galileo), and it's called science after someone shows how clever they are (by hook or by crook, but people are often persuaded by accurate predictions or things which satisfy their desires so those are frequently focused upon -- but note it's not the truth of propositions, but rather there persuasiveness that's being put forward here)

I don't think there's really an essence between the disciplines -- rather, more like a continuum that as things become uncontroversial scientists begin to step in and expand while holding some fundamentals constant.

Philosophers, on the whole, don't hold concepts constant or agree upon what philosophy should be doing.

So it's a sociological theory as to why we believe these things are different: they're different because we treat them differently, on the basis of how much agreement there is.

Against that Chalmer's points out:

Only one view (non-skeptical realism about the external world) attracts over 80% support. Three views (a priori knowledge, atheism, scientific realism) attract over 70% support, with significant dissent, and three more views attract over 60% support.

So that would seem to be, relative to his notion of progress (multiplicitous, but still concerned with true beliefs), a counter-argument to the claim.

I'd just say that these questions will change throughout history, except maybe the first one -- but I'd say the first one is a conceit of modern philosophy more than a real issue, so it's not a surprise that people agree on it. It's part of the culture of philosophy. It wouldn't be that interesting to discuss knowledge if we didn't know anything, right? So realism is a natural belief for people interested in philosophy, given that they care about such things. If someone were a skeptic, they likely wouldn't care too much about knowledge and metaphysics.

I'm still making my way through Chalmer's, but I'm pretty sure that my complaint is going to be somewhat dry but focused on measurement. I don't think Chalmer's is going into the problems of measuring things like "convergence to the truth" or "degree of belief" -- much less whose beliefs get to count (if a scientist quits his job and is looking for another, do the beliefs still count? How long? Do graduate students count? What about if one of the respondents changes their beliefs down the line, a common phenomena? How about when a belief is able to be expressed by two different sentences? Does the believer believe both sentences, or only one? Stuff like that)

That is, what appears to Chalmer's to be an empirical proposition in his argument "There has not been large collective convergence on the big questions of philosophy.", while it may be true, and I think it's empirical in principle, in practice we wouldn't know how to determine the empirical truth of the proposition. So it boils down to dueling intuitions on the beliefs of others'.

"Advancing" means making progress, which is the subject of this topic. And the subject of progress in philosophy is discussed quite a lot. One of the many interesting articles is "Why Progress Is Slower In Philosophy Than In Science" ((https://dailynous.com/2017/06/02/progress-slower-philosophy-science/), published in a site about professional philosophy. — Alkis Piskas

My thought is that there is neither progress in science or philosophy, really. "Progress" has some end-goal in mind, or at least a notion of how things ought to improve. And what scientists think of scientific progress isn't exactly the same as what the public at large thinks about scientific progress -- and as for philosophical progress, that simply depends upon the person speaking since there's no means for specifying, exactly, what progress consists in. Or, at least, one can do so -- but it will just be a stipulation.


I was suggesting, though, that the intension of "science" is "that which people tend to agree to" and the intension of "philosophy" is "that which people tend to disagree upon" in many uses -- but that the extension of those terms changes over time depending upon the state of a given science/philosophy. (basically the spin-off theory mentioned in your article. The other article linked there has a paywall, and I done read my free ones this month)

Science is advancing. This is very obvious. But is philosophy? — Alkis Piskas

I think that the perception of philosophical "advance" (whatever that might mean) is being colored by this belief. If advancement is understood to mean "be like the sciences" and philosophy is understood to mean "whatever it is, it's not science" then we shouldn't be surprised that we don't feel like philosophical advancement hasn't happened. That's just how we set up how to use our words.

*shrugs* Ignore it. Just trying to work within certain parameters I don't know. You shot down the example, so I wanted an example, but then it occurred to me that the two ethics should serve as a good enough basis for pointing out -- the open question argument works between Aristotle and Epicurus because both of these are naturalistic ethics that posit different goods.

Linking it back to Post-modern philosophy and ethics, Aristotle would serve a modernist, and Epicurus would serve as post-modernist because of their relationship to truth and knowledge. For Epicurus, while he certainly didn't deny truth, the value of truth is relative to what it can be used for -- or, to what extent it can be used to cure the soul of anxiety.

Or, sans an example... it should be enough to say, here are two naturalisms: Aristotle and Epicurus. So it makes sense to ask: Which naturalism is good? If there is a choice in the matter, then the facts are important to our judgment, of course: but the question still makes sense in light of the judgment between naturalisms which posit different goods. Clearly both were motivated by the facts, but what counts as good wasn't the same.

Sure, no problem.

So, who counts?

Aristotle and Alexander the Great?

Anyone alive today?

If that were so, then It'd almost make the point for me -- that there are two naturalisms here, and even with natural ethical facts, the ethical choice remains. Almost, because @180 Proof doesn't see Bezos as Aristotelian, so we can drop him. I have to wait to hear more about what sort of examples would even count, given the suspicion for philosopher's inventions.

I mean, in terms of actual access to psychological states of the elite, then I'd have to say I'm pretty dry on that. You agree that the elite are what Aristotle considers good, though, yes? Just of the political variety?

Oh, that's not your fault. I have more than a few threads I'm thinking through :D


Let's take Jeff Bezos. The man seems to be doing well for himself. I doubt he feels anxiety. He very likely has more good days than bad. While he doesn't follow the model of Epicurean bliss, I doubt that he needs to. He's probably feeling quite dandy.

But his life requires others to suffer, at least in our way of looking at the world: there's no free lunch, and the rich get rich on the backs of the poor.

So he's an example of a man living in equanimity, who doesn't worry -- but because the social system is set up in a way where others must labor for him.

That's hardly fair.

But by a bio-ethics, Bezos is basically a good person. Specifically, Aristotle's bio-ethics would say he's not just a good person, but the pinnacle of ethics -- and that being good is reserved to those like Bezos who are among the elite. (or, at least, he serves as an example -- due to the nature of ethics, of course we could posit someone else or interpret Aristotle differently, but I'm trying to use a real person due to the concern you brought up about philosopher inventions)

Moore's open question argument still punches because I can ask -- while Jeff Bezos is living a good life, is he good?

Just that the question works is all that matters, from the meta-ethical point. But I can understand that such things are rarified in relation to how one lives their life.

So, from my perspective -- and not because it is true -- I say Jeff Bezos shouldn't be allowed to exist in the first place, that his life is a bad life because it's not fair, even though he's living a naturally happy life (I doubt tranquility is his M.O., which is where the Epicurean would criticize him -- but the Peripatetic could very well say, yes, Bezos is the pinnacle of human goodness, and we are justified in so saying due to our biological nature)

Let's take the tetrapharmakos:

The Gods do not care about your life (so do not try and appease them with your actions)
There is no afterlife (so live the life you have, and not for a life hereafter)
What is good is easy to get (all you need are the basics to be happy)
What is painful is easy to endure (so you need not worry about the diseases you might experience later)

A simple enough set of beliefs meant to target what Epicurus saw as sources of anxiety in people's lives.

But one that only makes sense if you want to be happy, first and foremost. You have to care about living a tranquil and happy life in order for it to matter at all.

And it may sound strange, but not everyone seems to care about that. The choice remains, and people frequently choose unhappiness over happiness. I think Epicurus points out some of the ways in which we can hedge that choice off -- and, if we're dedicated Epicureans, the cure is more important than what some other person wants or wills.

But surely you see how people make choices other than an Epicurean life. Seems to me the diversity of choices, of ethics, makes the question make sense: you can say this will bring you happiness, but is that happiness good?

Sometimes, yes. Actually, almost always yes, given my perspective.

But one can be lulled by sweets and feel good while living badly, I think. What else to make of a person who owns people and lives blissfully, for instance?

I think it shows itself to be relevant, but I'm fine with dropping it for now.

Explain how is the following not an instance of moral realism (i.e. ethical naturalism)
What you find [harmful], do not do to anyone.
— Hillel the Elder — 180 Proof

I'm fine with this counting as moral realism and ethical naturalism. My charge is that moral realism nor ethical naturalism are ultimately helpful in making decisions -- Moore's open question argument still works, even dropping fact/value.